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Social Capital and Corruption

BY MARK E. WARREN



A number of years ago, one of Robert Putnam’s critics made the catchy observation that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols bowled together. In so doing, they created the network upon which McVeigh was later able to capitalize for help in making the bomb he set off in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Putnam incorporated the point into *Bowling Alone*, writing that “Networks and associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for those inside the network, but the external

effects of social capital are by no means always positive.” As Putnam noted, “urban gangs, NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) movements, and power elites often exploit social capital to achieve ends that are antisocial from a wider perspective.”¹

Although it is now widely acknowledged that social capital can produce social bads, research has focused almost exclusively on the social goods.² These goods are considerable and important, including democracy, education, prosperity, safety, health, and even happiness. But the social bads sometimes facilitated by social capital can also be considerable, including terrorism, organized crime, clientelism, certain economic inefficiencies, rigid communities that stifle innovation and are dysfunctional within broader societies, ethnic rivalries, and unjust distributions of resources.

Here I focus on just one of these social bads: political corruption, by which I shall simply mean those actions that deviate from public norms of decision-making for the sake of private gain, whether these norms are embedded in public offices, political procedures, or political culture. In the broader scheme of things, corruption is not the worst pathology of politics. It is better than extortion, violence, or war, for example. But it is the pathology that has a particular relevance to democracy, the social good of social capital that most interests me here. On the one hand, corruption is profoundly subversive of democracy, undermining the democratic principles that individuals should have equal chances to influence public judgment, and equal power to affect public decision-making. On the other hand, corruption often increases as democratic institutions develop. This is less paradoxical than it may seem. Corruption in a democracy is often an indication that those with resources can no longer use cruder means to get their way. As James Scott pointed out some time ago, the rise of machine politics a century ago in U.S. cities indicated the increasing power of the electorate, and the reduction in the effectiveness of outright force and fraud. New York’s Tammany Hall, for example, was relatively inclusive as compared to the Philadelphia machine of the time.³ The New York system was one of “democratic corruption” because “the public’s voting power was not diluted by fraud or coercion,” as it was in Philadelphia. In New York, votes functioned as a relatively egalitarian political resource that people could trade for access to economic resources—jobs, a bit of welfare, and the like. In [Continued, Page 16]

Creating the CDATS Community

BY STEVEN HEYDEMANN



Two years ago, faculty from Georgetown University's Department of Government and the Georgetown Public Policy Institute set out to create a new Center for Democracy and the Third Sector. Despite the proliferation of university-based

centers on democracy, they recognized the need for one that would focus on strengthening the quality of research on the third sector and its relationship to democracy, and attached priority to developing and applying new theoretical insights about this relationship both in the U.S. and around the world.

The university was an early and committed supporter of this vision. The President and Provost of Georgetown, as well as the Deans and faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and the Georgetown Public Policy Institute understood the role a center could play in bringing visibility, focus, and direction to this area of work. No less important, the center's leading advocates, Professor Virginia Hodgkinson of GPPI and Professor Mark Warren in the Government Department, succeeded in securing a significant matching grant to get the center launched. Generously, and reflecting the depth of its commitment to the Center, the university provided funds to meet more than one-third of the match requirement.

The Center for Democracy and the Third Sector opened for business on July 1, 2003, the day I joined CDATS as its first director. At about the same time, Professor Marc M. Howard, a specialist on democracy and civil society in Eastern Europe, joined the Government Department as a CDATS-affiliated member of the faculty. However, when I first walked into our offices on the lower level of 3240 Prospect Street in late June, we still existed as little more than a name: we had no sign on the door, no stationery, no computers, and phones that sorely tested both our own patience and the good humor of those trying to reach us.

The past eight months have been nothing less than a whirlwind of activity. CDATS has welcomed two visiting faculty fellows, Dario Castiglione and Dara Strolovitch, as well as two faculty fellows from the Government Department, Mark Warren and John

Bailey. Six graduate students have joined us as research assistants. Marc M. Howard, serving as principal investigator for a major survey of Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy in the United States, has formed a senior advisory group to discuss conceptual issues involved in designing a strong survey instrument. He also oversees a lecture series on the quality of democracy, bringing leading scholars to Georgetown to discuss their current research. Every one of the lectures has attracted an overflow audience. Our founding director, Dr. Virginia Hodgkinson, continued her work as principal investigator of the U.S. component of the 2000 wave of the World Values Survey. In November, her research assistants, Kaycee Misiewicz and Victoria Ford, presented a paper drawing on survey results at the ARNOVA conference in Denver. We organized a major one-day event on October 30 to inaugurate the Center, featuring historian Stanley Katz, sociologist and political scientist Theda Skocpol, and economist Steven Durlauf. We also began a series of occasional lectures, with Professor Ronald Inglehart, director of the World Values Survey at the University of Michigan, as our initial speaker. In addition, we continue to develop new programs at CDATS on issues that include philanthropy and democracy, homeland security and its implications for relations between citizens and government in the U.S., representation in the contemporary international system, and the role of civil society in the Muslim world.

This first issue of *Democracy and Society* (D&S) is another milestone in CDATS' ongoing development. We envision this publication as more than a newsletter. It is intended to be an intellectual forum, a venue for the exchange of ideas about crucial issues relating to democracy and the third sector, and an outlet for contributions from faculty and students both at Georgetown and from other institutions. In this issue, our focus is on trust and representation in the third sector. We are especially pleased to note that D&S is entirely a student-directed initiative. The editors of this issue are Nicole Love of GPPI and David Madland from the Department of Government. It has been a pleasure working with them and we all look forward to your reactions and feedback. And we can now be (almost) certain that if you call or send an email, you'll be able to reach us.

STEVEN HEYDEMANN (*Ph.D., U. Chicago*) previously served as director of the SSRC Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector. From 1997-2001 he taught at Columbia University. His research focuses on democratization and economic reform in the Middle East, and on the relationship between institutions and economic development.

Affirmative Representation

Women's, Racial Minority, and Economic Justice Organizations

BY DARA Z. STROLOVITCH

This essay is based on my previous research, in which I test competing accounts about the extent to which and the ways in which women's, racial and ethnic minority, and economic justice organizations represent the interests of their less advantaged constituents. For example, to what extent are women's groups active on issues affecting low-income women, or civil rights groups on issues affecting women of color?

BACKGROUND

Although pluralists such as David Truman (1958) and Robert Dahl (1967) predicted that organizations would form to represent groupings of people when their interests were at stake in the policy process, rational choice theorists, most notably Mancur Olson (1965), argued that collective action problems create disincentives to such mobilization. Others, notably E.E. Schattschneider, said that interest groups simply do not represent the interests of disadvantaged groups (Schattschneider 1975).

Soon, however, movements and organizations were formed by groups such as women, racial minorities, and welfare recipients—some of the very groups that critics had argued were the hardest to mobilize. In the wake of these changes, some argued that we had entered a new era in which the interest group system ensures that everyone has representation. Others quickly cast doubt on such claims. Schlozman and Tierney (1986) found that the growth in organizations representing weak groups had been far outpaced by the growth in the number of business and professional organizations. Critics also argue that these organizations only represent the interests of the better off within each group (Crenshaw 1989; Cohen 1999; Berry 2000).

Others, however, claim that there are compelling incentives for interest groups to represent their disadvantaged constituents: Doing so can help them gain legitimacy, increase their numbers, help them build coalitions, and ultimately help them to survive. For example, Michael Katz (1989) argues that feminist groups, accused of being a movement of and for affluent women, “turned to poverty” as a way to gain wider legitimacy. Perhaps most compelling is that many of these organizations themselves *claim* to represent the interests of *all* group members. The NAACP, for example, claims that “For 90 years, [it]...has served as *the voice for African Americans.*” Implicit in this statement is that it is the voice for all African Americans—male and

female, gay and straight, rich and poor, and that it will attend to issues affecting all these subgroups.

So, while women, racial minorities, and low-income people have more power than they have in the past, they still do not have as much power as advantaged or dominant groups. Moreover, many inequalities within these groups have become *more* pronounced, in part because the gains that they have made do not benefit all group members equally. An issue such as affirmative action in higher education has been hugely successful, but has had the greatest impact on the most advantaged subgroups of women and members of racial minorities. Low-income women and low-income people of color, that is *disadvantaged subgroups* of these broader marginalized groups, are less likely to be affected by affirmative action in higher education than by an issue such as the minimum wage.

To explore these divisions within the context of policy advocacy and representation, I have created a policy typology that highlights the size and the power of policy targets, distinguishing between: (1) *universal issues* that affect, at least in theory, the population as a whole, regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, class, or any other identity; (2) *majority issues* that affect with equal



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probability all group members; (3) *disadvantaged* minority issues that affect a *weak* minority of the larger marginal population; and (4) *advantaged* minority issues that still affect a minority of the larger marginal population, but a relatively *strong* or *advantaged* minority.

I argue that all else being equal, organizations will be most active on majority issues, moderately active on advantaged minority issues, and not very active on policy issues that affect disadvantaged minorities of their broader constituencies.

DATA AND METHODS

I collected new data using a telephone survey of 286 women's, racial minority, and economic and social justice organizations. In addition, I conducted semi-structured face to face, anonymous interviews with officers at 40 organizations. The survey asks respondents a series of ques-

tions about four different domestic policy issues that are on the political agenda, and that were selected so that each one represents one of the types of policy issues within my policy typology for each organization. So, each respondent was asked about his or her organization's level of involvement in, activities around, and opinions about four policy issues: one majority issue, one advantaged minority issue, one disadvantaged minority issue, and one universal issue, which was the same issue for every organization—Social Security. In order to gauge the level of advocacy on each type of policy issue, respondents are asked how active, on a scale of 1-5, their organization is on each of the four designated policy issues.

FINDINGS

The survey data reveal that organizations are, on average, most active on the majority issues. The issue type receiving the next highest mean level of activity is the advantaged minority issue, followed by the issue affecting a disadvan-

violence against women, the Field Organizer at one such organization framed the issue as a majority issue, saying, “It’s so prevalent, and it’s so dire, it affects so many women. It really prevents so many women’s freedom and success and equality.”

When asked about affirmative action in higher education, the Vice President of another feminist organization framed it quite similarly to a majority issue, saying “I think it’s a priority because...affirmative action is one of the reasons that women and minorities have made so much progress...It has a huge impact and...[it affects] *all* women who are in the workforce or go to college or start their own business and are competing for government contracts—that’s a lot of women. It may not be women on public assistance who don’t go to college but that’s a smaller and smaller set of people.”

Similarly, asked about her organization’s activity on welfare reform, a disadvantaged minority issue, the Field Organizer said, “we work in coalition with organizations that do work on welfare reform but it’s really just not our



ALL ELSE BEING EQUAL, organizations will be most active on majority issues, and not very active on policy issues that affect disadvantaged minorities of their broader constituencies

tagged minority. The universal issue, Social Security, comes in last (all differences in means are statistically significant). So, while about 45% of respondents claim that their organizations are “very active” on the majority issue, only about 20% claim that their organizations are “not active” on this issue. These numbers are almost completely reversed for the disadvantaged minority issue. In this case, only 20% claim that their organizations are “very active,” while about 43% report that they are not active at all. Scores for the advantaged minority issue fall in the middle of the levels reported for the other two issues. Respondents report the lowest levels of activity when asked about their activity on the Universal issue.

To illustrate this distribution of activity, I will use the case of women’s organizations. Among women’s organizations, 85% are active on the majority issue, violence against women. Slightly fewer, 77.3%, are active on affirmative action in higher education, which is an issue affecting an advantaged minority of women. However, a far smaller proportion of these organizations—only 65.2%—are active on welfare reform, an issue affecting a *disadvantaged* minority of women.

This breakdown can be further illustrated by the interviews, in which both majority issues and advantaged minority issues are framed as affecting all women, while welfare (which, like affirmative action in higher education, affects only a minority of all women, but in this case, a disadvantaged minority) is framed as having a very narrow impact. Asked why her organization is so active on

cup of tea... We definitely see welfare reform as [a] gendered issue; it’s definitely something that we’re concerned with and have been involved in, but just not on the same level.”

BEST PRACTICES

I turn now to a brief discussion of three “best practices,”—conditions that seem to increase the likelihood that organizations will be active on disadvantaged minority issues.

a. Coalitions. Coalitions are a key way in which groups become active around disadvantaged minority issues, and can help resource poor and marginalized groups to achieve a stronger voice in national politics. However, coalitions are a double-edged sword. In particular, when groups are involved in coalitions around disadvantaged minority issues, their commitments are weaker and their participation is often more symbolic than it is when it comes to majority issues. Moreover, stronger groups often withdraw support from causes in which they are less interested or to which they object. As a result, it is often left to the most resource poor groups to lead coalitions around disadvantaged minority issues, often tempering their policy goals to retain the support of stronger, often more moderate, partners.

b. Descriptive Representation. Another factor that stimulates activity on policy issues affecting disadvantaged minorities is descriptive representation—that is, having staff or board members who are members of the groups they are trying to represent. While descriptive representation is no

panacea, its *absence* can hamper effective engagement with disadvantaged minority issues and perpetuate problematic paradigms within policy debates.

c. Relationships with State and Local Groups. Confirming the claims of scholars and activists who argue that state and local groups are more likely to address disadvantaged minority issues, I find that relationships with these organizations represent a key route through which issues “trickle up” to the national advocacy agenda. For example, the Executive Director of an anti-poverty organization said that “The guys at community agencies were talking about...homelessness two years before I heard about it in Washington.”

CONCLUSION: AFFIRMATIVE REPRESENTATION

Advocacy groups are an indispensable form of political representation for groups such as women, racial minorities, and low-income people. Many groups also represent disadvantaged subgroups of their larger constituency. As such, these organizations give voice to the interests of weak groups that would otherwise go unrepresented. However, my findings lend a great deal of credence to concerns that issues affecting disadvantaged sub-groups are given short-shrift. Though it is arguably strategic for organizations to focus their energies on the issues that they believe have the broadest impact on their constituency, what is troubling is that many organizations seem to have double-standards for the level of energy they devote to issues affecting minorities of their broader constituency. That is, issues affecting advantaged minorities are given disproportionately *high* levels of attention, while issues affecting disadvantaged minorities are given disproportionately low levels. Based on these findings, I argue that organizations should employ a strategy of what I call *affirmative representation*, in which they devote disproportionate resources and attention to issues affecting disadvantaged minorities of their broader constituencies.

First, organizations should incorporate formal processes of affirmative representation through which they prioritize activity on issues affecting disadvantaged minorities. As with affirmative action in admissions or employment, issues should be ranked on a “point” system. While issues can get points for strategic considerations such as immediate threats or opportunities, extra points should be given to issues that affect disadvantaged subgroups. Based on this point system, issues can then be ranked on an organization’s agenda. Disadvantaged minority issues will then be high on the list of priorities and extra energy and resources can be devoted to them.

Second, organizations that do not already have them should foster strong, and perhaps formal, ties to state and local groups, using these relationships to develop their agendas.

Third, organizations should promote *meaningful* descriptive representation among their staff and board mem-

bers. To avoid the tokenism that so often accompanies descriptive representation, they should also make efforts not to limit themselves to a “one of each” approach. Instead, in keeping with the idea of affirmative representation, the goal should be to achieve *over-representation* of members of disadvantaged subgroups.

Fourth, coalition partners should agree to pursue common and clearly articulated goals and to pool their resources, and should make explicit attempts to place disadvantaged minority issues high on their agendas. Organizations that bring more resources to the table should agree not to use the threat of pulling their resources as an exit strategy if they disapprove of decisions that are made or directions that are taken by the alliance.

Reforms such as these would help to equalize the representation of marginalized sub-groups of women, racial and ethnic minorities, and low-income people, and might ultimately result in more egalitarian policy outcomes for *all* members of these groups.

DARA Z. STROLOVITCH, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota; Visiting Faculty Fellow, Center for Democracy and the Third Sector, Georgetown University.

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Trust and Social Capital in the Post-Communist Context

BY ARGINE NAHAPETYAN

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: TRUST AND PARTICIPATION

Much of the latest debate around the notions of social capital and civil society has focused on the importance of voluntary associations as settings for the production of social capital. Do social networks generate the level of trust necessary for civilized social and political life, or is it, on the contrary, the existence of widespread trust that makes the development of social networks possible in the first place (Newton, 1997, p. 557)? Generally, both of these assumptions are true. Social networks do generate trust, though to different degrees, depending on the organisational characteristics (Eastis, 1998)¹ and “radius of trust”². Membership in some associations, even if the individual does not consider the membership politically relevant and even if it does not involve his active participation, does lead to a more competent citizenry (Dekker, Broek, 1998, p.17). However, trust in voluntary organisations, in its turn, predetermines the levels of citizen participation in those organisations. This will be demonstrated with the Armenian example.

When asked what other ways citizens can use besides voting to influence government officials, most Armenians choose positive, proactive means such as demonstrations (32%), public complaints (27%), using the press or media (13%), meeting with officials (13%), and writing letters to officials (12%); some choose radical or illegal means such as paying bribes (8%) or rebellion (4%); a high percentage says that there is no way to influence government officials (29%) (IFES report, 2002).³

The most striking is the absence of the option to influence politics through voluntary organisations. One of the reasons is that those organisations are still quite fragile. They still lack financial sustainability, are overwhelmingly dependent on international donors’ short-term grants, and, do not constitute a vigorous counterbalance to the governmental structures. When respondents on this survey were asked to name any NGOs⁴ that they knew something about, only 30% were able to name an NGO; forty-six percent of respondents do not know the name of any NGOs, and 19% replied that they don’t know what NGOs are (IFES report, 2002).

“From a general public perspective, NGOs are still confused with the Public Organisations of the past. They are also perceived to be closely associated with foreign organisations or “just another form of government and just as bad,” as one opinion leader said. Or, they are tainted by guilt of association, lumped together with the discredited so-called charitable organisations that siphoned off portions of humanitarian aid intended for victims of the earthquake in 1988 and other tragedies. Armenians tend

to associate these negative perceptions with Yerevan, the big city. People in small towns, however, are accorded a greater degree of social capital (Armenia: NGO sector Assessment, p. 17).

Mistrust of voluntary organisations is reflected in the low participation. Armenians do not take part in many social organizations. Respondents on the survey were given a list of several different types of organizations and asked whether they were members of these types of organizations or took part in their activities. In each case, 20% or fewer reported being members or taking part in these types of organizations (IFES report, 2002).

Marc Howard explores the phenomenon of declining citizen participation in post-communist countries. The author compares Russia and East Germany, and demonstrates, that despite differences in history, culture, geopolitical locations, contemporary economic conditions and political institutions, these two countries share one similarity- the increasing number of voluntary organisations coupled with decreasing public participation. The author suggests that the following basic factors, explaining low participation, will apply in other post-communist bloc countries, presumably in different ways and different degrees: 1) mistrust of voluntary organisations that result



PRIVATE FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS, though an important source of social capital, cannot be considered as a substitute for voluntary organisations.

from their experience with communist organisations; 2) strong private friendship networks which substitute joining voluntary organisations, 3) disappointment with the new political and economic systems, thus, discourages participation in any public activities (Howard, 2003).

Mistrust of voluntary organisations that result from their experience with communist organisations. Voluntary or non-governmental organisations are translated into Armenian as “public organisations”(POs), which already can cause reluctance of the people to get involved since public organisations, in the Soviet times, served as just one of the means to exert control over the private sphere of individuals. One of the most interesting examples is the institutionalisation of age groups through POs like the Pioneer Organisation or Komsomol (Communist Youth): every child after 10 years old was unofficially required to become a member of a Pioneer organisation (Armenia: NGO Sector Assessment, 2001). There was a huge number of other organisations, which, though called POs, were government created, not a grassroots phenomenon. Howard proves that increasing mistrust of organisations during the communist period seems to be

closely associated with the decreasing levels of organisational membership today (Howard, 2003).

Private friendship networks. Private network arose because the economic shortage created a climate in which people needed connections and help to acquire many goods and services, and because the public domain was so controlled, they formed trusting ties with their close friends and family. Research results show that those people whose personal networks have not persisted seem to participate in voluntary organisations at higher levels (Howard, 2003).

Disappointment with the new political and economic systems. In Armenia, the disappointment with the current political and economic institutions is reflected in a steady decline in voter turnout since independence of 1991⁵, and decreasing trust in political institutions.

CONSEQUENCES OF LOW PARTICIPATION

The above mentioned trends are quite challenging for Armenia, and bear undesirable consequences for future democratic developments. Mistrust of voluntary association can lead to a greater distance between organisations and their potential constituencies. This will discredit NGOs since one of their functions is to “interpret citizens’ requirements by facilitating dynamic citizen participation and raising citizens’ awareness of these requirements. Through them, citizens’ wishes and needs are articulated, transformed into political demands, and in this way become part of the political process” (Potucek, 1999, p.38). Moreover, this will have a negative effect on the overall democratisation process. A link was determined between wide public participation and greater government responsiveness. Verba and Nie (1972) investigated the relationship of citizen participation with government responsiveness by comparing local authorities in the US. They observed higher levels of concurrence of leaders with citizens in the communities with high levels of citizen participation. Berry (1993) similarly concludes that cities with greater community participation had a strong tendency to make decisions in line with the preferences of larger portions of the general population. Putnam (1993) similarly revealed the importance of the regional “degree of civic community” (Dekker, Broek, 1998).

Private friendship networks, though an important source of social capital (Putnam, Habermas), cannot be considered as a substitute for voluntary organisation. Moreover, to view “civil privatism” (Habermas’ definition of private networks) is to accept what Cohen and Arato call “realist, elite models of democracy, which leave politics to professionals in the political society and advocate ‘civil privatism’ for the members of society” (Howard, 2003, p.153). Furthermore, private networks prevent the creation of “weak ties,” that is, heterodox individuals at the periphery of the society’s various social networks who are able to move between groups and thereby become bearers of new ideas and information (Fukuyama, 1999).

CONCLUSION

To conclude, social capital is declining in Armenia, and, though more research is needed, the assumption is that the situation is similar in other post-communist countries. Although there is a decline in citizens’ participation in older democracies (Putnam, 1995), Howard demonstrates in his research that post-communist countries have much less participation, and predicts future decline (Howard, 2003). The case of post-communist bloc countries is more challenging since democratic values have not been firmly embedded in the post-communist societies; therefore, there is a danger of reversal. It should be mentioned that the apathy and mistrust of people is quite understandable, given the facts revealed above. Moreover, it is a general assumption that though it takes several months or years to transform political and economic institutions, it takes decades to change the values and attitudes of people. However, there are possibilities for accelerating this process. The role of the state can be as follows: 1) adopting favourable laws for voluntary organisations, 2) increasing generally the level of cooperation with voluntary organisations and realising that it is in the interest of the state to leave some areas to civil society organisations, which, due to their nature, are more effective in the implementation of certain tasks, 3) introducing courses on human rights, civil society and democratic values in educational institutions’ curricula. NGOs also could contribute to this process by establishing cooperative relations with the government in order to ensure more favourable laws, especially tax laws⁶, attempting to find local sources of funding to be less dependent on international donors, and being more visible and closer to the public. It is obvious that there will be no rapid change; building vigorous civil society is a complicated task, however, steps should be undertaken. Otherwise, the current situation and existing trends constitute a great challenge to the future since “... no civil society as such, and no structural or institutional arrangement, can act as an independent stabilizer behind the back of human actors... democracy comes into existence and survives only if enough people fight for it and are engaged in its development” (Greven, 1994, p.38).

ARGINE NAHAPETYAN, *Ph.D. candidate at Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Prague*

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Informal Representation: Who Speaks for Whom?

Framing a CDATS Research Program

BY MARK E. WARREN

Questions of representation are central to democratic theory—and to the research concerns of CDATS. In particular, CDATS is interested in exploring how modes of representation are changing in ways that standard democratic theory does not adequately explain. Our aim is to promote and support research that will help us understand recent transformations in the organization and practice of representation.

In what ways are representatives accountable to those for whom they speak and decide? To what extent does the legitimacy and authority of a government and its policies depend upon democratically accountable representation? In standard democratic theory, the answer is that elected officials represent the interests and values of their constituents, and their constituents hold representatives accountable through elections. In principle, each constituent is empowered equally through the vote and through rights of speech and petition. When these conditions hold, governments and policies are legitimate and authoritative.


In the last several decades, however, a world has emerged to which the standard account is increasingly inadequate. The sources of inadequacy include the following:

- Representation in democratic political systems is based on territorial constituencies. Many emerging issues of trade, immigration, ethnicity, religious identity, gender, environment, and security, however, do not match these constituencies. As a result, democratic governments now produce many policies that affect people to whom they are not accountable, bringing into question their legitimacy and authority.
- Formal political collectivities are changing response to such issues, with many governments forming new political entities and trade regimes. The most far-reaching of these is the European Union, but organizations such as the World Trade Organization increasingly function as powerful political actors. In addition, many government functions are being devolved to civil society organizations. The representative bases of these new arrangements, however, are often unclear or inadequate, as evidenced, for example, by widespread talk of a “democratic deficit” in the EU.
- The numbers of groups with social and political missions have increased strikingly over the last two decades, partly in response to these new opportunity structures. Formal institutions such as the UN, the EU, and numerous executive agencies in Europe and the US are developing venues for participation by civil society organizations.

- Systems of group representation are changing. Older forms of interest and corporatist groups often worked on the “inside” and their primary purpose was (and remains) to affect government policy. Newer groups often work on the “outside.” They often serve as supplements or alternatives to governments, and “go public” with their missions. In addition, in many older forms of representation within society—for example, within churches, firms, and kinship-based groups—democratic criteria were not understood to have primacy. Not only are these systems of representation increasingly subject to democratic pressures, but there are new “markets” in representation, characterized by competing claims for constituencies.

We are interested in identifying and assessing, from the perspective of democratic theory, new forms of political representation that overlay, supplement, and compete with territorial representation. In particular, we hope to focus on what I shall call *informal representation*—that is, representation by groups that have taken on collective missions and identities, and which function as representatives of issue-based constituencies within more or less formal political processes, within civil society, and within public spheres.

In principle, newer groups have the capacity to make



IN WHAT WAYS
*are representatives
accountable to those
for whom they speak
and decide?*

up for deficits in formal, territorially-based representation. For example, such groups can increase representation of people and issues left out of formal venues, not only owing to their territorial limitations, but also—in majoritarian systems—because minorities often remain unrepresented. Newer groups can increase the public visibility of discourse surrounding issues, and provide distinctive forms of “deliberative representation” by serving as “voice entrepreneurs” for non-territorial, issue-based constituencies. They can affect agenda-setting by collecting and

using information. And they can increase communication between civil society and government.

While these potentials are little in doubt, the normative criteria for informal representation are. We know what representation means when it is based on territory, and we have criteria to tell us how democratic such representation is. But these criteria fit poorly with informal representation. Some of the difficulties are as follows:

Warren *Continued on Page 15*

Public Trust in the Public Face of Charities

BY MARK A. HAGER

One reason that we give our hard-earned dollars to charity is that we trust that charities can make a difference with these contributions. We hear about the ills of society, or the value of public association, and we trust that charities can effectively combat these ills or add to the aggregate value of community in some way. Many can and do, but many do not. Most of us give our trust blindly and do little to assess how well the charities we support are carrying out their missions. When we hear that particular charities (or the sector as a whole) are ineffective or unfaithful in some way, we feel betrayed.

We might feel less betrayed if we took the time to assess the charities we support and make wise giving decisions. However, especially for those givers who seek to exercise due diligence in their giving, assessment runs into two major roadblocks. One is the difficulty in gauging the effectiveness (and therefore the trustworthiness, or donation-worthiness) of charities. The other is the active management of the public face of charities in their efforts to attract contributions.

The effort to gauge the effectiveness of charities has long been a stumbling block for sector researchers and individual organizations alike. Even when particular organizations (like hospitals or theatre troupes) come up with reliable indicators of success, these indicators are invariably specific to the services or missions of unique varieties of nonprofits. And they should be. Using measures of hospital effectiveness to gauge the effectiveness of theatre troupes would be foolhardy. The lack of common measures of nonprofit effectiveness is a firm barrier for those who seek such measures to assess the donation-worthiness of charities.

Nonetheless, the market demands some kind of common measure. Inexplicably, we seem to have found them in the apparent sameness of financial reporting across otherwise wildly different nonprofit organizations. The *only* public document required of public charities in the United States is Form 990, the form that charities use to report their finances and activities to the IRS each year. The revenues, expenses, assets, and liabilities reported in this Form have become a substitute for evaluating the effectiveness of charities. Watchdog organizations espouse guidelines for ratios built from these financial reports, or base their watching primarily on the financial ratios of the organizations they assess. Media publications rank the donation-worthiness of charities according to these same financial ratios. Federated givers and donor-advised funds show these ratios in their donee profiles and assert that

financial efficiency is a reliable indicator of how well charities carry out their missions.

Given the absence of other manageable ways to rank and rate the broad array of nonprofits requesting our contributions, perhaps financial ratios are a reasonable alternative. After all, donors say that they care about how much of their contributions are spent on programs, as opposed to administration or fundraising. However, this brings us squarely up against the second problem regarding the due diligence of donors: they are constrained to trust the self-reports of charities that seek their donations. Unfortunately, in many cases, this trust appears to be misplaced.

Should we trust the financial self-reports of charities?

Ongoing research by the Urban Institute and the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University (www.coststudy.org) indicates that many charities do not carefully track or accurately allocate their expenses, making it difficult for them to reliably report the sums that make up the ratios used by evaluators. Accounting rules are complicated and technical, and many contract accountants are not well-versed in details of nonprofit accounting. Many bookkeepers pay more attention to the immediate

demands of their organization than the arcane details of cost accounting. Who can blame them? The IRS, funders, donors, and even most watchdogs do not scrutinize their financial reports, so charities are rarely motivated to comply with rules and standards. Consequently, financial reports do not always faithfully represent the internal workings of charities. The most famous example is that roughly two out of five charities that report public contributions also report zero total fundraising expenses. This issue has been the subject of both media and federal government scrutiny, but it has not deterred most users from taking Forms 990 at face value.

While ignorance, sloppiness, or lack of capacity might explain or excuse poor reporting by public charities, there is another more insidious force at work as well. That is, while charities are not given many incentives to accurately track and report their financials, they *are* faced with incentives to report inaccurately. Since Form 990 is the only public document required of charities, the Form has become increasingly available and its figures increasingly used to compare the donation-worthiness of charities. As a result, these same charities are faced with the prospect of managing what they report so as to look as positive as possible on the various measures of financial efficiency. Some give in to the pressure to fudge the numbers. Research by Ranjani Krishnan, Michelle Yetman and Robert Yetman compares Form 990 figures with state regulatory reports for a sample of California hospitals. On Form 990, the hospitals report that program expenditures represent 83 percent of total


MOST OF US give our trust blindly and do little to assess how well the charities we support are carrying out their missions

Hager Continued on Page 15

Representative Community Development? A Case Study in Tanzania

BY BRIAN DILL

Around the world, third sector organizations have come to be valued as important actors in development, advocacy, and service delivery. The smallest of these organizations, which operate at the local level, have become particularly popular with donors, development agencies, and even governments, because of their presumed ability to *represent* a particular target community by serving its interests and being accountable to it. But to what extent are local level organizations truly representative in practice? And under what conditions? This brief article highlights these two aspects of representation through a discussion of the activities, achievements, and community perceptions of a particular type of third sector organization: the community-based organization (CBO). Specifically, the article presents preliminary findings from an ongoing dissertation research in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. One CBO serves as a case study for analysis.

CBOs IN DAR ES SALAAM

A CBO is defined as a type of third sector organization formed by and for individuals residing in a geographically bounded area, such as a street, neighborhood, or village. Both the members and beneficiaries of a CBO reside in and consider themselves attached to a physical community. A CBO is both 'voluntary' in that no one's membership is pre-ordained at birth, automatic or forced, and an 'association' in that it is a formalized grouping from the point of view of both the members and the society as a whole (cf. Wallerstein 1964:322). CBOs tend to differ from other types of organizations that constitute the third sector, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), people's organizations (POs), or professional associations, which either seek to advance only the interests of their members or pursue goals that go beyond a single community.

The past ten years have witnessed the rapid proliferation of CBOs in Tanzania. They are particularly numerous and visible in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's largest city and *de facto* capital, where unprecedented urbanization rates and weak institutional arrangements have led to a tremendous gap between the demand and supply of infrastructure and services. This disparity is a chronic source of irritation for the city's three million residents, more than 70 percent of whom live in informal settlements (URT 1996:53); i.e., areas which did not evolve according to an approved master plan. As a consequence, the more than 50 informal settlements that constitute the city overwhelmingly lack tarmac roads (much less improved dirt roads), storm drainage channels, piped

water, and key social services such as public schools and health clinics.

In this context, CBOs have become an important mechanism for some residents to compensate for the state's inability to provide basic infrastructure and services. The popularity of this organizational form can be demonstrated both formally (i.e., through increased rates of registration with the government) and informally (i.e., vis-à-vis the number of organizations observed on the ground). Twenty-two such organizations registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs



THE MAJORITY OF RESIDENTS *surveyed*
have never heard of the organization.

in 2002, whereas only four did so a decade earlier, and a recent survey found more than 100 CBOs (both registered and unregistered) operating in Dar es Salaam's three municipalities.¹ The same survey, however, revealed that the capacity of most CBO leaders to accomplish their goals is greatly circumscribed by their lack of sufficient funds and/or managerial skills. And while the sheer number of issues facing informal settlements accounts for the fact that most CBOs purport to perform a variety of activities, ranging from the construction and management of unpaved roads to the collection of solid waste, fewer than half of those found in Dar es Salaam can cite actual achievements.

THE CASE OF THE BEACH DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

In terms of its organizational aims and objectives, the Beach Development Association (BDA) is not unlike most other CBOs found in Dar es Salaam.² Formally registered in 1997, BDA works to promote and upgrade the community of Kibongo, which is serviced by poor roads, crumbling schools, and insufficient water supply. While the organization boasts accomplishments in each of these areas, largely because it received external funding, its most lucrative and long-standing success, however, concerns water. In 2001, BDA was given two deep wells as part of the Community Infrastructure Programme, which was jointly funded by the World Bank and Irish Aid. CBOs, including BDA, were granted the rights to control the wells, as well as the revenues generated from the sale of water, so long as the profits were used to maintain and expand the system. BDA pipes water directly to seven houses from one well, and is in the process of connecting 20 additional houses. Water from the second well is sold to the public by the bucket for a nominal fee – approximately 2 cents for 20 liters – which is the same rate charged by other vendors in the community.

The leaders of BDA consistently maintain that they represent all residents of Kibongo, which according to the August 2002 national census consisted of more than 15,000 individuals over the age of 18. Presently, the organization has approximately 70 current members, only four of whom are women. Members are required to pay approximately \$5 to join the organization and 20 cents per month to maintain voting rights. As required of all organizations registered with the Ministry, BDA holds one general meeting for all members every December, where they receive information about the organization's activities, contribute ideas, vote to approve the minutes from the previous year's meeting and, every three years, select new leadership. The organization's leaders (i.e., the executive committee, which consists of six officers and six ordinary members) meet once every month to formulate plans and review on-going activities. These meetings are not open to the public and are rarely attended by members who are not part of the executive committee (EC). Apart from the annual general meeting, which is open to everyone in Kibongo, BDA has no formal procedures in place to allow members to contribute ideas and/or voice concerns, or to keep members and residents apprised of the organization's activities.

REPRESENTING THE COMMUNITY?

As noted in the introduction, the donors, development practitioners, and governments have come to associate representation with the ability to serve the interests of a community and be held accountable to it. Both aspects imply the existence of some formal mechanisms to solicit the opinions of and disseminate information to those being represented. How, for example, can a representative serve the interests of his/her constituents without knowing what those interests are? Moreover, in the absence of information, how can the constituents either make informed decisions about how to direct their representative, or be in a position to assess his/her performance and hold him/her accountable?

BDA's leaders are divided on the question of whether their members are sufficiently informed about the organization's activities, or afforded enough formal opportunities to contribute their opinions. Whereas some feel that the annual meeting is adequate, particularly given the lack of time and resources, others complain that more needs to be done. Those in the latter camp have even proposed that the minutes from EC meetings be posted and/or a suggestion box be constructed at BDA's office as a way for members to stay informed and provide input.

The disagreement among BDA leaders over whether the EC can credibly represent members' interests without strengthening communication channels does not extend to the residents of Kibongo. While admitting that most residents are ignorant of the organization, and that BDA has no mechanisms to communicate with the community it purports to represent, the leaders feel, by virtue of the fact that they are also residents, that they have enough information

about Kibongo to speak for everyone's interests. When asked how they can be so sure, one EC member responded: "My goodness, it is not something that is a secret. There is nothing here. Really. The roads are bad. There is no clinic. All you have to do is look at it and you can see that there is nothing. It is not a question of going to the people. We know we have nothing here and those are the things we are fighting for."

THE COMMUNITY RESPONDS

Discussions with local government leaders and randomly selected community residents confirm the importance of these issues. That is, the problems associated with a lack of proper roads, a public health clinic, or a sufficient and dependable water supply are so obvious that they are voiced by residents regardless of their gender, age, income and educational levels, or length of time in the community. In short, a sanguine observer might conclude that by simply working to improve infrastructure and services in Kibongo, BDA is indeed serving the interests of the broader community.

But if one shifts the topic of conversation away from the development issues of the area towards the activities and reputation of BDA, the representative credentials of this organization are rapidly called into question. This is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that the majority of residents surveyed have never heard of the organization. This same majority, however, was at least somewhat involved in the affairs of the community, insofar as they claimed to vote regularly, attend local government meetings, and be familiar with its leaders. More telling, however, may be the insights provided by the few residents who have heard of BDA. As one longtime resident noted: "In my opinion, BDA only represents themselves. It is not for the people at all. It is only for those people who started the group and they are the only ones who are concerned with it." Not everyone who had heard of BDA thought that it was closed to new members, at least formally. But they believed that the leadership had taken certain steps to exclude less affluent members of the community. As one of the original inhabitants of the community argued: "The \$5 entrance fee is really a barrier for the local people. It is very difficult for local people to pay this amount of money." Both of these opinions reflect the predominant view that BDA is little more than a social club for wealthy newcomers.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, donors, development agencies, and governments have come to view third sector organizations as the key way to reach local communities, because local organizations are assumed to represent local people. But whose interests do these organizations really represent and under what conditions? Two tentative conclusions about representation emerge from the preceding narrative. Both are relevant beyond Tanzania. And both are related to funding. First, in conditions of severe underdevelopment, local

organizations that work to improve basic infrastructure and services—i.e., things that impact the lives of everyone in a community—may be representative by default. Whereas local governments in the underdeveloped South, like their counterparts in the developed North, have the legal responsibility to provide services and bring development to their constituents, the former tend to be rendered ineffectual by a lack of resources: very little trickles down from central governments that are barely able to pursue national interests; and it is extraordinarily difficult to collect revenues where the majority of economic activity occurs in the informal economy. Thus, across the developing world, one can argue that third sector organizations with outside funding represent community interests by virtue of the fact that they accomplish the basic tasks that the government has failed to do. Second, third sector organizations represent the interests of those to whom they can be held accountable, namely those who have the power to provide or withhold necessary resources. For many third sector organizations found in the developing world, this consists of donors and members, but not the residents of the broader community. Thus, in contrast to the widespread assumption that local organizations represent the communities in which they are situated, one is inclined to conclude that this will only be the case in two situations: organizational members and community residents are one in the same; organizations establish mechanisms to solicit information from the community and be held accountable to it.

BRIAN DILL, *Ph.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Doctoral Dissertation International Research Grant, awarded by the Graduate School at the University of Minnesota.*

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- 1 The author would like to thank Dr. Manoris Meshack of the Tujenge Pamoja Project (TPP) for the use of these data. TPP is a CBO-oriented research and training center, which is housed within the University College of Land and Architectural Studies (UCLAS) in Dar es Salaam. It is funded by the Ford Foundation.
- 2 The name of the organization and the community it represents are pseudonyms.

Civil Society and Civic Virtues:

The Hard Case of the Christian Right

BY CLYDE WILCOX AND KEIKO ONO

It is commonly asserted that membership in social and political groups leads to increased democratic capacities. Participation in groups is thought to increase trust, and then in turn to increase tolerance for those with different viewpoints. Mark Warren has argued that not all groups will teach their members deliberative skills, however, nor increase their levels of trust and tolerance (Warren, 2001). Groups that seek to build exclusive social and political identities may not increase their members trust or tolerance, for many groups seek to enhance the solidarity of their members by creating a perception that other groups oppose their agenda, and are in some way dangerous to their interests.

This would suggest that Christian Right political groups would do little to increase trust and tolerance of their members. Past research has shown that potential members of the Christian Right enter politics with substantial deficits in civic virtues. Many Christian Right members bring with them a high level of intolerance that springs from their religious belief in an inerrant Biblical truth (Jelen and Wilcox, 1990). Many also have an apocalyptic cognitive style that views political struggles as between good and evil, and conceives of Satan as a living being who contests with God on earth (Wilcox, Jelen, and Lindzey, 1991). These attitudes make it difficult for Christian Right activists to trust their political opponents, or even to tolerate their speech and political activity.

How might membership in Christian Right groups alter these already low levels of trust and tolerance? Christian Right direct mail is designed to increase fear and hostility toward socially liberal groups. In one fundraising letter, Christian Coalition founder Pat Robertson declared that "the feminist agenda is not about equal rights for women. It is about a socialist, anti-family political movement that encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism, and become lesbians." (Wilcox, 2001) A more recent fundraising letter from a Christian Right group warned members that liberals like Hillary Clinton were seeking to have the Bible banned as "hate speech."

But it is possible that Warren's account sells short the impact of these types of political organizations. The members of even narrowly focused political groups must negotiate among themselves about political priorities and tactics, and this might lead to a deliberation of sorts (Wilcox, 1999). As group members work in

political parties and in campaigns, they may encounter others with different points of view, and this may lead to increases in tolerance (Rozell and Wilcox, 1996). As they make political deals with other partisans who do not share their agenda, they may learn to trust those outside of the group. Moreover, Christian Right literature urged political



IT APPEARS THAT
*membership in Christian Right groups
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and no obvious impact on tolerance
for liberal cultural groups.*

bargaining and compromise, and the Christian Coalition offered training sessions in building political coalitions. In addition, overlapping group membership may well mean that even within a relatively homogenous group, conversations may lead to increased tolerance (Truman, 1951). Thus at an NRA meeting, there might be one member who is also a member of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), another who is also a member of the Sierra Club, and a third who is also a member of Focus on the Family. As these three talk together, they may learn that at least some members of these groups can be trusted.

In collaboration with Alexandra Cooper, John Green, Mark Rozell, and Michael Munger, we have completed a mail survey of campaign donors to presidential nomination candidates in 2000. The survey asked donors whether they were members of various types of groups, their level of activity in these groups, their involvement in political campaigns, and a variety of questions about their political deliberations, their willingness to compromise, their trust of others, and their tolerance of conservative and liberal groups.

Slightly more than 1/3 of GOP contributors to GOP candidates are members of Christian conservative groups, pro-family groups, or pro-life groups. Christian Right members are more common among small donors, who are usually solicited through ideologically extreme mail solicitations, than among larger donors who are solicited through personal networks.

Compared with other Republican donors, Christian Right members are less trusting and less tolerant. Table 1 shows the details. Members of Christian Right groups are less trusting than other GOP donors, and less likely to support allowing various types of citizens to teach in public schools “assuming professional conduct.” It is difficult to know which is more troubling – that only 42% of Christian Right donors would allow a feminist to teach, or that only 61% of other GOP donors would permit this. The numbers are lower for atheists and homosexuals, and surprisingly low for environmentalists as well. Christian Right members

are not less tolerant toward black nationalists, white power advocates, or militia members, and they are not surprisingly more tolerant toward Christian fundamentalists than other Republican donors. Yet it is worth noting that 15% would not permit a Christian fundamentalist to teach – Catholics and evangelicals in the Christian Right are even intolerant toward their fundamentalist colleagues.

Yet we expect that the pool of potential members of the Christian Right enter politics with lower levels of trust and tolerance. Christian Right members begin with a belief that they are engaged in an apocalyptic struggle: Fully 66% of Christian Right members (and more than a quarter of other GOP donors) agreed that the attack on Christian schools is an attack by Satan, and a similar number believed that God works through parties and elections. Thus the Christian Right is especially cool towards the cultural liberals that it perceives as its greatest political enemy. When asked to rate groups on a “feeling thermometer” with 0 degrees being very cool and 100 very warm, fully 55% rated feminists at 0, 53% rated homosexuals at 0, and 20% rated environmentalists at 0.

Recent research has suggested the political discussion with those who disagree with you might lead to increased tolerance. And indeed, fully 55% of Christian Right members agreed that talking to others sometimes helps to change their mind, and 55% agreed that their involvement in politics has led them to better understand other people’s point of view. In both cases this learning was much more common among non-Christian Right Republicans, but nonetheless these data suggest that perhaps involvement



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in the movement has increased perspective-taking ability among Christian conservatives. Yet 89% also agreed that their involvement in politics has led them to realize that some points of view are wrong and dangerous. Thus it seems likely that Christian Right Republicans have come to understand more secular conservatives, but have come to distrust and despise cultural liberals.

To fully understand the impact of membership in a Christian Right group on trust and tolerance, however, we need to hold constant many things – levels of education, age, geography, religious beliefs and behaviors, cognitive style, and other factors. Although our analysis is still

preliminary at this stage, it appears that membership in Christian Right groups has little impact on trust, and no obvious impact on tolerance for liberal cultural groups. That is, compared to other Republicans with the same characteristics that are likely to produce a deficit in civic virtues, Christian Right members are not distinguishable from others. Christian Right members are somewhat more tolerant toward militia members and white power advocates, but the difference is small and in general they are not tolerant of these groups.

We have also sought to identify what sorts of things might increase trust and tolerance among members of the Christian Right. Our preliminary analysis suggests that two types of civil society engagements are likely to increase overall trust, and tolerance toward liberal groups. First, those Christian Right members who are also members of civic associations are markedly more trusting and tolerant than others. Membership in other conservative groups such as gun groups and business groups did not increase trust or tolerance. Second, those active in state and local political campaigns were more trusting and more likely to be tolerant of liberal cultural groups. This might be because this kind of political work inevitably brings contact with diverse elements in the party coalition, with different views on issues.

These data provide support for Warren’s argument that membership in certain types of groups do not inevitably lead to greater civic virtues. Yet despite their theological beliefs that incline them against trust and tolerance, Christian

Right members who become involved in civic groups do appear to increase their tolerance, as do those who work in local campaigns. It may be, of course, that it is the most trusting and tolerant who are willing to engage in these activities. Our ongoing research will seek to sort out this causal question.

CLYDE WILCOX is Professor of Government at Georgetown University; KEIKO ONO is a Ph.D candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown.

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	Christian Right	Other GOP
Most people can be trusted to do right thing	22%	36%*
You can't be too careful with people	54%	43%*
Would permit to teach in public schools:		
• Feminists	42%	61%*
• Environmentalists	60%	69%
• Homosexuals	26%	47%*
• Atheists	40%	53%
• Black Nationalists	26%	24%
• Christian Fundamentalists	85%	65%*
• White power advocates	17%	19%
• Militia members	33%	28%
N	400	711

Table 1: Trust and Tolerance among Christian Right members and other GOP donors

* differences between Christian Right donors and other GOP donors is statistically significant at .05.

Warren, "Informal Representation" [Continued from Page 8]

- Informal representation may over-represent people with more resources. Individuals usually must step forward to be represented by groups, and those who are most likely to do so have more education, income, and wealth.
- Many new groups are led by political entrepreneurs who seek a following to represent. Members may have little voice in organization; they may be diffuse, and claims for membership difficult to substantiate. New groups often lack the federated accountability structures that characterized many older forms of association.
- Many organizations—those seeded by foundations, for example—seek out disadvantaged groups to represent. Such representation is often quasi-paternalistic with little accountability to constituents, and may come and go with changes in foundation agendas.
- Identity-based groups—groups that represent ethnicities, gender and sexual identities, religion, and certain forms of nationalism—are often headed by elites whose representative status is purely descriptive or based on asserted authenticity.

Characteristics of informal representation such as these present particular difficulties to formal political entities seeking to include group representatives. Lacking criteria of legitimate representation, formal entities often involve groups in ad hoc ways, often guided only by vague legislative mandates for "public comment," "community representation," or advocacy by client groups.

CDATS hopes to sponsor research that will build on the now disconnected literatures developing in response to practical difficulties. We hope that over the next several years our efforts will seek to (a) define theoretically the problem of informal representation in democratic theory and practice; (b) develop criteria of representation that are appropriate to distinctive kinds of groups; and (c) identify context- and issue-appropriate mechanisms of representation.

MARK E. WARREN is Professor of Government at Georgetown University.

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spending, on average. However, on the less public regulatory reports, the same hospitals report average program expenditures at only 68 percent. They conclude that the disparity is explained by cost-shifting on Form 990 in an effort to demonstrate a more positive public image.

These findings call into question the extent to which we donors can trust the public face of nonprofits when we are struggling to make giving decisions. For better or worse, many donors have bought into the idea that financial efficiency is a reasonable proxy for mission effectiveness. In the next step, we trust that charities are accurate and accountable for their financial self-reports. The basis for this trust is suspect. As we increase our reliance on these financial reports, we increase the pressure for charities to mis-report. In too many cases, donors cannot trust the charities that solicit their contributions. However, charities can trust that donors will continue to make either poor or blind giving decisions, and they will resist efforts to regulate or improve their financial accountability.

MARK A. HAGER, Senior Research Associate, The Urban Institute

NOTE: These ideas come from a chapter in *New Directions in Philanthropic Fundraising* (December 2003); and a forthcoming chapter (with Janet Greenlee) in *In Search of the Nonprofit Sector*, edited by P. Frumkin & J. Imber. On the subject of regulation of the problem described, see E. Keating & P. Frumkin, "Reengineering Nonprofit Financial Accountability," Jan/Feb 2003 *Public Administration Review*.

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[Continued from Page 1]

Philadelphia, people were cheated and bullied out of their votes, leaving them with no political resources to sell or trade. Likewise, when countries shift to market economies, political elites lose their monopolies over economic resources, and will trade their political resources for the economic resources of the new elites.⁴ These developments include social capital formation: within machines down to the precinct level, among economic elites, and between political and economic elites.

Corruption can become an established part of a nominally democratic system only when parties to corruption are organized as collective agents who can deliver the goods—usually, money or monopoly. And such organization becomes durable only when agents can develop non-public networks of associative relations, characterized by



THE SOCIAL BADS *sometimes facilitated by social capital can also be considerable, including terrorism, organized crime, clientelism ... and unjust distributions of resources.*

trust, reciprocity, and enforceable norms.⁵ Indeed, given that the corrupt usually cannot appeal to the rule of law or public opinion to enforce their exchanges, social capital carries a relatively greater burden than in non-corrupt exchanges.

But if social capital both enables democracy and enables the corruption of democracy, it is clear that the concept lacks the normative and analytical bite we should expect it to have. From a normative perspective, the concept of social capital will do less than it should if it cannot provide distinctions that enable us to know which kinds or functions of social capital are good, and which are bad. Can we say anything about what kinds and functions of social capital are likely to produce negative externalities?

IS IT POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BAD SOCIAL CAPITAL?

One answer—the most common answer—is quite correct, but not as helpful as we might like. This answer follows from James Coleman⁶: social capital is not one thing, but rather numerous kinds of social relations grouped according to their function in producing returns to individuals. The same kind of social relation might be good in one context, but bad in another. It follows that to get beyond the abstractions of the concept requires contextual analysis. We need to ask, case by case, how social relations are functioning as social capital.⁷

But we may be able to do better if we can define more exactly what is at stake. This will require some care, since the concept of social capital is so closely bound to normative distinctions, which are in turn related to the social and political contexts that make them effective. Here is an outline of the conceptual strategy I propose:

1. As noted above, the social “goods” and “bads” of social capital refer to its functions. Functions are, in part, normatively defined. So, we tend to say that social capital functions in a good way when its consequences support democracy, tolerance, equality, economic prosperity, health, and community. These are normative judgments that can be supported by normative arguments. Negative externalities of social capital are defined as “bad” relative to these goods.
2. Insofar as they are effective within a society, definitions of these goods as “good” are not, ultimately, decided by social scientists, political theorists, and philosophers, but rather by more or less explicit processes of social interpretation. While some of these interpretations are virtually unanimous (e.g., physical health is good), others are contested. People have differing views of the value of tolerance, community, and economic prosperity, for example, especially when they trade off against other goods, such as moral identity, individual liberty, and environmental integrity. Under the best circumstances, these goods and their relative values are defined through on-going and inclusive public debates and deliberations, enabled by democratic rights, protections, and supports. As an epistemological matter, when these processes do not exist, negative externalities are more difficult to define because the victims are less likely to be able to identify and voice the costs they bear.
3. Social capital is more likely to function in negative ways under conditions that leave those who bear the costs of negative externalities—the victims—without the resources to resist the externalities. Democratic theory suggests that there should be a close connection between



CORRUPTION IS NOT THE WORST *pathology of politics. It is better than extortion, violence, or war, for example.*

unequally distributed background empowerments and the negative functioning of social capital. When power relations between groups are more equal, there is also a greater likelihood that groups can limit or reinternalize costs that other groups seek to impose.⁸

4. Combining (2) and (3), it follows that whether social capital functions as good or bad depends upon the degree of democracy, not only for the normative re-

sources involved in the very distinction itself, but also as a structural and institutional matter, that is, whether people are empowered to pressure, bargain, and persuade as ways of limiting negative externalities. That is, the very idea of bad social capital is parasitic on these two dimensions of democracy. It follows that there is a *prima facie* case for defining those externalities as negative that undermine either or both dimensions of democracy—equal inclusion in public judgment, and equal empowerment to resist negative externalities—whatever other externalities are defined as negative. Thus, for example, political corruption is bad, as are distributions of political and economic powers that produce vulnerabilities. Intolerance empowered in ways that exclude classes of people from public deliberation is bad because it damages public judgment. On the other hand, goods such as community depend on the ongoing definitions of public conversations for their definitions.

DISTINCTIONS OF SOURCE AND FUNCTION

If we keep these conceptual preconditions in mind, I suggest that we can distinguish good and bad social capital at two levels, anticipating widely agreed criteria of democracy:

- The common distinctions of “kind” are really distinctions in the dispositional sources of social capital in trust and reciprocity.⁹ Some sources of social capital will function according to democratic criteria better than others.
- Distinctions of “function” depend upon how these dispositions are embedded within institutions and structures that provide (or block) access to resources. Sources of social capital will function in better or worse ways depending upon how they combine with resources.

Thus, if we begin with a broadly agreed negative consequence of social capital such as political corruption, then we might locate some combined distinction of source and function that would help predict negative externalities.

The question here is whether some kinds of contexts are more likely to lead to negative social capital. My proposal is that contexts favor negative social capital when they make it *easier* for groups to generate negative externalities, and *harder* for those subject to negative externalities to resist. Those forms of social capital that can generate negative externalities are more likely to do so within inegalitarian contexts. Or, put in the language of Lin¹⁰ and Coleman, resource relations differ in their symmetry. “Symmetry” and “asymmetry” are also ways of describing power relations, and thus actors’ relative vulnerabilities. And relative vulnerabilities affect actors’ capacities to resist negative externalities of social capital, which in turn affects the question as to whether the sources of social capital function in good or bad ways.

DISTRIBUTIONS OF POLITICAL POWERS

While I do not have the space here to develop the implications of these ideas, they are confirmed by a number of more specific propositions about corruption that in many cases are well known and studied.¹¹ Here are some of them. Corruption is more likely where some elements of democracy are established (limiting the uses of outright force and fraud), but the protective and empowering institutions remain weak, or the reach of empowerments is limited. Clientelism, often associated with corruption, thrives on the political equivalents of protection rackets.



CONTEXTS FAVOR NEGATIVE *social capital*
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In addition, corruption thrives where there are weak institutional checks and oversight. Excessive bureaucratic rules and red tape can limit access to government powers and resources, and can be used by officials as power, especially where they have discretion in interpreting and applying regulations. Courts and administrative systems for citizens to use to enforce their rights function to transform rights into favors that can be used by political elites. Weak mass political parties will lack the capacity to discipline politicians, who will often seek election based on the targeted favors they can provide for constituents. Last but not least, robust public spheres function not only to define the goods and bads of externalities—what counts as “corrupt”—but also to expose corruption, and raise the risks for those who engage in corruption.

DISTRIBUTIONS OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES

Distributions of economic opportunities and protections make a difference. Again, the overall patterns are complex, but many of the possibilities are well known. Economies that develop without a parallel political openness—China, for example—produce entrepreneurs who seek to use state monopoly powers to impose “rents” on people who need their products. For their part, political elites gain access to new economic resources by trading these powers. Under conditions of mass democracy without welfare rights and protections, economically vulnerable groups have incentives to trade their votes for economic protection. Widely distributed economic opportunities and securities reduce the opportunities for elites to exploit vulnerabilities. As in machine politics and clientelism, corrupt exchanges are based upon and

produce a hierarchical fabric of obligations based on the norm of reciprocity. A similar logic works within the social services in the U.S., especially within the subsidized housing market and Medicaid. Both programs provide the incentives for corruption, owing both to the difficulties of overseeing privatized welfare provision, and to the economic vulnerability of the clients. Finally, individuals in regions with few economic opportunities have incentives to join in illegal markets and protect them with their accumulated social capital.

CULTURAL VULNERABILITIES

Although culture can serve as a source of social capital when it reinforces trust and reciprocity, it can also be considered as a structured context of normative rules and expectations. From a structural perspective, can we speak of cultural vulnerabilities embedded in networks and communities that might cause social capital to function in negative ways? By “cultural vulnerabilities,” I mean the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that have to do with the norms and identities that define groups. There are, of course, many examples: ethnic communalism generates vulnerabilities for individuals both within (since they are tied to the community) and without (since communal obligations do not extend beyond the community). Coleman’s interesting notion that normative systems differ in their degree of closure—that is, the extent to which actors within a network can impose and enforce expectations—helps to generalize this observation. When networks are closed, Coleman argues, actors within them have more social capital because they can rely on others within the network. At the same time, members of closed networks experience the expectations of others as obligatory: they can rely on expectations, but also have expectations imposed upon them. Good reputation counts, but it is not up to the individual what is going to count as good reputation.¹² Moreover, Coleman suggests, closure tends toward symmetry, and hence toward an equality of obligation that reduces members’ vulnerabilities to one another.

Now, let us speculate that the social space over which networks are closed might vary, from highly segmented societies with many relatively separate closed systems (e.g., ethnic communalism in the Balkans), to societies that are themselves closed systems based on more universal ethics of reciprocal obligations (e.g., the Scandinavian countries). In addition, a liberal pluralistic society might combine these systems, so that in the “private” domain of personal relations and association one set of expectations apply, while in “public life” a broader system of recognitions and reciprocal obligations holds sway (e.g., Canada). These possibilities are indicated in Table 1.

Broader systems of closure will provide a background that will support generalized reciprocity and trust. That is, individuals can act on these dispositions without fear that they will be “suckered”; their social generosity and opti-

Domain of Closure	Cleavages	
	SEGMENTED	OVERLAPPING
<i>Broad</i>	Inclusive bonding social capital (National community)	Bonding mediated by bridging social capital (Liberal pluralism)
<i>Narrow</i>	Exclusive bonding social capital (Segmented pluralism, ethnic communalism; favorable conditions for corruption)	

Table 1: Impact of network closure on kinds of social capital

mism will tend to be supported by others, with the overall effect of supporting good social capital. It is equally clear, however, that narrow, segmented closure such as might be found within an ethnic enclave will generate social capital. But it will do so by decreasing an individual’s autonomy and increasing his vulnerability, both to his own community and to those of outsiders. All other things being equal, these conditions are more likely to support bad social capital, including corruption, since there exist no cultural barriers to externalizing costs onto other groups.

CONCLUSION

I have sought to make three interrelated arguments. The first is purely conceptual: the normative logic of social capital should cause us to focus on the social externalities of social relations. Some of these externalities, such as political corruption, are negative. The second argument is that we can refine the theory of social capital in ways that help distinguish better and worse kinds of social capital. The third argument is both more speculative and more substantive: the more political, economic, and cultural democracy exists, the more likely social capital will function in good ways. The argument for democracy is simple: democracy tends toward more equal empowerments of individuals. Empowerments are generative: by reducing vulnerabilities they act directly on the precursors of association, which in turn provides individuals with social capital they can use to resist imposed externalities.¹³ In theory, more egalitarian distributions of social capital should, reduce the tendencies for social capital to produce social bads such as political corruption.

MARK E. WARREN is Professor of Government at Georgetown University. This article is excerpted from his presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association National Annual Conference, Palmer House, Chicago, April 3-6, 2003.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 21-22.
- 2 Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 1-24, 15-18.
- 3 James Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 94.
- 4 Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, 32.
- 5 See Donatella della Porta's and Alberto Vannucci's extensive account of the social relations that sustained political corruption in Italy, in *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption* (New York: Walter de Gruyter 1999).
- 6 James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
- 7 Cf. Tom Schuller, Stephen Baron, and John Field, "Social Capital: A Review and Critique," in *Social Capital: Critical Perspectives*, edited by Stephen Baron, John Field, and Tom Schuller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 1-38, 36-36.
- 8 This formulation relies on theories of associative democracy that focus on equalizing group powers to resist and negotiate externalized costs. See, e.g., Claus Offe, *Modernity and the State: East, West* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) chaps. 1, 2, and from Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 6.
- 9 Coleman tends to confuse sources and functions in ways that make his list of "kinds" less useful for identifying externalities that are negative for democracy. Thus, although Coleman includes authority relations as a kind of social capital, it is not clear whether it is the norm of authority that enhances an authority's capacity to call on the performance of others, or the fact that the authority holds a position that enables him to offer or withhold resources in order to gain performance. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory*, 311. That is, Coleman blurs the (normatively) crucial question as to whether social relations reflect normative attachments, or whether they reflect political and economic power relations.
- 10 Nan Lin, *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- 11 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Robert Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*; and della Porta and Vannucci, *Corrupt Exchanges*.
- 12 Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory*, 318-20. Cf. John B. Thompson's account of reputation as a kind of "symbolic capital" in *Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), 245-52.
- 13 Cf. Lin, *Social Capital*, 194-95: "When a number of actors share alternative rules or values and being to connect, the network may sustain their shared interests through solidarity and reciprocal reinforcement.... As the network expands and the number of participating actors increases, the pool of social capital increases. As shared resources grow, there is an increasing likelihood of a social movement, a process that can transform one or more prevailing institutions."

Nahapetyan [Continued from Page 7]

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ENDNOTES

- 1 Eastis (1998) conducted research in two choral groups, the Collegium Musicum, which is an ensemble of the university Department of Music and has membership restricted to the university community of professional singers of early music, and the community chorus which welcomes everybody to join with no indication of professionalism. The author comes to the conclusion that while collegium generates more stronger trust among the members, it does not expand the social networks that participants might draw on a broader social life beyond university. At the same time, the chorus does develop a broader social network. However, the bonds among participants are not strengthened by any values, the organisation's activity does little to foster trust in complex issues.
- 2 For example, Fukuyama (1999) mentions that all groups embodying social capital have a certain radius of trust, that is, the circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative. If a group's social capital produces positive externalities, the radius of trust can be larger than the group itself.
- 3 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) report. The 2002 survey was conducted throughout Armenia with 1,600 adult respondents. The results in this report are based on weighted data that is representative of the national population of Armenia. The margin of error for a sample of this size is plus or minus 2.5%.
- 4 The term NGO (non-governmental organisation) is used interchangeably with the terms voluntary or non-profit organisations.
- 5 It is enough to mention the first presidential election of October 16, 1991, voter turnout—80%, and the recent parliamentary elections of May 25, 2003, 51, 21% (source: Central Electoral Commission reports).
- 6 According to the current tax laws, an NGO is required to pay the same taxes as a business enterprise, therefore, most of the NGOs are reluctant to get engaged in entrepreneurial activities.

Book Reviews

Democracy & Society

Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy by Archon Fung
Reviewed by Mark Carl Rom

Restoration of the Republic: The Jeffersonian Ideal in 21st-Century America by Gary Hart
Reviewed by Jonathan Monten

Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements by Francesca Polletta
Reviewed by Caitlin Halferty

The Social Construction of Trust by Linda R. Weber and Allison I. Carter
Reviewed by Andrew Tucker

Inclusion and Democracy by Iris Marion Young
Reviewed by Kristen L. Fauson

Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America by Leonardo Avritzer
Reviewed by Rachel Bowen



■ *Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy*. By Archon Fung. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Forthcoming 2004

REVIEW BY MARK CARL ROM, *Associate Professor of Government and Public Policy, Georgetown University*

Harvard Professor Archon Fung has written a wonderful book: theoretically compelling, analytically insightful, empirically careful. It is a highly-skilled merger of arguments in democratic theory and applications in real world situations. It is well-written, clean, (almost) jargon-free and compelling. The book is a rich and deep inquiry into Chicago's democratic experiments in community policing and educational governance.

Fung's argument moves at several levels. First, he is concerned with how to make governments more democratic and more effective. He compares 'empowered participation' (or 'accountable autonomy') with market-based or bureaucratic reforms. He gives a sensitive account of the latter two forms, and so does not create 'straw men' for his arguments. Although he is convinced that empowered participation *can* be superior to these other reforms in terms of both democracy and effectiveness, he does not merely assert it, but carefully assesses it. He raises important theoretical challenges to empowered participation. He argues that empowered participation might not work well due to self interest (the rational choice critique), unequal starting positions (the strong egalitarian critique), inadequate so-

cial capital, cultural/economic heterogeneity, or lack of expertise. In assessing these counter arguments, he points out their strengths as well as their weaknesses. On the whole, he suggests that empowered participation can work given self interest, inequality, inadequate capital, heterogeneity, and inadequate expertise. Perhaps more importantly, he shows empirically that these conditions do not condemn empowered participation to failure. They are challenges, but not insurmountable barriers.

Fung focuses on two on-going experiments in democratic governance in Chicago. In the first, the Illinois legislature enacted legislation that shifted power away from the Chicago public school's central administration by creating 580 Local School Councils (LSCs), one for every elementary and high school in the city. The LSCs are bodies elected by members of the school community, and consist of two community members, two school staffers, and the principal. The LSCs are empowered to select principals, develop school governance plans and visions, and spend discretionary funds. These powers allow the individual schools to develop and implement their own educational visions. In the second, the Chicago Police Department created the Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), which involves ordinary residents and street-level police officers to determine policing priorities and approaches in the 280 neighborhood 'beats'. CAPS do not have the power to hire and fire police officers, but they do hold monthly open meetings to identify problems and develop strategies for addressing them.

Fung's work contains some quantitative work concerning participation, inequality, heterogeneity, and so forth. This work is solid but not high tech. Fung also presents a series of case studies (concerning public schools and police work) on various Chicago neighborhoods with differing economic and ethnic characteristics. His work is especially solid here, as he shows where empowered participation works and where it has been ineffective; he uses a simple analytical model to predict these outcomes.


In his concluding chapter, Fung draws four main conclusions from his research. First, "initial conditions bear importantly on democratic performance": more highly advantaged areas had more success than those less advantaged. Second, "inclusive participation and fair deliberation depend crucially on the *implementation* of the centralized elements of accountable autonomy—the administrative provision of resources for mobilization, training, and facilitation—especially under unfavorable initial conditions." Third, "the institutional outcomes in all of the cases were higher under accountable autonomy than under command-and-control arrangements." Finally—and perhaps most importantly—the least advantaged cases "gained much more from accountable autonomy *relative to what insular bureaucratic arrangements had given them...* [with one exception] all less advantaged [cases] in terms of their initial conditions benefited much more because accountable autonomy created new opportunities for voice and popular engagement."

One thing that Fung does not demonstrate is exactly why he chose to examine the empowered participation experiments in Chicago. He asserts that they are the best experiments to examine, but he does not really show that this is the case. One might easily imagine that there other models that might broaden his analysis and ability to generalize.

This book will be widely read and cited. It will be useful to scholars and also to policy advocates; not many books can make that claim.

■ *Restoration of the Republic: The Jeffersonian Ideal in 21st-Century America.* By Gary Hart. Oxford University Press. 2002

REVIEW BY JONATHAN MONTEN, *Ph.D. Candidate,*
Georgetown University



In a field not known for its dramatic irony, Gary Hart has resoundingly answered Walter Mondale's taunting question, "Where's the beef?" First written as a doctoral dissertation at Oxford University, *Restoration of the Republic* represents Hart's attempt to produce a work of some scholarly interest, and he has succeeded with a rare book

that combines political theory and policy prescription. Frequently referencing his role as co-chair of the US Commission on National Security/Twenty-First Century, and at the time evidently entertaining a new presidential run (activities that do not divert the attention of most graduate students), Hart revitalizes Thomas Jefferson's idea of "radical republican ideal within context of complex federation," and thereby squarely addresses the literature on democratic theory and civil society.

Hart's central argument is that the quality of American democracy can be revitalized through a reassertion of the classical republic virtues, and specifically through the adoption of Thomas Jefferson's idea of "ward" republics, or local community institutions that channel civic participation on issues of the public interest, including health, welfare, education, and what is now called homeland defense. Although conceived in the early nineteenth-century, this "neorepublicanism," according to Hart, is especially suited to managing the changing economic, political, and security conditions of the twenty-first century.

Hart takes as his starting point the academic consensus that trust in US political institutions and the quality of political participation have declined over the past several decades, and posits three causes: American democracy is increasingly defined in "rights-based" or "procedural" terms, "special interests" dominate the legislative process through lobbying and campaign contributions, resulting in the perception that the national interest is nothing more than an aggregation of narrow interests, and the long-term shift from local militias to a standing, regular army has led to the neglect of the military duties, an obligation central to the classical republic conception of civic virtue. These three factors, according to Hart, have resulted in widespread public apathy and civic disengagement.

The majority of the book is then devoted to the argument that Jefferson's vision of ward republics operating within a federal framework, an idea conceived late in his life, are the most appropriate institutions in which to channel citizen engagement. Hart argues that the constitution, responding to the imperatives of national unification, designed a centralized state based on large-scale federation, and thus failed to provide for a "public space" in which the classical republican virtues of civic duty, citizenship participation, popular sovereignty, and vigilance for corruption could be exercised. A recurrent theme in Jefferson's political thought was that laws and institutions must keep pace with changing social and economic conditions, and Hart uses this idea to suggest that these local institutions are the best means to combine republican virtue and the demands of modern social justice in an era of globalization, the information revolution, and the changing nature of security threats.

Hart generates a number of novel policy prescriptions from this framework, most notably with regard to homeland defense. As discussed earlier, Hart regards the military obligations and the defense of the political community as one of the most important aspects of republican civic


virtue. He suggests not only that the distinction between locally-organized defense and a professional army best illustrates the distinction between a right-based democracy and a duty-based republic, but that given the changing nature of conflict from the large-scale general wars that characterized twentieth-century conflict to low-intensity terrorism, homeland security is best organized around a system of local wards.

Although Hart uses these to suggest the political salience and practicality of Jefferson’s model to modern conditions, his approach suffers in two ways. First, although Hart emphasizes the benefits of local institutions, he acknowledges that American political history can be broadly read as the history of federal consolidation. From the decentralized debacle of the Articles of Confederation to the civil war, the New Deal, and civil rights, Hart would largely agree with the political program associated with the expansion of federal power. But because he argues that this expansion took place at “the expense of the republican virtues,” he would presumably acknowledge that the reassertion of localism—often associated in American history with the reactionary politics of states rights—will undermine the social and economic justice achieved only through national power. Second, despite trying to write a book that will withstand “scholarly scrutiny,” at times Hart becomes quite political, showing his ideological hand across a variety of policy issues. While this may be inevitable when discussing practical policy applications, it does at times distract from a work otherwise devoted to political theory.

Hart tries to preempt this first critique by asserting that his Aristotelian “neorepublicanism” is in fact consistent with federal power, as well as modern, Lockean liberalism. He is, however, at his strongest when demonstrating the suitability, and often necessity, of the Jefferson’s model to modern conditions. Hart’s style of devolution is not reactionary, but a logical response to changing realities, including the downward pressure placed on government by globalization and the immediate, direct threat posed by international terrorism, non-state actors, and weapons of mass destruction. Students of democracy and the third sector will be interested in Hart’s practical guidelines to restore the trust and civic engagement that he believes befits a republic.

■ *Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements.* By Francesca Polletta. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002

REVIEW BY CAITLIN HALFERTY, *Masters Candidate,*
Georgetown University



Recent literature has cited a growing lack of citizen involvement in local associations, and has advanced concern about how this may be undermining our democratic commitments. In *Freedom is an Endless Meeting*, Francesca Polletta examines a range of twentieth century social movement organizations in the United States, to see the benefits of direct representation and

new norms of leadership these groups model. Specifically, Polletta focuses on three ‘60s groups: the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee founded in 1960 by a group of black and white youths who had inspired sit-ins and freedom rides and became prime organizers of the Mississippi freedom struggle; Students for a Democratic Society, which attempted to imitate SNCC’s organizing approach in several Northern cities in the mid-’60s and, after protesting against the Vietnam War, became an extensive membership organization of thousands; and the women’s liberation movement as articulated by many local consciousness-raising groups. In arguing for a broader conception of political effectiveness and greater appreciation for the complexities of these movements, Polletta looks to deepen appreciation of the participatory democracy practices of these activists and present lessons for greater democratic understandings among citizens and political institutions.

Traditional scholarship has linked political effectiveness of a group with its ability to shape policy-making and influence the decision-making process of other political players. Under this rhetoric, the ephemeral nature of social movement organizations has rendered their successes irrelevant and has confined examinations of their purpose to detailed studies of their decline. Offering a richer analysis to explain the deliberative crisis these groups experienced, Polletta presents a detailed picture of the strategic choices made by these activists as they operate within a structure characterized by decentralized authority, and direct, consensus oriented decision making. Critics often point out inefficiency and inability to resolve conflicting interests, but Polletta instead focuses on the social relations that these groups chose. She identifies rationales for groups to incorporate nonpolitical notions of friendship, tutelage, and religious fellowship as models for interactions and guides to decision making because these models present effective ways for social movement groups to achieve goals

in ways not previously possible. These social movement organizations sought to achieve consensus through open deliberation rather than forced group discipline. She also focuses on the experimental and developmental benefits that critics often ignore, to help explain participant's involvement in these movements. Specifically, in times of uncertainty, few incentives to participate, and participant's inexperience with politics, participatory democracy's costs in time are counterbalanced by its innovatory, solidarity, and developmental benefits.


These benefits of participatory representation, such as ownership of decision making and effective political training, rest on a foundation of trust. Polletta argues that trust is vital to the institution's survival; trust is important during times of stalling because people are more likely to stay involved with an organization that has little to offer in terms of tangible incentives, until opportunities for greater mobilization are possible. These considerations would not take place within bureaucratic models where people do not feel a connection to the group. In contrast, when trust falls apart, procedures previously considered easy become increasingly difficult and decisions can not be made. Trust is also essential because formal rules do not apply to all deliberations. Activists are combining diverse principles in creating new ways of interacting and creating new criteria for authority. The governing set of normative understandings that help guide the decision making process must also foster trust in the process. Without this trust, resulting decisions are likely to be lacking, undermining the group's ability to uphold democratic ideals.

A main question that remains asks whether these movement organizations privilege democratic principles over effective accomplishment. Are they able to balance efficiency with equality in order to be politically effective? The very relationships generating trust and respect that direct representation enables may also come with norms that undercut democratic principles. Polletta points out that along with caring, cooperation, and a complex equality that made for mutual learning, relationships also came with exclusivity, deference, conflict avoidance, and an antipathy to the rules that might have made for more accountability. In addition, community groups are often unable to clearly define their notions of equality, democracy and efficiency. It becomes difficult to achieve goals when there is a lack of cohesion surrounding purpose. Though Polletta provides a detailed analysis of how conflicts arose, she does not convincingly articulate how groups were able to successfully overcome the efficiency equality battle and stay committed to democratic ideals in a meaningful way. She offers vague suggestions of successful strategies to mitigate this tension, such as enforcing multi-dimensional rules and developing new associational relationships to organize decision making. Though these ideas are interesting, her statement of the underlying tension is not serious enough, and a viable solution to this dilemma is not advanced. Despite these limitations, her analysis provides invaluable insight into social move-

ments that counteracted declining citizen participation and points toward the possibility of translating the fragile political gains of these groups into more solid understandings about democracy and political relationships.

■ *The Social Construction of Trust*. By Linda R. Weber and Allison I. Carter. New York: Kluwer Academic Press, 2003.

REVIEW BY ANDREW TUCKER, *Ph.D. Candidate*,
Georgetown University



This book answers Russell Hardin's call for a "street-level epistemology" of trust. As he pointed out a decade ago, an instrumental rational account of trust must address the justification of a belief by the believer himself. Robert Putnam, Eric Uslaner, and Theda Skocpol have all since offered examples of a street-level epistemology without quite defining it. Clinical sociologists Weber and Carter try

a different tack—49 in-depth qualitative interviews with American citizens. Their approach has two virtues and a vice. They successfully differentiate a multitude of related concepts that are routinely grouped under the "trust" umbrella. They are also successful in linking experimental evidence to the theoretical discourse. Unfortunately, their preference for the individual over the group and the interpersonal over the general will means students of democracy and representation will be disappointed.

The first virtue comes from Weber and Carter's updating of G.H. Mead's position that trust is an "orientation". As such, trust's "primary characteristic is self-reflexivity, a dynamic of meaning and behavior that changes through experiences of self, other and relationship" (52). This potentially breaks new ground for political scientists used to analyzing trust attitudes as defined by rational choice, institutional elites, or cultural indicators. Trust as an orientation has several implications: "(1) it does not exist prior to its enactment, (2) it is a state of the relationship that is emergent, and (3) it structures the relationship" (3). Therefore, trust is a social construct because "it emerges from the interactions of two or more people and influences those actions" (12). The authors focus on time, intention and forgiveness to show how trust as an orientation is constructed, violated and reconstructed. From this, the authors are able to derive useful indicators of the components of interpersonal trust. For example, they find that interpersonal trust is seldom static in real relationships and fluctuates with consequences for that relationship. They find that comfort is a signifier for trust and that it denotes reliability and predictability.


Lastly, they find that trust imbues the self with an external perspective: “[o]ne’s view of the self is distinctly different than one’s view in non-trusting relationships” (48).

The second virtue comes from their effort to link experimental results with the theoretical literature. Georg Simmel’s theory of creative conflict in group formation receives empirical confirmation if one transposes his group dynamic to the dynamic between two people starting out on a relationship by arguing through their differences. However, the interviews seem to disprove Adam Seligman’s theory in *The Problem of Trust* (1997) that one has trust in an unknown other but confidence in a known other. Where Seligman argues that familiarity reduces trust to confidence, Weber and Carter argue that the social construction of trust is based on the construction of familiarity. This is important because “we trust those individuals who we share the same strong moral evaluations of self” (147). If leaders of NGOs (including religious organizations) offer distinctive moral messages that chime with our moral evaluations of self, they may operate within the political sphere as bearers of representative mandate, regardless of their non-democratic procedures. This is a familiar argument – whether NGOs must become more democratic to participate in representative political discourse or whether they have a special role within modern democracies as bearers of public trust, regardless of their operating procedures. Weber and Carter seem to suggest that trust based on moral similarity is a firmer platform from which to act than any democratically representative institution.

Here is the vice. On one level, Weber and Carter’s hypothesis is of course true. I would rather trust my best friend than my Senator because I am more likely to have convergent interests and a shared moral understanding with my friend. On another level, their hypothesis is incomplete because whereas interpersonal trust is voluntary—people can choose whether to trust a new acquaintance—some form of trust in a representative democracy is involuntary. Even if one doesn’t vote, political leaders take action in your name. Because one cannot choose to ignore the political sphere (be it paying taxes, using healthcare, or even watching Putnam’s dreaded television), the social construction of trust as the ability to choose whether to trust does not pertain in the political sphere. This theoretical flaw saps the strength from the authors’ methodology of linking experimental and theoretical approaches. It seems the sociologists haven’t taken over trust studies yet.

■ *Inclusion and Democracy*. By Iris Marion Young. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.

REVIEW BY KRISTEN L. FAUSON, Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University



In *Inclusion and Democracy*, Iris Marion Young contends that democracies are founded as a means to promote the greatest justice, but if all parties affected by political decisions are not allowed equal part in the deliberative process, then the outcomes will not be just. As such, representation in deliberative democracy is the key to achieving the true potential of democracy. Rather than taking a

mechanistic approach to representation, Young looks at representation as the generalized concept of inclusion in the deliberative process. Representation is presented as more than how a group of people are represented in a large-scale society where direct participation is impossible, but also as how groups of people themselves are able to represent themselves in political discussions that affect them.

In understanding representation as inclusion, Young divides her work into three distinct areas. The first part of the book is concerned with norms and conditions of communicative action that hinder or promote inclusion. Her focus here is to challenge traditional methods of inclusion by explicating how contemporary deliberative processes exclude large numbers of people from involvement. By privileging certain types of discussion, certain norms of order, and assuming common bases of understanding, she believes that many potential participants are left out of discussion because they do not adhere to these norms. Her desire to include all people in deliberation leaves the reader feeling as if the bar of deliberation is lowered to such an extent as to make deliberation a free-for-all without any rules of expression or engagement. From later chapters it is clear that this is not her intent, but this section privileges inclusion to such an extent that any sense of order is lost.

The second part of the book is concerned with more traditional forms of representation in large-scale societies and how inclusion can best be achieved under these circumstances. She focuses on the process of how people relate to representatives, the need for representatives to understand the multiple perspectives of constituents, and how multiple perspectives can be brought to deliberation. Initiatives such as quotas, reserved seats, proportional representation, as well as the importance of civil society groups are discussed. Her ideas here are not particularly novel, but build on ways to achieve maximum inclusion.


The final section of the book deals with determining the scope of the polity in national and international situations, where current geo-political boundaries necessarily include

and exclude people from deliberative processes. She argues that the scope of the polity should be as large as that to which its interests and obligations extend. People need to be represented in all situations that affect them, whether across town or globally. In an interdependent world there are fewer actions that affect only a small number of people. By definition, jurisdictional designations and nation states are exclusive, keeping some people out by declaring them outside the polity. For Young, the polity should be whoever is affected by a decision, so current lines of demarcation are in violation of the principles of inclusion.

Throughout the three sections, her primary concern is to critique current methods that exclude people from democratic processes and thus limit the scope of justice. Her emphasis on processes for achieving greater inclusion presupposes the inviolability of her link between process and outcome. For Young, the outcome of an inclusive deliberative process is justice—only if all who are affected by a decision are included in determining the outcome will a just outcome arise. While this idea makes intuitive sense, in reality the argument is tautological. Justice is the outcome of deliberation yet any issue deliberated, if it is based on full inclusion, is defined as just. This circular logic limits the application of her critical theory because it is impossible to determine whether greater inclusion will result in greater justice. Despite this ultimate flaw in application, Young provides a provocative way to think of representation as more than just the relationship between citizens and elected officials, but as a matter of direct inclusion in deliberative democratic processes.

■ *Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America.* By Leonardo Avritzer. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 2002

REVIEW BY RACHEL BOWEN, Ph.D. Candidate,
Georgetown University



In his ambitious new book, *Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America*, Brazilian scholar Leonardo Avritzer presents a new theory of democratic public space. In so doing, he takes on Habermas, the elite theory of democracy, and the recent proliferation of literature on democratization and democratic consolidation. He attacks these by analyzing the role

of civil society actors during and since democratization in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. The examples of these three countries demonstrate his central contention that the premise supporting the elite theory of democracy—that of democratically-minded elites and anti-institutional or anti-democratic social mobilization—does not represent

the third wave democracies of Latin America. In Latin America, where the societies demonstrate greater commitment to democracy than do the elites, Avritzer suggests that the central task is to look for ways to adopt and institutionalize democratic innovations found in civil society.

He attacks recent literature on democratization for accepting the basic premise of elite theory of democracy that democracy can only be forged by limiting mass participation to periodic election of elite representatives who are then empowered to deliberate and govern. He also attacks the attempts of both Habermas and Linz & Stepan to theorize a connection between the public space and the political society. Avritzer uses the inability of active civil society communities to enshrine and protect human rights in the democratizing systems of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico to demonstrate the improbability of an influential communicative flow from the public space to the political society theorized by Habermas. Similarly, the authoritarian pockets that remain in these countries, especially Argentina and Brazil, limit the possibility of forming a successful workable agreement between elites and civil society that would protect human rights and ensure that the government represents the society.

His central theoretical development is a modification of the model presented by Habermas of the relationship between a discursive society and an elite political society. Avritzer is not satisfied with the idea of an influential flow of communication and suggests instead several means of actual societal monitoring of governmental elites, done through courts, political parties and (the focus of the book) public fora of deliberation, all of which can be exercised by civil society organizations. He presents two examples of societal monitoring: participatory budgeting in several Brazilian cities and the Federal Election Institute (IFE) in Mexico. Both grew out of the efforts of civil society activists before being incorporated into state institutions, and provide for monitoring of the government at a grass-roots level. In turn, both programs have helped to increase political participation (a persistent concern in Latin America) as well as trust in government institutions. Based on these successes, he calls for a new approach to democratization and democratic consolidation that focuses on encouraging and institutionalizing innovation in the public sphere in order to tie civil society to political society more closely.

The theoretical advance provided by Avritzer's focus on public monitoring corrects an important oversight in the literature on weak democracies. The development of monitoring institutions provides a potential solution to a myriad of problems in weak democracies, including low public participation, corruption, persistent authoritarian enclaves, and elite-dominated institutions. Avritzer highlights their importance particularly in societies with an active public space that is inadequately represented (and at times actually repressed) by the political society. As this situation reflects the empirical reality in many third wave democracies, his exhortation to reconsider the type and

centrality of public institutions of representation and accountability. This provides one solution to the often under-considered problem of the actual process of linking civil society to political society.

The theory is weakest, unfortunately, when applied to issues of human rights and citizen security, both of which are pervasive problems throughout Latin America. Indeed, Avritzer cites these problems as primary among the faults of current Latin American political systems. He recognizes that his theory does not solve these problems, although he suggests that they could, given sufficient experimentation among societies with methods such as community policing and other mechanisms for the involvement of citizens in policing human rights violations and especially policing the police.

Overall, however, this is a useful book for the development of democratic theory and for the creation of functioning institutions in weak democracies. Although he does tend to assume that his readers are already quite familiar with the cases he discusses, the book would be instructive for scholars in other regions of the world as well.

Center Highlights

■ CDATS Inaugural Event and Career Celebration

On October 30, 2003, the Georgetown University Graduate School and Georgetown Public Policy Institute officially inaugurated CDATS with a day-long event, “Rethinking Philanthropy, Democracy, and Civil Society: Bridging Research and Practice.” A symposium titled “Debating Democracy and Civil Society” featured **Steven N. Durlauf** of the University of Wisconsin-Madison on the topic of group membership and poverty, **Stanley N. Katz** of Princeton on constitutionalism and civil society, and Theda Skocpol of Harvard on the transformation of civic democracy. The panel discussion also featured CDATS Director **Steven Heydemann** as moderator and Government Professor **Mark E. Warren** as discussant.

The event culminated with a special celebration of the career of **Virginia A. Hodgkinson**. Hodgkinson was presented with the Jessie Ball duPont Lifetime Achievement Award, which recognizes individuals who “demonstrate the highest ideals of leadership, creativity, courage and community service.” Hodgkinson is one of CDATS’ founders and a Research Professor at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute. She has served in numerous leadership positions in organizations such as Georgetown’s Center for the Study of Voluntary Organizations and Service, Independent Sector, and the National Institute of Colleges and Universities and sits on boards of the National Center on Nonprofit Enterprise, the Aspen Institute’s Nonprofit Sector Research Fund, the International Society for Third Sector Research, and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation.

■ Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey

During 2003-2005, CDATS will carry out the American version of the “Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy” (CID) survey, one of few surveys to probe beyond the typical measures of civil society and social capital. With extensive questions about the respondent’s family, friendship networks, workplace, neighborhood relations, clubs, and organizations, the survey promises to generate a rich perspective on citizen participation in both the public and private realms. A European version of the CID has been conducted in thirteen countries. This project is led by CDATS’ **Marc Morje Howard** and an advisory committee of leading scholars: **Samuel Barnes** (Georgetown), **Jack Citrin** (UC Berkeley), **Russell Dalton** (UC Irvine), **Jennifer Hochschild** (Harvard), **Virginia Hodgkinson** (Georgetown), **Samantha Luks** (Minnesota), **Jane Mansbridge** (Harvard), **Gregory Markus** (Michigan), **Eric Oliver** (Chicago), **Kenneth Prewitt** (Columbia), **Richard Rockwell** (Connecticut), **Kay Schlozman** (Boston College), **Dietlind Stolle** (McGill), **Clyde Wilcox** (Georgetown), and **Cara Wong** (Michigan).

■ Center Lecture on the World Values Survey

On November 13, 2003, CDATS hosted a lecture featuring **Ronald Inglehart**, Professor of Political Science at

the University of Michigan and chair of the World Values Survey, a worldwide survey of mass values and attitudes. Inglehart's lecture highlighted his recent research on the linkages between economic development, cultural change, and democratization.

CDATS conducted the 2000 panel of the World Values Survey in the United States and anticipates carrying out the 2005 U.S. panel as well. Survey data from the 2000 panel will be released in April 2004.

■ Recent Awards and Publications

Daniel Brumberg (Associate Professor of Government) coedited *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Johns Hopkins University Press) with **Larry Diamond** and **Marc Plattner**. He also authored an op-ed piece titled "Bush Policy or Bush Philosophy..." in the November 16 *Washington Post*.

Marc Morje Howard (Associate Professor of Government) recently published *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (Cambridge University Press). He has also received a Research Fellowship from the German Marshall Fund for a new project on comparative citizenship in Europe.

George E. Shaumbaugh (Associate Professor of Government) coauthored with **Paul Weinstein** *The Art of Policymaking: Tools, Techniques and Processes in the Modern*

Executive Branch (Addison Wesley Longman). Shaumbaugh also published "The Power of Money: Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries" in the *American Journal of Political Science* (April 2004).

Dara Strolovitch (CDATS Visiting Fellow) received the Gabriel G. Rudney Memorial Award for Outstanding Dissertation in Nonprofit and Voluntary Action Research at the 2003 ARNOVA Conference for her dissertation titled "Closer to a Pluralist Heaven? Women's, Racial Minority, and Economic Justice Advocacy Groups and the Politics of Representation."

Mark E. Warren (Professor of Government) received the award for Outstanding Book in Nonprofit and Voluntary Action Research at the 2003 ARNOVA Conference for his book *Democracy and Association* (Princeton University Press).

Clyde Wilcox (Professor of Government) coauthored *The Financiers of Congressional Elections: Investors, Ideologues, and Intimates* (Columbia University Press) with **Peter Francia**, **John Green**, **Paul Herrnson**, and **Lynda Powell**.

Kaycee Misiewicz and **Victoria Ford** (CDATS graduate fellows) presented a paper titled "Volunteering, Values, and Civic Engagement," coauthored by Virginia Hodgkinson (CDATS Founding Director) at the 2003 ARNOVA Conference.

SPEAKER SERIES: "Quality of Democracy"

The CDATS speaker series addresses new conceptual, methodological, and substantive debates within the field of democracy studies, focusing on the quality of democracy in a variety of theoretical and empirical contexts. Speakers present their new and ongoing research projects, which develop innovative ways of conceptualizing, measuring, and analyzing democracy. Prior to each event, papers are posted on the CDATS website; sessions include a short presentation by the speaker, brief comments by a discussant, and open discussion.

PAST SPEAKERS:
Gerardo Munck (University of Southern California): "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Theoretical and Methodological Issues"
Keith Darden (Yale University): "Graft and Governance: Corruption as an Informal Mechanism of State Control"
Dario Castiglione (University of Exeter/CDATS Visiting Fellow): "The Virtues of Participation in Multinational Democracies"
Dara Strolovitch (University of Minnesota): "Affirmative Representation: Women's, Racial Minority, and Economic

Justice Interest Groups and the Politics of Advocacy"

Simone Chambers (University of Toronto): "Publicity, Secrecy, and Democratic Deliberation"

Larry Diamond (Stanford University): "The Transition to Democracy in Iraq?"

UPCOMING SPEAKERS:
Monday, March 22, 2004
Lucan Way (Temple University)
Title: "Ties that Bind? International Linkage and Competitive Authoritarian Regime Change in Africa, Latin America, and Postcommunist Eurasia"
Commentator: Harley Balzer

Location and Time: ICC 662, 12:00-1:30 p.m.

Tuesday, April 27, 2004
Rogers Smith (University of Pennsylvania)
Title: "Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership"
Commentator: Dara Strolovitch
Location and Time: ICC 662, 12:00-1:30 p.m.

To receive announcements about the Speaker Series and other CDATS events, subscribe to the CDATS listserv by logging on to www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/maillinglist.htm



CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE THIRD SECTOR
3240 Prospect Street, Lower Level
Washington, D.C., 20007
Phone 202 687 0593 | Fax 202 687 0597
<http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/>

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