Affirmative Action in White and Black

Ira Katznelson

Hurricane Katrina’s violent winds and waters tore away the shrouds that ordinarily mask the country’s racial pattern of poverty and neglect. Understandably, most commentators focused on the woeful federal response. Others, taking a longer view, yearned for a burst of activism patterned on the New Deal. But that nostalgia requires a heavy dose of historical amnesia. It also misses the chance to come to terms with how the federal government in the 1930s and 1940s contributed to the persistence of two Americas.

In June 1965, President Lyndon Johnson asked in a sweeping and assertive address why the black population of the United States had fallen even further behind the country’s white majority during the two decades since the end of the Second World War, despite the era’s sustained national prosperity. Conceding that ‘we are not completely sure why this is’, he stressed the need to adopt bold new policies of affirmative action to remedy the disabilities following from two centuries of oppression.

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Johnson missed the chance to say how the major policies of the New Deal and Fair Deal of the 1930s and 1940s, inflected by the preferences of the southern wing of the Democratic Party, had massively advantaged American whites while often excluding African-Americans, especially the majority who still lived

Mapping Mexican Migrant Civil Society

Jonathan Fox

This essay draws from an extensive background paper prepared for: “Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation,” November 4-5, 2005, Co-sponsored by the Latin American and Latino Studies Department, University of California, Santa Cruz and the Mexico Institute and Division of United States Studies of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. For the full version, with references and footnotes, as well as thematic background papers see: www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation

Recognizing migrant civil society

The more than 10 million Mexicans who live and work in the US represent approximately one in eight adults who were born in Mexico. They also represent 3.6% of the US population. While the growing numbers of Mexicans in the US are widely recognized, the presence of Mexican society in the US has not been widely acknowledged. Though organized migrants are now more visible than, say, a decade ago, the full breadth and depth of migrant collective action is still not well understood.

Many tens of thousands of Mexican migrants work together with their paisanos to promote “phi-
Compromised Democracy

Questions about the quality of democracy extend beyond the presence or absence of democratic institutions, electoral procedures, or formal indicators of civic engagement to ask how people experience life under democracy. What we learn as a result not only reveals democracy’s benefits, but highlights how it all too often falls short. First and foremost, such questions draw our attention to issues of inequality and its close companion, exclusion. Equality is the bedrock of democracy, and a necessary prerequisite for the rule of law. Even if we acknowledge that “egalitarianism is neither feasible nor necessarily desirable,” and that “some level of inequality is inevitable,” the principle of equality is crucial for democratic legitimacy.

In the U.S. as in other democracies, however, equality is increasingly compromised in ways large and small, formal and informal, visible and hidden, systematic and spontaneous. As the articles in this issue underscore, moreover, inequality and exclusion are not random effects. They exhibit patterns shaped by a wide range of attributes, including three that we highlight here: race, class, and citizenship. All three have deep effects on the life experiences and life chances of Americans, and on those who seek to become Americans. All three attributes represent deeply embedded sources of hierarchy, and of discrimination, that compromise equality and erode democratic legitimacy. We address each of them in this issue, with articles by Ira Katznelson, Manning Marable, and Jonathan Fox.

In recent years, the deepening of inequality in the U.S. has received growing attention from scholars, politicians, and the media. In the 2004 presidential campaign, John Edwards popularized the notion of “two Americas” to highlight the persistence of poverty and enduring gaps in income, education, and opportunity among Americans. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina brought into stark and tragic relief the realities of inequality, the racial and class dimensions of exclusion, and its devastating consequences.

Despite this attention, however, and despite the proliferation of research exploring its causes and effects, questions of inequality and exclusion occupy an oddly precarious position in American political life. Conservatives challenge the legitimacy of structural racism as a construct and have worked effectively to shift public debate toward issues of individual initiative and personal accountability. Some have responded to efforts to address inequality with charges of “class warfare,” raising the costs for those who try to raise such issues in the political arena. Thus, Edwards’ efforts aside, questions of poverty, inequality, and exclusion are, simultaneously, highly visible on some levels of American life, yet strikingly absent on others. As the 2006 mid-term elections play out, and we move toward the upcoming presidential campaign, it will be important to track whether we have now reached the point at which bridging this divide becomes politically feasible, and questions about the quality of democracy in the U.S., about the effects of race, class, and citizenship on our lived experiences as Americans, emerge as leading political concerns.

In addition to this newsletter, CDATS hopes to engage questions about the quality of democracy, and about other issues concerning the relationship between democracy and society, in a new Occasional Papers series. The first of these papers, “Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America: The Good News is... the Bad News is Wrong” by Professor Russell Dalton of U.C. Irvine, can be found on our website. We encourage our readers to submit papers on relevant topics for consideration as CDATS Occasional Papers.

This newsletter is edited and produced by graduate students affiliated with the Center. For the past year, it has been the responsibility of two remarkable second-year M.P.P. students in the Georgetown Public Policy Institute, Marni Schultz and Stipica Mudrazija. They have done an exceptional job. Working with them has been fun and stimulating. I thank them for their help and wish them well as they move into their post-graduate careers.

Steven Heydemann (Ph.D., U. Chicago) has served as director of CDATS since its opening in 2003.

Endnote
1 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Theda Skocpol, “Restoring the Tradition of Rigor and Relevance to Political Science.” PS Vol. 39, No. 1 (January 2006), p. 27.

By Manning Marable

The great exceptions to this phenomenon of new racialization in the time of terror, curiously, were African Americans. People of African descent, having lived on the American continent since 1619, occupy a unique position in the construction of white American identity and national consciousness. State power was deliberately constructed to exclude black participation; but black labor power was absolutely essential in the economic development of the nation. Black culture, moreover, contributed the most creative and original elements defining American national culture and various forms of representation.

Thus, the African American is unquestionably a recognized member of the American national household—but has never been a member of the American family. We are the Other that everybody knows. Yet there is a necessary kind of dialectical connection here, linking the false superiority of whiteness as a political and social category in the United States to the continued and “normal” subordination of blackness. Without “blacks,” whiteness ceases to exist as we know it. White supremacy has difficulty imagining a world without black people, but has no reservation about the indiscriminate mass bombing of Afghan peasants, or about supporting an embargo against Iraq, which is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Muslim children, according to international human-rights observers.

The great sociologist Oliver C. Cox understood this contradiction, the subtle distinctions between white racism, social intolerance, and xenophobia. As Cox put it: “The dominant group is intolerant of those whom it can define as anti-social, while it holds race prejudice against those whom it can define as subsocial. In other words, the dominant group or ruling class does not like the Jew at all, but it likes the Negro in his place.” In a time of political terror, the “terrorist” becomes the most dangerous Other and is recognized by certain “subhuman” qualities and vague characteristics—language, strange religious rituals, unusual clothing, and so forth. The “terrorist Other” thus is presented to the white public as an uncivilized savage who has richly merited our hatred and must be destroyed to assure our safety and the preservation of the American Way of Life.

Like most Americans, African Americans were generally outraged by the terrorist attacks, and during this moment of national crisis they gave unprecedented levels of support for the Bush administration. The most widely publicized post-9/11 poll, conducted by the Gallup organization, found that 70 percent of blacks “approved of the way Mr. Bush was handling his job.” Probably more accurate was the survey of the Pew Research Center, which found that 49 percent of African Americans generally supported the president, up from 32 percent prior to the attacks.

But the majority of blacks were also troubled by the exuberant hyper-patriotism of whites and the possible linkages between racism, national chauvinism, and the suppression of democratic rights. Bishop Cecil Bishop, a leader of the Congress of National Black Churches, reminded the press that “African-American people themselves have been terrorized… [by] the killings,lynchings, hangings years back,” as well as the more recent examples, such as the killing of Amadou Diallo by New York policemen. The Reverend James A. Forbes, Jr., pastor of New York’s Riverside Church, called for blacks to espouse a critical “prophetic patriotism… You will hold America to the values of freedom, justice, compassion, equality, respect for all, patience and care for the needy, a world where everyone counts.” National Urban League director Hugh Price asserted that “black America’s mission, as it has always been, is to fight against the forces of hatred and injustice.” Price condemned the “morally repugnant notion that the need for increased security justifies racial profiling… There is no excuse for singling out and stopping some Americans for no reason other than the color of their skin or their ethnic background or the way they dress.”

The African Americans who were made to feel most vulnerable in the aftermath of the attacks were Muslims. In the early 1970s, there were only about half a million adherents to Islam in the United States, including roughly 100,000...
Analytical Dilemmas in the Study of Accountability

By Alnoor Ebrahim

Accountability is a confusing concept, one that is not easily defined or applied. Yet, it is regarded as a kind of panacea with respect to preventing or punishing unethical, illegal, or inappropriate behavior by public officials, corporate executives and nonprofit leaders. Arguably, policy debates on accountability tend to conflate its normative claims with its actual effects.

As a problematique, accountability is frequently cast in technocratic terms; it is a problem of poor oversight and inadequate representation, amenable to correction through stringent regulation, more representative electoral and decision making processes, and backed up by punitive measures. A veritable slew of definitions emerge from attempts to frame accountability in these terms, such as “the process of holding actors responsible for actions” (Fox and Brown 1998: 12), or “the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions” (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 967), or “the capacity to demand someone engage in reason-giving to justify her behavior, and/or the capacity to impose a penalty for poor performance” (Goetz and Jenkins 2001: 5). This “original core of accountability” is premised on external scrutiny, supported by justification, sanctions, and control (Mulgan 2000: 555-557).

This is a principal-agent view of accountability, in which the lead actor or principal sets goals and employs agents to accomplish them. In public institutions, particularly in modern democracies, such forms of accountability can be applied to two broad sets of relations: between citizens who, as principals, elect candidates to office as their agents; and between those elected politicians who oversee the work of public administrators and other bureaucrats who act as their agents and, by extension, as agents of the public. The primary accountability problematique thus lies in constraining the opportunistic behavior of agents. The logic of accountability flows from this worldview.

Such a view of public accountability is widely shared among scholars of global governance and international politics. Discussions of accountability in public institutions at the global level have frequently centered on the “democratic deficits” of inter-governmental organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, etc. (Nye 2001). Definitions here likewise refer to authority of some actors over others, for example, “that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29). The literature further identifies four core components of accountability in global governance: transparency with respect to information availability and access; answerability in terms of providing justification for actions and decisions; monitoring and evaluation of compliance; and sanctions imposed for shortfalls in compliance, answerability, or transparency.

Regardless of whether one considers accountability in organizations that are domestic or global, however, one is confronted with a common analytical dilemma: the rift between how accountability is imagined and how it actually operates. As Goetz and Jenkins (2001: 5) put it, “Accountability is often derided as a cure-all development buzzword: a fit subject for exhortation, but something that in most parts of the world is rarely achieved because it demands too much compassion of the powerful and too much undiluted civic virtue from ordinary citizens.”

This disjuncture poses an analytic problem that must be addressed if we are to better understand the concept—definitions and framings of accountability tend to be driven by normative agendas rather than by empirical realities. Such an approach tends to proceed formulaically: specify the agents; identify the principals; enumerate the objectives; define the standards; review the mechanisms; locate the sectors or the policy domains and issue areas. This treatment tends to divorce into a format composed of the following: “who,” “to whom,” “why,” “for what,” and “how.”

This approach leaves out what Clifford Geertz once called “thick description”—empirical observation and interpretation that might enable us to better understand how a social regime such as accountability actually operates, how it is appropriated and manipulated, how it varies across social and cultural contexts, and with what effects. In this
spirit, Dubnick and Justice (2004: 14, 20) argue for a socially constructed analysis of the concept, cautioning that “any effort to categorize, measure, or model accountability must be guided by the qualities of the construct, magnitude or ‘reality’ it is intended to represent” and further advising that “students of accountability must be prepared to deal with alternative and shifting manifestations of the concept depending on the issue and arena being examined.” Theirs is a decidedly postmodernist outlook on accountability, one that confronts the discontinuities between discourse and reality. For them, the word “accountability” serves to cover, conceal and mask disparate meanings and realities precisely because so much semantic freight is conveyed by it. Drawing on the work of the French social theorist and historian, Michel Foucault, they argue that what matters in examining accountability is perspective, that is, an emphasis on how actions and events are the effects of power and knowledge.

To examine accountability in “perspective,” one cannot take for granted its normative assumptions, particularly the notion that more accountability is necessarily better. Scholars must instead seek to uncover the effects of accountability: how and to what extent its mechanisms and techniques serve to reinforce existing relations of power, or under what circumstances they result in reconfigurations. This is a skeptic’s view, and one in which the tools of the trade — disclosure and surveillance, standards and regulation, monitoring and compliance, sanctions and deterrents — are more likely to serve the interests of the powerful than the weak through the control of those very tools and expertise employed to validate them. In Foucauldian terms, accountability may thus be seen as part of a new set of disciplinary knowledges or savoirs, with its attendant forms of measurement, monitoring, auditing, and punishment. Accountability, in this sense, is a subset of “governmentality,” which Foucault has described as an “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” (Foucault 1991: 102). This does not mean that accountability mechanisms cannot be agents of social change, but rather that one must look to the effects of those mechanisms to understand their impacts and operations, rather than the rhetoric that motivates and accompanies them. A central point here is that the discourse of accountability is a reflection of broader social norms and assumptions at work in our society. In other words, accountability discourse is a manifestation of more pervasive forms of social mistrust, marketized measurement, and control that have emerged and come to characterize our worlds, thereby influencing our individual relationships, our organizations, and our governance systems. Concerned observers of the emergent regime, such as the Cambridge philosopher Onora O’Neill (2002: 57), have warned that “currently fashionable methods of accountability damage rather than repair trust” because they build “a culture of suspicion, low morale, and may ultimately lead to professional cynicism.”

For students of accountability, this discussion can be summarized as pointing to two general sets of analytical assumptions that in philosophical terms reveal both modernist and postmodernist themes. As indicated above, accountability discourses are frequently framed as a technocratic or administrative issue where problems are relatively identifiable, e.g., mismanagement of financial resources for personal gain, fraud, and other forms of malfeasance. The solutions that follow from this form of “problem framing” tend to be fairly straightforward, e.g., tougher regulation, codes of conduct, sanctions. Such an approach to accountability is common in managerial and public policy discussions involving private corporations, non-profit organizations, the public sector, and inter-governmental organizations. This may be classified as a positivist and modernist view of accountability where it is assumed that more information and transparency can reveal the “truth” about behavior, thus making corrective action or rectification possible. As a line of inquiry, this approach leads to questions such as: What standards or measures are indicative of good, or poor, behavior and performance? How can such behavior be monitored? What penalties for non-compliance will deter such behavior in the future?

A second and more skeptical approach to accountability treats it as a social phenomenon, in which its actual impacts are a result of relationships of power and interplays among actors. The method is empirical, based on observations of the effects of accountability discourses and mechanisms on actors, their relationships, and their relative positions in society. Within this context, Dubnick and Justice (2004: 20) offer three clusters around which the concept can be framed and analyzed: a) social relationships which serve as the context for action; b) “normative points of reference to which accounted-for actions are compared”; and, c) the actual processes or mechanisms through which accountability plays out. Such an approach to accountability seeks to understand how specific knowledges and mechanisms influence (or are influenced by) shifting configurations of power. This can be both a structuralist and/or a postmodern view of accountability, leading to questions such as: What kinds of knowledge are considered legitimate or valid in designing and implementing accountability systems? Whose interests are served and validated by systems

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in the seventeen states that mandated racial segregation. Southern members of Congress used occupational exclusions and took advantage of American federalism to ensure that their region's racial order would not be disturbed by national policies. Farm workers and maids, the jobs held by most southern blacks, were denied Social Security pensions and access to labor unions. Benefits for veterans were administered locally. The famous GI Bill adapted to 'the southern way of life' by accommodating to segregation in higher education, to the job ceilings local officials imposed on returning black soldiers who came home from a segregated army, and to an unwillingness to offer loans to blacks even when they were insured by the federal government. Of the 3,229 GI Bill guaranteed home, business, and farm loans made in 1947 in Mississippi, for example, only two were offered to black veterans. Together, these policies transferred more than $100 billion to create a modern middle class during the first decade after the Second World War, a sum more than six times the amount spent on Marshall Plan Aid in war-torn Europe.

Affirmative action as it came to operate focused mainly on opportunities for middle-class blacks seeking access to higher education and top-tier jobs. This affirmative action has worked to great effect, creating a more racially-just and diverse society than otherwise would have been the case. But the black affirmative action programs instituted since 1965 in fact were paltry in their scope and scale compared to the massive governmental transfers that disproportionately aided whites in the previous three decades.

Presently, many US politicians and much of the wider public are questioning the effectiveness of any kind of affirmative action in the face of continuing black disadvantage. Many view affirmative action as an expensive exercise that violates principles of merit and that, in any event, has not achieved its original goals as enunciated by President Johnson in 1965. Further, there is no agreement or clarity about what, if anything, should be put in its place.

Current policy possibilities become clearer when we take into account not just the policies that have been called by the name affirmative action, but the full range of affirmative action—including for whites—that marked much of American social policy in the key formative period that preceded the civil rights revolution. The almost exclusively white-targeted nature of this extensive federal legislation has largely been ignored by policy analysts, just as it was by Lyndon Johnson. The United States has practiced what, in effect, was white affirmative action on a highly generous and widespread basis, followed by a much more modest program of black affirmative action. By understanding this history, we can come to terms with the widening gap between blacks and whites and with the incapacity of many blacks to be able to reduce this gap in the following four decades.

The policy implications that follow a full appreciation of these features of modern US history are, in short, the opposite of currently popular views. Properly designed and funded, affirmative action policies can work very effectively, but the ingrained bias in a white direction has to be acknowledged and transcended. If American politicians and public opinion are serious about racial equality, this history indicates the need to implement an affirmative action program as ambitious as that delivered to whites during the three decades before President Johnson spoke out in 1965. It is important to consider both the principles that could animate such an effort and the form it might take.

During Jim Crow's last hurrah in the 1930s and 1940s, when southern members of Congress controlled the gateways to legislation, policy decisions dealing with welfare, work, and war excluded or differentially treated the vast majority of African Americans. Between 1945 and 1955, the federal government transferred unprecedented sums to support retirement and create opportunities for job skills, education, homeownership, and small business formation. Together, these domestic programs dramatically reshaped the country's social structure by creating a modern, well-schooled, owning middle class.

Imagine two countries, one the richest in the world, the other among its most destitute. Then suppose a global program of foreign aid transferred well over $100 billion, but to the rich nation, not the poor. This is the cumulative impact of the most important domestic policies of the 1930s and 1940s. Social Security began to pay old age pensions in 1939. By the end of the 1940s, its original provisions had been impressively improved. The GI Bill was the largest targeted fully national program of support in American history. The country passed new labor laws that promoted unions and protected people as they worked. The army was a great engine of skill training and mobility during the Second World War. Individually and collectively, these programs organized a revolution in the role of government that remade the country's social structure in dramatic ways.

But most blacks were left out. The damage to racial equity caused by each program was immense. Taken to-
together, the effects of these public laws were devastating. Social Security, from which the majority of blacks were excluded until well into the 1950s, quickly became the country’s most important social legislation. The labor laws of the New Deal and Fair Deal created a framework of protection for tens of millions of workers who secured minimum wages, maximum hours, and the right to join industrial as well as craft unions. African Americans who worked on the land or as domestics, the great majority, lacked these protections. When unions made inroads in the South, where most blacks lived, Congress changed the rules of the game to make organizing much more difficult. Perhaps most surprising, the treatment of veterans after the war, despite the universal eligibility for the benefits offered by the GI Bill, perpetuated the blatant racism that had marked the affairs of a still-segregated military during the war itself. With these policies, the Gordian Knot binding race to class tightened.

This is an unsettling history, especially for those who keenly admire the New Deal and Fair Deal. At the very moment a wide array of public policies were providing most white Americans with valuable tools to insure their old age, get good jobs, acquire economic security, build assets, and gain middle-class status, black Americans were mainly left to fend on their own. Ever since, American society has been confronted with the results of this twisted and unstated form of affirmative action.

Despite the prosperity of postwar capitalism’s golden age, an already immense gap between white and black Americans widened. Even today, after the great achievements of civil rights and affirmative action, wealth for the typical white family, mainly in homeownership, is ten times the average net worth for blacks, and a majority of African-American children in our cities subsist below the federal poverty line.

By contrast, Lyndon Johnson depicted policies for racial equity that would target ‘the poor, the unemployed, the uprooted, and the dispossessed.’ He famously noted that ‘freedom is not enough’ because ‘you do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are free to compete with all the others”, and still justly believe you have been completely fair’. The past four decades have not been kind to this vision. It is important now, in the early 21st century, to retrieve Johnson’s ambitious project by connecting the goals and precepts he enunciated to the history of racial bias that was deeply embedded in American social policy.

Johnson had in mind the kind of comprehensive effort the GI Bill had provided to most returning soldiers but without its exclusionary pattern of implementation. But that form of assertive, mass-oriented affirmative action never happened. By sustaining and advancing a growing African American middle class, the affirmative action we did get has done more to advance fair treatment across racial lines than any other recent public policy, and thus demands our respect and support. But as the scenes from New Orleans vividly displayed, so many who were left out before have been left out yet again.

Rather than yearn for New Deal policies that were tainted by racism, we would do better in present circumstances to return to the ambitious plans President Johnson announced but never realized to close massive gaps between blacks and whites, and between more and less prosperous blacks.

In the Supreme Court case in 1978 of the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell, a quite conservative Republican, offered clear and strict standards for racial rectification. These guidelines, I believe, can help guide such a program. Powell argued that modifications to color-blind policies could be undertaken to remedy race-based disadvantages when two conditions are met. There must be a clear and tight link connecting affirmative action’s remedies to specific historical harms based on race. This tie between past action and present policy has to be strong and precise. More general claims about racism in the country’s past are not enough. Neither can the goal to be pursued by affirmative action be vague or only of moderate importance. It must be sufficiently valuable as a social good to justify suspending rules that ordinarily must be blind to race. Further, if there is a non-racial way to pursue a given goal, that course should always be preferred.

Building on these principles has significant advantages. First, his demand for strict scrutiny appropriately sets the bar high, but not beyond reach. It balances a widely-shared desire to make color-neutrality the dominant norm with the cheerless recognition that this goal cannot be achieved if the role race has played in American life is downplayed or, worse, ignored. As settled law, Powell’s deeply historical approach has been applied to the type of affirmative action developed during the Johnson and Nixon administrations, but it also can shape and motivate a considerably broader effort that might target affirmative action at those who are less well-off.

Powell’s distinctions placed the onus of proof on the character of the historical evidence that is deployed to justify...
rectification. A focus on the policies about welfare and work, which the southern wing of the Democratic Party successfully imposed during the New Deal and Fair Deal is consistent with this requirement. They provide the content Powell requires to justify acts of official rectification.

Combining Powell’s principles and Johnson’s ambitions can push us forward to a framework for public policies that can respond to the injuries inflicted by officially-sanctioned racism. Though motivated by a desire to protect Jim Crow, many of the methods and instruments those programs used were adopted on a non-racial basis. A renewed and extended program of affirmative action could offer a reciprocal possibility. Responding to non-racial racism, affirmative action could be established in ways that at least partially transcend race, even while primarily rectifying racial injustice.

Beneficiaries must be targeted with clarity and care. The color-blind critique argues that race, as a group category, is morally unacceptable even when it is used to counter discrimination. But there is an important distinction this view misses. African American individuals have been discriminated against because they were black, and for no other reason. This violates basic norms of fairness. But under affirmative action, they are compensated not for being black, but only because they were subject to unfair treatment at an earlier moment because they were black. If, for others, the policies also were unjust, they, too, must be included in the remedies. When national policy kept out farm workers and maids, the injury was not limited to African Americans. Nor should the remedy.

On this understanding it is important to identify the recipients of affirmative compensation who have a direct relationship to the harm being remedied. This does not mean that they necessarily had to directly experience a specific act of discrimination. To qualify, however, it needs to be shown how discriminatory institutions, decisions, actions, and practices have negatively affected their circumstances. This approach does not limit remedies to individuals who have faced injustice directly, one at a time; neither does it justify remedies for African Americans as a unitary exclusive group that has shared in a history of racism except when the harm, as in military segregation, was created with unambiguously racist categories.

Popular and political support for corrective justice, in short, as well as judicial legitimacy, will depend on the clarity and persuasiveness of the association between harms and remedies. One of two approaches is possible. A closely-targeted program of rectification would search for identifiable individuals who have been harmed, even at the distance of one or two generations, by the pattern of exclusions and local administration described here. This policy could yield both tangible and symbolic compensation. For example, for the lag in entering the Social Security system, the excluded could be identified and they, or their heirs, could be offered one-time grants that would be paid into designated retirement funds.

Alternatively, a less administratively burdensome but still exacting approach could be crafted. With this design, the broad target group for assertive federal policies would be poor Americans who face conditions produced by the constellation of the patterns of eligibility placed inside the most important New Deal and Fair Deal programs. Although less exact at the individual and family level, this approach would authorize a major assault on inequality and poverty that would be justified by these historical patterns and remedied by policy interventions offering boosts into middle class status. The major instruments would be the same as those the federal government utilized in the GI Bill: subsidized mortgages, generous grants for education and training, small business loans, and active job searching and placement. This line of attack on the legacies of exclusion also could deploy an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit, assure generous child care, and guarantee basic health insurance.

Either way, it is not only the persons, or group of people, who have to be identified, but the specific qualities of racial discrimination. There is something of a hierarchy. Individual private acts of prejudice and discrimination count for less than more pervasive institutional ones. Injuries dealt by government count for more than private patterns of institutional racism. When government is directly involved, claims for systemic compensation to match systemic harm become most compelling. Public policies, after all, have been the most decisive instruments dividing Americans into different racial groups with vastly different life circumstances and possibilities.

Speaking from the French Quarter in New Orleans in mid-September of this year, President George W. Bush recognized that Hurricane Katrina has revealed ‘deep, persistent poverty’ with ‘roots in a history of racial discrimination’. Any serious search for what he called ‘bold policies’ might begin by taking both the history of affirmative action for whites and Lyndon Johnson’s urgency and prescriptions to heart. For without an unsentimental historical understanding of the policy roots of black isolation and dispossession, the response to the disaster in the Gulf states will remain no more than a gesture.

Ira Katznelson, a professor of political science and history at Columbia University, is the author of When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in America (W.W. Norton, 2005).
of accountability and the specialized forms of knowledge embedded in them? What kinds of information, knowledge, expertise are devalued in this system? How do the mechanisms of accountability serve to reproduce, or alter, existing configurations of power?

Such an approach may be disconcerting to some observers, from a normative standpoint, since it implies that instruments of accountability are at least as likely to reproduce relationships of inequality as they are to overturn them. At the very least, it suggests that the reality of accountability is ambiguous—as a socially embedded, politicized, and value-heavy construction. This is not to deny the normative and transformative potential of accountability, but to inject some empirical skepticism into the modernist and binary prescriptions that characterize much of the discourse on accountability today.

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References


Endnotes

1 This list of core components is adapted from a review of various analyses of accountability summarized in Herz and Ebrahim (2005). For example, Woods (2001) identifies the three “elements” of transparency, compliance and enforcement. The component of “justification” draws from Coleman and Porter (2000: 380) who note that “The concept of accountability includes the idea that political leaders will explain to citizens how their actions have addressed the articulated wants and preferences of the people” and from Oakerson (1989: 114) who writes that “To be accountable means to have to answer for one’s action or inaction, and depending on the answer, to be exposed to potential sanctions, both positive and negative”.

Alnoor Ebrahim, Continued from Page 5
At least until recently, many Mexican migrant organizations were disengaged from US civil society. For example, back in 1994, few Mexican hometown associations participated in the broad campaign against California’s notorious anti-immigrant Proposition 187. In contrast, a decade later, when the main state level immigrant rights issues involved the right to driver’s licenses for the undocumented, hometown association members were very engaged in US public life, working the phone banks at the headquarters of Los Angeles’ trade union movement.

2) **Migrant-led communications media** — They can range from local and binational newspapers to radio programs, independent video and now numerous internet discussions oriented to hometowns or regions. For example, the Oaxacan community in Los Angeles is now sufficiently large and established to support two serious newspapers, *El Oaxaqueño* and *Impulso de Oaxaca*. In addition to regional community service-oriented publications, the broader Mexican migrant voting rights campaign now has its own binational monthly magazine based in Chicago, *MX Sin Fronteras*. The migrant-run US Spanish language public radio network, *Radio Bilingüe*, is broadcast on approximately 50 stations in the US — reaching most California farm-workers — as well as 20 more in Mexico.

Beyond the nonprofit media is the huge world of commercial Spanish language media. Though for-profit enterprises fall outside of most definitions of civil society, these media nevertheless play key civic roles, not only informing their publics, but also encouraging public service. Spanish language media have actively encouraged both US citizenship and voter turnout. Such practices contrast sharply with critics’ assumptions that the persistence of Spanish is associated with an unwillingness to join US civil society.

3) **Migrant-led NGOs** — While many non-governmental organizations, or nonprofits, serve migrant communities, in this approach only those that are migrant-led would be considered part of migrant civil society. In addition, many migrants in NGOs, both as individuals and as organizations, joined with membership organizations to lobby the Mexican government for voting rights abroad. To continue recognizing gray areas of overlap, this category within migrant civil society can also include those migrants who, as individuals, have gained positions of leadership within established US nonprofits, including foundations. They are strategically located to make major contributions to the capacity-building of other migrant civil society institutions.

4) **Autonomous migrant-led public spaces** — This term refers to large public gatherings where migrants can come together to interact and to express themselves with relative freedom and autonomy. Here culture, religion, sports and recreation are key. For example, in California, indigenous Oaxacan migrants now organize huge annual music, dance and food festivals known as Guelaguetzas. They are the embodiment of the imagined cultural and civic space known as “Oaxacalifornia.”
Do organized Mexican migrants represent the US branch of Mexican society, or the Mexican branch of US society?

Having reviewed these four different arenas of migrant civil society, how might we think about their relationships with US civil society? Is migrant civil society the US branch of Mexico’s civil society? Or is it the Mexican branch of US civil society? The concept of migrant civil society proposed here would include both, because it is defined by the migrants themselves rather than the national arena within which they are active. The hometown associations would be the clearest example of a branch of Mexican civil society that is in, but not necessarily of the US. They have created a public sphere that is clearly Mexican, not only because of its participants’ national origin, but also because of its culture, organizational style, symbolic references and principal counterparts. In contrast, for examples of Mexican branches of US civil society, we could look at the trade union locals that have become majority-migrant and migrant-led, as in the case of several major agro-industrial, service and construction unions in California, or the probably hundreds of religious congregations that have become Mexican spaces within US churches.

To pursue this conceptual question, one way to think about this distinction between migrant civil society in the US versus of the US, is to think about two words that are usually treated as synonyms: cross-border and binational. Here “cross-border” refers to Mexican society broadly defined, located both inside and outside the physical borders of the homeland. “Binational,” in contrast, would refer to being of both nations, an overlapping sphere or space of convergence, in which civil society actors are simultaneously part of both Mexican and US civil societies.

If “cross-border” refers to “a people divided by a border,” as New York’s Tepeyac Association put it, then “binational” refers to engaging with both societies at the same time. In this sense, a migrant civil society that is engaged across borders may or may not be engaged binationally.

When organized migrants go public—as immigrants, as workers and as Mexicans

A key part of forging civil society involves migrants “coming out” as public, collective actors, representing themselves rather than relying on advocates. For example, migrant organizations were officially represented on the 2003 cross-country Immigrant Worker Freedom Ride. This initiative was led in part by the broadest multi-racial set of US civil society organizations—the trade union movement. This convergence was made possible, in turn, by the growing voice and clout of Latino leaders within the US labor movement—most notably in California. In several areas of recent Mexican settlement in the US, such as Nashville, the Freedom Ride permitted migrant organizations to become public actors for the first time.

In contrast to what could be called the Freedom Ride’s “integration strategy,” Mexican migrant-led organizations also construct and deploy their own collective identities as their primary basis for claiming a space in the public sphere. For example, not long after the Freedom Ride, the Asociación Tepeyac—a New York-based, Mexican faith-based mem-
biership organization—led its own mass traveling collective action for immigrant rights. The Tepeyac Association pursues a distinctive strategy for forging collective identity, based around the combined ethno-national and spiritual symbolism of the Virgen de Guadalupe, together with an explicit effort to build a shared collective identity as undocumented workers.

Both the Freedom Ride and Tepeyac’s Torch Run brought organized migrants into the public sphere, both crossed vast territories in the process, both were organized from below but counted on institutional allies in the U.S. Yet they followed different strategies to broaden their bases—one ventured from west to east, while the other traveled from south to north. The Freedom Ride framed migrants as the most recent wave in the long history of struggle against social exclusion in the US, building a multi-racial class identity as immigrant workers, while Tepeyac looked across the border to build a shared identity as Mexicans fighting for dignity and recognition as Mexicans. Each strategy has its own strengths and limitations.

While most civic binationality takes the form of individuals who do double duty, some migrant organizations are following what we could call “fully binational” paths as well. This means being engaged with social, civic or political agendas in both countries. The leading example in the US is the Binational Front of Indigenous Organizations, formerly known as the Oaxacan Indigenous Binational Front (FIOB). The FIOB is one of the very few mass membership organizations that include organized bases in both the US and in Mexico, with thousands of affiliated members organized in branches in California, Baja California and in their home state of Oaxaca.

Five puzzles for future research

1. How can we explain the unevenness within Mexican migrant civil society?

Mexicans in the US are much more organized in some regions than in others, notably in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles and Chicago. In addition, migrants from some regions in Mexico are much more organized than others. Clearly migration history and a critical mass of population are key factors, but they are not sufficient to explain the degree and pathways of social and civic organization. Cross-regional comparative research on Mexican migrant associations is just beginning.

Among those who are organized, why do some clubs and federations decide to engage in civic, and even political issues, while others limit their activities to strictly local issues and “philanthropy from below?” At least until recently, many clubs actively considered themselves asapolitical, partly in response to associations of politics with corruption. Yet the Mexican HTA federations have engaged in increasingly diverse binational civic and political issues over the past decade. Much more robust documentation of actual patterns of variation and change over time would be necessary to get at these comparative analytical questions.

2. What are the social, civic and political impacts of migrant associations in their hometowns?

The discussion of the impact of migration on sending communities has shifted from an earlier focus on the loss of human capital, to a debate over whether family remittances contribute to more than survival for the relatives who stay behind, and whether remittances can become a lever for job-creation. In the recent high profile discussion of impacts on sending communities, one could argue that the focus on economic flows have “crowded out” recognition of non-economic impacts, which have been described as social and cultural remittances.

How do migrant hometown clubs affect public life in their communities of origin? Do they encourage local democratization? Do they affect women’s opportunities for participation and representation? Many participants and observers expect that HTAs do have democratizing impacts, though the evidence is not yet clear. Clearly returned migrants play key roles in public life, as individuals. But the fact that some migrants return to fill local leadership roles does not answer the question about the civic and political impacts of HTAs. More generally, to what degree do the hometown associations reproduce the political culture that dominated Mexico in the 20th century? Optimists often suggest that organized civil society generates democratic values and practices, and this is sometimes the case. But civil society also carries the weight of history, and is cross-cut by hierarchies and inequality between genders, classes and ethnic groups, as well as the legacy of less-than-democratic political ideologies.

3. If a migrant civil society exists, then where do political parties fit in?

Mexico recently joined the 60 countries that permit their citizens to vote from abroad. In principle, Mexican migrants’ right to vote dates from a constitutional reform in 1996, but nine more years of debate and campaigning were required to begin to put the reform into practice. After the closing of the January, 2006 deadline for Mexicans abroad to vote in July, signup rates were dramatically lower than expected—approximately 40,000 of 55,000 applications
were accepted. Yet these numbers are less surprising when one takes the daunting procedural and political obstacles into account.

Mexico’s electoral authorities have been very cautious about any measures that might raise questions about the security of a national voting process that only recently has won the trust of the electorate. Mexico’s congress also built measures into the law that were designed to limit the possibility of external intervention in an extraterritorial voting process. As a result, only those migrants who already held a Mexican voter registration card could use the new vote-by-mail system, which also required the sending of copies of the card by registered mail. Political obstacles included a ban on Mexican political party or campaign activity abroad. This experiment in migrant voting poses a paradox, as suggested by a recent Los Angeles Times editorial (Sept. 21, 2005). Recalling dissident José Vasconcelos’ 1928 presidential campaign in the US, the editors noted that before Mexican migrants had the right to vote, they could do politics freely in the US. Now that they have the vote, they are prohibited from doing politics.

What is clear is that given the constraints on Mexican political party activities in the US, migrants will have to depend almost exclusively on US Spanish language media to be informed participants in the process, underscoring the critical role these outlets perform.

4. How can disenfranchised migrants gain political representation?

The issue of how migrants can gain political representation poses a puzzle. If they lack voting rights in their host country, then host country politicians have little electoral incentive to make the political investment necessary to enfranchise them. If they also lack voting rights in their country of origin, then their home country politicians will lack political incentives to enfranchise them. This presents a ‘chicken and egg’ problem — migrants need to gain electoral clout for politicians to pay attention, yet they need politicians to pay attention to get electoral clout.

In Mexico, the recent approval of the absentee ballot represents a first step towards overcoming this problem, though the structure of the voting process is likely to encourage low turnout. In the US, the unrepresented population is huge and growing. In California, for example, 20% of the adult population lacks the right to vote. The discursive frame of “non-citizen enfranchisement” challenges the systemic political exclusion of immigrants, but also blurs the distinction between undocumented immigrants and permanent residents. The reasons for their exclusion are different, as are their possible pathways to inclusion.

5. What are the obstacles to US citizenship for Mexican permanent residents?

In any discussion of immigrant integration, Mexicans stand out in part because of what conservative nationalists perceive as their insularity. They point to lower rates of naturalization, English language acquisition and social mobility compared to other national origin groups, as well as persistent pride in their language and ethnicity. These critics see the large concentrations of Spanish-speaking immigrants in major cities as an inherent hindrance to the kind of assimilation that they associate with integration into US society. Yet new forms of integration may be evolving. It is possible that these communities offer a critical mass within which new forms of civic, social and political engagement can emerge, public spheres in which Mexicans can both continue to be Mexicans and join US society at the same time.

Naturalization is a classic indicator of engagement with US society, in the social science sense that the successful acquisition of citizenship is also correlated with other indicators of integration. Mexican migrants have long naturalized at lower rates than other national origin groups, and naturalization rates among eligible legal permanent residents vary significantly across national origin groups. According to a key study by the Urban Institute, the percentage of Asians who had adopted US citizenship in 1995 was 56%. Among non-Mexican Latin Americans the rate was 40%. Among Mexican legal residents, only 19% had taken out citizenship in 1995. By 2001, all these rates went up — to 67% among Asians, to 58% among non-Mexican Latin Americans, with the rate among Mexicans almost doubling to 34%. This data suggest two distinct trends — first, the persistent lag among Mexicans compared to immigrants of other nationalities, and second, the sharp rise in their naturalization rates within a remarkably short period of time. These trends appear to be contradictory. What factors can explain both continuity and change?

One could interpret the combination of continuity and change in naturalization rates in terms of two simultaneous trends. On the one hand, in a context in which the dominant political cultures in both countries continue to require people to choose — either you are Mexican or you are American, but you can’t be both — many Mexicans in the US want to live and work here while continuing to identify as Mexican. The persistent power of the political culture of nationalism on both sides could partly account for the persistent lag in naturalization rates. On the other hand, in
practice, many Mexican migrants are rejecting traditional nationalism and are increasing becoming active members of US society — while still retaining their Mexican identity. Perhaps the trend towards “civic binationality” might help to account for the recent sharp increase in Mexican naturalization rates.

To get a more precise measure of the degree of interest in naturalization, one would need data on the numbers of migrants who attempt to become citizens, rather than relying exclusively on the number who succeed in completing the process. This distinction is necessary because applicants often encounter a series of obstacles along the way, and some of those obstacles may well affect Mexican migrants more than those from other countries. This hypothesis would be difficult to test, since public official data on citizenship petition denials do not mention national origin. Nationally, 1.6 million applicants for citizenship were denied between 1996 and 2002. Leaders of citizenship support efforts for Mexican families in Monterey County, California report failure rates on the order of 50% — much higher than average — for reasons that remain unclear. Literacy levels are a major issue, though as noted above, they reflect access to services more than qualifications for and interest in citizenship.

Conclusions

The main point here is that migrant civil society exists and involves diverse forms of representation and collective action. When compared to the vast size and diversity of Mexican society in the US, clearly the vast majority remain unrepresented by formal organizations of any kind. Nevertheless, the idea of migrant civil society recognizes that Mexicans in the US are creating their own institutions, as well as joining existing ones. Some are building multinational and multi-ethnic worker organizations. Others are joining community and faith-based organizations. Some also participate in cross-border Mexican civil society, joining with their paisanos in hometown associations and voting rights campaigns, while campaigning for immigration policy reform in the U.S. These actors are just beginning to appear on research agendas. More systematic comparative analysis could help to understand their dynamics, especially if informed by both survey and ethnographic research.

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members of the Nation of Islam. By September 2001, the American Muslim community numbered nearly 7 million, which is larger than the U.S. Jewish population. About one-third of all Muslims, more than 2 million, are African Americans. The most influential Muslim leader, Imam W. Deen Muhammad, is the son of the NOI’s late patriarch, Elijah Muhammad. As the head of the orthodox Muslim American Society, W. Deen Muhammad has been described as “fiercely patriotic.” For years, the Muslim American Society’s national newspaper, the Muslim Journal, has featured on its cover page an American flag at the upper left corner.

Virtually all prominent Muslim religious leaders and civic representatives of the Arab-American community unconditionally condemned the attacks. Even Farrakhan denounced the criminals behind the assault as “depraved wild beasts,” while at the same time urging the U.S. government to reevaluate its Middle East policies. Muslims overwhelmingly opposed U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and favored some type of United Nations resolution to the crisis. They justly feared that the non-Muslim, white majority would aim its desire for retaliation indiscriminately, classifying all Muslims, recent immigrants and native-born citizens alike, as potential terrorists.

By the spring of 2002, many prominent African-American leaders and organizations had voiced criticisms of Bush’s “War on Terrorism” and expressed concerns about the permanent deployment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Numbers of African-American and Latino activists participated in antinuclear demonstrations and teach-ins, many led by working-class and poor people of color, that were largely ignored or unreported in the media. In San Francisco, for example, the People Organizing to Win Employment Rights (POWER) led a May Day 2002 rally and march calling for “Land, Work, and Peace.” The broad range of participating organizations included the Chinese Progressive Association, the Homeless Pre-Natal Program, Hogares Sin Barreras (Housing Not Borders), and Mujeres Unidas y Activas (United and Active Women). On April 20, 2002, an estimated 80,000 people attended a Washington, D.C. protest demonstration against the Bush administration’s “Permanent War on Terrorism.” Significantly, at least one-third of those participating in the demonstration were Arab Americans and/or Muslims.

But the national media’s attention focused on stories about the “new American patriotism,” and people of color were frequently featured center stage. Blacks were reminded constantly that Colin Powell, after all, is President Bush’s secretary of state, and Condoleezza Rice is his national security adviser. I also suspect that the new xenophobia was being viewed by a significant sector of African Americans as not entirely a bad thing, if jobs that had previously gone to non-English-speaking immigrants would now go to blacks. There is considerable hostility in cities such as Detroit and Houston between impoverished and working-class black urban neighborhoods and Arab shopkeepers. Blacks in 2000 voted overwhelmingly for the Gore-Lieberman ticket, while at least 40 percent of Arab Americans supported Bush-Cheney, based in part on their political and religious hostility toward Lieberman.

Part of the frustration the African-American community feels is rooted in our complicated love-hate relationship with our own country. That U.S. democracy was crudely constructed on the mountain of black bodies destroyed by centuries of enslavement, segregation, and exploitation is abundantly clear to us. Yet there is also that knowledge, gleaned from our centuries-old struggle for freedom, that the finest ideals of American democracy are best represented by our own examples of sacrifice. This was undoubtedly behind W.E.B. Du Bois’s controversial editorial, “Close Ranks,” which endorsed African-American participation in the U.S. war effort during World War I. It is important to remember, however, that immediately after World War I ended, the “Red Summer” of 1919, during which hundreds of African Americans were lynched, beaten, and even burned at the stake, erupted. Most African Americans understood, however, that we cannot overturn the structural racism against us if we accommodate or compromise with war and racism against others.
CDATS has recently carried out a major study of American civic engagement in comparative perspective. The “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” (CID) survey, which was conducted between mid-May and mid-July of 2005, consisted of in-person interviews with a representative sample of 1,001 Americans, who responded to an 83-minute questionnaire.

The project also represents a loose collaboration between CDATS and the European Social Survey (ESS), an award-winning cross-national survey that has been conducted biannually since 2002. The result of this project is that the U.S. can now be included in comparative perspective to the 23 European countries from the 2002 version of the ESS.

In addition to the replicated questions from the 2002 ESS, which contained specialized “modules” on civic engagement and immigration, the American version of the survey includes new and innovative questions—particularly related to the themes of informal social networks, the composition and diversity of ties and associations, democratic values, and tolerance—all of which are connected to lively debates about civic engagement, social capital, and democracy. In short, the survey provides an unusually rich perspective on citizen participation in both the public and private realms.

For more on the U.S. CID survey, including the questionnaire and codebook, readers can consult the project’s website at http://uscidsurvey.org/. The data are currently being checked and analyzed by the project’s advisory committee members. Updates about the project, as well as initial results and findings, will continue to be posted on the site over the course of the spring and summer of 2006. The data will be publicly released at the end of the summer.

The short articles below represent the preliminary analyses of three of the CID advisory committee members. In the first piece, Marc Morjé Howard makes use of the comparative data to argue that despite the recent ascendancy of pessimistic views about decline, American civic engagement remains very strong when viewed in comparative perspective. Russell Dalton addresses the norms of citizenship, showing that the decline measured by Robert Putnam and others refers mainly to a more traditional, “duty”-based view of citizenship. According to Dalton, this drop has been counter-balanced by an increase in “engaged” citizenship, which he views as an encouraging development for the vitality of American democracy. Finally, Eric Oliver and Shang Ha focus on the issue of racial diversity and articulate an important challenge to theories of social capital. Contrary to the assumption that civic participation will lead to greater racial harmony, they find that the highest levels of participation are situated in segregated and homogeneous areas, while diverse communities have much lower levels of involvement.

These three pieces only touch on a few of the themes that are included in the U.S. CID survey. Nonetheless, they should give readers a sense of the remarkable breadth and depth of this important study. It is our hope that the CID dataset will become widely used by scholars who come from a variety of different intellectual perspectives, but who share an interest in better understanding the form and character of American civic engagement.

**Article 1**
**American Civic Engagement in Comparative Perspective**
Marc Morjé Howard, Georgetown University

**Article 2**
**The Two Faces of Citizenship**
Russell J. Dalton, University of California, Irvine

**Article 3**
**Examining the Civic Paradoxes of Racial Segregation**
Eric Oliver and Shang Ha, University of Chicago
American Civic Engagement in Comparative Perspective

Marc Morjé Howard
Georgetown University

The study of American civic engagement over the past two centuries has resulted in two distinct—though not entirely contradictory—perspectives, each of which comes from a different time period. The long-standing view has emphasized the pattern of “American exceptionalism,” according to which the United States is unique because of its high levels of civic engagement. In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that “Americans of all ages, of all stations in life, and all types of disposition, are forever forming associations.” And a century later, in 1944, Arthur Schlesinger Sr. referred to the U.S. as “A Nation of Joiners,” emphasizing the long-standing patterns of associationalism and civic engagement in American culture.

A second view, however, has captured the attention of contemporary researchers during the past decade. It stresses the theme of “American decline.” Robert Putnam launched the new debate in 1995 with his somewhat impressionistic articles “Bowling Alone” and “The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.” These were followed by a very detailed and systematic account in his book *Bowling Alone*, published in 2000, in which he shows that civic engagement has declined along many dimensions since the 1950s and 1960s. Other eminent scholars, including Theda Skocpol, William Galston, and most recently Stephen Macedo and his co-authors in *Democracy at Risk*, have also written about this American decline.

While the recent discussion of “American decline” has reinvigorated Tocqueville’s focus on civic engagement, it has caused many people to forget about its presupposition, i.e., the theme of “American exceptionalism.” For all their debt to the letter of Tocqueville’s text, these studies have generally not examined the U.S. in comparison to other countries. This article therefore proposes a step in redressing this imbalance, by examining the U.S. CID data to see how the U.S. compares to a host of European countries that were included in the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS). In addition, since generational change is a major component of the “American decline” argument, I will attempt to discern any generational differences which could portend future trends in civic engagement—though, of course, caution must always be used when interpreting generational differences since people may change over the course of their lifetime.

For the sake of simplicity, I present some preliminary results comparing the U.S. to two groups of countries: Western Europe (consisting of the 15 “older” EU member-states, along with Norway and Switzerland) and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia). The pooling of data into these two groups obviously overlooks numerous differences between the countries in each category, but it allows for an efficient first cut at putting the U.S. into a broader comparative perspective. As for generational differences, the results below break down the samples into three main age groups: under 35, 35-54, and 55 and over.

The figures present the results by country-grouping and generation on the following four concepts, all of which are at the core of debates about civic engagement: 1) interpersonal trust; 2) political action; 3) participation in voluntary organizations; and 4) religious attendance. For each figure, I want to focus on two dimensions: a) how the U.S. compares on aggregate to Western Europe and Eastern Europe; and b) what the generational differences may suggest in terms of future trends.

Figure 1 is based on the standard interpersonal trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” On the CID/ESS, respondents could specify their level of trust on a 0-10 scale, with higher scores representing higher levels of trust. The figure shows that the U.S. actually has slightly higher interpersonal trust scores than Western Europe, and much higher than Eastern Europe—though of course there is great variation within Europe (e.g., Nordics are very trusting, South Europeans are not). There are also large generational differences. As opposed to the typical generational pattern on civic engagement measures in Western Europe, where the middle generation is the highest, each American generation is less trusting than its elders. This difference seems to provide support for Putnam’s argument about generational differences and continuing American decline.

Figure 2 presents the results on a more behavioral measure. Respondents were asked whether, in the last 12 months, they had done any of the following 10 different kinds of political activities: 1) Contacted a poli-
tician or a local government official; 2) Worked in a political party or group; 3) Worked in another political organization or association; 4) Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker; 5) Signed a petition; 6) Taken part in a lawful public demonstration; 7) Boycotted certain products; 8) Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons; 9) Donated money to a political organization or group; or 10) Participated in illegal protest activities. The results shown in Figure 2 present the average number of “yes” answers per person. We see that, on aggregate, political action is higher in the U.S. than in Western Europe, and again much more so than in Eastern Europe. But in the U.S. it is still lower for younger generations — unlike in Western and Eastern Europe, where the more “typical” pattern of higher involvement by the middle generation holds — which may be another indicator of ongoing decline.

Figure 3 turns to voluntary organizations, which are at the core of almost all definitions of civil society and social capital. Unlike most other surveys, the CID/ESS actually has a measure of participation, rather than simply membership, a distinction that is important for theories of social capital and civil society, which stress the positive consequences of face-to-face interaction, rather than passive or “checkbook” membership. The figure presents the average number of organizations in which each respondent participates, in response to a list of 12 types of organizations. In comparative perspective, the U.S. comes out just ahead of Western Europe, and, not surprisingly, well above Eastern Europe. But in terms of generational differences, unlike the other measures, this time the younger generation seems to be defying the pattern of having lower levels of participation. This suggests that younger people may prefer informal participation rather than formal membership. In any case, this noteworthy exception points to the need for more research on informal participation, particularly among young people, before reaching any firm conclusions.

Although religious activity was certainly not a part of Hegelian or Marxian interpretations of civil society, it was central to Tocqueville’s characterization of the U.S. Figure 4 therefore shows the percentage of people who attend religious services at least once a week (focusing on the U.S. and Western Europe only). This time, unlike the other figures, which show roughly similar levels of engagement in the U.S. and Western Europe, we see a very clear difference. Church attendance is much higher in the U.S., as 34% of Americans attend services at least once a week, compared to 16% in Europe. That said, religious attendance is also dropping quite sharply by generation in both the U.S. and Western Europe, but this is difficult to interpret, since people typically become more religious over their lifespan. Nonetheless, on aggregate, it is clear that in terms of religion, American exceptionalism remains very strong.

This brief examination of American civic engagement in comparison to Europe provides an important perspective that has largely been neglected by those who stress its “disappearance.” Despite the well-documented decline of the past few decades, and notwithstanding the fact that generational patterns seem to indicate the potential for further decline (with the important exception of organizational participation), the evidence presented here shows that in comparative terms, civic engagement in America is still alive and well. While the extent of American exceptionalism may have diminished, civic engagement in the U.S. is certainly still within the “normal” level among today’s advanced democracies, and it is even on the high end on many measures. This finding suggests that bold titles and catchphrases that give the impression of a truly catastrophic situation are somewhat exaggerated. The reality is more nuanced. On the whole, despite any decline that may have taken place, American civic engagement is still comparatively strong.
Figure 1: Interpersonal Trust (mean of 0-10 scale)

Figure 2: Political Action (mean of “yes” answers to 10 types of activities)
Figure 3: Participation in Voluntary Organizations (number of organizations in which every respondent participates)

Figure 4: Religious Attendance (% attending once a week or more)
The Two Faces of Citizenship

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At his inauguration in 2001, with prompting from prominent political scientists, George W. Bush stated: “I ask you to be citizens. Citizens, not spectators. Responsible citizens, building communities of service and a nation of character.” Bush’s comments reflect an ongoing debate about citizenship in America. A growing list of political analysts maintain that too few of us are voting, we are disconnected from our fellow citizens and lacking in social capital, we are losing our national identity, we are losing faith in our government, the nation is in social chaos, and the list goes on seemingly ad infinitum. The lack of “good” citizenship is often used to describe or explain these phenomena.

The U.S. CID survey has probed into the meaning of citizenship to Americans, and the consequences of these norms. This article outlines some of our findings that contradict the dire claims that American democracy is at risk because of the lack of good citizenship.

Two Meanings of Citizenship

Political theorists—republicans, liberals, neo-liberals, communitarians, social-democrats, and others—differ substantially in their definitions of citizenship. To probe how Americans actually think about citizenship, the CID survey asks: “To be a good citizen, how important is it for a person to be . . . [list items]. 0 is extremely unimportant and 10 is extremely important.” The survey examines norms in four areas:

- **Participation**: the importance of voting in elections, being active in voluntary groups, and general political activity.
- **Autonomy**: the importance of forming one’s own opinions.
- **Social Order**: obeying laws and regulations, serving on a jury, reporting a crime, and serving in the military.
- **Solidarity**: the importance of helping others who are worse off in society.

Although there is a rich philosophical discussion of these categories, the American public perceives citizenship in terms of a simpler framework. The items align along two dimensions that are described in Table 1. To one group of Americans, citizenship means principles of **Citizen Duty**. This involves norms of social order and the duty of voting. This is the classic citizen-subject that is well known in the political culture literature—and we suspect this is the pattern of citizenship that George Bush had in mind at his inaugural.

In contrast, **Engaged Citizenship** spans several elements that are typically described as liberal or communitarian norms of citizenship. It includes both measures of solidarity, as well as two participation examples: being active in civil society groups and general political activity. This dimension also incorporates the norm of political autonomy. The engaged citizen appears willing to act on his/her principles, be politically independent, and address social needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Citizen Duty</strong></th>
<th><strong>Engaged Citizenship</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote in elections</td>
<td>Be active in voluntary organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve on a jury if called</td>
<td>Be active in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always obey laws and regulations</td>
<td>Form opinion, independently of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men serve in the military when the country is at war</td>
<td>Support people who are worse off than themselves</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report a crime that he or she may have witnessed</td>
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These two sets of norms are not contradictory, and all are cited as important by most Americans, but they reflect contrasting emphases in the role of a democratic citizen. And as one might expect, seniors and Republicans emphasize a duty-based definition of citizenship. Younger Americans, Democrats and minorities stress engaged citizenship. There are two faces of citizenship in America, with distinctly different emphases, and opinions are shifting from duty-based citizenship to engaged citizenship.

**The Consequences of Citizenship Norms**

Much of the current discourse on citizenship focuses on the presumed erosion of the norms of citizen duty: Americans today are less respectful of authority, more distrustful of government, and less likely to vote—and these developments may be linked to the erosion of duty-based citizenship. But this is only half the story. The decline of duty-based citizenship is counterbalanced by the rise of engaged citizenship, which has its own consequences for citizen actions. To understand contemporary American democracy, we need to examine both.
The implications of changing citizenship norms can be seen in three examples: participation patterns, volunteering beyond politics, and political tolerance.

**Political Participation**
Since Putnam’s influential book *Bowling Alone*, researchers have stressed the decreasing citizen involvement in elections and other forms of participation — and argued that citizenship norms have contributed to this pattern. The 2005 CID survey examined participation in fourteen different political activities. As we might expect, citizen duty encourages Americans to show up on election day and participate in election campaigns. However, citizen duty discourages participation in protest and other contentious forms of action.

In contrast, engaged citizenship is only weakly related to voting turnout and electoral participation. But it stimulates contentious action, such as signing a petition, attending a protest, boycotting, or internet-based actions. Those high in engaged citizenship characteristics are five times more likely to protest than those who score low in these norms.

Thus, norm-shift is transforming the patterns of political action in America. A revival of duty-based citizenship might increase electoral participation, but it would also strengthen the normative impediment to alternative forms of political action. Engaged citizens have a different repertoire of political action, and this is a positive feature of norm shift.

**Volunteering and Citizenship**
A *Los Angeles Times* article on the annual UCLA survey of college freshmen began with a story of a university student who spent his fall break as a volunteer helping to salvage homes flooded by Hurricane Katrina. He organized a group with other students volunteers to give up their break to do hard labor in a devastated region. The message of the article was that volunteering was at its highest percentage in the 25 years of the UCLA college survey.

This experience stands in marked contrast to the recent drumbeat of negativity about the civic involvement of Americans. We are told by political scientists and presidents that Americans are not “good citizens” as they once were, and more civic engagement and citizenship is needed. To test the civic spirit of Americans, the CID survey asked four questions about volunteerism:

- Are you registered as an organ donor
- Have you donated blood in the last five years
- Have you given to charity in the last year
- Have you picked up someone else’s litter in the last year

Ironically, our analyses show that the duty-based citizenship does not encourage volunteerism. Once one’s duty to obey the law and participate in voting has been fulfilled, civic engagement stops. Thus, the renewal of traditional duty-based norms — which is often the message of contemporary pundits — will not produce many of the civic results they seek. Conversely, engaged citizenship encompasses norms of greater social concern and social engagement. Thus, those who score highly on engaged citizenship are about twice as likely as those at the low end of the scale to perform at least three of these volunteer activities.

**Norm-Shift and Tolerance**
Listening to the pundits, one would conclude that America is an intolerant and divided nation. Indeed, following the terrorist attacks after September 2001, passage of the Patriot Act and other government actions to combat terrorism have renewed the debates on the balance between security and civil liberties in America.

Surprisingly absent from discussions of citizenship is the impact of citizenship norms on political tolerance. A duty-based image of citizenship, stressing citizen obligations to the state and participation through elections, may be less accepting of dissenting political views, and expect that the “good citizen” conforms to social norms. In contrast, engaged citizenship may evoke more sensitivity toward challenging political groups and thereby encourage feelings of tolerance — even to groups that hold contrasting political values.

The CID survey first asks respondents to identify their least liked group from a list provided by the interviewer. The identification of the least-liked group differs across the two dimensions of citizenship. Those high in citizen duty most often mention the Klu Klux Klan (34 percent), radical Muslims (19 percent), people who are against churches and religions (12 percent), and American Nazis (9 percent). Those high in citizen engagement have a similar set of least-liked groups in a slightly different order: the Klu Klux Klan (52 percent), American Nazis (11 percent), radical Muslims (8 percent), and those against churches and religions (7 percent).

Then, the survey asked whether the most disliked group should be allowed to make a speech in the community, be banned from running for public office, or should be allowed to hold rallies in the community. The norms of engaged citizenship significantly increase tolerance of even the “most-disliked” groups. Conversely, citizen duty generates a slight decline in political tolerance. In short, norm shift is increasing political tolerance in America, which strengthens the foundation of our democratic process.
In conclusion, some political experts may look back to the 1950s as a golden age of American politics and want to renew duty-based norms of citizenship. This essay argues that this retrospective definition of citizenship is too narrow—it ignores the potential negative elements of these norms, and the potential gains from other definitions of citizenship. Americans are renewing their commitment to good citizenship, but to a model of citizenship that is substantially different from what Bush envisioned in his inaugural address. Norm shift will change the nature of American politics—with both positive and negative effects. Instead of seeking the norms of the past, we should examine how norm shift might strengthen the democratic process.

Examining the Civic Paradoxes of Racial Segregation

ERIC OLIVER AND SHANG HA
University of Chicago

Over the past decade, two major trends have caused great alarm among observers of American democracy. The first is the well-documented decline in American social capital. According to scholars of civic engagement, Americans are becoming less active in voluntary civic associations and are spending more discretionary time in isolated pursuits such as watching television. The second trend is the persistent segregation and racial tension among America’s new different groups—across most neighborhoods, cities, and suburbs, whites, blacks, and Latinos continue to live more apart than together.

We believe these two trends are not only connected, but that they lie at the heart of many challenges facing American society. Take, for example, the impact of civic participation on people’s racial attitudes. According to social psychologists, civic associations may be the ideal location for promoting positive interracial contact: the equal status of members, shared goals, and cooperative work endeavors make them ideal sites for promoting interracial understanding. If Americans are less likely to participate in such organizations, their opportunities for interracial contact may be lower.

Or consider the apprehension that many observers have regarding the growth of immigrant populations and America’s national identity. Over the past three decades, a tremendous influx of Latino and Asian immigrants has made the United States more ethnically and racially diverse than at any time in its history. If voluntary associations are a crucial mechanism for civic and social integration of immigrant groups, then it is important to recognize how their residential patterns and social environments may influence their opportunities for civic involvement.

Despite the importance of these issues, social scientists have little clear idea about how people’s racial surroundings affect their civic participation. The limited previous research on this question offers both incomplete and contradictory answers. Some studies demonstrate that racial diversity can boost civic participation; other studies find that, in heterogeneous metropolitan areas and counties, people participate less in civic associations, spend less time in voluntary activities, and show less willingness to help others.

Much of this ambiguity was due to poor data. Until recently, we simply did not have sufficient data on a large sample of Americans to know whether or how their racial environments were affecting their civic activities. Fortunately, the recent CID survey provides an ideal vehicle for examining this issue. Given the battery of items about the exact nature of people’s civic lives as well as the geocodes for each respondent, we were able to estimate how much the difference in people’s civic behaviors and feelings of community varied by the racial composition of their metropolitan areas and neighborhoods.

We find that the relationship between civic participation and racial segregation presents a paradox for those concerned with promoting racial equality. On the one hand, racial segregation, at least for the white majority, corresponds with higher levels of civic engagement. Whites who live in predominantly white neighborhoods and metropolitan areas are generally more active in their voluntary organizations than those in integrat-ed contexts. Such higher levels of participation are attributable to the correspondingly higher levels of social connection that whites feel in such settings. Whites in predominantly white neighborhoods show higher levels of social trust, have more social acquaintances, and report a greater feeling of belonging in their communities. These results yield the uncomfortable conclusion that, for whites at least, racial segregation enhances their civic engagement. For other groups, the results are less consistent: African Americans and Latinos living in predominantly white neighborhoods tend to feel socially alienated, but social disconnectedness is not necessarily
 Racism has been entwined in American life and politics since this country’s inception; today, persistent disparities remain between whites and people of color. The minority population is growing rapidly—minorities will soon become the majority in many areas of the United States. Minority involvement in and mastery of politics is critical for full exercise of this new demographic power. *Diversity in Democracy* is a collection of studies on barriers to minority representation that emerged from the 2001 Claremont/Riverside Conference on Minority Representation. The editors intend to bridge the gap between the study of minority politics and mainstream politics, as well as to simultaneously examine African American and Latino politics. Taken together, the studies show how econometrics can be used to analyze the existing political landscape and inform attempts to correct current race-based disparities by increasing minority political efficacy.

The authors’ introduction provides a necessary framework for the book and helps the reader identify main findings and common themes. The studies are organized into four sections. First, individual-level attitudes and opinions are examined in an effort to understand how minorities develop their political identities. Then, the importance of context is highlighted as the second section explores direct democracy, with a focus on ballot propositions. The third section examines the link between descriptive representation and minority attitudes and political behaviors. Finally, directions for the new century are explored with a historical overview of redistricting and a well-crafted essay outlining how to increase minority involvement and representation in politics.

Common themes emerge, highlighting issues for further study. Informed citizen participation in politics is repeat-
edly emphasized, since it is central to the functioning of democracy. Participation is linked to trust in the government and other attitudes. The key, the editors contend, is to understand the context of minority political involvement. Despite the importance of being politically involved, minorities are less involved than whites by all measures. The significance of socioeconomic status in shaping political attitudes and behavior is examined; education was highlighted as instrumental in empowering minorities politically by Pantoja, as well as by Banducci, Donovan, and Karp. It is worth noting the political diversity among, as well as between, racial groups. Finally, a lack of data on minority issues—and a lack of dialogue about minority political representation—hinders further research.

The reader may be surprised by the finding that Latino voters are not trending towards increased support of the GOP, despite the party’s recent focus on attracting Latino voters. Nicholson and Segura examine issue ownership and salience and conclude that, if anything, Latinos nationwide are trending towards being more Democratic. Contrary to popular wisdom, Latinos are not singularly focused on family values, and religiosity among Latinos does not affect which party they choose. The authors also found that as socioeconomic status increases, Latino voters actually become more Democratic, on average. Uhlaneer and Garcia also find that for some groups of Latinos, individuals become more Democratic as socioeconomic status increases.

The first sections of the book provide food for thought on the current state of minority political representation. Looking to the future, the last three pieces provide a framework for reform. The Bowler and Donovan study of cumulative voting, which could have been placed in the last section of the book, is very thought-provoking. Cumulative voting, used in corporate elections and currently adopted by nearly 100 U.S. localities, is a system in which voters cast as many votes as there are positions available on the city council, school board, or other elected body. Cumulative voting is presented as an alternative to redistricting, which is a litigious and costly way to increase minority representation. However, minority voters need to be involved in politics, develop a strategy, and organize to coordinate their voting patterns for cumulative voting to successfully increase minority representation. Although cumulative voting is currently used primarily in small municipalities, the authors present a good case for its prospects of increasing minority representation across the nation.

Grofman presents a history of redistricting, which has become a contentious issue frequently fought in court. There was a backlash to the increase in minority representation resulting from the 1990 redistricting session. In 1993, the Supreme Court chastised the Justice Department, even drawing the analogy of apartheid, for being overzealous in the pursuit of increasing minority representation by creating oddly shaped districts. The full implications of the case, Shaw v. Reno, are still being determined in ongoing litigation, but the blow to minority representation is clear. The author also highlights the minority undercount in the 2000 census, specifically the decision not to adjust the final census results as fully as possible. Redistricting holds hope for further increasing minority representation, but the degree of change depends on the courts.

Taken as a whole, the book provides a hopeful picture for the future, as well as a roadmap for increasing minority representation. The keys are political knowledge, involvement, and organization, which can be applied within the current system or used to implement strategies such as cumulative voting, direct democracy, or redistricting. Diversity in Democracy will make a useful addition to the library of anyone interested in the political issues involved, as well as readers who are more focused on increasing the well-being of minorities in America.


Review by Grey Maggiano, MPP candidate, Georgetown Public Policy Institute

Taken as a whole, Not Just Black and White accomplishes exactly what it sets out to do—present a panorama of current thought on immigration, race and ethnicity in the United States. Not Just Black and White combines historical, political and sociological perspectives on immigration. The volume is not exhaustive; it leaves a number of unanswered questions regarding some immigrant groups and intra-group conflicts. It is similarly not always rigorous; some chapters lack the academic scrupulousness to support the broad claims made about race and ethnicity. Nevertheless, Not Just Black and White does create a helpful backdrop for examining the current discussion on immigration in the United States. The text deserves attention as a jumping off point for a larger discussion on the current realities of immigration.

The current immigration debate suffers from a lack of attention to history. Immigrant advocates consistently refer to the U.S. as a country of immigrants. However, the historical presentation of a harmonious immigrant experience is not congruent with the reality of modern-day immigration. For this reason, most Americans see the current immigrant experience as fundamentally different from that of
their ancestors. Until advocates place the modern immigration struggle in the proper historical context, the image of a country of immigrants will continue to ring hollow. In Not Just Black and White, Editors Foner and Frederickson bring together a collection of historians, sociologists and political scientists to facilitate a better understanding of modern immigration and race issues in the proper historical framework.

The volume is divided into five parts. The first two sections deal mainly with the history of immigration and the changing definitions of race and ethnicity. By re-telling significant portions of American history with an eye towards ethnicity and race, Not Just Black and White provides some interesting illuminations. One such example is that minorities and immigrants are at once connected and separate: while immigrants may initially share some of the same negative stereotypes as African-Americans, with time they are able to become “White”. This transformation can be symbolic, as Italian immigrants gradually became accepted as citizens and equals in society, or literal, as Mexicans went from being quantified as Mexican to White in the census. Also of particular interest is the discussion of the creation of an underclass. In chapter 5, Gerald Jaynes argues that in the post Civil Rights era, Americans are very intolerant of racism and bigotry, but accept a certain amount of inequality; they accept that certain minorities disproportionately belong to the “underclass,” a group that lacks sufficient education and motivation to climb the social ladder.

The last three sections of the book address more modern trends among immigrant groups including the construction of pan-ethnicities (e.g. Latin American and Asian American), trends among immigrant groups, and relations between minority groups. It is here that the volume loses its rigor. One author argues that the activities of Irish-Americans as hosts in the early 20th century led to the instilling of racial attitudes into the minds of new immigrants from other parts of Europe. Another suggests that the unifying factor among all Asian-Americans should be that the United States is responsible for forcing Asians out of their home countries and into the U.S. Neither of these arguments is very intuitive and the authors favor rhetoric over substance. Both chapters rely on contemporary pieces of fiction and broad generalizations about U.S. foreign policy to defend the above arguments. The authors should heed the advice of John Lie, who notes that “romantic abstractions strike me as the stuff out of which destructive demagogues and mass murderers empower themselves. After all, the very expression of interracial conflict reifies identities and strengthens boundaries that may in turn lead to inter-ethnic conflict (Not Just Black and White, 311).”

Overall, Not Just Black and White does accomplish its goal of placing the current immigration debate in its proper historical context. However, at the end of the text several important questions are left unanswered. The book fails to address recent immigrants from Africa, the problems they have identifying as a new kind of African-American or the conflict between African immigrants and U.S. born African-Americans. Nor does the volume discuss the important distinction between legal and illegal immigrants and the political dilemmas this situation creates for legal immigrants. The text does not explore the differences in the integration of immigrants in urban and rural areas, which is of particular importance in southern states that are experiencing high levels of Latino immigration. However, Foner and Fredrickson do not set out to answer all the questions about immigration but instead “to provide new insights and new ways of thinking about immigration, race and ethnicity.” Overall, the volume will leave readers with more questions than answers about immigration, but this may have been the editors’ intention all along.


Tariq Modood is a political sociologist who teaches at the University of Bristol. His work focuses on the multifaceted impact of Muslim immigration on British politics and society. Modood is particularly interested in the ways in which liberal and leftist perspectives on race and politics have failed to grapple with the specificity of the Muslim experience, and with the concrete claims and demands that Muslims have embraced as political and social actors.

Prior to 9/11, a book of this type would have appeared under the rubric of area studies, and the interest it generated would have depended on the value readers placed on “Muslims in Britain” as a distinct social category. As Modood recognizes, any discussion that touches on Islam and the European democracies assumes a wider significance in the context of the war on terror.

Tariq Modood writes as a supporter of what he calls “the emergence of Muslim political identity,” and as a proponent of “moderate multiculturalism.” His book is aimed at scholars and anti-racist activists who are interested in a theoretically informed account of Muslim politics and identity in a liberal democratic context. He writes from “in-
side” both Islam and Britain, and he is personally as well as intellectually sympathetic to the “desire for a hyphenated Britishness among immigrants and their descendants.” His aim is to simultaneously defend and rethink multiculturalism as the major project of contemporary liberal democracies. “We must rethink ‘Europe’ and its changing notions,” he concludes, “so that Muslims are not a ‘Them’ but part of a plural ‘Us’, not mere sojourners but part of its future.”

Multicultural Politics opens with an illuminating discussion of “cultural racism” and how it draws on but is distinct from “color racism.” In contemporary Britain, he says, Muslims from South Asia are discriminated against “on the grounds of color,” but also on the basis of culture. “The perceptions of Asians,” he writes, “is that their defects lie deep in their culture rather than in biology that produces their culture. This means that Asians, more than blacks, suffer a double racism.” Far from reproducing the bimodal white-black tensions that have shaped, and warped, U.S. history, race relations in Britain are increasingly understood in terms of a deep-rooted antagonism between an Enlightenment-inspired, pleasure-seeking mainstream and a God-affirming, mostly Muslim minority that views itself as neither “black” nor “white” but religious and communitarian. From this perspective, an alliance of committed Christians and Muslims, say, is more likely to gain traction than a U.S.-style rainbow coalition that subsumes religious and ethnic identity into the category of race.

Many observers have assumed that the “political solidarity of all non-whites” in Britain would trump “Asian self-identification.” But the rise of a self-consciously Muslim political identity poses an enormous challenge for multiculturalists as well as the major political parties. “An absurd situation” has emerged, Modood points out, “in which antiracists were encouraging self-pride and assertiveness in the racially subordinated, but were intolerant of Asians defining themselves, their circumstances, frustrations, and aspirations except in approved ways.” In other words, the language and practice of civil rights and multiculturalism inspired and galvanized the Muslim community in ways that defied the expectations of civil rights actors.

The assertion of Muslim identity has, not surprisingly, come into conflict with a post-9/11 discourse that insists on the fundamental autonomy of the Western tradition and the famous clash of civilizations. Modood cites a number of writers who have recently renounced multicultural and pluralistic conceptions of British nationalism in favor of a tart liberal secularism that emphasizes individual freedom over group reconciliation. Modood insists that the spread of secularism as a response to Muslim demands will only further inflame the community and is for this reason deeply counterproductive.

Modood’s analysis points in a different direction, one that affirms multiculturalism but accepts the legitimacy of Muslim group identity. “It is foolish to disparage and dismantle the cohesiveness of Muslim communities,” he argues. “Integration cannot be on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis; we must be willing to redefine Britain in a more plural way.” Modood defends this conception of “a more plural” Britain not only because it corresponds to how Muslims themselves feel about things, but because of what Robert E. Park and W.I. Thomas called the “ethnicity paradox”—“that allowing ethnic communities to take root and flourish in the new soil was the most satisfactory way of promoting long-term integration and participation” in the wider society. As Park and Thomas observed, “the individual will not be respected unless the group is respected.” A purely secular politics, Modood suggests, is incapable of tolerating “the existence of pre-Enlightenment religious enthusiasm” and at the same time helps motivate the very extremism that secular politics seeks to repress.

For Modood, individualism and secularism are part of the problem rather than the solution. “We ought to recognize,” he says, “that there is an incompatibility between radical secularism and any kind of moderate multiculturalism in which Muslims are an important constituent.” Muslims in Britain, he insists, must be recognized as a community within a larger community, rather than as individuals in a community of individuals. Whether this position is sufficiently responsive to the perspectives of ethnic Muslims who are indifferent or even antagonistic to the group consensus that Modood invokes is an open question. What cannot be doubted is that Multicultural Politics is a genuinely thought-provoking text on a critically important topic that merits attention and debate.


Review by Hamutal Bernstein, PhD candidate in Government, Georgetown University

Immigrants now account for 11% of the U.S. population, thus constituting a potentially powerful political force. From the standpoint of political behavior theory and immigrant incorporation, it is crucial to understand how immigrants fit into the U.S. electorate. Do traditional models of voting behavior apply to them, or should alternative theories be used to explain their political activity? Many hypotheses have been posited to explain the relatively low rates of
immigrant participation, but Ramakrishnan provides the first comprehensive test of various explanatory theories by drawing on a wide array of recent data. His empirical analysis provides a thorough examination of numerous theories on immigrant incorporation and political behavior, covering heretofore neglected immigrant groups and providing a comparative view across racial groups and generations.

Chapter 2 begins with a brief review of scholarly work on early European immigration and more recent studies on contemporary immigration in the U.S. Ramakrishnan proposes filling an important gap in the literature by moving beyond projects that have only analyzed specific groups or specific geographic regions. He is providing the first comparative, national analysis of immigrant participation across racial and ethnic groups. His analysis includes not only Latino and Asian immigrants, but also the understudied groups of white immigrants and black immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa. The survey data he employs is also more recent than that used by other scholars, which is crucial in order to capture the effect of the surge in naturalizations that took place in the mid-1990s. His primary data source is the Current Population Survey Voter Supplements (CPS), a national survey that covers from 1994 to the present. He supplements this with other surveys in addition to qualitative data.

Chapter 3 places the current immigration situation in historical perspective, showing that immigrants make up a smaller proportion of the U.S. population now than they did in the early 1900s and disproving the myth that immigrant numbers are at an unprecedented high. He describes the shift in immigrant concentrations from the rural Midwest to the urban Northwest, and now to the Sunbelt. He points out that one-quarter of the U.S. population will consist of first- and second-generation immigrants by 2025.

In Chapter 4, Ramakrishnan tests whether traditional models of voter participation that emphasize age, education, and income also apply to immigrants. He analyzes several data sources in order to compare across racial groups, national origins, and immigrant generations. He does not find evidence for claims of “immigrant exceptionalism,” instead concluding that there is a significant positive relationship between turnout and all three of the traditional predictors. There is evidence, however, that these effects are weaker for the first generation than later generations. Ramakrishnan goes on to assess the significance of several non-individual-level factors, including social incorporation, institutional barriers, political mobilization, and political culture. He finds mixed effects across racial groups and immigrant generations. The evidence provides some support for assimilationist theories of immigrant adaptation, showing that first generation immigrants are less influenced by state political culture than later generations.

Ramakrishnan offers several alternative factors to explain immigrant participation in Chapter 5. Although other scholars have hypothesized the importance of many of these effects, he is offering the first comprehensive test. He examines turnout across generations, finding that political incorporation proceeds differently across racial groups and does not follow straight-line theories that predict increasing turnout over the generations. He also identifies a continuous racial gap, which has resulted from persistent race privileges that discourage minority participation. Ramakrishnan also investigates the effect of country-of-origin characteristics, including the impact of migrating from a country with a repressive or communist regime, or a country that permits dual nationality. He also checks for the significance of country- and region-specific effects. He goes on to examine several factors particular to the American context: residential ethnic concentration, multilingual ballots, and English language proficiency.

Chapter 6 takes a look at immigrant responses to the surge in anti-immigrant legislation of the mid-1990s. This legislation began with California’s Proposition 187, which sought to deny public benefits to immigrants. Ramakrishnan investigates the effect of this political threat on immigrant voting as well as the effect of mobilization by candidate, ethnic party, and civic organizations. This analysis focuses on California, Texas, and New York, and relies on interviews with ethnic leaders, newspaper coverage of immigration issues, and individual-level data on voting behavior. He finds that high threat levels indeed raised immigrant participation, encouraging both voting and registration. Mobilization effects were weak and not consistent for first-generation immigrants.

Chapter 7 moves beyond voting to explore other forms of political participation including signing petitions, attending local meetings, writing to elected officials, contributing to political causes, attending rallies, and doing party work. The analysis finds that there are widely differing degrees of participation across racial groups.

Ramakrishnan concludes in Chapter 8 with several policy recommendations to improve immigrant participation. He proposes stronger education to improve civic and language skills, policies to improve socioeconomic equality across groups, greater outreach and inclusion of ethnic candidates and voters, and programs to regularize undocumented immigrants.

This book provides a useful contribution to immigrant incorporation literature by adding a political perspective to the extensive body of economic and sociological theories. His use of rich new data covering a broad range of immigrant groups provides good tests of interesting factors, and he verifies all of his empirical findings with alternative data sources. Throughout the book he provides brief possible explanations for various findings.
Although I appreciate his acknowledgement of many forms of political participation, his work does not cover other important modes of participation, such as running for political office, nor more modern modes of activity like participation on electronic chat boards, blog writing, and other new forms especially popular among youth. Secondly, his focus on threat as a stimulant for voting is interesting, but it points to the importance of the newly threatened group post-9/11 that he mentions only briefly: Arab-Americans. Although their numbers may not be significant enough for this type of empirical analysis, further study of their situation is clearly necessary. Thirdly, I was struck by the crucial importance of racial identification, as Ramakrishnan assigns immigrants into four distinct racial groups: white, black, Latino, and Asian American. He does not raise the issue of the problematic nature of racial identification until the very last sentence of his book. The classification of individuals into different racial groups is obviously quite problematic, especially with the overlap between these categories, intermarriage, and conflicting identities. Ramakrishnan writes repeatedly of racial inequalities, but there is little theoretical discussion of race in a sociological sense.

Ramakrishnan has written a thorough and well-researched book that provides important tests of the factors that influence immigrant political behavior. This is a timely and fascinating topic whose complexity is managed quite effectively by the author, not only along the racial and national-origin lines, but also regarding the concentration in specific states. Hopefully this type of work will motivate more national political surveys to ask immigrant-status-related questions, so that we can come to a greater understanding of this important issue. This book is an interesting read that addresses the issue of immigrant participation from a comprehensive standpoint.
CDATS Events & Lectures, Spring 2006

- **Benjamin Read** (University of Iowa, and CDATS), “The Uses of Local Interpersonal Networks in Governance: State Cultivation of Neighborhood Social Capital in China and Taiwan”  
  Commentator: Harley Balzer

- **Carol Gould** (George Mason University), “Conceptualizing Solidarity in Global Ethics”  
  (Co-sponsored with the Georgetown Political Theory Colloquium)  
  Commentator: Patrick Deneen

- **Bo Rothstein** (Gothenburg University), “Can Efficient Political Institutions Be Created? A Journey into the Soft Underbelly of Rational Choice Theory”  
  Commentator: Eric M. Uslaner

- **Almut Wieland-Karimi** (Friedrich Ebert Foundation) “Perspectives on the Future of Democracy in Afghanistan”

Fall 2006 Faculty Fellows

CDATS is happy to announce its Fall 2006 Faculty Fellows, **Marc Morjé Howard** and **Michele Swers**.

Howard’s project, “The Causes and Consequences of Civic Engagement,” follows on two years (2003-2005) as the director of a survey project for CDATS called “Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy” (CID). The main goal of the CID survey is to provide an in-depth analysis of American civil society in comparative perspective. With the fieldwork for the survey completed, Howard plans to spend his semester as a CDATS Fellow working on several articles and possibly a co-authored book based on the CID data.

Swers’ project, “Making Policy in the New Senate Club: Women and Representation in the U.S. Senate,” examines questions of representation and policymaking. She evaluates whether women in the Senate are more likely to provide substantive representation of women’s interests by playing a more active role in the development of social welfare policy or advocating for women’s rights on issues such as abortion and family leave. Her study is the first to move beyond examining differences on “women’s issues” to evaluate assumptions about women officeholders in other policy areas, particularly defense. Since 9/11, voters have been more focused on issues of national security and studies demonstrate that the public trusts male candidates more than female candidates on issues of defense and foreign policy. Swers’ work compares the legislative activity of men and women on defense issues to determine if women are less active on security issues or if they are less supportive of a hawkish defense policy. Finally, the study examines the politics of judicial nominations to determine if women are more supportive of female nominees or more likely to get involved in nomination debates when issues related to gender are central to the nomination.

Affiliated Faculty and Fellows Accomplishments

- CDATS director **Steven Heydemann** published a review article, “In the Shadow of Democracy,” which appeared in the *Middle East Journal*, Volume 60, Number 1, Winter 2006. Also, he co-edited a manuscript, “Foundations and the Challenge of Legitimacy in Comparative Perspective,” which was accepted for publication by Russell Sage Press and will appear in Fall 2006.

- CDATS visiting fellow **Alnoor Ebrahim** received the 2005 Editor’s Prize for best scholarly article in the journal *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*, for a paper titled “Making Sense of Accountability: Conceptual Perspectives for Northern and Southern Nonprofits.”

- Assistant Professor of Government **Marc Morjé Howard** published “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes” (with Philip G. Roessler) in the April 2006 issue of the *American Journal of Political Science*, as well as “Conceptual and Methodological Suggestions for Improving Cross-National Measures of Civil Society: Commentary on Heinrich” in the Fall 2005 issue of the *Journal of Civil Society*. His forthcoming publications include “Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research,” in *Perspectives on Politics*, “Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews” (with James L. Gibson) in the *British Journal of Political Science*; and a co-edited volume (with Vladimir Tismaneanu and Rudra Sil), *World Order After Leninism*, which will be published by the University of Washington Press in 2006. In addition to his academic work, he has also published an article in *Tennis Magazine* and an op-ed on wrongful convictions in *The New York Times*. 
Center Highlights


- Associate Professor at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute Mark Rom wrote a chapter titled *Are the States Effective Laboratories of Democracy?* that will be included in an upcoming book published by Brookings Institution.

- CDATS graduate assistant Marni Schultz received a scholarship from the Nonprofit Academic Centers Council to present a paper titled “Learning First-Hand: Why Nonprofit Management Students Need the Case Study Method” at the Benchmark3 Conference on Nonprofit and Philanthropic Studies at Arizona State University in March 2006.

About this Publication

*Democracy & Society* is published twice a year, and CDATS welcomes submissions from scholars around the world. Please visit [http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/democracyandsociety.htm](http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/democracyandsociety.htm) or email cdatsnews@georgetown.edu for more details.

This issue was edited by Marni Schultz and Stipica Mudrazija.