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Ten Years of CDACS: The State of Democracy and Democracy Studies

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Challenges in Democratic Consolidation: The Impact of AKP in Turkey

BY SELMA BARDAKCI, ERTUĞRUL GENÇ
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This paper deals with the democratic consolidation in Turkey in the light of the political stability in the past decade that increased hopes for a more liberal democracy, but which nevertheless failed to materialize. Studying the Turkish political system, the paper concludes that this failure can be attributed to the uninterrupted dominance of a single political party that had adverse effects on the democratic consolidation, and the political leaders’ narrow democratic understanding, and that given the very recent political turmoil the prospects for liberal democracy to prevail are grim.

A classic definition of democracy put forward by Robert Dahl involves extensive civil and political rights and a fair, competitive, and inclusive electoral system.¹ In addition, Huntington’s “two-turnover test”² seems to create a reliable basis on which we can classify democracies. However, many countries’ political systems fall short of Dahl’s concise definition and their regimes vary considerably, hence the names attributed to them, such as “illiberal,” “delegative,”³ or **[Cont’d, Page 2]**

Democracy in Crisis: An Interview with Dr. Benjamin Barber

Dr. Benjamin Barber is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society at The Graduate Center, The City University of New York. He is the author of the international bestseller *Jihad vs. McWorld*, and most recently of *If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities*. Dr. Barber’s studies focus on, among other things, citizenship and democracy in the United States and around the world. He kindly agreed to participate in an interview with *Democracy and Society* to discuss the progress of democracy and governance over the last 40 years and his current research concerning democracy, politics, and culture.

What have we learned about democracy and governance over the past 40 years? What has surprised us and what lessons were possibly missed? What new puzzles do scholars of democracy still need to address and what analytical tools might they use?

Democracy is increasingly in crisis, even in the places where it is ostensibly well established. This is in part because its meaning has become **[Cont’d, Page 21]**

TEN YEARS OF CDACS: THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY STUDIES

• *A Letter from the Director* •



The Carnation Revolution, which signaled the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization, occurred 40 years ago this April. At the end of 2013 the Center for Democracy and Civil Society (formerly known as the Center for Democracy and Third Sector), also turned ten. We found it opportune to use this

moment in time to pause and reflect on the state of democracy, but also importantly on the state of democracy studies.

The optimism of the Third Wave has given way to a new era of democratic decline. For several years now Freedom House's annual report on Freedom in the World has persistently reported declines in political rights and civil liberties across the globe. Regimes that appeared to be solidly democratic have backslid back toward authoritarian territory. Massive changes that fundamentally altered politics in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Sub-Saharan Africa have produced electoral regimes that are hybrid in nature, and what many now call electoral authoritarian rather than democratically flawed. The Arab Spring, which swept long-standing dictators from office, now faces the challenge of dealing with highly entrenched political and economic interests, within an environment of deep societal division.

On April 24, 2014 we hosted a panel discussion with Thomas Carothers, Steven Heydemann, Sharon Wolchik, Eusebio Mujal-Léon, and Daniel Brumberg to specifically address these issues. In 2002 Carothers famously urged scholars and practitioners to move beyond the "transition's paradigm," to focus less on elections and more on context and many of the deep structural impediments to political change. All of our speakers echoed that theme, noting the growth of mixed regimes and the ability of autocrats to improvise, or "upgrade" to cope with the new challenges of social mobilization. They often do so by limiting citizen action, curtailing technologies, managing elections, only partially reforming their economies, and diversifying international linkages. The surprising persistency of anti-democratic political culture and prevalent corruption, even in supposedly consolidated democracies like Hungary, was also stressed.

A number of overarching themes emerged as especially important for consideration. First, it is obvious that the dichotomy between democracy and autocracy fails to capture

the myriad of regimes in the world today, yet we also want to avoid splitting hairs over how we define something. Second, the role of the military in political transitions has not been adequately addressed, and indeed their relationship to politics and their material interests can be determinative factors in moments of social protest. Third, international actors can make a difference when they are committed to the promotion of democracy and better governance. This is increasingly important in an environment where anti-democratic patronage is easily available. Finally, and perhaps the silver lining, was the fact that massive social protest ultimately reflects the fundamental failure of authoritarian orders to cope with increasing demands on their political systems.

In this edition of *Democracy and Society* we bring together some more insights on the current status of democracy and democracy studies with an interview with Benjamin Barber, and fascinating submissions from international scholars and our student body. Dr. Barber comments on democratic cynicism, the European Union, but also about the role and dynamism of modern cities. Two of our submissions (from Bardakci, Genç, and Hekimci of Bahçeşehir University and So Jin Lee of Georgetown SFS) write about the failure of democratic consolidation in Turkey and South Korea due to elite politics and regionalism respectively. Katie LaRoque and Meagan Moody, both Georgetown D&G students, look at two sets of intersections in the fascinating cases of Ukraine and Cuba — the nation and the state, and the market and the polity. Georgetown SFS graduate Salvador Depaz provides a case study of transitional justice in El Salvador.

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"pseudo" democracies as well as "democraduras."⁴ Similarly, O'Donnell explains the term "delegative democracy" as a type of democracy consolidated insufficiently, that does not express any visible sign of regressing into authoritarianism or turning into a representative liberal democracy, and is "marked by an extremely personalistic style of leadership." Contemporary Turkey constitutes an excellent example of such a delegative democracy.

There are a number of factors determining democratic consolidation such as external and internal factors, geopolitical circumstances, the party system, the political elite, and political institutions. Turkey's slightly unusual situation as a delegative parliamentary democracy is arguably due primarily to its parties and political elite. Here it should be noted that theoretically, concepts used to explain the failure of democratic consolidation might not only indicate a lack of moving towards a more comprehensive democracy,

they can at the same time indicate a wider problem, that of regression to authoritarianism. Thus, adopting a limited conceptual framework makes authoritarian tendencies invisible.⁵ In any case, even if there is no regression, democratic consolidation might easily be at least as difficult and lengthy as transition itself,⁶ causing countries to stagnate.

A look at the situation of democracy in Turkey will present the current situation and the level of democratic consolidation, creating the basis for the ensuing analysis. Turkey has long been a formal, yet unconsolidated democracy, which makes for an interesting case to investigate. A look at the trajectory of Turkish political system will yield important insight as to why the abovementioned concerns materialized and Turkish democracy did not jump from electoral to complete democracy.

This paper argues that democratic consolidation in Turkey is slowed down by the fact that the political parties in power and the political elite adopt a minimalist approach towards democracy,⁷ effectively turning the political system into “electoralism.”

Democratic Development in Turkey

Efforts to democratize the Turkish political system go back to the 19th century. In 1808, the *Sened-i İttifak*⁸ strived to adjust the dealings between the government and Sultan, and the commands of *Tanzimat*⁹ in 1839 and *Islahat*¹⁰ in 1856 gave way for defining citizenship on equal terms.¹¹ The *Kanun-i Esasi*¹² (the constitution) was proclaimed in 1876, however, authoritarianism persisted. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)¹³ succeeded in preventing tyranny but failed to restore a constitutional regime, becoming the “sole legatees of the Sultan’s autocracy.”¹⁴ Turkey’s regime formally became a republic in 1923,¹⁵ and the Republic’s first constitution was created in 1924, although the authoritarian culture persisted in Turkey under single-party rule.

Democratization was refueled by a new foreign policy agenda at the beginning of the Cold War, ending the single-party system. The newly governing Democrat Party (DP) retained power until a 1960 military coup, but during its rule, civilian authoritarianism persisted as the DP continuously violated the oppositions’ civil liberties.¹⁶ Following the 1960 coup, a new constitution was developed to protect basic freedoms for universities, the press, and civil organizations. Though it lessened threat of repression from civilian governments, the constitution still allowed other threats towards democracy, such as extensive military oversight and judicial bureaucracy — bodies that monitored elected governments.¹⁷ The main reason behind the enlargement of rights and liberties was that of protecting the state elite against the “tyranny of the majority.”¹⁸


Later, the 1982 constitution included very little space for liberties such as freedom of speech and expression,¹⁹ mainly aiming to protect the state and its authority against citizens, rather than protecting individuals against the encroach-



Turkey’s situation in its democratic development. Source: Andreas Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation Journal of Democracy (1998) 91-107.

ments of state authority.²⁰ Additionally, the military kept and maintained its autonomy in the Turkish government through the National Security Council.²¹ The 1980s and 1990s saw partial liberalization, but in the 1990s the country was once again preoccupied with regime security, as the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party and especially the growing military conflict between the Turkish Army and the illegal terrorist organization PKK in the Kurdish-dominated Eastern and Southeastern provinces was alarming and resulted in often undemocratic precautions and actions taken by the state.

Freedom House scores are a useful measure to help understand a country’s level of civil liberties and political rights. The figure below shows the freedom rating of Turkey between the years 1990 and 2014.



Freedom House scores of Turkey between 1990 and 2014. Source: Freedom House

The slight worsening of the figure in the last two years indicates the political turmoil that surrounded the country in 2013. The 2014 report speaks of the “harsh government crackdown on protesters in Istanbul and other cities.”²² Similarly; the World Justice Project ranks Turkey 59th among 99 countries,²³ and Reporters Sans Frontières ranks Turkey 154th among 179 countries.²⁴ Despite a “seemingly stronger commitment to democracy at both elite and mass levels” since the 1970s,²⁵ the democratization process seems to have stalled. Although technically a “second wave” democracy, the result is far from impressive as of 2010s.

The AKP Era

In Turkey, the Islamic and secular segments confront each other on various levels, and this creates problems in consolidating the democracy.²⁶ This confrontation has roots going back to the foundation of the Republic, as the founding elite adopted a very strict interpretation of secularism and aimed to transform not only the political system but also the cultural and political attitude of its population as well. Strict implementation of secular practices and principles can be said to have backlashed, as the first free and fair elections in 1950 gave a large majority to the opposition party, which followed a more moderate course in its conduct of religious affairs. To this day, this secular-religious divide—coupled with regional/economic inequalities—arguably defines the major fault line in the Turkish society.

Turkish political style is dominated by “strong party discipline and the absence of intraparty democracy”²⁷ commonly cited as a key element of the Turkish politics,²⁸ but over-stressing this method undermines legitimacy.²⁹

Founded in 2001 after a devastating financial and political crisis that effectively wiped out the established parties that dominated the political arena in the 1980s and 1990s, AKP has won three national elections, three local elections and two referenda in twelve years, in an unmatched fashion. In addition, the party won an overwhelming number of seats in the National Assembly in all three elections, which gave it ample political power to implement its vision.³⁰

Although political stability can be seen as an advantage for democratization, since cross-party cooperation is more effective in supporting and furthering consolidation than single-party behavior,³¹ AKP’s “cycle of dominance,” which began from its ability to garner votes from center-right as well as Islamic voters by a combination of pragmatism, economic growth, and democracy, siding with “the people,”³² which other center-right parties had never been able to accomplish,³³ has overall proved harmful for democratic consolidation in Turkey. In the process, AKP chairman and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emerged as by far the most important political figure in Turkey, being target of much praise and criticism.

AKP’s pro-EU agenda appealed to both liberal and center-right voters, allowing it to win an unprecedented 47% of the popular vote in 2007.³⁴ The *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer*

trials³⁵ perfectly illustrate the fundamental cleavage between political forces in Turkey, a key reason for the failure of democratic consolidation. Next, AKP established judicial oversight through a referendum in 2010, increasing its grip on the judiciary.³⁶ While patronage and clientelism have always played a role in Turkish politics,³⁷ AKP balanced patronage with responsible fiscal and monetary policies. This allowed it to expand its core base even further,³⁸ leading the party to centralize power and win by an even bigger margin in 2011. Democratic governments that believe they have absolute power from the ballot box often centralize authority,³⁹ leading to what Fareed Zakaria calls an “illiberal democracy,” where governments gain legitimacy based on

Despite its electoral success, AKP could not prevent the enormous Gezi Park protests in 2013 or the December 2013 corruption scandal, involving high-ranking political figures.

being popularly elected,⁴⁰ while at the same time failing to implement electoral laws better addressing representation, or widening civil and political liberties.

Eventually, AKP used electoral success to attain a more permanent grip on power,⁴¹ and has cracked down on its critics in an increasingly authoritarian manner. Despite its electoral success, AKP could not prevent the enormous Gezi Park protests in 2013 or the December 2013 corruption scandal, involving high-ranking political figures. Given its electoral power and lack of serious challenger to its domination, “it is puzzling that there were such major governance failures.”⁴² AKP’s Schumpeterian understanding of democracy became more apparent as it increasingly sought to delegitimize opposition and counter criticism⁴³ by pointing to the ballot box. By calling its opposition a “conspiracy” or labeling protesters as “alcoholics, looters, and leftists;”⁴⁴ AKP bolstered a political culture that rewards blind obedience.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other AKP figure heads support democratic change when it aligns with AKP interests, but ignore rule of law and democratic institutions when they pose a political threat, a strategy further manifested in Erdoğan’s refusal to take responsibility for corruption allegations, as well as his (unsuccessful) efforts in the spring of 2013 to increase presidential powers through constitutional referendum.

General elections in 2015 will thus serve to reveal AKP’s reliance on Erdoğan. In a country struggling to consolidate its democracy, AKP must fulfill two challenges in order to maintain even a modicum of legitimacy. First, it must survive a leadership transition, if and when Erdoğan leaves office. Second, AKP must maintain public confidence in the elections that it holds so highly. Given widespread suspicion

of election fraud for the recent local elections, it may not achieve that goal. Without dependable elections, not only will democratic consolidation in Turkey have failed, but Turkey will be in danger of completely losing its democratic identity.

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ENDNOTES

1 Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

2 This “test” implies that when a democracy survives two successive and peaceful turnovers, it is qualified as an “established democracy”. By this measure, Turkey became a democracy only following the national elections in 1995. Samuel Phillips Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” *Journal of Democracy*, 2, no.2, (1991), 12-34.

3 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, (eds.), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1992): 48-49.

4 Democradura is a regime where few democratic procedures exist but where civic liberties are lacking and the power of the elected can be balanced with the power of the non-elected.

5 Yunus Sözen, “AKP ve Bir Otoriterleşme İdeolojisi Olarak Neo-Muhafazakar Popülizm” *YeniYol*, no.43, (January 2011): 7-23.

6 O’Donnell. *Ibid*, 48-49.

7 Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey: How Far From Consolidation?” *Journal of Democracy*, 7, no. 3 (December 1996): 123-138.

8 Charter of Alliance. Although having had limited effect on the conduct of politics and even in the future attempts to establish a constitutional system, this charter can be seen as the first constitutional document ever in the Ottoman Empire –and Turkish- history.

9 The first attempt for democratization in Turkish history, the command of Tanzimat –literally, reorganization- included clauses aiming to establish equality among Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in taxation, as well as the guaranteeing the right of private property.

10 The Command of Islahat (Reform), a continuation of the command of Reorganization, mostly aimed the improvement of non-Muslim subjects’ rights. This document is largely seen as a result of increasing pressure from the European major powers, for the Ottoman Empire tried to balance Russia versus others and wanted to secure their support and thus had to reform its treatment of non-Muslim population in civic rights as well as commercial and judicial matters.

11 Faroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 2002): 29.

12 The first constitution written in the Ottoman Empire. Although having been in effect for only two years, this was the first modern constitution written in a non-Western (or Christian) country in history.

13 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: IB Tauris, 2004): 4.

14 Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 74.

15 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1961): 255,260.

16 William Hale, “Turkey,” in Peter Sluglett, ed., *The Times Guide to the Middle East: The Arab World and Its Neighbours* (1991): 273-274.

17 Ahmad, *Ibid*, 148-153.

18 Metin Heper and Emin Fuat Keyman “Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34, no. 4, (1998): 265.

19 Zürcher, *Ibid*, 405-410.

20 Ergun Özbudun, “Constitutions and Political System,” in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 2013): 165.

21 *Ibid*, 196.

22 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2014*, (New York, 2014).

23 World Justice Project, *Country Profiles*, (2014).

24 As the organization’s report reflects the degree of freedom enjoyed by journalists and news organizations, this measure is for press freedom only, though it evidently has implications for the political system as well. The 2013 report states “democratic Turkey is today the world’s biggest prison for journalists,” a nevertheless very strong criticism. *World Press Freedom Index*, Reporters without Borders, (2013): 14.

25 Özbudun, 1996, *Ibid*.

26 Şebnem Yardımcı Geyikçi, *The Impact of Parties and Party Systems on Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Turkey*, (2013).

27 Özbudun, 1996, *Ibid*.

28 For a detailed assessment of the impact of political parties and the party system on democratic consolidation in turkey, see Geyikçi, Ş. Y. *The Impact of Parties and Party Systems on Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Turkey*.

29 Sinan Ülgen, “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Shallow Version of Democracy Will Falter,” Internet, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/27/recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9Fan-s-shallow-version-of-democracy-will-falter/h650> (Date accessed: 20 February 2014).

30 This situation was expected to somewhat deteriorate following the very heavy political crisis and social movement seen in Turkey in 2013, but the local elections that took place on 30 April 2014 showed that the party was able to keep its vote base loyal, albeit a minor decrease in votes.

31 Geoffrey Pridham, ed. *Securing democracy: Political parties and democratic consolidation in Southern Europe*, (Sussex: Psychology Press, 1990): 6.

32 Nora Fisher Onar, "Constructing Turkey Inc.: The Discursive Anatomy of a Domestic and Foreign Policy Agenda," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 19, vol. 4, (2011): 463-473.

33 Şebnem Gümüştü, "The Emerging Predominant Party System in Turkey," *Government and Opposition*, 48, vol. 2, (April, 2013): 223-244.

34 Steven A. Cook and Micheal Koplow, "How Democratic Is Turkey?" *Foreign Policy*, Internet, *Foreign Policy*: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/02/how_democratic_is_turkey (Date accessed: 15 February 2014).

35 These trials were technically aiming to unveil the illegal organization and the alleged planning of a coup d'état by an ultra-nationalist, secularist faction of high-ranking generals, NGO figures, journalists etc. against the ruling AKP. Despite the judiciary nature of the trials, they drew much political attention due to the individuals involved and the technical ambiguities as well as the controversy surrounding the evidence and the allegations during the trials.

36 Gümüştü, *Ibid*.

37 Sabri Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition*, vol. 13, Issue 1, (January, 1978): 39-57.

38 Gümüştü, *Ibid*.

39 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, Internet, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53577/fareed-zakaria/the-rise-of-illiberal-democracy> (Date accessed: 11 February): 22-43.

40 Zakaria, *Ibid*.

41 Cook and Koplow, 2013, *Ibid*.

42 Ali Çarkoğlu, "Turkey Goes to the Ballot Box," Internet, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/03/13%20turkey%20ballot%20box%20municipal%20elections%20carkoglu/13%20turkey%20ballot%20box%20municipal%20elections%20carkoglu.pdf> (Date accessed: 10 March 2014)

43 Erdoğan frequently resorted to this tactic during the Gezi Park protests in June 2013. See Cook, Steven A. "Turkey's Democratic Mirage." *Foreign Affairs*. Council on Foreign Relations, 8 Jan. 2014. Retrieved April 02, 2014 from: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140640/steven-a-cook/turkeys-democratic-mirage>

44 Daron Acemoğlu, "Development Won't Ensure Democracy in Turkey," *The New York Times*, Internet, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/opinion/development-wont-ensure-democracy-in-turkey.html?pagewanted=all> (Date accessed: 2 April 2014).

The "Moral Project" of Post-Communist Ukraine: Understanding the State, Nation(s), and the Future of Ukraine

BY KATIE LAROCHE

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was faced with a four-fold transition. Not only did it have to transition to a market economy and democratize, it was also forced to reconcile significant issues of stateness and national identity. Such an undertaking was made even more difficult given the significant linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences that separate western and central Ukraine from the eastern and southern regions. Western Ukraine was not under Soviet rule until WWII, and it and central Ukraine consist predominantly of ethnic, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians; whereas in the eastern and southern regions of the country, most people speak Russian and a large minority of ethnic Russians exists. These differences in the Ukrainian population posed significant challenges for the creation of a new state and national identity—and they remain unresolved in many respects even today.

In addition to determining boundaries and creating new institutions, the creation of a state requires an articulation of a state's social and moral project. This "project" fosters national unity among citizens and bestows a sense of purpose—or legitimacy—onto the state. Through various means like language, public education, and national symbols, the state attempts to shape its national identity—but issues inevitably rise over *how* to articulate this project. Given the divided character of the Ukrainian state, the resulting "moral project" was arguably an outcome of a state-building process that contained competing visions of Ukrainian identity. The ultimate (and controversial) creation of the Ukrainian "moral project" along ethnic nationalist lines has had a lasting impact on Ukrainian politics. Despite its ethnic origin, though, the "moral project" of Ukraine has since evolved to contain more civic elements that may assist the new Ukrainian government as it attempts to navigate the ongoing political crisis. In order to understand contemporary issues affecting Ukraine, one must examine the origin and evolution of the Ukrainian "moral project." Ultimately, the answers to some of Ukraine's fundamental problems may be found there.

State and Nation Building in Ukraine

According to most scholars of democratization, a sovereign state is a prerequisite for democracy.¹ A state must be autonomous, as well as “monopolize the use of legitimate violence.”² Another crucial component of a state, however, is its spiritual or moral project. That is, a state is more than an enforcer of boundaries; it also plays an important role in shaping national identity and in building a civic community. It does so with the institutions it creates and the laws it passes.

In contrast to the state, which is an artificial construct, the concept of a nation exists because of the “psychological identification of the people who constitute it.”³ A nation is not necessarily identical with the people of a state — and it does not have to be. Problems can arise, though, if a “national majority — linguistic, religious, ethnic, or cultural — imposes its rule or conception of the state on minorities”⁴ or if a substantial group of citizens wants to join another state.⁵ Ultimately, scholars argue that democratic consolidation requires “[taking] into careful consideration the particular mix of nations, cultures, and awakened political identities present in the territory.”⁶

Although support for a Ukrainian state was widespread at the collapse of the Soviet Union, support for a Ukrainian nation, defined in ethnic nationalist terms, was not.

Although support for a Ukrainian *state* was widespread at the collapse of the Soviet Union, support for a Ukrainian *nation*, defined in ethnic nationalist terms, was not. At the time of Ukrainian independence from the USSR, the country was mostly ethnic Ukrainian, but a large ethnic Russian population lived in eastern and southern Ukraine, particularly in Crimea. The issue lay in how to define the political community of the newly independent Ukrainian state: would it be a state of and for ethnic Ukrainians (the titular majority), or would it be inclusive of other groups? The ability of a state to shape national identity through institutions was what made the nationhood question so important for Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union — and nowhere was this issue more important and symbolic than in the decision over Ukraine’s national language.

Language has been found to be “one of the most powerful indicators of ethnicity,”⁷ especially when it comes to distinguishing between Ukrainians and Russians. As one scholar asserts, because Ukrainian and Russian cultures are quite similar, “it has long been recognized that the Ukrainian language is one of the few defining characteristics of a Ukrainian national identity that is different from Russian.”⁸ Because of this, there was concern that a Ukrainian nation,

defined by *both* Ukrainian and Russian speakers, would not constitute a clean enough break from the Soviet Union and would not legitimize the existence of a separate regime.

In order to decide on these issues of nationhood and political community, Kuzio writes that the Ukrainian state effectively had three options when writing their new constitution:

1. “A Ukrainian ethnic titular nation with the Ukrainian language as the state language;
2. A Ukrainian ethnic titular nation with two languages defined as state languages (Russian and Ukrainian); and,
3. Ukrainians and Russians both defined as titular nations with their two languages also defined as state languages (Russian and Ukrainian).”⁹

Ultimately, the new Ukrainian state chose the first option, defining Russians as one of many national minorities, but providing no preferences for the Russian language.¹⁰ Given recent events, it is important to note that an exception was made for Crimea, as it was (and continued to be) the only region of Ukraine with a majority of ethnic Russians. Consequently, it was “granted group rights in the form of political autonomy and [had] Russian as the state language (with Ukrainian and Turkish as additional official languages).”¹¹

These regional and linguistic cleavages in Ukraine were further complicated by the decision of the new Ukrainian state to incorporate other ethnic nationalist elements into its “moral project” — namely, to celebrate the survival of ethnic Ukrainians throughout centuries of foreign occupation and repression.¹² Take, for instance, the Ukrainian national anthem, “*Shche ne vmerla Ukraina*,” which means “Ukraine has not yet perished.” The opening verse is as follows:

“Ukraine has not yet perished, nor her glory, nor her freedom,
Upon us, fellow Ukrainians, fate shall smile once more.
Our enemies will vanish like dew in the sun,
And we too shall rule, brothers, in a free land of our own.”

Mikhail Molchanov argues that this decision to incorporate ethnic components into the state’s “moral project” was highly problematic for Ukrainian statehood, and warns that “ethno-cultural streamlining of the nation, based on the imaginary picture of what constitutes ‘authentic’ Ukrainianness, may limit life choice and thwart natural ethnic processes in the country, blocking not only ethnic diversification, but ethnic consolidation as well.”¹³

Given the risks to stateness associated with its decision, what compelled the Ukrainian state to define itself in this way? The answer arguably lies in its interest in external differentiation; that is, the essential creation of a separate national identity from other states, namely the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian Nationalism – Civic or Ethnic?

The “moral project” of Ukraine is an articulation of justice and freedom originating from the nationalist movements

in western and central Ukraine, but not the whole country. According to Lucan Way, the people from this region “gained a strong non-Russian/Soviet national identity prior to their incorporation into the USSR” and “actively mobilized against Soviet rule in the late 1980s, when Soviet central control began to weaken.”¹⁴

Demands for independence and freedom from foreign occupation became inextricably bound to the desire for self-governance. Therefore, to take Way’s argument further, not only is the Ukrainian “moral project” associated with freedom, it is also associated with *democracy*. As Liah Greenfeld succinctly puts it,

Democracy was thus born with the sense of nationality, the two are inherently linked, and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection. Nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon.¹⁵

The relationship between Ukrainian nationalism and democracy may even suggest a deeper belief in the country’s “moral project” — that is, that Ukrainian democracy may not have been possible at all without Ukrainian nationalism.

Although the connection between Ukrainian nationalism and democracy is quite strong, many scholars argue that nationalism “in whatever form” is often incompatible with democracy.¹⁶ In Ukraine, this may not entirely be the case. Terry argues that regardless of its usage, nationalism is problematic because it “elevates the rights of a particular community over the rights of all citizens.”¹⁷ Although the adoption of Ukrainian as the national language may appear problematic, the reality is that Ukraine is a bilingual country. Most Ukrainians actually speak both Russian and Ukrainian fluently, and alternate language depending on their location and with whom they are speaking. It is only in state institutions (i.e., public schools, town halls, etc.) that speaking Ukrainian is mandatory and this law reflects the language’s aforementioned symbolic importance in state affairs.

In contrast to Terry’s predominantly liberal argument that democracy and nationalism are mutually hostile, Ghia Nodia argues that the two are actually “joined in a sort of complicated marriage.”¹⁸ States are artificial constructs, and Nodia argues that “nationalism is the historical force that has provided the political units for democratic government.”¹⁹ Pursuant to Nodia’s argument, the connection between Ukrainian nationalism and democracy may not necessarily be entirely *ethnic* anymore. Although the Ukrainian nationalist movement began in western and central Ukraine and was in sharp contrast to the beliefs of the east and south where “Soviet identity was highly legitimate at the time of the Soviet dissolution,”²⁰ Ukrainian beliefs in democracy and independence are no longer contained to just one half of the country. This is arguably a reflection of increased civic nationalism and a growing civil society.²¹

Take for instance the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Hundred of thousands, if not millions of Ukrainians took

to the streets in protest of major electoral fraud — the trigger being a breach in democratic processes.²² Although the scope and demands of the protestors grew — and many analysts framed the protests in terms of pro-/anti-Russian sentiments²³ — it was the threat to Ukrainian democracy that served as a catalyst for civic mobilization. Significantly, there were even protestors from eastern and southern Ukraine, who supported the incumbent regime responsible for the fraud but disapproved of its behavior.²⁴

Over time, the “moral project” of Ukraine has come to contain both ethnic and civic nationalist elements. Although the Ukrainian state was built around ethnic Ukrainians, in terms of promoting Ukrainian as the national language, its “project” is not entirely ethnic anymore. The value of democracy — which was once deeply rooted in Ukrainian nationalism — has taken root in Ukrainian society, beyond the western and central regions.

Political Tensions over Ukraine’s ‘Moral Project’

The inclusion of ethnic “Ukrainianness,” to use Molchanov’s term, into the state’s “moral project” has had a lasting impact on Ukrainian politics and the struggle for Ukraine’s future. Politicians have frequently used nationalism and regional, linguistic differences to mobilize popular support in opposition to incumbent power.²⁵ Moreover, to ethnic Russians and primarily Russian-speaking Ukrainians, the ethnic components of Ukraine’s “moral project” may have less meaning or value.

The future of Ukraine will likely depend on the ability of the new Ukrainian government to harness the civic components of the state’s “moral project,” rather than the ethnic ones.

Hailing from Donetsk, an eastern city of Ukraine that is predominantly Russian speaking, former President Viktor Yanukovich challenged the promotion efforts of Ukrainian language and culture. In 2012, a controversial law was passed, amid actual fistfights in parliament, which gave Russian the “status of a regional language, approving its use in courts, schools and other government institutions in the country’s Russian-speaking southern and eastern regions.”²⁶ Although Ukrainian was still the only official national language, this law was seen as a challenge to Ukrainian nationalism and identity. As Ksenya Lyapina, an opposition deputy, commented, “With this law, the Russian language will become a de facto government language for eastern Ukraine. It’s very dangerous for Ukraine,” she added, because “it can lead to the division of the country.”²⁷ Indeed, many opposition leaders argued against the law, claiming that it would “discourage the

millions of Russian speakers inside the country from learning Ukrainian, prolonging their dependence on Russia.”²⁸

The decision by the Yanukovich administration to undermine the state’s own “Ukrainianness” underscores two significant considerations — first, that there may be some aspects of Ukraine’s “moral project” that were never accepted by the entire population; and second, that these tensions remain a source of political struggle within Ukraine today, especially as politicians continue to manipulate them for political gain.

Such tensions beg the question: Can a state whose “moral project” was defined in terms of promoting one nation over another ever be realized? The answer arguably depends on whether the values of the “project” are transferable to the entire population. In other words, aspects of the “project” which remain largely ethnic issues are unlikely to be resolved easily. Given the large percentage of Russian speakers in Ukraine, for example, the issue of national language is likely to always be divisive and is unlikely to ever garner the full support of the people.

There is hope for Ukraine, however, in the aspects of its “moral project” that are more *civic* in nature, rather than ethnic. Where consensus can be reached, progress can be made; and the Euro Mайдan protests in Ukraine suggested that issues related to democracy, anti-corruption, and socioeconomic hardships were more *uniting* than dividing. Although these protests began over the sudden refusal of former President Yanukovich to sign an association agreement with the European Union, they quickly escalated due to violence against peaceful protestors in downtown Kyiv on November 30.²⁹ Moreover, the announcement that the demonstrations would continue as long as Yanukovich remained in power suggest that the protests quickly adopted anti-regime and pro-democracy sentiments as they grew.³⁰ It is here that the civic components of Ukraine’s “moral project” reassert themselves, indicating that Ukrainians no longer support the “sovok, or the dustbin, a euphemism for the disappointing post-Soviet state.”³¹

Conclusion

The future of Ukraine will likely depend on the ability of the new Ukrainian government to harness the civic components of the state’s “moral project,” rather than the ethnic ones. As the political crisis in Ukraine continues, what remains clear is that the Ukrainian state and its territorial integrity may very well depend on its ability to do so. Although the ethnic components of the Ukrainian state were important to the external differentiation of Ukrainian identity from its Soviet past during the years following its independence, immediate cleavages emerge when Ukraine acts on its ethnic, not civic, identity. Such circumstances are further complicated by the unabashed willingness of Russian President Vladimir Putin to exploit these linguistic and regional cleavages within Ukraine to justify his blatant interference in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The new Ukrainian government must

represent the interests of all regions of Ukraine and work towards improving state institutions, reducing corruption and increasing transparency, and improving Ukrainian democracy for everyone.

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Cuba: Economic Reform and Political Change

BY MEAGAN MOODY

Cuba has faced some extreme economic challenges since its revolution, but the Communist party has survived. Now the 2008 world economic crisis has plunged Cuba into yet another downturn, one that has resulted in economic reform and liberalization to an extent never before seen under the regime. Those who argue that economic liberalization and development lead to a freer state believe the current economic reforms hold the potential to encourage political liberalization and eventually a transition to a more democratic government. If economic changes lead to a change in Cubans' attitudes and values, including a rise in expectations, the state will have to struggle to continue to meet these expectations and face de-legitimation if they fail to do so. If Raúl Castro cannot shore up the erosion of credibility the failing economy has caused, there is the potential for actual reformist, soft-line political leaders to emerge in the future. This is probably the best chance for more liberal and democratic political changes to take place. However, by examining the current economic liberalization in Cuba, and by looking at Cuba's past experience with economic liberalization, it seems that as long as the regime retains the ability to control economic, social, and political life, economic liberalization will not lead to political liberalization. Any transition that does happen will mostly likely be one determined and steered by the regime itself. Yet change could still happen. The regime is currently facing new weaknesses and challenges that could lessen their ability to exercise control and could allow enough opening for Cubans to move towards demanding more political freedoms.

While modernization theory became the primary viewpoint for those who argue economic liberalization and growth lead to democracy, authors have recognized that there are many cases, such as Cuba, which bring the theory into question. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs argue that autocrats have learned how to use economic growth to strengthen their own regimes. These autocratic regimes have found ways to allow economic liberalization while maintaining tight control over political rules and institutions, especially over what the authors call 'coordination goods'.¹ They define these as "public goods that critically affect the ability of political opponents to coordinate but that have relatively little impact on economic growth."² This way economic liberalization and growth can occur without any corresponding political liberalization.

Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman stress the effects of economic conditions on bargaining power and interests

of incumbents and oppositions. They argue that when economic crises are not dealt with successfully, it undermines the bargaining power of the rulers with key socio-political constituents, results in a loss of support from the business sector, increases protests from below, and causes serious fragmentation of the elites. Therefore, when a transition happens the existing government is unable to ensure the creation of institutional frameworks that maintain some of their interests, favor their political allies, and limit the abilities of the opposition.³ This is why a regime may choose to liberalize the economy in an effort to protect their bargaining power and interests in the face of an economic crisis.

The case of Cuba strongly supports Mesquita and Downs' argument. Raúl and Fidel Castro both have implemented economic reforms and limited liberalization in a way that has supported the economy while maintaining, and even strengthening, state power. The regime has also acting in accordance with Haggard and Kaufman's analysis, relying on economic liberalization in times of economic crises. The regime has continued to survive severe economic crises, despite ongoing predications of its imminent demise. However, Castro's success or failure to deal with the current economic crisis will likely determine the ability of the party to stay united and effective in protecting its interests in the future.

Analysis of Current Reforms

When Raúl Castro took office in 2010 he described an ambitious proposal of changes and structural reforms.⁴ *Lineamientos*, the guidelines for economic reform that were approved in 2010 by the party congress, contain measures intended to make the state financially sustainable, raise production and exports and cut import demand. The state set goals to turn over idle state land to private farmers, become more productive by transferring workers to the private sector or to co-ops, and to lift some of the many prohibitions that restrict Cuban's lives and small businesses.⁵ These goals are necessary and are positive changes. However, measures implemented by Raúl were originally few and have been limited in magnitude, affecting mainly the highest income group and leaving the state in firm control. Some of the most important measures announced by Raúl, such as the termination of rationing, legalizing the selling of houses, increasing self-employment and small private businesses, expansion of foreign investment, and greater flexibility to citizens to exit and travel abroad, were very slow in coming and tightly controlled when they did arrive.⁶

However, many of these measures have begun to take place, even if slowly and cautiously. Perhaps the two biggest measures were the November 2011 announcement that the state would allow real estate to be bought and sold, and the announcement on October 16, 2012 that the exit visa requirement would be terminated as of January 13, 2013. This will allow many Cubans to depart the country with only a passport and a visa from the country where they plan to go. These changes may look promising, but the government has

been extremely cautious to ensure they remain in control of the entire process. The New York Times states, "The new policy — promised by President Raúl Castro in 2011, and finally announced in the Communist Party newspaper — represented the latest significant step by the government to answer demands for change from Cubans, while also maintaining a significant measure of control."⁷ For example, while the exit visa requirement is being dropped, the state will be able to deny Cubans the right to leave for reasons of "defense and national security," meaning dissidents will face the same restrictions they always have.⁸ The New York

Raul and Fidel Castro both have implemented economic reforms and limited liberalization in a way that has supported the economy while maintaining, and even strengthening state power.

Times points out, "many Cubans remain skeptical about President Castro's commitment to change, noting that the laws allowing for property sales and entrepreneurship were later larded with restrictions and taxes that have ensured only minority participation."⁹ The question moving forward will be whether or not the regime will be able to maintain control over the process of its limited economic liberalization, or if this process and Cuban's demands for change will somehow get away from the regime and ultimately lead to political liberalization and potentially a transition.

Current Causes of Economic Liberalization

So what explains this recent round of economic liberalization in Cuba? It began with the change of leadership when Raúl Castro took over and became president in February 2008 and then first secretary of the Communist Party in April 2011. Raúl immediately faced a stark economic reality that demanded a serious, meaningful response. The New York Times argues, "[Raúl] has given signals he might try to follow the Chinese example of state-sponsored capitalism, and has often pledged to make Cuba's centralized, Soviet-style economy more efficient and open up opportunities for people. Cuba's budding private sector is the frail backbone of his plan to reinvigorate the country's feeble economy."¹⁰ The persistent structural problems of the Cuban economy could no longer be covered up or ignored. The global economic crisis, as well as devastating hurricanes and natural disasters, has once again crippled the nation. The economy is unproductive, tourism and trade are underperforming, capital is running out, living standards remain stark, and social services are no longer affordable. Carmelo Mesa-Lago has found that in the past fifty years Cuba has suffered severe economic

deterioration (accentuated during the *Período especial*) and that even though a great number of social indicators have improved, in 2008 half had still not recovered to their 1989 level.¹¹ In addition to all of this, the population is shrinking and aging. Therefore the biggest financial backer the country has is growing old and the Cuban leadership is ossifying. The average age of the Politburo is over 70, and those who fought in and lived during the Revolution are dying. Economic reform is not an option right now — it is a necessity. Raúl has clearly recognized this. In a 2010 speech he stated, “We either rectify things, or we run out of time to carry on skirting the abyss [and] we sink.”¹² This is a time of deepening concern over the viability of revolutionary Cuba’s economy, and so Raúl’s approach to change has had to be significantly more ambitious than ever before. The state has realized it must fundamentally rethink its role in the Cuban economy in order to ensure its own survival.¹³

Castro’s success or failure to deal with the current economic crisis will likely determine the ability of the party to stay united and effective in protecting its interests in the future.

However, unlike past experiences with economic reform, current reforms are not just about survival. Raúl is trying to re-found and shore up the credibility and legitimacy of the party. When he came into power he already lacked the power of personality Fidel lent to the regime. He has taken visible measures in an attempt to strengthen the party enough to ensure its continuation after the Castros are gone. For example, he has been cracking down on corruption, an ailment that is hurting the party’s image and credibility.¹⁴ These reforms to improve the economy are also an attempt to shore up credibility because right now economic weakness means the party can no longer rely on performance legitimacy or the social contract they traditionally use to maintain loyalty. Raúl expressed these concerns in one of his speeches, stating, “Many comrades and I will have authority. However, we want the party to have it, which is the only thing which can guarantee continuity, the unity of the nation.”¹⁵ Raúl recognizes that in the future, when he and his brother are no longer in the picture, the party will need to derive its legitimacy from its institutions, not from personalities since these will only appear weak in comparison to the Castros, especially Fidel.¹⁶ Raúl’s economic reforms are happening now not only to ensure the survival of the Cuban economy, but also to ensure that the party is able to re-found and strengthen its credibility based on institutional performance and legitimacy, especially since the sway of Fidel, and to a lesser extent his brother, are soon not going to be strong enough to keep the Revolution going.

Prospects for Transition

The Cuban case illustrates the complicated relationship between market reforms and democratization. While the move from a command-economy to a more mixed one has meant the regime does not display the same levels of totalitarian restrictions that existed before, it has not resulted in a move in a democratic direction.¹⁷ Market economies are often considered a necessary (though not sufficient) precondition for democratic development.¹⁸ However, market openings can just as easily allow economic freedoms to grow while political liberties remain repressed.¹⁹ Corrales argues that in Cuba, recent market reforms have been enacted in a way that manages to protect state power while opening up spaces of economic freedom.²⁰ Corrales argues, “The survival of the regime is explained by the state’s acquired capacity to distribute inducements and constraints by fragmenting the economy into different pieces of different value and monopolizing access to the most valuable piece.”²¹ As long as the regime retains this sort of control, the most likely transition paths will be ones determined and steered by the regime itself.

A transition path steered by the regime itself would most likely involve consolidation of an authoritarian regime, where there would be relaxation on certain controls but where dissidents and opposition would still be severely repressed. Expanded, gradual economic reforms would continue to ensure the economy’s survival.²² For this transition scenario to work, the elite would need to remain united and achieve some real results in strengthening Cuba’s economy. At the same time, repression and control techniques relied on in the past to ensure Cuban society remains inert and apathetic about the restrictions imposed by the regime would continue, and the population would remain closely connected and dependent on the regime for economic and societal benefits.²³

For a transition to democracy to happen, there would either have to be a regime collapse due to some type of major crisis that overwhelms the state or public order, or a sizeable reformist sector would have to develop within the regime that is able to negotiate with political opposition and an independent civil society.²⁴ Yet the regime has continually used economic liberalization efforts to strengthen pro-regime hard-liners by making them the principal beneficiaries of the economic gains of reforms, making it unlikely that a sizeable and powerful enough reform sector would really be able to emerge. This scenario would likely only be possible when the Castro brothers are gone and a new generation of leadership succeeds to power. In this situation there could be an increase in the chances of conflicts within the ruling coalition and the military, leading to a breakdown in unity.²⁵ In addition, Mujal-Leon and Langenbacher argue, “A more organized and emboldened civil society, in advancing from narrower economic and social demands toward more explicitly political claims, could provide a social base for mobilization and protest.”²⁶ The latest economic changes have

introduced economic expectation and uncertainty to Cuban society, which could potentially start changing attitudes and values for real political change.²⁷ However, so far the tight control the regime retains and the lack of any accompanying political liberalization with the economic make this path an extremely difficult transition path for Cuba.

Conclusions

The Cuban case illustrates that the relationship between economic liberalization and democratization is complicated and not linear. Looking at economic liberalization alone does not clearly tell us where political change may emerge. We must view this issue dynamically, not just in terms of economic gain, failure, or distribution. Because we cannot count on the changes in the economic sector to lead political change, we must identify other areas where change is taking place. In Cuba, the other dimension we can look towards is within the state itself. State capacity has declined economically and ideologically. The credibility and legitimacy of the regime's socialist model is in decline, and the state is no longer able to provide the same social services it has relied on in the past.

Ultimately, it is what is changing in the political and state capacity, not only the change in the economy or economic liberalization, which matters for the future of Cuba. Clearly there is no linear effect between Cuba's economic reform and political change. Looking at how the state itself is transforming and dealing with its decreasing capabilities illustrates the real areas where political change can emerge in Cuba.

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A Hurdle Too High: Regionalism in South Korea

BY SO JIN LEE

Scholars of democracy treat democratic consolidation as the final stage of a long, arduous path of democratic transition, reversals, and crises. Indeed, democratic consolidation is understood as the equilibrium in which "democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down."¹ As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan put it, a consolidated democracy is a political situation in which democracy has become "the only game in town."² Legitimacy, as a widely shared normative and behavioral commitment to democracy, is central to this conventional definition of democratic consolidation.

But does legitimacy ensure the quality of democratic governance in consolidated democracies? I would argue that democracy becoming the only game in town does not necessarily make that game a good one. Samuel Huntington argues that new democracies, especially third wave democracies, confront a few problems in consolidating their new democratic systems. He argues that there are three types of problems: transition problems, contextual problems, and systemic problems.³ I will explain that only the transition problems can be solved when democratic consolidation is achieved; the other two contextual and systemic problems do not cease to exist, even once democracies have been consolidated. Specifically, I argue that regionalism in South Korea hinders the quality of democratic governance in the country.

Only the transition problems can be solved when democratic consolidation is achieved; the other two contextual and systemic problems do not cease to exist, even once democracies have been consolidated.

There are largely three types of regionalism: regionalism due to ethnic-linguistic cleavage, territorial cleavage, and developmental cleavage.⁴ Being ethnically and linguistically homogenous, South Korea today experiences territorial and developmental cleavage but not ethnic-linguistic cleavage. Territorial regionalism, specifically provincialism, between the Jeolla and Gyeongsang provinces can be categorized as Huntington's contextual problem of regional antagonism. Developmental regionalism, specifically urban-rural disparities due to the domination of the central government in Seoul, can be categorized as Huntington's systemic problem of "domination by vested economic interests"⁵ and also as a contextual problem of socioeconomic inequality.

The Origins of Regionalism in Korea

Consisting of nine provinces, Korea today experiences intense provincial rivalries, especially between the Jeolla and Gyeongsang provinces. The origins of regionalism in Korea can be attributed to three major factors: the historical underdevelopment of Jeolla provinces in contrast to Gyeongsang provinces, the "biased recruitment of elites and the manipulation of regional sentiment by political elites,"⁶ and the 1980 Gwangju Massacre.

Provincial bias has deep roots in Korean history and dates back to the Three Kingdoms (Silla, Baekje, and Koguryo). The Three Kingdoms reigned from 57 AD to 668 AD. The Silla, which is located in modern-day Jeolla province, and the Baekje, which is located in modern-day Gyeongsang

province, consistently went to war with each other in hopes of becoming the unifying force of the Three Kingdoms. Despite the comparative disadvantage in size to Koguryo, in the seventh century the Silla Kingdom allied with China and conquered the Baekje and Koguryo Kingdoms. This unified the entire Korean peninsula and put an end to the Three Kingdoms era. During the Unified Silla Dynasty, from 668 to 935 AD, the Silla region era developed and prospered much more quickly than the rest of the peninsula.

This unequal trend continued on into the modern period. This is apparent today as the economic axis of modern South Korea stretches from Seoul to Busan. This is because in modern Korea "the military governments placed industrial sites at the southern end of the peninsula to protect them from a possible North Korean invasion and to encourage trade through Busan."⁷ Busan was the closest port to Japan as well, which facilitated international trade. Such strategic decisions led to the Jeolla provinces remaining largely backwards and agrarian, and consequently, Jeolla provinces industrialized much later than the Gyeongsang provinces.

Historically a higher proportion of political and business elites came from the Gyeongsang provinces, whereas a lower proportion came from the Jeolla provinces. During the Rhee Syngman years, while a quarter of the Korean population lived in the Jeolla provinces, only less than 6% of elites originated from there.⁸ Although notable under all administrations, the trend became marked during the Park Chung-Hee era from 1961-1979. Park, from the Southeast Gyeongsang province, handpicked and placed his loyal followers in positions of power and also directed economic development toward the Busan-Seoul axis. As David Kang writes, "from the Park regime through the Kim Young-Sam regime, although Jeolla's population remained roughly one-fourth of the total, elites never comprised more than 15% of the whole, and often closer to 10%."⁹

Furthermore, the Gwangju Massacre of May 1980 was widely interpreted as prejudice against the Jeolla provinces. The massacre occurred when President Chun Doo Hwan took front-line troops off the DMZ and violently suppressed the demonstrations taking place in Gwangju, the Jeolla provincial capital. There was a widespread belief in Jeolla that Chun, who hails from a Gyeongsang province, intentionally chose Gwangju out of all the different locations where its citizens were protesting against his regime, due to the rivalry and prejudice against the Jeolla provinces.¹⁰ The Gwangju incident "so alienated the Jeolla people that their loyalty [to Jeolla-born leaders] became unconditional."¹¹

The Problems of Regionalism

In *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea*, Byung-Kook Kim claims that regionalism in general can be looked at in a positive manner, since party votes in certain societies in Western Europe also tended to be unevenly distributed across regions.¹² However, he argues that regionalism in Korea is peculiar in that it is strictly a Confucian cultural

phenomenon, which possessed neither ideological legitimacy nor policy substance, unlike Western European regionalism. Kang claims that regionalism in Korea is neither unique nor surprising. He argues that regionalism would be a problem for democracies only if voters engage in regional voting for emotional reasons rather than in rational self-interested reasons.¹³

Sallie Yea analyzes the reasons behind Korea's developmental regionalism. Yea claims that during the course of Korea's rapid economic development, the resources and benefits of the growth process have been disproportionately distributed among the various provinces.¹⁴ And as a result, income distribution patterns reveal large regional imbalances. Overall, most studies on Korean regionalism, both territorial and developmental, do not seem to find the

After all, territorial and developmental regionalism may all be sustained for a long time.

issue of regionalism problematic. So long as democratic consolidation is achieved, there seems to be no motivation to raise an issue about regionalism. However, I will explain why regionalism still poses a critical problem to the quality of democratic governance in South Korea.

There are three reasons why regionalism remains as a hindrance to the quality of democratic governance in South Korea. First and foremost, the primary contention between different political parties in Korea does not represent differences in ideology or policy programs. Instead, because the basis of party identity is regionalism, political parties in South Korea are not programmatic. While programmatic party identity is based on a rule-based and universalistic access to public policy programs, South Korean political parties, with substantial identification with and support from regional cleavages, represent clientelistic parties. In South Korea, the provision of public programs and policy benefits are *conditional* on regional ties to the personal leader in office.¹⁵

Such a non-programmatic nature of political parties hinders the quality and efficiency of democratic governance. Public programs that may benefit the majority of the electorate do not get implemented, let alone proposed. If political parties compete for votes and seats in the legislature on the basis of public policy programs that they promise, the national electorate would enjoy better provisions of public programs and goods than when political parties base their partisan support on territorial cleavages. In short, citizens would enjoy a much more effective and higher quality of democratic governance under programmatic party systems.

Secondly, regionalism precludes development of civic consciousness, interest groups, and vibrant civil society, which are all necessary for good democratic governance.¹⁶ If citizens vote for political parties based on regionalism,

then they have no information on what values and principles the party stands for and which public programs they offer. In effect, voter loyalty is automatically determined by the residential location. In democracies where party systems are not programmatic, ill-informed citizens are virtually delegating their representation to their patron leaders.¹⁷ Under such circumstances, citizens are less likely to hold their leaders accountable for any misrepresentation of their interests. Because citizens delegate representation to the leaders, citizens themselves do not take the initiative to engage in the public policy debates and act for their interests. Thus, the rise of civic consciousness, interest groups, and civil society may be less likely.

In addition to the low levels of civic engagement, another critical consequence of the citizens not willing, or unable, to hold their elected leaders accountable is that there may be widespread corruption. Cronyism, vote-buying, and any other illegal acts may be practiced with any checks from the citizens or citizen watch groups. When corruption is widespread, the playing field is unequal and public budgets are misused. Again, strong regionalism can be a hindrance to effective democratic governance through these channels of undermining the growth of civic consciousness and civil society organizations, which can hold elected officials accountable.

Last but not least, the root cause of poor democratic governance is not addressed in South Korea's strongly regionalized political context. If politicians can secure their seats at the legislature through the blind loyalty of their regional voters, then why would these leaders try to demystify the regional rivalries and prejudices? In fact, it is in the interest of politicians to sustain a high salience of regionalism so that they can easily earn the votes and not be held electorally accountable after the elections. After all, territorial and developmental regionalism may all be sustained for a long time.

Conclusion

Is regionalism in Korea a hurdle too high? Will regionalism continue to hinder South Korea's quality of democratic governance? This article concludes that regionalism is indeed a hurdle too high. Given the democratic repercussions of regionalism, both South Koreans and scholars should be aware that this problem might perpetually linger in the country, even after democratic consolidation has been achieved.

The likelihood of the central government taking the extra steps to decrease the effects of regionalism, or even doing away with regionalism, is extremely slim. Citizens and intellectuals, who are aware of these problems, should actively reduce the political effects of regionalism so that the central contention of politics in South Korea becomes programmatic and ideology-based. Grassroots activist groups should form and raise awareness that it is in the interest of South Korean citizens to go beyond their traditional regional divisions and demand more program-based goods from political leaders. Scholars of democracy should also focus more on how po-

litical parties transition from clientelism to programmatic parties, although recent studies begin to show that economic and institutional reforms, which reduce the amount of pork that elected leaders could spend, help decrease clientelistic practices.¹⁸ For civic leaders, intellectuals, and scholars alike, it is time to take the effectiveness and quality of democratic governance seriously.

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Call for Papers: *Democracy & Society* • Volume 12, Issue 1

The Democracy and Governance Program at Georgetown University is seeking well-written, interesting submissions of 1,500 – 2,000 words for their Fall-Winter 2014 publication, *Democracy & Society*. The submissions can be new publications, summaries, excerpts of recently completed research book reviews, and works in progress. Submissions for this issue will be due by November 10, 2014. Please email all submissions along with a brief author's bio to democracyandsociety@gmail.com.

Democracy, Conflict and Peace-Building:

Across the globe policymakers are faced with the daunting task of forging democratic institutions after severe conflict. Likewise, we have seen supposedly stable democracies falter into civil war. International peacemaking institutions face unforeseen challenges, and at times making peace and restoring democracy seems out of reach. With recent conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe in mind, what do we know about the relationships between democracy, conflict and peace building?

We are seeking articles that address the following issues and questions:

Forging Democracy after Conflict: If democracy is to be used as a conflict resolution measure, what practices have worked best and which have failed? How do you forge democratic institutions after severe conflict?

What tools must we use to address these conflicts and promote stability and peace in volatile, post-conflict states?

Transitional Justice: What new insights are there into this longstanding question – how do you balance the need for accountability after conflict with the need to reach consensus in order to build new political institutions?

The Relationship between Democracy and Conflict: Does democracy foster stability, or rather, in certain contexts, does it lay the seeds for future conflict? Do democratic institutions actually solve conflict or simply reinforce and freeze existing tensions and divisions?

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Variations on these themes will be accepted. Research on post-conflict societies, democratic proliferation, and analysis of war and peace are encouraged. Questions and comments are welcome.

Please visit, democracyandsociety.com for more information about *Democracy & Society* and <http://government.georgetown.edu/cdacs> for more information about the M.A. in Democracy and Governance and the Center for Democracy and Civil Society.

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Transitional Justice in El Salvador: A Case Study

BY SALVADOR ERNESTO PINEDA DEPAZ

Introduction

El Salvador is a country with a troubled past, having endured a civil war conflict from 1980 to 1992 during which over 75,000 civilians were killed.¹ The military and paramilitary forces under government directives caused over 95% of all these deaths, based on findings of the report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. The patterns of violence and actions employed by security forces during the conflict ranged from extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, targeted massacres of entire villages by the military, rape, torture, assassinations carried out by death squads and summary executions. Hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans were internally displaced during the conflict; many of them emigrated out of the country, seeking refuge in foreign lands.

With the help of the international community, a peace agreement was brokered by the United Nations between both warring factions. The State and leftist guerrilla forces agreed to end armed operations and seek peace. The peace

accords between both parties were signed in Chapultepec, Mexico in 1992. Praise was given all around for the signing of the accords. The international community as well as Salvadoran citizens had much hope for the future of the nation. The peace accords proposed democracy and rule of law. Both political parties in El Salvador agreed that it was necessary to move on and heal the wounds caused by the years of war. In this context, both factions decided to allow for the creation of a truth commission with a mandate to "investigate serious acts of violence occurring since 1980, and the nature and effects of the violence and to recommend methods of promoting national reconciliation."²

When the peace accords were signed the prospects of building a strong democracy and rule of law in El Salvador were promising. The fact that a truth commission was created was also seen as a sign that El Salvador was willing to analyze and draw important lessons from the war conflict, as well as addressing and dealing with the damage the armed conflict caused to innocent victims. Unfortunately, when we fast-forward to the present-day, it is remarkable just how little progress El Salvador has made in regards to transitional justice.

A society that has not fully healed from the wounds caused by the 12-year civil war has become one of the most violent in the world. In 2011 El Salvador held the alarming honor of being the most violent nation in the world.³ The victims of El Salvador's civil war have not been able to heal and reconcile from the war inflicted mental and physical wounds. On top of that, the war victims as well as the rest of the country are now victims of the high rates of violence ravaging this nation. Seriously addressing and moving towards fulfilling the indicators of transitional justice will only aid "efforts to prevent the recurrence of human right abuses and to reinforce the rule of law" necessary for a strong democracy.⁴ For the purposes of this analysis, the four main indicators of transitional justice are: a truth commission, criminal prosecutions, reparations and institutions, as well as institutional reform.⁵ Given the context, evaluating the progress of El Salvador regarding the four indicators of transitional justice is indeed a necessary case study.

The Truth Commission

During the peace accord negotiations, the warring parties agreed to create a truth commission. The intent of creating a truth commission is found in the signed accords emanating from negotiations held in Mexico in 1991 between the two political parties, the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and liberal Front for the National Liberation Farabundo Marti (FMLN). In this meeting, the record states that the parties agreed on creating a Truth Commission that would "have as a mandate to investigate the serious acts of violence transpired since 1980, and whose footprint on society demands with urgency the public knowledge of the truth."⁶ In the final peace accord of 1992, both parties agreed that there is a "need to clarify and put an end to any indica-

tion of impunity on the part of officers of the armed forces, particularly where respect for human rights is jeopardized. To that end, the parties refer this issue to the Commission on the Truth for consideration and resolution.”⁷

The responses to the report actually received much more attention than the report itself, as most of the media in El Salvador was allied with government interests. There was a conscious effort by the government and its allies to not disseminate the report in El Salvador at that time. Currently, the truth commission report is not popularly available in El Salvador. The victims of the civil war were again victimized, as they were left largely with no representation. The FMLN,

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who the people believed would advance the rights of the victims, chose to “position themselves for a role in post-war El Salvador” as political actors whose priorities were guided around their political self-preservation.⁸ Some scholars argue that “those most ready to ‘put the past behind us’ tend to be those most desirous of participating in the political process — or those who might be objects of prosecution.”⁹ El Salvador had both types of groups as key players of the newly formed democracy. The FMLN, “a political entity eager to take part in the country’s political process and with its own concerns about potential prosecution,” proved to be an inadequate voice in energetically pursuing and speaking out for the rights of the victims of the conflict.¹⁰

Overall, the truth commission report was widely discredited in El Salvador. The recommendations to strengthen the transition to democracy, as well as address the wounds caused to the victims of the war violence were largely ignored. Among the recommendations that were implemented, the creation of the National Civil Police (PNC) structure stands out as essential. The partial reforms to the judicial reform system leave much to be desired. Even the creation of the PNC has much room for improvement. The passing of the amnesty law effectively aborted any process of accountability to address impunity from the war conflict years.

Unfortunately for El Salvador, the Salvadoran Truth Commission report did not serve as the catalyst for the comprehensive and fundamental changes needed in order to strengthen the transition to democracy. Much more could and should be done in order to fulfill the demands of transitional justice, which will in turn help to strengthen the nascent democracy and rule of law.

Criminal Prosecutions

The Salvadoran congress enacted a sweeping amnesty law in 1993 in response to the report by the Truth Commission whereby individuals deemed responsible for major acts of violence during the war were identified by name. The broad amnesty law effectively “removed civil and criminal responsibility for political crimes committed by the government and the FMLN.”¹¹ Most of those named were associated with the elites and key power brokers of El Salvador. The fact that amnesty was overwhelmingly approved by the Salvadoran congress, and no serious attempts have been made to eliminate it, clearly shows that not much progress has been made in regards to criminal prosecutions of those accused of violent acts during the war period. Furthermore, the blatant existence of the amnesty law demonstrates that “in El Salvador, there will be no punishment of those crimes [acts of political violence, crimes against humanity, and war crimes] to the extent that punishment might affect the interests of powerful individuals, institutions, or groups.”¹²

In El Salvador, since the 1993 amnesty law was enacted, not a single conviction to serve jail time has ever been issued against any individual involved in violent acts during the war period. Of the very few cases brought forth by victims of the war towards the attorney general for action since the signing of the peace accords, they all have been met with a systematic non-proactive approach towards investigating and solving them. Despite frequent calls by international actors to move forward with investigations for war violence acts, the Salvadoran structures keep the amnesty law afloat.

Overall, extremely limited progress has been made in the quest to seek justice for acts of violence perpetrated during the war times. The ruling of the Salvadoran Supreme Court in 2009, ordering the attorney general to investigate cases of forced disappearances, is a faint ray of hope for the victims of the conflict. Much still needs to be done in respect to the fulfilling the indicator of criminal prosecutions. The repeal of the amnesty law is a must in order to solidly move forward in the path for reconciliation, justice and the strengthening of democracy.

Reparations and Restitutions

The Salvadoran judiciary structure has not produced a single guilty verdict to serve jail time after the amnesty law was passed in 1993. In fact, the national judiciary system has not ordered any reparations of any kind. Not even the creation of a comprehensive fund for victims of the war was created, which was a direct recommendation of the Salvadoran truth commission in 1993. The few acts of reparations or restitutions to the victims performed by the Salvadoran State have been due to the verdicts of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and recommendations issued by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission throughout the years.

There has not been any official effort to “dedicate resources to the communities that bore the brunt of army mas-

sacres or other particularly heinous crimes.”¹³ The cowardly “let us all forgive and forget” policy advanced by all four ARENA administrations is evidenced in their lack of action in moving forward with the process of reparations, among other major failures. As Popkin observes, “the government seemed more willing to address issues related to the war (for example, the need to reintegrate former combatants) than to take any responsibility for the suffering of thousands of campesino families.”¹⁴ The still standing amnesty laws, originally passed in the name of national reconciliation and peace, have done absolutely nothing “to alleviate the suffering of these [campesino] families on a moral, emotional, or material basis.”¹⁵ Reparations are a fundamental part of transitional justice for the victims, and progress in this matter is needed in order to strengthen democracy.

After experiencing a particularly violent civil war conflict for twelve years, El Salvador negotiated and signed the peace accords in 1992 with much hope for a better future.

Institutional Reform

The peace accords were supposed to be the genesis of a new democratic order in El Salvador, where the rule of law would be strengthened, and a process of reconciliation and justice would gradually fortify the nascent democracy. The truth commission report was supposed to serve as a compass, orienting the developing nation into the path to progress, democracy, justice and peace. The peace accords and the truth commission report both mentioned the importance of addressing various elements that exacerbated the civil war, in order to prevent it from happening again. Institutional reform was seen as a fundamental step to be taken, as there were many conservative structures that needed to be reformed in order to advance democratic principles. The report of the truth commission in particular left no doubt of the severe need to reform the armed forces, as well as the judicial institution of El Salvador, among other detailed recommendations, in order to develop an enduring peace.

The institutional reforms in El Salvador have been “largely in form rather than substance.”¹⁶ This is not to say that no change has happened at all. For example, the dismantling of repressive state security forces (the Treasury Police and the National Guard), as well as the purging of some human rights violators as named by the truth commission were positive actions. Furthermore, the creation of a new National Civil Police and the National Public Security Academy, “independent from the military and based on a new doctrine of citizen security, deterrence through effective criminal investigation, and respect for human rights,” when compared to the old

State security apparatus, are definitely positive steps.¹⁷ Also, the elimination of the feared National Intelligence Directorate, which was replaced with the State Intelligence Agency, “subordinated to the civilian authorities and under the direct authority of the president of the republic,” provides a greater degree of accountability, compared to previous times.¹⁸

The judicial system of El Salvador has severe deficiencies that must be addressed. The lingering centralization of powers in the Supreme Court president has not been tackled comprehensively. The procedural deficiencies that permeate the process of selecting and appointing judges to the bench, as well as the lack of full independence from political influences pose a direct threat to the proper reform of this institution. Overall, there is still much needed progress to be made in the process of institutional reform in El Salvador. Without it, the fulfillment of transitional justice principles is affected negatively, and the society is left with a state of impunity and no positive outlook for a better future.

Conclusion

After experiencing a particularly violent civil war conflict for twelve years, El Salvador negotiated and signed the peace accords in 1992 with much hope for a better future. Democracy and rule of law were principles that influenced the text of the peace accords, and justice for victims of the conflict was something needed in order to live up to those principles. The people of El Salvador, as well as many international observers praised the end of the war operations, which took a severe mental, social, economical and political toll of society. Having the warring parties sit next to each other and sign the accords at a castle in Chapultepec, Mexico represented a symbolic gesture of peace and reconciliation, where everyone looked forward to a better tomorrow.

Unfortunately, in the 21 years after the signing of the accords, El Salvador has made lackluster efforts in its attempts to transition towards democracy. Plagued by inefficient actions to redress the victims of the war violence, as well as a strong environment of impunity, propelled by the still standing amnesty law, El Salvador has much work to do in evolving its young democracy. In this context, the four key indicators of transitional justice described in this study have been mediocly implemented at best, and at times their progress has been downright purposefully blocked in order to protect the political and economic elites of this nation.

The process of truth telling was aborted early on in El Salvador. After the civil war ended, the convenient idea of forgiving and forgetting the past was strongly advocated by the standing structures of power. The power brokers of this country materialized this fallacious idea, when they passed the comprehensive amnesty law that still stands today. The enactment of this amnesty effectively prevented any criminal prosecutions and convictions of those implicated in carrying out violent war acts. As of today, total impunity remains, as not a single conviction to serve jail time of individuals involved in war violence has been produced since the am-

nesty law was passed. This total impunity leads to a level of denial of the past, which is not compatible with progressing in the indicator of reparations.

By granting impunity to the criminals that carried out violent acts of war, the State effectively denies the right to reparations for many thousands of victims who suffered during the armed conflict. Their status as victims is simply not even acknowledged by the power structures of El Salvador, as the State does not even investigate the war crimes that these victims actually endured, due to the amnesty law. These same victims, having been victimized during the war, and now, again, during the post war period due to the lack of progress in truth-telling, criminal prosecutions and reparations, are rightfully disappointed, infuriated and feel perpetually victimized by the status-quo and impunity existing since the armed conflict years.

In order for the nation to move forward, the institutional status quo that allows for impunity to thrive in El Salvador must be reformed. In this last indicator El Salvador has also much work to do, and it needs to be urgently addressed, as well as the rest of the previously mentioned indicators, as they all share a complimentary relationship with each other. Furthermore, moving forward in all four indicators will in fact aid El Salvador in providing justice to the thousands of victims it has, as well as strengthening the democratic goal and dreams of rule of law in El Salvador. For now, those goals and dreams are far from being at an ideal level. Currently, those noble goals are not even fulfilled at a basic level. Only when transitional justice indicators are positively brought up to par will El Salvador be able to solidly move forward in their quest to a better democracy.

This article was adapted from a larger study developed by the author for his Masters research.

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
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INTERVIEW, *Continued from Page 1*

trivialized — “elections,” or “multiparty system,” or “representation.” There is cynicism about the role of citizens in governance — do they really make any difference? This exacerbates the skepticism. Only a little more than half of citizens in old democracies even vote.

Meanwhile, in new “emerging democracies,” there is a rush to elections (call them “elections without citizens”) in which the results are also immediately repudiated by the so-called electorate (Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ukraine with the forcing out of a legitimately elected President by force of arms). One problem is that we have confused the overthrow of tyranny (Libya, Egypt) with the birth of democracy. Whereas in reality, overthrowing tyranny often breeds anarchy, leading to chaos, tribal war and sometimes the return of even more tyrannical leaders (Egypt).

In short, in both the older and newer regimes, “democracy” seems more a slogan than a meaningful form of self-government. Given the alternative, this situation is very grave.

How do think the meaning of “democracy” and other terms have been trivialized?

There is an ideological gridlock in Congress, a political polarization that allows the demonization of ‘enemies’ and ad hominem hubris. This makes ‘democracy’ look like hypocrisy to ordinary citizens. With little participation and a sense that votes don’t count, people lose their faith that the system works.

Where do you think this cynicism about the role of citizens in governance comes from? Is it a recent phenomenon?

The United States was founded on a certain distrust of central power, and that has been a part of skepticism about government from the beginning. But the current cynicism is darker and more anti-democratic — a loss of faith in the very idea of popular sovereignty itself. Obviously such cynicism has been cultivated in recent decades by the failures of the federal government to govern, the inability of Congress of compromise, and the sense that politicians really don’t represent their constituents any more. And of course by the massive infusion of money into politics, and the belief that government is now bought and paid for by the rich and by powerful corporations (a result of two Supreme Court decisions — *Buckley v. Valeo* that insisted money is speech, and *Citizens United*, that insisted corporation are people and that their money is thus also ‘speech’ and not to be regulated.)

What is the power of boundaries? In your recent work you compare boundaries (or lack of boundaries) in the city and the state. You explain that in this day and age we all realize that we live in a world without boundaries, but that tensions

arise because we must live within certain bounded institutions. What is to be done about the tension that arises from these boundaries?

Boundaries are how we define territorial nation states that literally abut one another and engage in a kind of zero-sum game. When, say, Germany grows larger, Poland grows smaller. The very essence of the nation-state, its sovereignty, entails a unique monopoly of jurisdiction over a fixed and bordered territory. This leaves bordered and independent nation states increasingly dysfunctional in the face of interdependent challenges like climate change, pandemic diseases, and global markets. In a 21st century world demanding cross-border cooperation, states are left behind. For example, the COP talks on climate change in Copenhagen five years ago have done nothing at all to lower greenhouse gases or limit carbon emissions.

On the other hand cities are defined by diversity, trade, and global interactivity, and are thus far more inclined to cooperation and exchange. Berlin and Warsaw can *both* flourish, even where Germany and Poland are locked in territorial rivalry. Given their inclination to collaboration and their lack of a “sovereignty” that might prevent working together, cities are poised to solve common global problems, and thus in the title of my new book ready to “rule the world” (and not just metaphorically).

You just got back from a conference in Brussels titled “CITIES — Cities of Tomorrow: Investing in Europe.” How is the EU rethinking about the concept of cities? As cities across the EU face challenges in urban development, how will their strategies change?

As the noble experiment in “pooled sovereignty” represented by the post WWII European Community seems to run up against its limits — its inability to get beyond the new European borders that define it, and the reemergence of forms of nationalism and populism hostile to cross border cooperation — Europe looks increasingly to its cities rather than its states or provinces as the key to collaboration. An emerging “Europe of cities” in which groups like EuroCities and the European Cultural Capitals play a greater role is beginning to displace the troubled EuroZone and the European Community (where austerity causes friction and inequality among member states, north and south) as the foundation of future cooperation.

Although the European Commission still likes to think in terms of subsidiarity and the “inferior” role of cities as “levels of administration,” in truth Europe’s cities are the key to community, the warp and woof of everyday life. Cities are not just levels of administration, but forgers of identity, where citizens are born, educated, grow up, get married, play, pray, work and eventually die. They are the human habitats that make us an “urban species” (as noted by Ed Glaeser), the source of that defining creativity and entrepreneurship that generate both culture and wealth. Hence, though the

EU has yet to give cities their full due, it is becoming apparent that if Europe is to have a future, its cities will play a far greater role than heretofore.

You have mentioned that the notion of a city across the EU is more administrative — something along the lines of a level of governance. How do concepts of cities differ around the world?

As I remark above, I do not mean to say cities are no more than a “level of administration” in Europe; only that small-minded and bureaucratic EU commissioners sometimes seem to think they are no more than that — very much to the detriment of their understanding of the real role cities play. It is certainly true that cities around the world come in many different sizes: some port towns, some inland, some massive new mega-cities, some ancient towns. Yet they share that defining urbanity that makes them diverse, open, creative, dense and interdependent, and those shared features make even the most distinctive urban centers more alike than not.

Cities such as New York and Washington D.C. suffer from huge gaps in income inequality. In a November 2013 New York Times article by Adam Davidson, you reflect on some of the difficulties that mayors face in combating inequality. How much power do mayors have to reduce inequality? What are some of the factors that mayors of large American cities must consider when they address inequality?

It is of course not just American cities that suffer from inequality, but cities throughout the world — indeed, those in the developing world such as (for example) Karachi, Rio, Kinshasha or Mumbai even more so. (See Katherine Boo’s remarkable study of a Mumbai slum called *Beyond the Beautiful Forever*). If the world of cities is to be more than what Mike Davis has called a “Planet of Slums”, urban inequality must be confronted. Yet this is difficult, because the inequality cities face is generated by systems of power and wealth they neither originate nor control. They must deal with the consequences of systems whose causes are beyond them.

Yet because cities have virtues such as creativity, mobility, openness and tolerance, innovation, entrepreneurship and interdependence, they are able to ameliorate inequality and deal with injustice even without having the power or jurisdiction to get at the causes. In my two chapters on inequality in *If Mayors Ruled the World*, I point to the *informal economy* with its undocumented capital (see Hernando de Soto’s work on the subject), its squat housing stores, and its class mobility as key sources of amelioration in cities. The fact that the poor vote with their feet to migrate to cities despite the challenge of urban inequality tells us something about the comparative advantage of cities over the rural countryside in offering ways out of poverty.

The second major point about inequality and cities is that while cities can hardly be expected to deal one by one with the global problems of inequality associated with global markets, global capitalism and global migration, when cit-

ies network and cooperate, they *can* begin to take on such global challenges. That is why in the final chapter of my book I propose a global parliament of mayors in which a bottom up world council of cities can begin to enable cities, when working together, to actually oversee, regulate and shape the global economy and the global environment. One by one, cities cannot make our planet sustainable, but together they can.

Do you have any particular predictions about the situation of democracy and governance in the near future?

Unless we can shift our focus from nations to cities, from prime ministers to mayors, we are likely to confront ever more dysfunctional nations, and citizens ever more skeptical about democracy. The great dilemma of the new millennium is a world of global, interdependent challenges demanding global, interdependent solutions, in which solitary and competing sovereign nation states are unable to cooperate effectively at all. If we do not rise to the challenge and re-order our political relations so that global challenges receive global (and democratic) answers, we are likely to lose both a sustainable planet and our democracy. We will either have to globalize democracy or democratize globalization, or we will lose the ability to survive. Cities offer a way forward.

What methods do you suggest democracy promoters implement in order to strengthen local democratic institutions and to change current antidemocratic practices and political tensions in the world?

The potential of cities lies in their capacity for both *local* participatory activity that strengthens democracy and global networked activity that address global challenges. In the “*glocality*” of cities can be found the secret to their potential as a new form of governance that can serve citizens locally and globally. Perhaps this is why *If Mayors Ruled the World* has incited not only an actual urban process in which cities are meeting to consider the convening of a global parliament of mayors, but in which citizens are for the first time in decades imagining that democracy may still be possible in a globalized world. The most important message of *If Mayors Ruled the World* is a message of hope.

Program Highlights

❖ The M.A. program and CDACS welcomed **Dr. Josep Colomer** as a senior visiting fellow. Colomer is the author of numerous books and articles, and a lifelong member of the American Political Science Association (APSA). During the Spring 2014 semester Dr. Colomer taught a core course on political institutions.

❖ On **January 30, 2014** the Democracy and Governance program hosted alumnus **Samuel Tadros** (2011) to discuss his recent book *Motherland Lost: The Egyptian and Coptic for Modernity*. Samuel is currently a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom

❖ On **February 7, 2014** Democracy and Governance co-sponsored a talk with **Carlos Modeas**, Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of Portugal, titled "The Politics and Economic of an Adjustment Program: The Case of Portugal." The event was co-sponsored with the Department of Government, the BMW Center for German and European Studies, and the Luso-American Development Foundation.

❖ **Prof. Jeff Fischer** conducted a talk on **February 10, 2014** titled "Careers in Elections," which examined exciting new career paths in elections and surveyed existing and future professional opportunities.

❖ We welcomed our outstanding admitted students at an Open House event on **March 20, 2014**. Our guest speaker for the event was **Michelle Dunne**, senior associate with the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

❖ Amherst College professor of political science **Javier Corrales** delivered a talk on **April 9, 2014** titled "Is the New Venezuela All That New? Politics in the Age of Barricades." The talk addressed changes in the Venezuelan state and the current state of democracy. The event was co-sponsored with the Center for Latin American Studies.

❖ On April 22, 2014 Democracy and Governance co-hosted Cuban author **Orlando Pardo-Lazlo** along with the Department of Government and the Department of Spanish and Portuguese. Pardo-Lazlo presented from his book *Cuba in Splinters: Eleven Stories from the New Cuba*.

❖ On **April 24, 2014** Democracy and Governance hosted an expert panel titled "Ten Years of CDACS: The State of Democracy and Democracy Studies." In attendance were **Thomas Carothers** (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), **Dr. Steven Heydemann** (USIP), and **Dr. Sharon Wolchik** (George Washington University). The panel was chaired by our program's co-director **Prof. Eusebio Mujal-Léon**, while co-director Prof. **Daniel Brumberg** acted as discussant.

Faculty Awards and Publications

❖ **Prof. Daniel Brumberg** published two pieces for Foreign Policy – "A Moderate Proposal" (January 2014) and "From Détente to Meltdown" (March 2014)

❖ In January 2014 Freedom House released its annual report Freedom in the World. **Prof. Yonatan Morse** contributed the sections on Tanzania and Kenya.

Student and Alumni News

❖ Over Spring Break, **Jeff Fischer** took Democracy and Governance students **Claire Robertson**, **Adam Peterson**, and **Meagan Moody** to Istanbul, Turkey for a Leadership, Education, and Development (LEAD) roundtable with Iranian students.

❖ Catherine LaRoque, D&G class of 2015, recently joined the International Republican Institute and works for their Eurasia Division. She focuses on Ukraine and the ongoing political crisis there.



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