Representation Revisited: 
Introduction to the Case against Electoral Accountability

By Jane Mansbridge

Concerns about a “democratic deficit” in Europe and low electoral turnout in the United States have generated cries for greater electoral accountability and more electoral democracy. But electoral democracy has significant flaws that make it a poor response to the need for thoughtful popular consent to specific policies. Fortunately, other acceptable and legitimate forms of legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic representation require little or no formal electoral accountability. A greater stress on these alternatives would probably increase integrity in political office, popular deliberation in political processes, and continuing mutual communication between representatives and represented. Such alternatives have normatively attractive features in themselves and the potential to generate forms of consent that appropriately supplement elections.

The public often responds to problems in democracy by wanting to tighten the ties between voters and representatives (e.g. through term limits) and, on the other side of the equation, the legislature and the bureaucracy. Political scientists and normative theorists also focus on elections as the primary tool of democracy. This paper, by contrast, argues against too great a focus on electoral democracy and reduced delegation. It turns instead to other tools to establish consent.


Segmenting Voters in Political Markets

By Lizabeth Cohen

Through the 1950s, marketers’ conception of a mass market had encouraged them to emphasize what united American consumers. But, the embrace of market segmentation thereafter lent marketplace recognition to social and cultural divisions among Americans.

How far-reaching was the impact of this fundamental shift from mass marketing to market segmentation? Did marketers’ commitment to fragmenting the mass market have consequences for other realms of postwar American experience, particularly politics? Given the centrality of mass consumption to the larger political culture we have been calling the Consumers’ Republic, one might very well expect a spillover. And indeed, astute observers of American society after World War II noticed that mass marketing was becoming more and more entangled in other aspects of life, especially politics, illuminating a potential connection between market structure and political structure. In the 1940s, Paul Lazarsfeld and his...
Setting an Agenda

The start of a new academic year is a good time to think again about the broad purpose of a center like CDATS and what we’re trying to accomplish. Our aim, quite simply, is to build CDATS into a center that will promote creative ideas about the relationship between democracy and the third sector; actively connect research, advocacy, and policy through outreach work and the engagement of policy and advocacy communities in our projects; train a cohort of graduate students at both the Master’s and Ph.D. levels to pursue careers, academic and otherwise, focusing on third sector issues; and strengthen a community of researchers on democracy, governance, and civil society by supporting the professional development of promising junior scholars.

The vision (so to speak) is to create new, usable knowledge about the third sector and its relationship to governance and democracy. We hope to strengthen the conceptual and data infrastructure of research on democracy and civil society; create sustainable channels of communication between researchers, advocacy communities, and policy makers; improve understandings of the third sector’s role in democratic life among those entering careers in government, business, and the nonprofit sector; and help establish the field more firmly within higher education, beginning with Georgetown University, but extending over time into other institutions as well. Among our core purposes are strengthening research capacity in the study of democracy and civil society, consolidating the presence of research on issues concerning the third sector and democracy more firmly in the social sciences, and improving the applied use of research in current debates about the state of democracy and civil society in America and around the world.

These are ambitious aims, to be sure. Fortunately, we benefit from a strongly supportive university setting. As first steps, we have established a Ph.D. program through Georgetown University’s Government Department, are developing an M.A. program in Democracy Studies, and sponsor a number of internal and external fellowship programs—alongside of a full complement of seminars, lectures, and workshops that draw in audiences from all around the greater Washington area. All of these activities require, and receive, the active support of administrators, faculty, students, and staff in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the College, and Georgetown’s Public Policy Institute.

In addition, we are working to develop a portfolio of research projects, along three main lines: (1) the quality of democracy and democratic life, with an emphasis on how civil societies affect the quality of democratic life; (2) legitimacy, representation, and accountability in the third sector, and (3) understanding the forces that are shaping and transforming third sector institutions. These areas are broad enough to encompass a wide range of concerns, but not so open ended that our work loses direction and becomes fragmented. Though distinct, they overlap sufficiently to form an integrated whole. In each area, we have a number of initiatives underway. These include our Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy survey project directed by Professor Marc M. Howard, a series of activities on homeland security and democracy, a major workshop on the transformation of representation that was held last June, and a new Inter-University Workshop on Accountability and the Nonprofit Sector that we have launched this term in collaboration with the Institute for Governance and Accountabilities at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The workshop addresses the third of our core concerns, and is intended to promote innovative research on the effects of an emerging “accountability regime” on institutions in the nonprofit sector.

This issue of the newsletter focuses on our two other issue areas. It includes a set of articles on the commercialization of political life—a phenomenon with direct implications for the quality of democracy—and on the transformation of representation. Once again, the newsletter contains articles and reviews from Georgetown faculty and students, and also from faculty based at other institutions. We are grateful for permission to use their work and pleased with how the issue turned out. And, as always, we welcome your comments and feedback. Last but not in any sense least, I want to thank David Madland and Nicole Love for their superb work as editors of DēS.

Steven Heydemann (Ph.D, U. Chicago) has served as director of CDATS since its opening in 2003. Previously he directed the SSRC Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector. From 1997-2001 he taught at Columbia University. His research focuses on democratization and economic reform in the Middle East, and on the relationship between institutions and economic development.

By Ronald Rogowski, Eric C. C. Chang & Mark Andreas Kayser

Democracy & Society is pleased to offer this excerpt of new research by Ronald Rogowski, Eric C. C. Chang, and Mark Andreas Kayser. The authors demonstrate that the relationship between electoral institutions and citizens is far more complex than previously understood. Their research substantiates the claim that consumers benefit more from majoritarian electoral systems than proportional representation and thus raises important questions about the nature of democratic representation. The complete paper, which is currently under journal review, is available at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Kayser/

In a recent article, Rogowski and Kayser (2002) introduced a claim to the political economy literature that majoritarian electoral systems: (a) systematically privilege consumers relative to producers and, consequently, (b) reduce real prices. The authors, modifying an established model of regulation, illustrated that, within a competitive political system, politicians favor those who provide only votes (consumers) over those who provide both money and votes (producers). When producers provide only money, the intuition becomes apparent even without a model: politicians respond more to voters under (majoritarian) systems in which a small change in vote share can produce a large change in seat share. Cross-sectional evidence for the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1990 was strongly supportive, suggesting that real prices were reduced by a broad array of robustness checks, about ten percent lower in the average OECD country with single-member district (SMD) electoral systems than in those that used some form of proportional representation.

As with all new empirical claims—no one had previously documented the relationship between electoral arrangements and real prices—healthy skepticism is warranted. Indeed, recent research in related areas has contrasted with—but not contradicted—these price results, associating proportional electoral arrangements with more positive social welfare outcomes including (a) lower income inequality (Austin-Smith 2000; Birchfield and Crepaz 1998), (b) higher public spending (Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Milesi-Feretti et al, 2002) or, in combination with central banking institutions, (c) greater price stability (Keeler and Stasavage 2003). We acknowledge the possible incongruity of these results with those of Rogowski and Kayser (2002); after all, verification of the price effects would suggest a more complicated relationship between electoral institutions and social welfare than is indicated in the extant literature. Electoral systems may have several inconsistent effects on social welfare, each of which must be traced out before aggregate results such as income inequality or social welfare can fully be understood.

Rogowski and Kayser (2002) intended only to demonstrate the plausibility of a novel idea; here we seek to establish more definitively the relationship between electoral systems and real prices—a relationship with profound consequences for the social welfare implications of institutional design. Purely cross-sectional evidence cannot be conclusive on such substantively important issues. Despite the indirect corroboration of findings such as Scartiscini (2002) that countries with majoritarian electoral systems have lower barriers to business entry, a critical reader must find the direct evidence wanting. The relationship observed between electoral systems and prices in Rogowski and Kayser (2002) simply could prove anomalous, spurious, or unfounded for too many reasons.

First, the observed effect might prevail only in 1990, the single year observed. The year 1990, for example, witnessed the beginning of a recession in a considerably larger proportion of majoritarian countries, including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, than proportional countries. Depressed domestic demand could have diminished both components of real prices—nominal price baskets (PPP) and the exchange rate—yet, obviously, only a control for the latter could be included. Another anomalous event of 1990 was the first Gulf War. Might large military deployments have had distinct economic effects in those countries—all majoritarian: US, UK, and France—that made the largest military commitments? Additionally, might the spike in oil prices from the anticipation and prosecution of the first Gulf War have raised prices less in OECD countries with domestic oil sources, which may be disproportionately majoritarian (U.S., UK, Canada) rather than proportional (Norway, the Netherlands)? It is even possible that the Plaza Accord of 1985, which succeeded by 1990 in driving down the value of the dollar, may have had differential price consequences in majoritarian than in proportional countries. Any one of these possible anomalies would suffice to draw the reliability of conclusions founded on a 1990 cross-section into question.
Second, cross-sectional data cannot rule out a more enduring spurious relationship between electoral systems and real prices. Countries with majoritarian and proportional systems exhibit systematic differences in many characteristics. Majoritarian electoral systems, for example, might simply be an instrument for British colonial heritage—an influence that, together with its liberal market ideals, might explain both electoral arrangements and price levels. Panel data, such as those introduced here, permit fixed-effect models that absorb country-specific influences not articulated in the earlier specifications, and thereby assuage concerns about omitted variables. The implicit “natural experiments” of countries that switched electoral systems, but little else, during the panel period should hopefully allay skepticism about such omitted variables.

A third and final problem arising from the systematic differences between countries of each electoral category is out-of-sample extrapolation. As Daniel Ho (2003) has noted, the price effect claims of the earlier paper often extended beyond what could be supported by the cross-sectional data. Because majoritarian countries differ so systematically from PR countries, inferences about the effect that majoritarian electoral arrangements have on prices extended beyond the available data range of the member countries of the other electoral system. Again, here the panel data in our current research at least partly remedy the problem: when countries change electoral systems, as several do in our panel sample, they provide overlapping variation to both electoral system categories. Given the contrast between the earlier Rogowski and Kayser findings and those of other authors noted above, more rigorous investigation promises considerable possible payoffs for our understanding of the role of electoral institutions in social welfare.

Our new research extends the earlier empirical analysis to panel data for twenty-three OECD countries over the period 1970-2000. This specification allows us to control for country fixed-effects and to incorporate the over-time effects of the within-country changes in electoral systems: the shift from SMD to PR in France (1986) and New Zealand (1994); and from PR to SMD (or predominantly SMD) in France (1988), Italy (1993), and Japan (1994). The results of our study strongly support the original conjecture and give us a better idea of how electoral-system change within a country affects consumer power and real prices. Perhaps most importantly, the panel analysis, again after a variety of robustness checks, suggests that the long-term effect of a within-country change in electoral system is, at a minimum, virtually identical (i.e., about a ten per cent change in prices) to that identified in the earlier cross-sectional analysis as prevailing between countries with different electoral systems.

Moreover we are able to establish, as the earlier study did not: (a) the likely effects of a change of electoral system in a single county and (b) the short- vs. long-term impact and the length of time required to reach the new equilibrium. We attach particular importance to the present finding that the long-term effects of electoral systems are at least as strong as the cross-sectional ones that the earlier study established. Finally, the present study, by exploiting the fortuitous fact that several OECD countries changed electoral systems in the 1980s and 1990s, substantially remedies problems of systematic differences between PR and SMD systems.

We emphasize again that the price effects established here imply nothing about the overall welfare effects of the two electoral systems: the higher prices that prevail under PR may well be offset by higher wages, more generous welfare benefits, the “de-commodification” of labor (Esping-Anderson 1990), or similar effects. We also remain agnostic about the precise mechanism by which PR raises, and SMD lowers, prices. While we suspect that PR systems are characterized by greater tolerance for cartels, covert protection, and inefficient retailing, and while Scartascini (2002) has shown, in a representative sample of 65 countries, that regulatory barriers to entry are significantly higher in PR systems than under SMD, it could equally be the case that higher real prices in PR countries are driven by stronger unions and higher wages, or by a propensity for overvalued exchange rates.

Obviously, many questions remain to be answered. But we take it by now as highly likely that, among the economically advanced democracies, more majoritarian systems produce policies markedly friendlier to consumers, and less favorable to producers, than do systems of proportional representation.

Ronald Rogowski, Professor of Political Science, UCLA; Eric C. C. Chang, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University; Mark Andreas Kayser, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester

Endnotes
1 Purchasing power parity over exchange rate (PPP/XR).
2 These include GDP per capita, trade openness, exchange-rate stickiness, and market size.
4 Even more strongly, Hall, Iversen, Soskice, Estevez-Abe, and others (see, for a representative set of papers, Hall and Soskice 2001) have argued cogently that PR is the linchpin of an “organized market economy” characterized by anti-competitive mechanisms, and that these structures are so intermeshed with educational, labor-market, and political institutions as to be almost impervious to change. Lewis (2004) establishes the importance of competition and retail-sector efficiency for overall growth of productivity and income.
A. Why Revisit Representation?

In the modern period, democracy was established in the form of representative democracy based on elections of political representatives and a universal franchise. Representative forms of democracy were based on two elements. First, the electoral form enabled democracy within large, integrated political units with large populations. Second, the electoral representative form established a viable if uneasy balance between the pressures of social and political democratization and the rule of professional political elites. Owing in part to these functions, we have come to understand democratic representation as having two key characteristics:

- Representation involves a principal-agent relationship (the representatives "stood for" and "acted for" the represented), mainly though not exclusively on a territorial and formal basis, so that democratic governments were responsive to the interests and opinions of the people.

- Democratic representation legitimatized political power so that it could be exercised responsibly and with a degree of accountability, while providing citizens some control over its deployment.

The standard form of democratic representation is that enacted through regular (territorially based) elections, which provide a mechanism for citizens to select their officials and entrust them with the running of public affairs. The assumption is that the representatives will (or should) faithfully carry on the business of government by reflecting (representing) the electors' interests, values and opinions. In fact, political representation has never been such a simple mechanism since it has always taken on a number of compensatory forms. The relationship between citizen and representative has been enabled and mediated by mass political parties, class-based groups, interest groups, and corporatist organizations. In addition, public spheres and civil society organizations have mediated public opinion so that mechanisms of representation have never simply aggregated citizens' preferences, but also formed and transformed them. Nonetheless, under the assumptions of the representative model of democracy, those political activities subject to democratic controls and input were focused on electoral-based representation.

Recent changes in patterns of politics, however, throw into question the adequacy of the representative model of democracy. Two of these changes involve the scale and complexity in processes of decision-making in modern society:

- Increasingly powerful transnational players and decision-making arenas tend to escape the reach of (nation-based) democratic representation.

- An increasing number of collective decision-making areas and issues, at both the national and supranational level, are now under the control of specialized and expert bodies with only loose connections to the traditional institutions of political representation.

Recent changes in patterns of politics throw into question the adequacy of the representative model of democracy.

Two other changes have to do with the ways people relate to their political community:

- The simple political egalitarianism on which the institutions and mechanisms of modern representative democracy were established has given way to increasing demands for group recognition as well as for forms of equality related directly to people’s needs, characteristics, identities, and conditions. This has resulted in a more complex discourse of political and social representation for which simple egalitarian and “universalistic” standards seem no longer adequate.

- There has been a diffusion of more informal structures and opportunities for democratic representation and influence. This partly reflects the diminished role of formal political structures in social decision-making, but also the increasing diversification of the forms of association in modern societies as well as postmaterial ideals and culture.

Owing to these changes, it is no longer possible to represent and aggregate the interests, opinions, and values of the citizens through simple (territorially-based) electoral mechanisms. Nor does it seem likely that the standard model of representative democracy can describe and assess emerging
Hollowing Out Civil Society?
Government Contracting and Social Capital

By Sheila Suess Kennedy & Wolfgang Bielefeld

The study of social capital focuses upon norms of trust and reciprocity thought to be essential to the operation of social networks and thus to democratic processes. Recently, some scholars have asserted that social capital is declining, and have offered theories to explain such a decline. Culprits have ranged from television to working wives to gated suburban communities.

There is a widespread belief that the voluntary sector is an important generator of social capital and considerable scholarly concern over the possibility that government contracting is “hollowing out” the state (Milward 1994). However, no one to date has studied whether the growth of contracting with nonprofit organizations might similarly be “hollowing out” the capacity of voluntary organizations to develop social capital or, in the alternative, might be enhancing that capacity.

This article discusses the role of nonprofit organizations and social capital in a democracy, and proposes five topics for research regarding the changing relationship of nonprofits and government in an era of increasing privatization.

Defining Social Capital

References to social capital can be traced back many decades, but with the publication of Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community in 2000, the concept emerged into the general public consciousness, and sparked a lively and ongoing debate about the nature of social capital and its significance for democratic governance. Definitions of “social capital” abound, with general agreement that social capital is an element of social structure, that is, that it is an attribute of those relationships in which social actors are embedded. Putnam, Alejandro Portes and others have distinguished between norms of trust and reciprocity that are characteristics of “bridging social capital,” and norms of felt solidarity that characterize “bonding social capital.”

Bonding social capital results from ties between heterogeneous actors, and facilitates ties among people of diverse backgrounds and across social cleavages. Bridging social capital promotes in-group solidarity and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneity. Thus, while social capital is believed to facilitate coordination, reduce transaction costs and enhance the flow of information—effects which enhance social activities from job hunting to trade to community action (Bielefeld 2003)—its effects depend upon whether we are talking about bridging or bonding social capital.

The Role of the Nonprofit Sector

Numerous authors have noted the important role of neighborhood and community associations, sports clubs, and cultural organizations in generating social capital. While it is clear that not all associations contribute to social capital in the same way or to the same degree (Stolle & Rochon 2001; Backman & Smith 2000), it is equally clear that the role of the voluntary sector in the production of social capital is extremely important—and that this production of social capital is critically important to democratic processes.

Voluntary organizations are considered a buffer between the state and the individual, serving as “mediating institutions” to facilitate and moderate the relationships between citizens and their formal governmental structures. As the points of contact and potential conflict between individuals and the modern administrative state increase, the importance of such mediating institutions, and the networks created by and through them, increases as well.

The continued health of the voluntary sector is as important to democratic governments as it is to individual citizens. The nonprofit sector is where citizens acquire skills needed for effective community participation. It is also the arena in which they build social capital that enables them to use those skills in concert with others to influence political and community decision-making. The networks of trust and reciprocity generated by nonprofit activity are resources from which government draws personnel, paid and voluntary, and to which it increasingly looks for program implementation.

Government Contracting and Social Capital

Especially in an era of privatization (defined here as the delivery of government services through nonprofit and for-profit intermediaries), the ability of government contractors to deliver social services depends to a considerable
degree upon the adequacy of their networks—upon the extent of their social capital. That dependence raises important questions: What if the increasing use of nonprofit agencies to deliver government services is changing the character of those agencies? Do those changes erode their ability to generate social capital and contribute to democratic self-government?

Government contracts in the United States now account for nearly 40% of all voluntary sector income, and by some estimates 80% of the income of social-service-providing nonprofits. Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky (1993) were among the first to explore a variety of issues raised for government and the nonprofit sector by virtue of the increasing reliance of the latter upon government contracts: ‘Although government funding of nonprofit service organizations dates to the colonial period, only in the last 25 years did this government-nonprofit strategy emerge as a widespread and favored tool of public service delivery.”

In recent years significant attention has been paid to the management and contracting challenges posed by privatized service delivery methods (Kennedy & Bielefeld 2002; Dannin 2001; GAO 1997), and to the implications for the doctrine of state action and constitutional accountability (Metzger 2003; Kennedy 2001). However, other possible effects of this governance shift have been less fully explored. The following five issues are worthy of serious research in the coming years:

(1) There is little or no scholarship investigating whether participation in government itself, by serving on boards, and commissions, ad hoc committees and the like, facilitates production of bridging social capital. Certainly, such service may bring citizens into contact with persons they otherwise might not meet, and the common experience of service has the potential to generate trust and reciprocity. However, as government outsources, it relies less on such boards and commissions and more on “experts” holding the relevant contracts (Kennedy 2001). These arenas for democratic deliberation are “hollowed out.”

(2) When nonprofit organizations contract with the state, they become accountable in ways that are qualitatively different from the accountability owed to board members and even donors. Government requirements such as fiscal reporting undoubtedly improve the efficiency and management practices of the nonprofit involved. The question is whether the more businesslike organizations that emerge are still able to provide the benefits—including, but not limited to, social capital generation—that truly voluntary associations afford. Is there a point at which a nonprofit loses its identity as a voluntary organization, and becomes simply a differently-constituted arm of the state? If so, what are the consequences?

(3) Many criticisms of contemporary contracting revolve around questions of accountability (Kennedy 2001; Dannin 2001). If, as some have argued, government transparency and accountability are compromised by contracting regimes, one potential consequence is increased citizen distrust of government agencies and their contractual partners. The generation of trust and reciprocity are essential attributes of social capital, and if we are eroding trust—“hollowing out” nonprofit organizations—social capital suffers.

(4) Emerging evidence suggests that privatization-cum-contracting may be stifling grass-roots advocacy efforts by private, voluntary organizations. (GAO, Cremson and Ginsberg 2002; Gittel 1980) In democratic systems, citizenship implies participation in democratic deliberation; if contracting depresses such participation, we must ask whether the consequence is to diminish both social capital and the capacity for democratic deliberation.

(5) To the extent that nonprofits or NGOs become financially dependent upon government contracts, opportunities for decision-making may shift from the voluntary association to the government, diminishing occasions for democratic decision-making. Board decision-making shifts from setting policy to implementing government directives. What are the implications of such a shift for the development of democratic habits?

It would be possible to frame these five hypothetical questions very differently. It is possible that government contracting may bring more citizens into contact with democratic policy processes, may enlarge and extend the networks of which they are members, and thus may increase, rather than diminish, social capital formation and citizen awareness of the importance of collective action. For example, some scholars have suggested that in community development organizations partnering with government, the capacity to develop social capital improved. Furthermore, there are a wide variety of organizations within the general category of “nonprofit.” Service-providing organizations may have very different experiences with contracting than other types of nonprofits. Also, nonprofits that contract with local governments may have a different experience than those doing business with a federal agency.

Finally, social capital itself is a double-edged sword, and some nonprofit organizations encourage social solidarity...
Voluntary organizations providing services, irrespective of the field in which they operate, are confronted with a trend towards commercialization. The term commercialization refers to the fact that a growing proportion of voluntary organizations’ income is coming from the sale of services within a competitive market. On the other hand, voluntary organizations claim to be democratic bodies, and democracy within voluntary organizations is said to contribute positively to societal democracy. At first glance, there is a contradictory relation between the voluntary organization’s trend to commercialization and its democratic functioning. Even if the link between democracy internal to voluntary organizations and societal democracy is not straightforward, theoretical arguments (Putnam 1993) and empirical evidence (Almond and Verba 1963) support the idea that the contribution of voluntary organizations to societal democracy increases with active participation within these organizations. By weakening participation within voluntary organizations, commercialization may threaten the specific contribution of voluntary organizations to societal democracy.

In Norway, sport has been traditionally organized on a voluntary basis. With 29 percent of all organizations and 26 percent of members, sport organizations form the largest field within the Norwegian voluntary sector. Voluntary labor continues to represent the main resource of the sector. In 1998, there were 613,000 active volunteers who contributed 42 million work-hours in the local sports clubs (Enjolras & Seippel 1999). The voluntary sports organizations are democratic member-based organizations that aim to foster local participation and activities. These mass-sport organizations are not as yet professionalized to any great extent (Enjolras & Seippel 1999).

At the outset of the study I expected voluntary sports organizations’ activities to become increasingly commercialized. Local voluntary clubs are already facing competition with new commercial (for-profit) actors which have invaded the sports industry, particularly the fitness sector. In addition, due to the process of individualization that characterizes modern societies, two factors push in the direction of a substitution of participation within voluntary sport organizations by a consumption of sport services. First, individuals face an increasingly diversified set of choices. Second they experience an increasing press over their time and the way they allocate it among different activities. As the rarity of time increases one could expect that choice makers would choose activities which are less time con-
sion-related output), a preferred private good, and a non-preferred private good (potential sources of revenue for financing the mission-related output). In this approach the private goods are produced in order to cross-subsidize the collective good.

In order to conceptualize the way the collective good is funded, it is possible to distinguish between three types of transaction (Polanyi, 1957a; Polanyi 1957b; Zelizer, 1998): commercial transactions where money is used as compensation in exchange for a good or a service; entitlement where money, goods or services are allocated according to a predefined right to a share; and reciprocal transactions where money, goods or services are mutually exchanged as a result of the norm of reciprocity, i.e. the obligation to requite what has been given (Gouldner 1960; Fehr and Gächter, 1998).

Each type of transaction corresponds to a type of resource for voluntary organizations. Public funding involves entitlement-based transactions, donations, and voluntary work involves reciprocal transactions, whereas and revenues from sales involve commercial transactions. Commercialization will then be defined as the process leading to the replacement of transactions based on reciprocity or entitlement by transactions involving compensation (i.e. sale in a market).

In other words, the production and consumption of goods and services is no longer realized by means of voluntary involvement, gift or domestic relations but by means of market exchange (buying and selling). Commercialization may occur at the organizational level as the share of resources coming from sales.

Given the two ways by which voluntary organizations may become commercialized (increased commercial income and marketization of the relationships with members), two related problems are interesting to investigate. First, does commercialization lead to a reduction of voluntary resources? Second, does commercialization entail a lower rate of participation in democratic decision-making organs?

Empirical Research

The empirical analysis is aimed at testing the propositions and hypothesis drawn from the theoretical analysis. The specificity of this analysis consists of using data at both the organizational (voluntary sport organizations) and at the individual levels (their members). The data was extracted from the “Survey of Norwegian mass sport organizations and their members” (Enjolras & Seippel, 1999) based on two representative samples of 294 voluntary organizations and 1,216 members of these organizations. Two surveys were implemented one at the organizational level (sport clubs) and one at the individual (club’s members) level.

The first issue investigated was to determine whether a crowding-out effect between voluntary work and commercialization took place. The results of the empirical analysis (Enjolras, 2001) displayed interesting features relative to the determinants of volunteers’ participation. First, both when it comes to the decision to participate as volunteer and to the amount of time devoted to volunteering, the results show, contrary to what is commonly predicted by economic theories of voluntary labor supply, that individuals with a high value of time volunteer more. The effects of commercialization on voluntary work indicate the presence of a crowding out effect between voluntary work and commercial income. In other words, increased commercialization leads to a reduction of voluntary work. But individuals volunteer more when other volunteers increase their voluntary contribution. Members do not free ride and seem to respond to the collective effort in order to produce the club good.

The second issue involves the relation of participation in the Assembly General of members (AGM) to commercialization. The results of the empirical analysis (Enjolras, 2001) show that individuals with a high value of time are more likely to participate. This reflects the known fact that individuals with higher incomes are also those having higher political skills and those who participate more in voluntary organizations’ decision-making organs. Participation increases with age and women participate less than men. The level of commercialization of the organization has a negative impact on participation. This effect may be partially due to a size effect. Bigger organizations and more
commercialized organizations are expected to generate less relational good than smaller and less commercialized ones. The availability of “relational goods”—goods that arise as a function of a relationship with others (Uhlner, 1989: 254)—within the organization contributes to increasing the level of participation. At the same time the organizations which are the most commercialized are also those where the availability of relational goods is the lowest. The results of the empirical analysis support the hypothesis: the higher the development of market relations between the organization and its members, the lower the availability of relational goods, and the lower the level of participation in the AGM.

There exists apparently a crowding out effect of voluntary work by commercial incomes. However, individuals increase their voluntary contribution when other members volunteer more. The reason for such behavior may originate in the social obligation experienced by the members. The present community-based economy that characterizes voluntary organizations in Norway is anchored in an old social institution: the “Dugnad.” In large parts of Norway, “the Dugnad” formed an important element of the social organization of the old peasant community. The “Dugnad” is usually defined (Norddølum, 1980: 103) “as many persons assisting one person and more precisely means work done by neighbors which is performed at the same time by a collective neighborhood in the interest of one man or farm.” An important feature of the assistance was that it was carried out without thought of a direct equivalent return effort or payment. The “Dugnad” was considered to be a neighborly obligation; it was an institution based on reciprocity, i.e. where contributions were made and received without thought of personal gain or direct equivalent contributions.

If this type of “Dugnad” has disappeared as a social institution with the extension of the market economy (Klepp, 1982), the spirit of “Dugnad” is still anchored in Norwegian social practices. Voluntary sport organizations are community-based—they are anchored in a local community, organize physical activities for this community, and represent it in local competitions—and to this extent they perpetuate the “Dugnad” spirit. However, the results of the empirical analysis show that commercialization as well as the increasing impersonality that characterizes interactions in big organizations may contribute to the disappearance of the obligation involved in the “Dugnad” spirit.

**Conclusion**

Crowding out effects are the result of a complex process of interaction between the organization’s decision makers and the organization’s members. Since the organization’s decision-makers solicit voluntary work and active participation of its members, it may be of importance that they recognize the interdependency of the different resources and behaviors, not only for economic but also for social reasons. In effect, the voluntary basis of sport organizations and its erosion by the process of commercialization may be of concern when one considers voluntary sport organizations as an arena for socialization and social integration. Because they are associations of persons, voluntary organizations constitute a locus for social integration. Integration occurs both as the result of the adhesion to common norms and values, and as the result of choices made by individuals having a common interest.

Internal democracy within the voluntary organization presupposes the integration, the embeddedness of its members within a network of social relations, and the availability of relational goods. But conversely, integration of the members (within the organization) is realized by the role played through the active participation of the members in the organization’s life, through active volunteering and by participation in the democratic life of the organization.

---

**The results of the empirical analysis show that commercialization may contribute to the disappearance of the obligation involved in the ‘Dugnad’ spirit**

The weakening of internal democratic functioning also means the weakening of the integrative function of the association. Democratic weakening and integrative weakening may be analyzed as the result of a modernization process having two origins: one external to the organization, the other internal. From the external point of view, the voluntary organization knows the effects of a tendency towards increased individualization which is concretely manifested in the fact that individuals have less time to devote to the life of the city. Subject to the pressures of modern life, individuals do not always have the time to participate in voluntary organizations and prefer market mechanisms which are less time-consuming. From the internal point of view, the process of modernization of the voluntary organization finds its origin in the difficulty of maintaining a space for democratic decision-making when active involvement tends to decrease.

**Bernard Enjolras, Senior Researcher, Institute for Social Research in Oslo, Norway.**
References

Rogowski, Continued from Page 4

References

CDATS Visiting Fellows—Call for Applications

CDATS is pleased to announce the third annual visiting faculty fellowship competition for the 2005-2006 academic year. Fellowships will provide support for scholars, researchers, and specialists with experience equivalent to a Ph.D. to pursue research on all aspects of the relationship between, and interactions among, democratic governance and the third sector.

The Center will award a maximum of two visiting faculty fellowships. The term of the fellowship is for one academic year. Fellowships will typically begin no later than September 1 and end no earlier than May 31. For more information, download an Application Package from our website at http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/cdats/visit.html. All application materials must be received by CDATS no later than January 15, 2005.
arguing for selection systems that favor integrity in public office, for institutions of direct participation, and for continuing communication between representatives and represented. The approach differs from the usual alignment of democratic theories on a spectrum from aristocratic to participatory by choosing institutions from different spaces along this spectrum on the criterion of their capacity to generate thoughtful, deliberative consent.

This paper ARGUES AGAINST TOO GREAT A FOCUS ON ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY AND REDUCED DELEGATION

No one can be perfectly represented by another. This existential dilemma is particularly vivid in the two-party system at election time, when many voters cannot find either a party or a candidate to represent their favored collection of policies. In a multi-party system, this disjunction is reduced at election time but increased later, when the voter, having picked a candidate who more closely represents his or her favored policies, is “betrayed” through legislative compromise.

The sense of betrayal is perhaps greatest when expanded bureaucracies produce outcomes that no one seems to want (e.g., detailed regulations from “Brussels” on the size of apples) and when corporate and wealthy interests exploit their inevitably greater access to legislators. These failures in the democratic process generate repeated calls for more “democracy”—for shorter tethers on legislators and bureaucrats, for term limits, and, in an earlier era, for initiative, referendum, and recall.

Yet electoral democracy’s dirty little secrets—short time horizons, reliance on sound-bites, dependence on funding—make more electoral democracy a flawed response to many of the current problems with representation. Many features of electoral systems (e.g., the need to raise money, the expectation that representatives should promote district interests, and selection for individuals who have “fire in the belly” and are willing to put up with personal vilification) discourage selecting and maintaining in office individuals with integrity and concern for the common good. Other features (e.g., negative advertising and vilifying opposing groups) actively undermine the process of securing responsible consent from the citizenry on negotiated solutions to collective problems. Thus elections are not always the most effective vehicles of consent, especially when consent derives from recognizing oneself in either the process or the outcome. In permanently and deeply divided societies, moreover, electoral systems have great difficulty producing legitimacy.

Nor is more “accountability,” in the specific sense of giving citizens more and heavier sanctions to wield against elected or appointed officials, often the best answer to these problems. Too much accountability of this classic sort may actually undermine the internal motivation to act in the public interest, just as too much supervision and too many quid pro quo rewards undermine intrinsic motivation in the non-political realm.

Transparency also has flaws, because pure “sunshine” (fully transparent negotiation) often undermines the creative deliberation that yields viable solutions to problems. Negotiators need closed doors to try out potential solutions from which they may later back away, to acknowledge the needs of the other side in language that their constituents might consider betrayal, and to develop the mutual trust that forms one strand of a successful negotiation. In many cases, transparency of rationale is more important for consent than transparency of negotiation.

Many distrust delegation for the same reason that they distrust closed doors. But delegation is a normatively justifiable and highly practical tool of government in any society characterized by the division of labor, as long as certain conditions are met in both initiating and continuing that delegation.

The sense of betrayal is perhaps greatest when expanded bureaucracies produce outcomes that no one seems to want.
legislature, forms of representation that I call “anticipatory,” “gyroscopic,” and “surrogate” already operate without traditional accountability, increasing the democratic legitimacy of the system thereby. In the judiciary, appointed judges do better on many measures than elected ones. In the bureaucracy, regulations work better when designed to reflect and promote the public-regarding impulses of the regulated than when the bureaucrats are classically accountable to elected legislatures. In all three branches, for example, “descriptive” representation, often relatively unaccountable and traditionally maligned as not substantive, can help produce substantively appropriate outcomes, generate citizen participation, and call forth genuine consent.

In the initial selection of a representative, the search for integrity may be aided by what economists call “costly signals.” (E.g., if a war for independence leads to a democracy, voters can use candidates’ roles in that war to identify those willing to risk their lives for their country. The first generation of legislators after independence is thus likely to include more persons of integrity than later generations.) Cultural practices that value, seek out, and reward integrity and concern for the public good also help select representatives of integrity. (E.g., village councils in West Africa use early reputation for integrity in selecting their members.) Political institutions such as juries can cultivate integrity among members of the modern public. A culture of integrity depends both on what parents and textbooks say and what material success in a particular culture tells observers about the actual character of public life. Because tight accountability often discourages creative, autonomous commitment to the public good, network accountability (to peers) can produce better results. But network accountability cannot effectively substitute for all electoral accountability. The line to the people should be strong but thin and flexible, like a nylon cord, not heavy and immovable, like a yard-wide rope.

Representative institutions, whether legislative, judicial, or bureaucratic, also need to generate thoughtful, deliberative consent rather than the formal trappings of consent. In pursuit of this goal, several countries have experimented with rehabilitating the ancient Greek institution of the lot, through citizen juries drawn randomly from the population to deliberate on particular issues (also called “Deliberative Assemblies on a Random Basis” or “Deliberative Polls”). Few advocates of such a “neo-lot” have asked how this form of representation could contribute to the “consent of the governed” by allowing the public to get another perspective when their representatives’ decisions differ from their own preferences and by forcing representatives to explain when their judgments differ from those of a random deliberative assembly. Participatory assemblies (as in Porto Allegre in Brazil and Kerala in India) or advisory assemblies (such as those organized by America Speaks) also promote active consent, even among non-participants. Finally, state officials practicing respect, attending to local cultural codes, and engaging in two-way communication tend to generate “street-level” consent to specific instances of authority.

In order to meet current challenges to political legitimacy, in short, we should not fall back on “more of the same but stronger.” Rather, we need more diverse forms of accountability and new ways of generating authentic public consent. A critique of elections based on the inevitability of electoral betrayal, a focus on the flaws of traditional accountability, the importance of transparency in rationale rather than process, a defense of delegation, selection for integrity, and the generation of consent through forms of the “neo-lot,” mutual communication, and other features not necessarily connected to accountability would provide a normatively attractive and politically feasible alternative to the current emphasis in political science on elections and electoral accountability.

Jane Mansbridge, Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Bureau of Applied Research at Columbia University hypothesized strong similarities between political campaigns and advertising campaigns, testing a “consumer preference model” of politics that stressed the impact of the mass media on individual choice and applied marketing research techniques like repeated depth interviews to voters. In 1950 sociologist David Riesman argued in *The Lonely Crowd* that Americans were increasingly becoming “consumers of politics,” responding to the packaging of leaders or events as they did products, valuing charisma and glamour over more rational self-interest.

The application of mass marketing techniques to the political arena dates back to the turn of the century, though it reached a new level of intensity in the 1930s. Nineteenth-century political campaigns had used the language and paradigm of disciplined military campaigns: “cadres” of party workers, presided over by party “captains,” “mobilized” “armies” of “loyal” voters and punished “traitors” on the electoral “battlefield.” With the new century came the gradual atrophy of political parties and the rise of a new political paradigm of the marketplace, where voters became consumers, candidates and issues products, and campaigns advertising pitches overseen by mass marketers.1 Beginning in the 1890s, political parties hired public relations experts and then “ad men” to enhance candidates’ images. During World War I the federal government employed experienced advertisers to build public support for the war effort, and in the 1920s the League of Women Voters’ “Get-Out-the-Vote” campaigns employed every advertising technique known to Madison Avenue to boost voter turnout.2 But all that was mere warm-up for the 1930s, when New Dealers heavily marketed recovery programs like the NRA, with its Blue Eagle logo; when the Democrats and their Republican challengers, Alf Landon and Wendell Willkie, made history hiring advertising men as “public relations directors”; and, most important, when the techniques of market research advanced sufficiently to make them reliable predictors of voters’ attitudes, not just buyers’ preferences. When surveyors George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley accurately forecast Roosevelt’s landslide in 1936, consumer research had successfully spawned public opinion polling, and American politics changed forever.3

At about the same time, a husband-wife team of marketing consultants in California, Clem Whitaker and Leone Smith Baxter, established Campaigns, Inc., the first company devoted exclusively to managing political campaigns, and with it the concept of entrusting an election campaign entirely to a political consultant. But despite these critical innovations that brought consumer marketers into the political arena, their influence through the 1940s remained limited enough that in 1950, the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association could still conclude that “relatively little use has been made by the parties of social survey techniques as a basis for political campaigns.” Likewise, other experts concluded that in comparison to the subtle manipulation of public opinion ubiquitous in commercial advertising, political propaganda remained crude. In most campaigns, longstanding party operatives were still calling most of the shots, even when they bought advice from advertising and marketing experts.4

Ironically, it was the campaigns of down-home, grandfatherly Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and again in 1956 that brought mass marketing fully into the political arena, sounding the death knell for campaigning by whistlestop tours, street parades, and grassroots organization. Now, convinced that, in the words of Republican Party chairman Leonard Hall, “you sell your candidates and your programs the way a business sells its products,” the Republican Party hired three major New York advertising agencies, BBDO, Young and Rubicam, and Ted Bates and Company, to bring their full bag of advertisers’ tricks to the campaign, particularly the magic of television. Madison Avenue did not disappoint. Ted Bates’s ad whiz Rosser Reeves came up with the ingenious idea of buying time at the very end of top-rated programs like *This Is Your Life. The $64,000 Question,* and *The Jackie Gleason Show* to capture already tuned in, prime-time audiences for Ike. And rather than have Eisenhower deliver predictable political speeches, Reeves produced a forty-spot ad campaign, “Eisenhower Answers America,” featuring twenty-second and one-minute commercials of Ike answering ordinary people’s questions with what came across as honesty and empathy. For the three weeks before election day, the spots saturated the airwaves in key states at a cost of millions of dollars. The campaign—in both the advertising and electoral sense—culminated with an election-eye BBDO-produced extravaganza (promoted in an ad in the *New York Times* as “one of the great hours in radio and television history . . . an hour you and your family will remember the rest of your lives”), filled with testimonials by representative Americans about why they were voting for Ike. In addition, the GOP in 1956 hired Hollywood actor and MGM public relations director (and later California senator) George Murphy to make its convention in San Francisco appear more like a television commercial for party and candidate than its undisciplined predecessors ever had. Vice presidential candidate Richard Nixon, of course, was no stranger to promoting himself through television either; when charged with fundraising improprieties in...
1952, he saved his spot on the ticket through delivering his famous “Checkers” speech, emotionally defending himself, his family, and their dog on primetime television directly following the popular Milton Berle Show.

The Democrats, caught off guard by the Republican media onslaught in 1952, which left them embarrassingly stuck with a glut of outdated, half hour, late-night broadcasts of candidate Adlai Stevenson pontificating, scrambled to catch up to the Republicans in 1956. They sought help from the ad agency Norman, Craig and Kummel, known for its successful “I Dreamed I Went Walking in My Maidenform Bra” ad campaign, which introduced negative political commercials against Eisenhower and Nixon and, along with the Republicans, a new five-minute TV spot format, and they hired another MGM director, Dore Schary, to orchestrate their convention. What wasn’t working in the Democrats’ favor, however, was their candidate. Stevenson purportedly protested to party handlers: “The idea that you can merchandise candidates for high office like breakfast cereal, that you can gather voters like box tops—is, I think, the ultimate indignity to the democratic process.” While Eisenhower had initially voiced doubts in 1952, he quickly deferred to Republican Party chieftains thoroughly sold on the miracle-making of Madison Avenue in business and politics.5

The advent of market segmentation later that decade would change the rules of the game for political marketing, as it had for product marketing, pushing campaigns and electioneering away from selling to the lowest common denominator of the mass market toward crafting special messages for distinctive segments about whom more and more was becoming known through increasingly sophisticated polling. The change was first visible in the 1960 presidential election, already famous for making television the denominator of the mass market toward crafting special marketing for distinctive segments about whom more and more was becoming known through increasingly sophisticated polling. The change was first visible in the 1960 presidential election, already famous for making television the
decide the race. Television played an even greater role in the race that year between Lyndon Baines Johnson and Barry Goldwater, who broadcast 10,000 television spots between them including several celebrated ones produced for LBJ by the Doyle Dane Bernbach agency, of Levy’s rye bread, Avis, and Volkswagen ad fame, to scare voters with the nuclear danger of a Goldwater victory—one of a little girl innocently licking an ice cream cone that the narrator warns could be made from milk contaminated by fallout and another of a child pulling the petals off a daisy in a countdown that ends with a thermonuclear explosion.8

But that election is also noteworthy for Kennedy’s new attention to voter segments, rather than solely appealing to the mass of Americans as Eisenhower had. Kennedy hired Louis Harris to do private state-level opinion polling for him and used his findings to tailor his messages, such as on civil rights, to the occasion of his speechmaking. A marketing company, Simulmatics, provided the Kennedy campaign with a computerized mathematical model of the U.S. presidential electorate that, along with polling, likely helped his managers identify sufficient support in West Virginia to deliver his “upset” primary victory there over Hubert Humphrey, which propelled him toward the Democratic nomination. Furthermore, Kennedy’s Catholicism drew intense attention to the religious identity of voters, while his physical attractiveness, so visible on television, made female voters a segment for wooing.

Upon taking control at the Democratic convention, the Kennedys quickly discovered that apart from a Civil Rights Division on paper, the Democratic National Committee had no structure through which to make pointed appeals to special interest groups. Kennedy brother-in-law Sargent Shriver was promptly dispatched to reach out to as many of these groups as possible, and soon a range of special units emerged: the Nationalities Division, with four main sections of German, Italian, Polish, and Spanish, as well as twenty-six special committees; an additional Spanish-language operation of Viva Kennedy clubs; special interest groups like Businessmen for Kennedy, Farmers for Kennedy-Johnson, and Labor’s Committee for the Election of Kennedy and Johnson; and Senior Citizens for Kennedy, Youth Citizens for Kennedy-Johnson, and a reinvigorated Civil Rights Division. Pioneer segmenters Kennedy and Johnson also paid more attention to geographical targeting, allocating most of their time to doubtful states, while mass marketers Nixon and running mate Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., trudged around the country trying to fulfill their promise “to carry this campaign to every one of the 50 states.” Republican efforts at courting specialized interest groups likewise proved less effective than the Democrats.7 While the Republicans had pushed politics into the age of mass marketing in the 1950s, in 1960 the Democrats, under the wing of the sophisticated and well-oiled Kennedy marketing machine, took the initiative in recognizing the benefits of breaking that mass electorate apart.

But in 1964 the leadership in segmenting political campaigns swung back to the Republicans. Television played an even greater role in the race that year between Lyndon Baines Johnson and Barry Goldwater, who broadcast 10,000 television spots between them including several celebrated ones produced for LBJ by the Doyle Dane Bernbach agency, of Levy’s rye bread, Avis, and Volkswagen ad fame, to scare voters with the nuclear danger of a Goldwater victory—one of a little girl innocently licking an ice cream cone that the narrator warns could be made from milk contaminated by fallout and another of a child pulling the petals off a daisy in a countdown that ends with a thermonuclear explosion.8 But the major advance in applying market segmentation...
techniques to politics to come out of this election would be on the ground, not on the air. It was the development of a direct-mail strategy by Richard Viguerie and other political conservatives that made targeting audiences with particular messages much more precise than was possible with television advertising and other traditional media.

Although the Nixon-Lodge ticket had experimented with direct mailing to various address lists in 1960 with mixed results, it was Goldwater’s campaign that launched the first successful large-scale direct-mail solicitation, posting more than 15 million fundraising appeals and raising $5.8 million. Viguerie further refined the methods of direct mail by taking the names of the 12,500 Americans who had contributed more than $50 to Goldwater’s campaign and building from there. He first used his list to fundraise for the conservative youth organization, Young Americans for Freedom, and as his meticulously assembled lists grew over the sixties and seventies, so too did the right-wing candidates and causes he helped promote. George Wallace’s success in 1972 in particular was credited to Viguerie’s sharpshooting with his computerized letters. (By 1977, Viguerie had compiled more than 30 million names of conservative-leaning individuals and employed three hundred people at the Richard A. Viguerie Company and its various subsidiaries.) Political organizations of other conservative candidates, most notably Ronald Reagan and Pat Buchanan, and issue-driven political action committees (PACs, such as Gun Owners of America, the Moral Majority, and the National Tax Limitation Committee) perfected the science of direct mail, delivering specially tailored messages ever more accurately to the most appropriate constituents. In time, Democratic candidates such as George McGovern and liberal groups such as Common Cause and the National Organization for Women would mount successful direct-mail campaigns as well. When Reagan assured recipients of his invitation to join the Republican Presidential Task Force, at an annual price tag of $120, with the compliment, “I’m not asking everyone to join this club—only proud, flag-waving Americans like you,” he did more than flatter. Likely they had been carefully selected through cross-tabulating of their income, residence, age, past political views, magazine subscriptions, church affiliation, and so forth.9

Republican campaigners expanded the basic strategy of market segmentation—identifying demographic and lifestyle clusters—beyond direct mail fundraising to recruiting potential voters in Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign for president. Determined not to replay the defeat of 1960, Nixon and his campaign team—noteworthy for its experienced talent drawn from television and advertising—used the latest polling and market research techniques to divide the American electorate into voter blocs that could be sold different images of the candidate, images conveyed especially well through new-style television ads made up of emotion-grabbing collages of still photographs and other iconography set to dramatic soundtracks. Televised commercials targeting the South, where Nixon was in a dogfight with independent candidate and racial extremist George Wallace, spoke in “regional code words” and images about “busing,” “crime,” and the “Supreme Court,” according to his southern campaign manager, Fred LaRue, and hence were used “very selectively,” never in the North. In another segmentation scheme, Nixon’s campaign hired nationally famous country-and-western artists to record Ballard type songs for broadcast on radio and television, arranged so that stanzas addressing different issues could be added or dropped as the local situation required. Citing a basic principle of market segmentation, LaRue cautioned, “You could spend a million dollars on songs like that and it’s wasted money unless you get them played in the right spots. You get to get that on or adjacent to country and western programs. Either that or wrestling. That’s a special kind of audience. . . . What you do for those people would not appeal to other kinds of people and vice versa.” Similarly, Nixon’s “ethnic specialist,” twenty-seven-year-old Kevin Phillips, devoted himself to identifying “where the groups are and then we decide how to reach them. What radio station each listens to, and so forth.” Fearing he had started too late in the ’68 campaign to nail down what he called “group susceptibility,” he predicted that “by seventy two I should have it broken down county by county across the whole country so we’ll be able to zero in on a much more refined target.”10

Market segmentation techniques were not only implemented in candidate campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s; they were also called on to help mobilize voters around controversial issues. For example, in what proved to be a successful battle defeating an anti-union “right to work” referendum in Missouri in 1978, a cluster system was used to identify union sympathizers. According to a disapproving U.S. News & World Report, “Missouri’s labor leaders worked together under a campaign plan that was designed for them by a Washington political consultant. . . . With advertising, direct mail, telephone contacts and door-to-door solicitations, the unions directed their message only into favorable areas—union households, blue-collar neighborhoods and the black community. This strategy means that they place[d] their local TV commercials around tough guy shows like ‘Baretta.’”11 Carefully pitched campaigns by California conservatives in the late 1970s helped collect the necessary signatures to put Proposition 7, a pro-death penalty measure, and Proposition 13, Howard Jarvis’s mas-
Mass marketing has obviously had a tremendous impact on the practice of twentieth-century American politics. Campaign duels between televised advertisements, packaged candidates known more by image than substance, and party conventions that are no more than infomercials are not creations of the last two decades, when their presence has been much commented on, but rather have deep roots in the earliest years of the Consumers’ Republic. Since the 1960s, moreover, politicians’ embrace of market segmentation has promoted additional trends. Attention to matching voters to candidates much like products to consumers has encouraged perpetual dependence on pollsters, what a recent observer has called “government of the polls, by the polls, for the polls,” the turning of campaigns over to political consultants with the technology and expertise to target specialized voters with tailor-made messages, and the gradual decline of political parties, as increasingly “independent” voters become mobilized through direct appeals by individual candidates and single issue campaigns. Political segmentation substitutes narrower identities with narrower interests for the broader constituencies to which “big tent” parties most effectively respond. Certainly, the extensive feedback mechanisms from voters to candidate that political marketing has put in place have had benefits. No recent candidate could convincingly plead ignorance of who the voters are and what they want. To the extent that market segmentation of the electorate has made politicians more responsive to voters’ diverse concerns than when they searched for the “Lowest Common Denominator,” which inevitably favored some groups over others, it has enhanced democracy in America.13

But in other ways, this thrust dangerously threatens democratic government. To start with, the enormous expense of hiring the media and marketing expertise now required to mount an even run-of-the-mill campaign has made seeking office feasible only for the wealthy or their agents; from 1912 to 1952 each national party spent about the same amount of money per vote cast in national elections, only to see the expenditure skyrocket over the next sixteen years until by 1968 each vote cost three times as much. Furthermore, as polling, direct mail, and other strategies have helped candidates adapt their images flexibly to multiple audiences, campaigns have moved further and further away from appealing to a shared political agenda. Rather than try to convince voters of some common good, as Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower all struggled to do—from FDR’s Four Freedoms to Ike’s prime-time “Eisenhower Answers America”—more recent presidential candidates, as well as many running for lower office, at best construct a composite vision out of the specialized interests of their distinct constituencies, and at worst avoid discussing any common good at all.

With the new practitioners of political marketing embracing something they call the “law of minimal effects,” they have become convinced of the limited ability of a campaign to change people’s attitudes and hence of the necessity for candidates to appeal to voters’ existing views without offending them with contrary positions. According to one study of political consulting, “slicing and dicing” the electorate has become a chief strategy for achieving “high interest, low backlash” communication with voters. On the very same block in Miami, one homeowner with children might receive a mail piece addressing mortgage tax deductions and federal aid to education, while her neighbor, a renter without children and with a Latino surname, would get a message about relations between the United States and Cuba with no mention of mortgage tax breaks or education. Exacerbating this fragmentation of the electorate through targeted appeals, moreover, is the kind of discourse direct mail campaigns employ to capture recipients’ attention. Political observer James Davison Hunter has noted that the simplified analysis, demonized enemies, and sensationalized claims commonly found in direct-mail appeals further polarize the public beyond their ideological differences. With candidates establishing direct links to constituents, moreover, those citizens identified as not important, either because they are not likely to vote or wield little influence, are easily ignored. On the voters’ part, just as segmented buyers of goods seek the best match for their distinctive tastes and desires with what is available in the commercial marketplace, so segmented citizens have similarly come to expect the political marketplace—consisting of candidates, government agencies, and PACs—to respond to their needs and interests narrowly construed.

When the far-reaching implications of the shift from mass to segment are combined with the other kinds of social differentiation under way over the postwar period, the consequences for American political culture in the last decades of the twentieth century are monumental indeed. In a Consumers’ Republic constructed around the expectantly broad-reaching rewards of mass consumption, the imperatives of profit-making soon motivated marketers to segment the mass, rather than reinforce it, everywhere from the commercial marketplace to the political arena, much the way mass home builders and shopping center owners became invested in the stratification of metropolitan areas. Likewise, individuals soon learned that their own good fortunes as homeowners, shoppers, and voters depended on identifying with special interest constituencies with clout—for example, locally minded suburbanites, Yuppies, African Americans, senior citizens, or gun owners.
Although mass markets, mass culture, and mass politics by definition did not promise positive political outcomes, and could render some social groups invisible, they also could make new political achievements possible for the first time through forging alliances across class, race, ethnicity, and region. America’s retreat from the aspiration to appeal to the mass, which accelerated in the 1960s, combined with the ongoing stratification of residential communities and the privatization of public space, made the achievement of a broad-based political agenda difficult.

Americans’ growing recognition that social and consumer identities could have strategic political value fueled the return in the 1960s of a reborn politics of consumption, embraced from the bottom up through the consumer movement sparked by Ralph Nader’s crusade against General Motors, and from the top down by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter, and by Congress and state legislatures. Much as novelist John G. Schneider uncannily predicted in The Golden Kazoo in 1956, consumer rights became a new battle cry of citizens and elected officials alike. In some ways, this late-twentieth-century consumer movement harked back to the 1930s and 1940s, linking the consumer interest to the larger public interest and reviving the mandate of the citizen consumer to serve as protector of the general good. But in other, more disturbing ways, all the social, economic, and political changes since the late 1940s altered its significance and broadened the territory in which the Consumers’ Republic’s more self-serving purchasers as citizens operated. In what in many ways became, by the end of the twentieth century, a “consumerization of the republic,” not only were citizens still assured that they fueled their own and the nation’s prosperity simultaneously through their private consumption. Increasingly they were bringing market expectations to their appraisals of the government itself, judging it and its policies by the personal benefits they, as segmented purchasers as citizens, derived from them.

LIZABETH COHEN, Howard Mumford Jones Professor of American Studies, Harvard University.

ENDNOTES
8 The Johnson campaign pulled the daisy commercial off the air because of its sensationalism, but then it was shown over and over again on the news: Diamond and Bates, The Spot, pp. 15–47.
of a sort highly inimical to democratic processes. A more finely-grained investigation of these questions will necessarily distinguish between those attributes of both bridging and bonding social capital thought to be supportive of democratic self-governance and those thought to be destructive of it.

Whatever the caveats, however, the five topics above need to be explored with careful, empirical research. Milward (1994) has suggested that contracting produces a "hollow state." If contracting also is "hollowing out" an essential component of civil society, that possibility deserves scholarly attention.

Sheila Suess Kennedy, Associate Professor, and Wolfgang Bielefeld, Professor, in the School of Public & Environmental Affairs at Indiana University Purdue University-Indianapolis.

References
Backman, Elaine V. and Smith, Steven Rathgeb. 2000. "Healthy Organizations, Unhealthy Communities?" Nonprofit Management & Leadership, vol. 10, no. 4, Summer
ing forms and meanings of political representation. These changes suggest a reconfiguration of the relationship between territory, function, and identity as the main vectors of democratic representation. They also imply a different balance between the political and the social, as well as between formal and informal representation.

B. Conceptual issues

While there were many conceptual issues raised at the workshop, the following seem especially important to recall, revisit, or reconceptualize if the above challenges are to be met.

1. Representation is a relationship. Reconceptualizing representation as well as identifying emerging forms requires that we recall its generic features. Democratic representation involves a representative X being held accountable to constituency Y with regard to interest Z. Accountability means that X provides, or could provide, an account of his/her decisions or actions to Y with respect to Z, and that Y has a sanction over X with regard to Z. Democratic representation is, therefore, a relationship, specifiable in terms of a good.

2. Input versus output representation. In so far as representation is a relationship specifiable in terms of a good, it can be judged from both process and outcome perspectives. We should distinguish between the quality of representation within processes of collective decision-making—process representation—from the outcome or product of the process, which we might refer to as output representation or legitimacy. It is not necessarily the case that representation within a process will produce results that represent participants, however they judge the results. Or, possibly, we should simply ask whether, in particular cases, representation within the process results in good, fair, or legitimate outcomes.

3. Representation as a political practice. In the same way we think of representation as a relationship, we might also think of it as a political practice. Because democratic representation requires not only the development and expression of interests, but also accountability, it depends upon and includes participation by those represented. Thus, the traditional division between participatory and representative democracy is not, perhaps, helpful, and less so in modern democracies where participation and representation often intersect.

4. Representation as constituted by/within political processes. If we understand representation as relational, then objects of representation are constituted within and by political processes. This point allows us to understand representation as something that is, in part, brought into being by institutions or groups which reflect social relationships, and evoke as well as formulate interests or identities within their more general understandings of the public good. The roles as well as the objects of representative relations are constituted through the political process. Citizens’ education and representatives’ qualifications both determine and are determined by the process of representation, so that citizens and representatives continuously contribute to each others’ formation and transformation. For these reasons, issues such as political corruption and political communication are involved intrinsically in representative relationships.

5. What is represented? The common idea that persons or characteristics of groups are the objects of political representation is not exhaustive. The “goods” that may be represented might include any of the following:

   Interests, values, identities: Representative relationships are not constituted among persons qua persons, but rather among the interests, values, and identities that are constitutive of persons. Each person is a complex of such attributes, any of which may be the object of political representation. “Groups” are stable complexes of attributes. But there are also latent interests or interests subject to collective action problems that may require representative leadership in order for the interests to have political representation.

   Arguments, issues, ideas, public opinion: With the development of influence or persuasion as a kind of political force enabled by democracies, we may want to think about arguments, issues, and ideas as objects of representation. In this case, representatives function as agents of discursive force. Likewise, owing to the importance of expertise, we may wish to speak of epistemic representation—the professional representation of expert consensus within discourse or decision procedures.

   Legal and political standing within political processes. With individual and group rights assuming a higher political profile and much political activity occurring within the courts, we may want to think of judicial systems and groups devoted to rights and citizenship issues as representatives of standing within political processes.

   6. Groups as representatives. We may want to think not just of persons as representatives, but also groups and institutions insofar as they have mandates to represent, or are normatively constituted in such a way that they view themselves as representing constituents, arguments, positions, ideas, etc. The process of selecting representatives is a key element of representative systems: in formal institutions, we do so through elections. Informal selection, however, especially at the group level, occurs through group membership...
and exit, as well through the opportunity structures created by formal institutions. The question of what entitles groups to act as representatives is increasingly important as powerful bodies such as the EU and UN provide standing for these groups as “civil society representatives” within formal political processes.

7. Temporal dimensions of representation. Because representation includes authorization for representatives to use their judgment on behalf of the represented, the nature of representation has an irreducible temporary dimension. The dimension may be understood in terms of the relationship between authorization (a representative is authorized to speak for or vote on behalf of an individual, group, set of interests, etc.) and accountability (a representative gives an account of his/her actions and is judged or sanctioned by those in whose interests he/she acted).

C. Issue complexes

While it is likely that the conceptual issues above will need to be refined to meet emerging challenges of representation, they should be refined in relation to problems, or complexes of issues. Some of these might provide the focus for research agendas.

1. The role of accountability in representation. Accountability has a crucial role in representation, since it is through this process that citizens maintain their powers of sanction over those who represent them. In modern democracies, however, practices of accountability tend toward sub-optimal extremes. On the one hand, it is extremely difficult for electors to hold their representatives accountable either for their decisions on specific issues or for the political environments and institutions their practices create. On the other hand, in a mass-media-saturated environment, politicians often seem to pander to irrational swings in public opinion. In this respect, the electronic revolution presents both dangers and opportunities. New research on electoral accountability shows that this is a much more complex process than traditional democratic theory tends to portray, and certainly suggests a need for rethinking the question of how accountability mechanisms relate to representation.

2. New forms of accountability. The growth of informal forms of representation suggests that we should identify the means and mechanisms of accountability in order to judge whether these forms can be identified as “democratic,” and whether we should judge them as contributions to democracy. Traditional forms of accountability may come to play new roles; market-based, or “exit” accountability may have a key place within group accountability; internal group democracy/representation may also be important. There may be other kinds of accountability that have democratic importance. For example, are there informal but effective “horizontal” forms of accountability—peers answering to peers—that might function in democratic ways? Can accountability be the result of a “network” of voluntary organizations that police each other and public standards? In what ways does democratic accountability relate to the introduction of mechanisms of organizational performance and organizational learning typical of the private sector and of the new managerialism in the public sector?

3. Group accountability and role obligations of group representatives. As a subset of the previous topic, it seems important to conceive new forms of group accountability, particularly with regard to voluntary organizations and advocacy groups. Two contemporary trends indicate the importance of group accountability. On the one hand, these organizations are taking on representative functions that were traditionally performed by public institutions. As a consequence, their representativeness has become an issue. On the other hand, increasing demand for group accountability is contributing to changes in both the way organizations work internally and the mechanisms of their accountability.

4. Equality and inequality in representation. As points of access and opportunities for participation multiply, so do resource requirements for participation—education, money, time, and social capital. Group representatives often fill this void. But it is unclear whether increasing the openness of the political system helps or harms equal inclusion. Unorganized and latent issues and groups may lose out. In addition, if institutions are opened to more representation without being designed to unify responsibility for decisions, accountability may become so diffuse that representation loses its egalitarian and democratic value. One of the crucial elements to explore is the connection between unofficial and official power and how this works in relation to the empowerment of disadvantaged groups. What forms of group organization and representation are most likely to generate power for those who are least represented in formal political institutions?

5. Institutional opportunity structures for informal representation. Institutions create incentives that bring groups into existence—for example, by requiring “citizen input”
into administrative processes. Depending upon patterns of interaction between official and unofficial power; however, these forms of representation may shade into unwarranted forms of corporatism, and groups may be co-opted. A research project might focus on: (a) existing criteria for group representation within formal processes, and (b) whether criteria could be developed that would equalize representative opportunities, e.g., by requiring that groups themselves have a representative/democratic structure with respect to their representative claims, or that they develop broader coalitions in order to have access to formal processes.

6. The representation of public opinion. In deliberative accounts of democracy, public opinion has “force”—but it should count as “democratic” only when it develops a public quality—that is, when it is the result of public discourse. Opinion polls, deliberative polls, and the media make representative claims to public opinion, and seek authorization from it. What, exactly, can representation and accountability mean in this increasingly important context?

D. Research and Networking Activities

The CDATS Workshop in June was meant as the first of a series of initiatives on the “Transformation of Representation”. It is CDATS’ intention to help promote other such initiatives, and encourage the formation of a network of researchers working in this area. At present, we suggest three ways of proceeding.

1. Develop a loose network through the promotion of other initiatives. By organizing other moments of discussion on issues of representation, we hope to carry on the conversation started at the June workshop. This would allow us, and other researchers who may want to participate in future initiatives, to verify if, as we originally suggested, there is a need for new studies on representation, reflecting important developments in our democratic practices and institutions. Andrew Rehfeld is organizing a series of panels on the topic at the Midwest Conference next April, and we hope this can be the first opportunity for some of us to carry on the discussion. We will also explore the possibility of connecting with other similar networks, such as the Collaborative Democracy Network, as suggested by Iris Young.

2. Promote integrated research projects on representation. One other aim is to promote empirical research that is theoretically informed. CDATS is particularly interested in setting up a research project on new regimes of accountability. In the short term, it is sponsoring, together with Virginia Tech, an Inter-University Workshop on Accountability and the Nonprofit Sector. In the medium-term, it aims to set up an in-depth research project on the same topic. We would hope that the Network may function as a place through which we can exchange ideas and research results. To this end, CDATS’ Website and its Democracy and Society Newsletter are open to contributions and information on research and initiatives on representation and accountability.

3. Build a new theoretical agenda. Following more directly from the June workshop, we would like to pursue the question of a “new theoretical agenda” for the study of democratic representation. We are therefore planning some other moments of discussion (including the panels organized by Andrew Rehfeld at MPSA) so that we can arrive at a publication outlining such a new theoretical agenda.

Mark Warren, Professor of Government at Georgetown University (on leave); Dario Castiglione, CDATS Visiting Faculty Fellow and Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Exeter.
Nancy Bermeo has written an important, cogent and impressively documented study of the relationship between “ordinary people” and the breakdown of democratic regimes. It meets the most important standard for a book that must be read: it forces the reader to think about major issues and to re-examine basic assumptions. It is possible to contest some of her propositions, but it will not be possible to ignore them.

Focusing on seventeen cases of democratic breakdown in two quite different spatial and temporal settings, interwar Europe and 1960s-1970s Latin America, Bermeo argues persuasively that an image of polarization undermining democracy leaves out important elements of the story. In each of the cases she demonstrates that “ordinary people” did not side with extremists, and that majorities would have preferred to preserve democratic systems. Some of her most important evidence demonstrates that support for extremist political movements came from newly enfranchised or newly mobilized voters rather than from citizens defecting from traditional party affiliations. Bermeo contends that the breakdown of democracy is not a story of voters shifting to extremes but of elites deliberately dismantling democratic regimes, usually with the support or direct participation of the military: “Even profound polarization—in both public and private space—is never, in itself, a sufficient condition for regime collapse. Democracies will only collapse if actors deliberately disassemble them and the key actors in this disassembling process are political elites.” (p. 234) In each of the cases of breakdown, she provides evidence that majority support for democracy was obscured by the multidimensionality and opacity of party systems leading to elite misperceptions. In both sets of cases international “contagion” effects stemming from the Bolshevik and Cuban revolutions exacerbated the dangers.

Why do elites misread the wishes of ordinary people? Bermeo sees the problem in leaders adopting radical positions to differentiate themselves from competitors, the prominence of radical leaders in some social organizations, and frequent misreading of signals in times of highly fraught social and political circumstances. Activist leaders often contribute to the opacity, since it is in their interest to overstate both their own support and the strength of the opposition. If activists are in the streets demonstrating,
their impact outweighs the vast majority who stay home. When the demonstrations provoke violence, the situation seems to require intervention by the forces of “order.” None of the democracies failed because a majority voted for extremists: in every case the right wing leaders either staged a coup or were invited to rule by conservative executives. In the rare cases where people opposed the coup (most notably Spain), the result was civil war.

Bermeo also focuses on misperceptions in explaining the absence of resistance to assaults on democracy. In most cases, people expected the military to adhere to a “traditional” pattern of restoring order and returning to the barracks. When the military chose to remain in power, it was a departure from their previous behavior. Fear of repression kept people passive once they realized their mistake.

Bermeo’s story is not necessarily good news for those who see growth of the Third Sector always and everywhere as a positive development. She suggests that the greatest danger of democratic breakdown comes when civil society morphs into broad social movements let by radical activists. In a highly charged public space, neither the leaders of these movements nor the forces of “order” can gauge public opinion. She notes that regions with dense civil society—Austria, Germany, Romania, Northern Italy—were also places where fascism was most popular.

Bermeo not only diagnoses the problem, but offers solutions, drawing on the experience of Finland and Czechoslovakia between the wars and Venezuela in the late 1950s for a recipe to avoid breakdown. In each of these cases, parties and elites distanced themselves from extremist positions and advocates of violence. Bermeo suggests that successful distancing requires hierarchical parties that are able to implement decisions, and this is helped enormously by charismatic leaders who resist extremists. Yet the Venezuelan case is also a stark reminder that the issues do not go away if democracy is defended successfully at one point in time.

There is a conundrum in Bermeo’s story. Both the problem and the solution involve a degree of passivity on the part of the “ordinary people.” I doubt Bermeo intended the message to be that studying ordinary people does not tell us much about important political events. But she is quite explicit that elites are culpable, not ordinary people. If ordinary people are not responsible for the breakdown of democracy, and their modulated participation is the key to its preservation, the implication for civil society is a “Goldilocks” solution: neither too active nor too apathetic, but “just right.” Yet this offers little guidance in defending democracy when elites threaten its continuation.

Bermeo’s rethinking of the polarization theory involves shifting attention from ordinary people to elites. But in the same manner that party leaders in a democracy tend to polarize issues to differentiate themselves from other leaders, Bermeo may overstate the extent of her differences with earlier scholarship. She is correct that Linz, Sartori, Lipset and others focused on shifting loyalties rather than changes in the electorate (p. 17), but she ignores Linz’s statement absolving ordinary people of guilt for democratic breakdown: “Few citizens, even in a crisis, are ready to support those who might want to overthrow democracy, but in a modern society they feel unable to do anything in such a situation.” (Juan Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration, Hopkins, 1978, p. 85) Bermeo’s real contribution is in showing the role new voters and changed electoral laws played in so many of the cases.

Contradictions in the story force us to think hard about the issues Bermeo raises. She notes (p. 237) that the military is always a factor: nine of the 17 cases involved military coups; the others had the military’s blessing. In some passages she argues that the military acts on its own timing and generally in defense of its institutional interests (p. 217), but she also states that the military intervenes when they become convinced that elected civilian elites cannot cope with polarization (pp. 228; 237). Bermeo does not engage the work of Mary Kaldor and others who emphasize the economic benefits military and para-military groups derive from conflict situations. Both in European rearmaiment in the 1930s and in America’s support for opponents of communism in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, military elites had enormous opportunities for material gain.

I would extend this to a broader question about elite motivations. Bermeo implies that elites will respond to the public will when it is clearly manifested. I am less sanguine on this point. Elites may be, or may become, self-interested and downright rapacious. They inevitably cloak their self-interest in grand verbiage about tradition, values, and the welfare or greatness of the nation; sometimes they even believe this themselves. But we might at least entertain the notion that elites dismantled democracies for the same reason that Bill Clinton hit on interns: because they could.

The crucial issue then becomes how to constrain elites and hold them accountable. Bermeo comes close to acknowledging this when she emphasizes the role leaders play in distancing. If ordinary people play a secondary role both in undermining and preserving democracy, are ordinary people merely at the mercy of competing elites? Bermeo’s analysis would suggest that ordinary people need to resist the blandishments of leaders who endeavor to transform their interest associations and social groups into social movements. When activist leaders turn organized civil society into a movement society, the potential for violence and breakdown is enormously enhanced, and the moderating influence of ordinary people is severely diluted.
Michael Edwards sets out to answer a fundamental question surrounding civil society, and the third sector as a whole: “Is civil society the ‘big idea’ for the twenty-first century, or will the idea of civil society—confused, corrupted or captured by elites—prove another false horizon in the search for a better world?” Given that civil society cannot be equated to “good” in and of itself, then what exactly is it good for, and how does it deliver the goods to society at large? In taking a systematic approach to this complex issue, Edwards has produced a thoughtful deconstruction of the links between civil society and positive social outcomes.

Though brief, at 112 pages, Civil Society offers a solid introduction to the theory and practice of civil society. Its real value, however, lies in the author’s ability to integrate his own strong support for civil society with a deep intellectual skepticism that forces the reader to look beyond the clichéd arguments advanced for civil society and its role in democracy and development. Drawing insights from history, philosophy, economics, and politics, from international developments as well as domestic experience, Edwards peels back the layers of logic, assumption, and fact to offer a clear-eyed assessment of civil society’s contribution to society at large.

Edwards’s argument centers around three competing frameworks for analyzing civil society and its role in the broader society: Is “civil society” the institutions themselves, the society that is shaped by their presence, or the public space in which society and institutions interact? He looks first at civil society as “associational life,” the messy multitude of voluntary institutions that citizens create to pursue diverse purposes through collective action. He then examines the concept of civil society as a characteristic of societies that permit such associations to appear and flourish: the “good society” or the “society that is civil,” rooted in broad, public discourse. Finally, he explores the idea of civil society as the “public sphere,” the space in which this dialogue takes place, looking both at dialogue among competing civic organizations and among such groups, government and business.

Civil Society takes a skeptical and penetrating look at each of these frameworks in turn, looking for—and often finding—flaws in the arguments and evidence that sustain them, as well as critical points in each model that stand up to examination. Each analysis is grounded in intellectual history, showing that what are often thought of as new and modern concepts of civil society in fact build on and reflect earlier discourse on democracy and society. It is intriguing to learn, for example, that de Tocqueville’s analysis of Americans’ predilection for association was prefigured by Marco Polo’s observation of the same tendency in early China.

Having untangled the threads making up each model of civil society and laid them out for our examination, Edwards looks at different ways to reweave them, to synthesize the three strands of argument into a single fabric. He begins this second part of the analysis by looking at three competing schools of thought regarding civil society’s role in society: 1) the civic culture school, typified by Putnam, which argues that civil society creates a set of habits, linkages, and “templates for collaboration” that are critical to democracy; 2) the comparative associational school, which looks for principles that can be generalized from global experience with civil society; and 3) the school of skeptics, who question whether civil society really plays the central role in democracy and equity assigned to it by its advocates.

One senses that Edwards would really like to pull all of these various threads together into something resembling a unified theory of civil society, but is too intellectually honest for the hand-waving, glossing-over, and broad-brushing that would be necessary to pull this off. So he turns instead to the equally important task of drawing out the potential for the practice of civil society development.

Edwards recommends two broad areas where assistance from donors and other external change agents is most likely to be helpful. He calls, first, for “building the preconditions for a true civil society,” and, second, for “facilitating the development of a healthy associational ecosystem.”

The first area requires, inter alia, building connections across and between different parts of society, rather than only within each segment. He urges greater use of ‘co-production,’ the joint provision of public goods and essential services by the state, firms, and community groups working together to create “synergy in the management of local resources and [increase] a sense of ownership over the results.”

To facilitate a healthy associational ecosystem, he emphasizes the importance of mobilizing and building on indigenous sources of support. The development of local support for civil society from business and government is an area that, in the reviewer’s experience, merits much greater attention within donor-driven civil society programs. It is particularly refreshing to see this need—and the potentially pernicious impact of outside funding on local leadership—recognized by someone who is a leading representative of the external donor community.
These recommendations, while useful, are not ultimately convincing as comprehensive strategies to address the tough challenges that Edwards raises in *Civil Society*. The book’s greatest value lies in offering readers an opportunity to walk down the intellectual pathways of civil society development alongside a leading practitioner, sharing what he has learned, his insights, and his frustrations. Edwards’s hard-eyed, critical, realistic, and ultimately hopeful view of civil society’s role in building the “good society” underscores not only the importance of building civil society but also the real limits on the outsiders’ ability to influence it.


*Review by Jonathan Monten, Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University*

This edited volume conceptualizes and assesses the impact of transnational advocacy groups on international politics. According to the editors, the primary goal of transnational civil society is to create, strengthen, implement, and monitor international norms. The groups that constitute this emerging civil society are of increasing interest to students of international relations: whereas other political actors in the international system are motivated by the self-interested pursuit of power or profit, transnational advocacy groups are distinguished by their pursuit of principled beliefs about right and wrong, and attempt to influence state behavior accordingly. This volume brings together the diverse perspectives of scholars, activists, and policymakers to show how these groups address key issue areas such as labor, the environment, human rights, and democratization.

As customary, the editors begin by establishing a conceptual framework within which the empirical chapters can be situated, in this case a typology of transnational collective action. Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink argue that collective action can take the form of international networks, coalitions, and advocacy campaigns, and social movements, differentiated primarily by mechanism of change employed: information exchange, informal contacts, and coordinated tactics. These techniques form an interesting area of research because these groups command none of the material resources associated with political power, and must instead rely on other means: legitimacy, strategic framing, etc. The empirical chapters then explore how specific transnational networks and campaigns attempt to influence policies and agendas, the causal conditions in which they succeed or fail, and the problems and complications they encounter.

This volume makes two contributions to a growing literature on transnational civil society and the third sector. Substantively, the research findings provide further evidence that transnational activity by the civil society sector matters, challenging the predominantly state-centric view of international politics. The contributors present a range of cases where nongovernmental actors attempt to change the norms and the practices of governments, private firms, and international organizations, in issue areas as diverse as anti-dam projects in India to pro-democracy movements in Indonesia. The most interesting chapters address what are traditionally regarded as the “hard cases” for this research program: the high politics of military and security competition. For example, Daniel Green’s chapter on the process by which NGOs surrounding the Helsinki agreements influenced reformers within the Soviet Union and ultimately contributed to the end of the Cold War should be required reading for those who eulogized the death of Ronald Reagan with the thesis that the assertion of American power in the 1980s induced the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Theoretically, the volume contributes to our understanding of the origins of international norms. The first wave of constructivist research in the international relations subfield was criticized for being overly structural; in its zeal to demonstrate that norms mattered, early constructivist work focused primarily on how an international social structure shaped and influenced states, and ignored the processes by which agents created or influenced norms of appropriate behavior. The conceptual claims and empirical evidence presented in this volume suggests that this gap in the constructivist research program can be filled by a better understanding of non-governmental activism and advocacy.

Nonetheless, *Restructuring World Politics* is undermined by a problem that continues to plague the study of transnational civil society and the third sector: the authors openly sympathize with the normative agenda of the groups and campaigns under consideration. In general, this sympathy raises two flaws; methodologically, scholars tend to be drawn only to cases of success, creating a severe selection bias problem, and substantively, case studies tend to focus on instances of good or positive norms, leaving an empirical gap in our understanding of different kinds of normative change. By including cases of both success and failures, Khagram, Sikkink, and Riker admirably avoid the first problem, but not the second. Those interested in how “bad” norms are created and exert influence in the international system will have to wait for a more creative collection of transnational case studies.
Democratic theory has seen a remarkable renaissance during the last two decades, witnessing the emergence of new perspectives as well as the creative reformulation of older ones. By the last decade of the Cold War, Ian Shapiro tells us, “democratic theory did not seem to be going anywhere interesting or worthwhile.” The Third Wave of democratization and the processes of democratic consolidation changed this by directing new interest and energies to the study of democracy, furthering a reinvigoration that had begun in political theory a decade before with the work of philosophers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.

In The State of Democratic Theory, Shapiro attempts a precise assessment of the literature developed during these last years, which proceeds from the difficult intersection of normative and explanatory perspectives. The book offers both more and less than this explicit aim. To a large extent, it provides a well-crafted defense and reformulation of the reform agenda of the competitive pluralist brand of American Liberalism, framed within a critique of some of the current influential positions among democratic scholars and activists. The approach is minimalist, institutional-reform oriented, and well rooted in Robert Dahl and Joseph Schumpeter, with an incisiveness that brings to mind the work of Albert O. Hirschman. It assumes a commonsensical tone and the skepticism about overambitious projects proper to this tradition. It insists on the need for the redesign, not the reinvention, of institutions.

Shapiro criticizes many of the most significant positions in the literature, from liberal constitutionalism to Madisonian and Tocquevillian arguments. In fact, one of the refreshing aspects of this book is to find sober criticism of some of the emerging conventional wisdom in democratic theory.

In examining the centrality of independent courts in new democracies, for example, Shapiro notices that their popularity “may have more in common with the popularity of independent banks than with the protection of individual freedoms [by functioning as devices that signal for investors that] the capacity of elected officials to interfere in redistributive policy or interfere with property rights will be limited” (21).

He shows particular skepticism about the adequacy of the claims of deliberative democrats and civil society advocates. Most of the criticisms are not entirely new, but are effectively argued and nicely brought together by his perspective.

Normatively, Shapiro notices that there is no evidence to support the expectation that the outcomes of deliberation will provide better public policy and increased agreement. He argues that the conclusions reached by the proponents of deliberation about what the results of political dialogue could or should be appear to be fully dependent on the different assumptions embraced by the argument. He hints at the notion that the claims of these authors about the conclusions of deliberative politics are alien to the actual individuals who should be part of it, thus imposing a conception that belongs to the theoretician or attempting to transform the participants, in either way depending on a particular substantive notion of the common good that precedes deliberation.

Empirically, Shapiro suggests that an overly inclusive process of deliberation can risk the attainment of the goals pursued, by providing powerful opposing interests with positions and power for vetoing or complicating the process. In practice, deliberation could become another form of domination by favoring those more adept and better situated to participate in dialogue processes in detriment of other groups. In these ways, deliberative processes can favor the status quo or recreate domination. Deliberation could also bring to light previously hidden disagreements that would increase conflict instead of reducing it. While Shapiro discounts central parts of the arguments provided by deliberative democrats, he presents useful criticism.

The problem with the conceptions of deliberative and aggregative democrats, Shapiro says, is their Rousseauian conception of democracy that involves a notion of the common good that depends on the possibility of discovering the general will of society. This expectation rests “upon implausible expectations about rationality and a misconstrual of what stable democratic politics require” (10).

The mistake begins by forgetting that politics is fundamentally about “power relations and conflicts of interest.” Thus, Shapiro's response is to propose a minimalist conception of democracy “as a means of managing power relations so as to minimize domination.” Accordingly, the common good is “that which those with an interest in avoiding domination share” (3).
Book Reviews

Now, the question about deliberation becomes how and on what settings it diminishes domination. Deliberation is costly, low in efficiency and burdensome, so it should not be imposed on citizens while there are other alternatives that can solve the problems. Shapiro finds, however, that given certain prerequisites deliberation is desirable as part of democratic politics.

First, to work, the shaping of deliberative mechanisms should have a presumption in favor of “insiders’ wisdom” (§ 2.2) as opposed to an amorphous civil society, where even governmental functions are part of a division of labor. Second, deliberation can function as an intermediate form of regulation. Disadvantaged groups could demand the establishment of deliberative processes in cases in which their basic interests can be affected: “strengthening the hand of those whose basic interests are threatened, government can shift the balance of incentives indirectly” (47). It is only those who have a direct interest in the issue and who have some form of expertise who should be involved in deliberative processes.

These are very interesting suggestions. Unfortunately, in this book Shapiro does not clarify the model enough, so that notions like “insiders” and “basis interest” remain unclear. Additionally, in trying to find its usefulness, Shapiro transforms deliberation into bargaining, which is more compatible with the traditional pluralist model.

The section on “Power and Democratic Competition” is a forcefully developed defense of Schumpeterianism as a theory of democratic politics: “in a world in which power is ubiquitous, structured competition beats the going alternatives” (148). Shapiro argues that the problems identified with American democracy have to do not with this minimalist conception, but with insufficient competitiveness in the system. He provides very cogent and convincing criticism of bipartisanship and bipartisan consensus, campaign financing and supervising institutions formed by the parties themselves, all of which reduce competition and erode the value of opposition politics.

In this context, judicial review “should be limited to preventing subversions of democracy by ensuring that the principle of affected interests is not undermined through disenfranchising legitimate voters when their basic interests are at stake” (66).

In terms of description, the last two chapters, in which there is less of an agenda, are the best developed. The literature on transitions and consolidation is very well reviewed and analyzed. Shapiro’s skepticism about the reach of our knowledge is particularly appropriate for its assessment. Here also his reasonable suspicions about the prejudice in the literature in favor of the virtues of negotiated transitions are instructive.

The last chapter is a very interesting exposition about the relation between democracy and redistribution. The intuition that the larger the income inequality, the less likely are strong redistributive politics is well explored. The proverbial call for ingenuity and political will adequately closes this section.

The State of Democratic Theory offers a fresh look at the main issues and concerns of the literature, as well as some incisive criticism of the emerging conventional wisdom in this area. Shapiro also offers a resourceful and cogent restatement of the best intuitions of the tradition of American competitive pluralism in terms of current debates. In a sense, the book is a call for returning to more traditional ways of presenting democratic theory in this academic tradition, one more centered in governmental institutions and market-like equilibriums of power. He also presents an interesting series of suggestions for democratic institutional engineering aimed at the American political system.


Review by Carin Larson, Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University
Cohen argues, that the “good consumer, good patriot” relationship was solidified. Women and blacks were the first beneficiaries of this mentality, says Cohen, as they were able to assert their civic worth through their buying power. This was especially true while the men were away at war. “By mobilizing as consumers, African Americans participated in a broader political culture of dissent where ‘the consumer’ became viewed as a legitimate and effective agent of protest, particularly for women and blacks who were marginalized from the mainstremes of politics and the labor movement” (53). Cohen offers great insight into how mass consumption became the arena for the fight for equality, particularly among African-Americans. Equality first meant an equal right to buy things. For a time, boycotts were effective and the Consumers’ Republic offered hope for women and minorities who used their position as consumers to achieve recognition in the public sphere. But in the 1950s, with the GI Bill offering financial benefits to veterans, most of whom were white males, inequalities and segregation not only resumed, but intensified.

Perhaps Cohen’s most impressive contribution to the literature is found in her discussion of suburbanization during this time. She intricately outlines how suburbanization, as a result of the home being the prized consumer possession, contributed to greater inequalities. “The socioeconomic hierarchy of communities that arose from the commodification of ‘home’ intensified the inequitable effects of the ‘localism’ that had long been a feature of American, and particularly New Jersey’s, political culture. As residents retreated into suburbs defined by the homogeneity of their populations and the market values of their homes, the barriers they erected against outsiders grew higher, and their conception of ‘the public good’ correspondingly narrowed” (228). Focusing on New Jersey, including maps and analysis of the physical landscape, Cohen goes on to explain how suburbanization led to a commercialized, privatized, and feminized public space summed up in two words: the mall. Suddenly, free speech in the public sphere butted heads with property rights. The newly configured landscape sharply contradicted the original goals of the Consumer’s Republic.

It is not surprising, as Cohen points out, that in the 1970s a Boy Scout merit badge for consumer buying debuted. Consumer consciousness remained intact even after a period of deregulation of the marketplace in the 1980s and 90s. Cohen’s analysis of the Consumer’s Republic puts out as she reaches present-day America. She offers no solution to the inequalities consumerism has produced and appropriately avoids an outright critique of current policies. But she convincingly establishes consumption as an American way of life. Citizens are now courted as consumers by politicians trying to win their vote. We are segmented from our fellow Americans based on the brand of jeans we prefer to buy.

Robert Behn, currently a visiting professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School, has written a thoughtful consideration of how to ensure accountability in public administration. Drawing on the competing paradigms of traditional public administration and the newer, performance-based “new public management,” Behn carefully constructs a definition of accountability and how it can be practically applied.

Behn argues that the manner by which accountability rules have developed out of the traditional model of modern public administration tends to hinder performance. There are important fallacies in Max Weber’s notion that bureaucracies are efficient, Frederick Taylor’s belief that there is necessarily one best way, and Woodrow Wilson’s conviction...
that policy implementation could be inherently non-political. All contribute to difficulties in ensuring the accountability of public bureaucracies. But despite the obvious flaws in these three men’s thinking, Behn argues that even today “we are their slaves” (61). In large part, the traditional model clings on because it includes a compelling theory of accountability: voters elect policymakers, who implement policy through civil servants operating with neutral competence. At any point, policymakers can be thrown out through elections, while bureaucrats can be reined in by special prosecutors, inspectors general, congressional oversight, and citizen oversight.

For all the attractive simplicity of this model, Behn criticizes it for its inbred bias. Accountability “holders,” such as the congressmen and investigators general who keep public servants accountable, find it far easier to focus on financial probity and fairness than on performance. And even when accountability holders focus on performance, they use finance and fairness-based measures to evaluate and punish those who step too far outside the lines. The result is the sclerotization of public bureaucracies, where the rules tend to either lead to extreme timidity or, more rarely, extreme entrepreneurship.

It is in the goal of liberating public sector entrepreneurs that Behn finds flaws in the new public management. Behn is focused largely on the challenge to the theory of public administration presented by advocates of “reinventing government,” such as Osborne and Gaebler, and echoed by policymakers ranging from the Volcker Commission on public service to Vice President Gore’s National Partnership for Reinventing Government. But as Behn argues exhaustively, in the new performance-based world of public management, old-fashioned process-oriented accountability mechanisms are incapable of measuring performance without reducing the discretion essential to enhancing performance. Accountability requires both discretion for accountability “holdees” and trust from accountability “holders.” In the American system of Madisonian checks and balances, most accountability “holders” are unlikely to want to measure performance, since all incentives point them to discovering and uncovering financial or equity-related issues in a “self-reinforcing scandal machine.” Meanwhile, public bureaucracies are well equipped to shield themselves from effective performance-based measures, given the likely speciousness of the performance goals they set for themselves and the bureaucratic anonymity of individual civil servants.

It is in structuring solutions to this accountability paradox that Behn’s analysis stumbles. While the first six chapters of this book are sharp and concisely written, the remainder is imaginative and free-flowing, but frustrating. Behn suggests some solutions to the dichotomy between process and results, including “compacts of mutual collective responsibility,” charter agencies, and broader lines of accountability, emulating the business model of “360 degree evaluations.” But these are posed tentatively. After two chapters of discussion, the responsibility compact is judged “splendidly naïve.” The notion of charter agencies draws on the combination of greater flexibility and greater performance accountability in charter schools, but the extension of this concept to a regulatory or strategic government agency, such as the FCC or the State Department, seems highly improbable. At the very least, greater discussion of the complications of applying performance-based measures in agencies who produce less measurable policy results would have been useful.

Perhaps the most intriguing notions of all are Behn’s discussion of collective or mutual accountability, which he argues would represent a move forward from the linear hierarchical model of accountability, and his introduction of the need to emphasize rewards as well as punishments in ensuring accountability. But it is a sign of how intriguingly Behn poses the questions in this book that the reader feels let down by his answers. In part, this is because the new public management is still in its early stages; as Behn notes, “the answers will only emerge as the experiments evolve.” It may also be, as this reviewer became convinced, that the solution to accountability lies in a long-term dialectical process by which accountability holders constantly adjust the criteria for evaluation, from performance to process, and back again. Yet despite these shortcomings, which are perhaps inevitable, Behn has written a deeply considered evaluation of the concept of democratic accountability, highlighting the important questions that need to be answered as we consider how to keep civil servants accountable to their multiple and often conflicting constituencies.

In his book, NGOs and Organizational Change, Alnoor Ebrahim challenges the commonly held notion that non-governmental organizations passively accept the guidance of their funding organizations. Instead, Ebrahim argues that NGOs and their funding institutions have an interdependent relationship, in which an NGO’s access to information and ability to promote the reputation of the funding organization gives it an active role in shaping the association. This claim is supported by a comparison of two case studies: the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, India (AKRSP(I)) and the Navinchandra Mafatlal Sadguru Water and Development Foundation (Sadguru). Both of these institutions are development...
NGOs in India that receive support from international sources. While the book is often uneven and could benefit from additional analysis, Ebrahim has succeeded in creating a work that raises important issues for anyone who desires to better understand how NGOs function.

Both of the NGOs that Ebrahim examines are located in India and focus on environmentally sound land development. In addition, both receive international funding and operate within an organizational structure that requires the funds to pass through several levels before arriving at the local organization. Ebrahim lays the foundation for his thesis by embedding each organization in the world discourse that existed at the time of its founding: Sadguru was founded at a time when the “basic needs” approach (viewing poverty as the outcome of material constraints) was the prevailing discourse; while the “participation” approach (viewing the development of village organizations as both a means and an end of resource development) was dominant at the time of AKRSP(I)’s establishment. Given this framework, Ebrahim argues against a governing role of the theory of discourse and instead focuses on how NGOs impact the ongoing relationship. He refers to this as the “theory of learning”.

An NGO’s power lies in its ability to transfer information, expertise, and prestige to those that fund it. As funders generally rely on metrics to demonstrate success, reporting is a critical element to this exchange. The funders reliance on metrics also results in a desire that NGO reports focus on information that is quantitative, easily reported, and comparable over time - regardless the value of this type of information to the NGO. Many common NGO activities (such as the role of women in society) involve processes and outcomes that are often intangible and difficult to measure. Consequently, NGOs often respond by insulating these activities from the interference of the funding organizations while finding ways to support the reporting requirements in order to continue receiving funds. This lack of compatibility between common focuses of NGOs and the funders desire for results that can be easily quantified creates a tension between the NGO and funder.

Ebrahim’s “theory of learning” provides the theoretical basis for how NGOs move away from their initial focuses. According to this theory, “single loop learning,” which refers to the process of learning how to better achieve fixed goals and is therefore tactical in nature, does little to move the focus of the organization. However, “double loop learning,” which draws in feedback from the environment to re-examine base goals and potentially modify them, is a form of learning that impacts strategy. While single loop learning was found to be common to both organizations, AKRSP(I)’s focus on community involvement allowed for greater double-loop learning due to its openness to feedback and its inclination to explore alternate types of projects. Funders have the power to support this type of learning by creating strategic review processes that examine how the goals of the organization fit into the changing environment. Unfortunately, double loop learning is often impeded through reporting requirements that do not adjust to the changed circumstances. This may hamper both the ability of the NGO to achieve its core goals and the ability of the funder to receive the positive feedback it needs.

Ebrahim reaches this conclusion through an examination of how his two case studies fit into two theories: the theory of discourse and the theory of learning. The fit is somewhat awkward at points, but thought-provoking for those who are attempting to achieve progress via an NGO. The discussion of the theory of discourse is the least satisfying of the two. Although a dominant discourse is provided for each organization, it is not altogether clear how the discourse given is more than an opinion or convenient vehicle to carry the author’s theory. How would one determine what the dominant discourse was at any given point in time, or what it is now?

Ebrahim’s analysis of the theory of learning provides much more insight into the benefits of feedback and strategic review. However, this analysis would have greatly benefited from a quantitative analysis that encompassed a full range of activity, rather than picking out a handful of examples to support the theory. For instance, the author focuses on reporting and how it can be used to advance or impede learning. Reporting provides a limited universe of examples that could be examined in full. If the author had gone through the specifics types of reporting required and showed what each type of report does, then mapped the type of report into the theory, the result would have been a significantly more compelling argument. To some extent, Ebrahim does this while making a similar analysis of reporting in the discussion of power relationships. The continuation of this level of analysis in the learning context would make his argument more complete and would have done much to mitigate the limitations inherent in a two-case study that make any generalization risky. Even with these problems, Ebrahim manages to draw attention to real world risks and issues that would otherwise go unnoticed in the field of NGOs.
Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy:
A Major New CDATS Survey

By Marc Morjé Howard

In the spring of 2005, CDATS will be carrying out a major survey of American civic engagement in comparative perspective. The survey will consist of in-person interviews with a representative sample of Americans, and it includes extensive questions about a number of important themes and concepts from the literature on civil society and democracy. Overall, the survey has three main objectives: 1) to monitor changing levels and types of participation in the U.S. over the last few decades; 2) to conceptualize and measure new forms of participation and association in the U.S.; and 3) to generate comparative data that will allow researchers to investigate the similarities and differences between the U.S. and a number of European countries in terms of the forms and mechanisms of civic engagement.

The survey is called “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” (CID), since it is an adaptation of a European survey—conducted in 13 different European societies—by that same name. A “module” from the CID was also included in the 2002 round of the new European Social Survey (ESS), which was carried out in 23 countries.

The U.S. version of the CID survey includes many of the questions from the 2002 ESS, suitably adapted to the American context. We have also added other new and innovative questions—particularly related to the themes of informal social networks and democratic values—that relate to lively ongoing debates about civic engagement and democracy. The survey promises to generate an unusually rich perspective on citizen participation in both the public and private realms, thus providing a more firm empirical basis to important debates that are often normatively driven.

In order to prepare the best possible survey instrument, CDATS has put together an advisory committee of leading scholars, which has been meeting several times over the two-year span of this project (2003-05). Data collection should be complete by the summer of 2005, and we intend to make the data publicly available as soon as possible, most likely early in 2006. We hope that this survey will become an important source of data and research, for Americanists and comparativists alike.

Marc Morjé Howard, Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Director of the CID Survey Project

The American CID Survey includes questions on such concepts as:

- activities in formal clubs and organizations
- informal social activities
- personal networks (strong and weak ties)
- trust (in other people, the community, institutions, and politicians)
- local democracy and participation
- democratic values
- political citizenship
- social citizenship
- views on immigration and diversity
- political identification, ideology, mobilization, and action

Advisory Committee for the American CID Survey:

- Samuel Barnes (Georgetown)
- Jack Citrin (UC Berkeley)
- Russell Dalton (UC Irvine)
- Jennifer Hochschild (Harvard)
- Virginia Hodgkinson (Georgetown)
- Samantha Luks (Minnesota)
- Jane Mansbridge (Harvard)
- Gregory Markus (Michigan)
- Eric Oliver (Chicago)
- Kenneth Prewitt (Columbia)
- Richard Rockwell (Connecticut)
- Kay Schlozman (Boston College)
- Dietlind Stolle (McGill)
- Clyde Wilcox (Georgetown)
- Cara Wong (Michigan)
Philanthropy and Homeland Security Panel

On March 11 CDATS coordinated a panel discussion on “Philanthropy and Homeland Security.” Scholars, community activists, and former government officials from the U.S. and the U.K. came together to discuss how homeland security policies are affecting philanthropy and charitable giving. The panel was moderated by James Allen Smith, Nielsen Chair in Philanthropy at Georgetown University. Panelists included Helmut Anheier (UCLA, Center for Civil Society), David Aufhauser (Former General Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury), Jean AbiNader (Co-Founder, Arab American Institute), Richard Freis (Chair of the Board, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law), and Barnett Baron (Executive Vice President, The Asia Foundation).

Transformation of Democratic Representation Workshop

On June 4-5, CDATS sponsored a workshop to discuss how representation is being transformed by new forms of political expression. These new forms include civil society organizations—from local to transnational—that claim to represent definite constituencies, new institutions such as holder representation within government agencies, and increasingly important public spheres within which speakers make representative claims. These phenomena challenge traditional understandings of representation that are grounded in territorially-organized electoral institutions.

Participants in the workshop included leading scholars Jane Mansbridge (Harvard University), Andrew Rehfeld (Washington University), Joshua Cohen (MIT), Carol Gould (George Mason University), Dario Castiglione (University of Exeter and CDATS Visiting Faculty Fellow), Henry Richardson (Georgetown University), Suzanne Dovi (University of Arizona), Dara Strolovich (University of Minnesota and CDATS Visiting Faculty Fellow), Julie Fisher (Kettering Foundation), Laurel Weldon (Purdue University), Mark Warren (Georgetown University), and Iris Young (University of Chicago). The event marked the beginning of CDATS work exploring the implications of these new political forms on representative democracy, focusing in particular on the role of the third sector in global governance and the accountability of civil society in representative democracies. The workshop was organized by Dario Castiglione and Mark Warren (see article on page 5).

Center Lectures

In addition to the Quality of Democracy speaker series, CDATS also sponsored a number of other lectures this past spring:

- John Bailey (Georgetown University), “Toward a Theory of Public Security and Democratic Governability”
- Jan W. van Deth (University of Manheim), “A Dark Side of Social Capital? Political Attitudes among Members and Non-Members of Voluntary Associations in Europe”
- Philip Pettit (Princeton University), “The Third Concept of Democracy”

Publications and Awards

Harley Balzer (Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service) received a grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research to support completion of his monograph on Public-Private Partnerships in Russian Higher Education: Comparative Historical Perspectives and Current Policy. He also authored “State and Society in Transitions from Communism: China in Comparative Perspective” in State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation, Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds. (Routledge, 2004).


Kenneth Greene (CDATS Visiting Faculty Fellow) presented “A Theory of Single Party Dominance and the Case of Mexico” at the 2004 APSA conference.

Steven Heydemann (CDATS Director) edited and wrote the introduction for the just released volume, Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Reconsidered (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). The volume is the result of the efforts of a research working group funded by the Mediterranean Program of the European University Institute. Chapters explore the role of informal economic networks in shaping the processes and outcomes of economic reform programs in the Middle East and North Africa. They explore the conditions under which economic reform disrupts privileged economic networks, and how these networks work to capture the benefits of economic reform programs.


Meredith Weiss (CDATS Visiting Faculty Fellow) presented “Who Sets Social Policy in Metropolis, Economic Positioning and Social Reform in Singapore” at the 2004 APSA conference.

2004-2005 CDATS Visiting Faculty Fellows

CDATS welcomes back Visiting Faculty Fellow Dario Castiglione (University of Exeter) and the following new fellows:

Kayla Meltzer Drogosz is a Senior Research Analyst for the religion and civil society project in the Governance Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, where her research interests include the politics of nonprofits, elections and polling, faith-based initiatives, civil society, national service and civic engagement. She also continues her research in the area of applied ethics, political philosophy, Jewish political history and the public purposes of religion.

Kenneth Greene (University of Texas at Austin), whose research focuses on political parties and elections with an emphasis on the formation of opposition parties in dominant party regimes, will be working on a research project on “Defeating Dominance: Opposition Party Building and Democratization in Mexico.” He will also be teaching a seminar on Comparative Political Parties and Party Systems, an advanced introduction to the subject for graduate students.

Meredith Weiss (DePaul University) is a specialist on politics and civil society in Malaysia and Singapore. While at CDATS, she will be working on a research project, “The Campus as Crucible: Manifestations and Ramifications of Student Activism in Malaysia,” which examines the causes, foci, and organizational forms of student activism. She will also be teaching a seminar on Contentious Politics in Southeast Asia.

About this Publication

Democracy & Society is published twice a year, and CDATS welcomes submissions from scholars around the world. Please visit http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdat/sdemocracyandsociety.htm or email cdatsnews@georgetown.edu for more details.

This issue was edited by David Madland and Nicole Love with assistance from Joshua Lieb (GPPI), Marni Schultz (GPPI), and Leah Smith (Government).
CDATS Visiting Fellows—Call for Applications

CDATS is pleased to announce the third annual visiting faculty fellowship competition for the 2005-2006 academic year. Fellowships will provide support for scholars, researchers, and specialists with experience equivalent to a Ph.D. to pursue research on all aspects of the relationship between, and interactions among, democratic governance and the third sector.

The Center will award a maximum of two visiting faculty fellowships. The term of the fellowship is for one academic year. Fellowships will typically begin no later than September 1 and end no earlier than May 31. For more information, download an Application Package from our website at http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdatos/visitors.htm. All application materials must be received by CDATS no later than January 15, 2005.

Inaugurated in 2003, the speaker series brings leading scholars in the field of democracy studies to Georgetown to discuss their new and ongoing research projects. The lectures present innovative ways of conceptualizing, measuring, and analyzing democracy.

Past Speakers:

Gerardo Munck (University of Southern California), Keith Darden (Yale University), Dario Castiglione (University of Exeter), Dara Stolovich (University of Minnesota), Simone Chambers (University of Toronto), Larry Diamond (Stanford University), Lucan Way (Temple University), and Rogers Smith (University of Pennsylvania), Michael Bernhard (Pennsylvania State University), Patrick Deneen (Princeton University), David Campbell (George Washington University/University of Klagenfurt), Craig Parsons (University of Oregon).

Upcoming Speakers:

Thursday, February 3, 2005
(Co-sponsored with CERES)

Rudra Sil (University of Pennsylvania)
“The Puzzle of the Postcommunist Proletariat: Russian Labor in Comparative-Historical Perspective”
• Commentator: Harley Balzer
• Location and Time: ICC 450, 12:00 – 1:30 p.m.

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Seyla Benhabib (Yale University)
“The Right to Have Rights in Contemporary Europe”
• Commentators: Dario Castiglione and Gerald Mara
• Location and Time: ICC 662, 12:00 – 1:30 p.m.

Thursday, March 3, 2005

Jim Sleeper (Yale University)
“Neoconservatives and the American Republic”
• Commentator: TBA
• Location and Time: ICC 450, 12:00 – 1:30 p.m.

Monday, April 4, 2005
(Co-sponsored with CGES)

Sheri Berman (Barnard College)
“The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Ideological Dynamics of the 20th Century”
• Commentator: Daniel Nexon
• Location and Time: ICC 450, 12:00 – 1:30 p.m.

Monday, April 18, 2005

Kathryn Sikkink (University of Minnesota)
“U.S. Mixed Signals on Human Rights: Policy and Practice”
• Commentator: Leslie Vinjamuri
• Location and Time: ICC 662, 12:00 – 1:30 p.m.

To RSVP or for more information, email cdats@georgetown.edu.
Call for Applications

CDATS Visiting Fellows
Details on Page 35