The Promise of National Service: A (Very) Brief History of an Idea
By E.J. Dionne, Jr. and Kayla Meltzer Drogosz

Americans are always for national service—except when we are not. Public rhetoric in the United States has always laid heavy stress on the obligations of citizenship. “With rights come responsibilities.” It’s a statement that rolls off the tongues of politicians. “Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country.” John F. Kennedy’s words are so embedded in our civic catechism that the mere mention of the word “service” automatically calls them forth. On Veterans Day and Memorial Day, politicians regularly extol the valor of those “without whose sacrifices we would not enjoy our freedom.” Bill Clinton praised the idea of service. George W. Bush now does the same. It is one of the few issues on which our last two presidents agree.

Yet how firm is our belief in service? There is little prospect that we will return to a military draft anytime soon. The number of politicians who support compulsory national service is small. Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), in his now-famous December 2002 New York Times article, succeeded in creating the most serious debate on renewing the draft since its expiration after the Vietnam years. Most of the American military remains skeptical of a renewal of the draft, a view reflected by former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s response to Rangel in the pages of the Wall Street Journal. While only a few lawmakers signed on to Rangel’s proposal, many joined the debate he sparked. A headline from [Continued, Page 11]
From Solidarity to Social Capital and Back?

Current debates about the quality of democracy often focus on what’s missing in the political arena. They stress the gap between what happens at the level of formal politics, where institutions and practices appear democratic, and the everyday, lived experiences of citizens, where significant barriers exist to participation, representation, and inclusion. Efforts to close this gap tend to focus on ways to increase political participation and strengthen civic ties, promoting the development of positive social capital. A richer civic life contributes to a higher quality of democratic life. At least in theory. As E.J. Dionne and Kayla Drogosz note in this issue of D&S, this civic sensibility is evident in Americans’ support for the idea of national service, even if we also disagree about how to translate the idea into reality.

Less prominent in these debates, however, especially in the U.S., is the role of social and economic rights in defining the quality of democratic life. Americans’ focus on political attributes of democracy has tended to overshadow other, social and economic, dimensions. This isn’t entirely unexpected in a context in which market logics obscure the impact of non-market factors in shaping the life chances of individuals, and where markets rather than social policy are seen almost exclusively as the appropriate mechanism for securing economic and social rights. As a result, however, possibilities for engaging social and economic rights as subjects of political debate have receded, even as market liberalism becomes more encompassing, cutting more deeply and broadly into civic and associational domains of modern life.

We would be mistaken, however, to see this trend as new; indeed, it has been a long time in the making. More than half a century has passed since T.H. Marshall wrote his now classic work on Citizenship and Social Class. Marshall linked social and economic rights to civic participation, finding their origins in “membership of local communities and functional associations.” He warned of the disintegrative impact of a “competitive economy” on social rights, and noted the gradual divorce of such rights from conceptions of citizenship that came, increasingly, to be defined in narrowly political, rather than economic, terms. He understood, as did Karl Polanyi and others, the importance of social rights both for the quality of democracy and as a basis for political participation.

Marshall’s concerns are evident in the summary of a Green Paper on the Future of Democracy in Europe that we reprint here, with thanks to Philippe Schmitter. Marshall’s legacy is even more evident, however, in Adalbert Evers’ article about the idea of a “social economy” as a form of economic organization based on the participation and inclusion of citizens in the governance of economic activities.

To highlight these issues, we have chosen to feature the articles by Dionne & Drogosz and by Evers using the unduly neglected term “solidarity.” Though long out of fashion, and now thoroughly displaced by the related but distinct notion of social capital, solidarity could offer a useful (though not unproblematic) vocabulary for linking debates about the quality of democracy to a broader conception of civic life, taking social and economic as well as political rights into account.

Moreover, our use of this term is not simply a bit of academic wordplay. In philanthropy and other domains we see developments that could, on one hand, signal a deepening of the divorce that Marshall noted. Yet, on the other hand, they could also be seen as tentative steps toward the recovery of social rights as a legitimate category for debate and action. What defines these developments is an interest in using markets themselves as a source of social solidarity, both through the kinds of efforts described by Evers, and in the proliferation of ideas and programs defined in terms of social entrepreneurship, venture philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and similar strategies for embedding social purposes within commercial, market-based frameworks.

Whether a conception of the social economy offers a way to renew forms of solidarity that will, in turn, create the foundations for renewed civic and political engagement is not yet clear. However, the growing interest in using market logics to create new forms of social solidarity and civic participation is a trend worth watching.

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The Future of Democracy in Europe: Trends, Analyses and Reforms

By Philippe C. Schmitter

“Democracy is the word for something that does not exist.”
—Karl Popper

For something that does not exist, democracy has certainly been much talked about recently. Moreover—at least in Europe—“real-existing” democracy seems to have a promising future, although it is currently facing an unprecedented diversity of challenges and opportunities. The issue is not whether the national, sub-national and supranational polities that compose Europe will become or remain democratic, but whether the quality of this regional network of democracies will suffice to ensure the voluntary support and legitimate compliance of its citizens.

The major reason for this optimism is simple: the democratization of Europe’s “near abroad” and its subsequent incorporation within the region as a whole. With the success of these national efforts at regime change to its East, Europe has become and should remain an enlarged zone of “perpetual peace” in which all of its polities can expect to peacefully resolve their inevitable differences of interest through negotiation, compromise and adjudication. Moreover, there exists an elaborate Europe-wide network of transnational institutions, both inter-governmental and non-governmental, to help resolve such conflicts and draw up norms to prevent their occurrence in the future.

Ironically, this much more favourable regional context presents dilemmas of its own for democracy. Many of the major historical advances in democratic institutions and practices came in conjunction with international warfare, national revolution and civil war. Fortunately, none of these Archimedean devices for leveraging large-scale change seems to be available in today’s pacified Europe. It is, however, our presumption that democracy cannot only live with peace, but can thrive with it— if it can learn to reform institutions and practices in a timely and concerted manner.

We draw five (tentative) conclusions from this unprecedented state of affairs.

First, established democracies in Western and Southern Europe will find it increasingly difficult to legitimate themselves by comparing their performance with that of some alternative mode of domination, whether real or imagined. Now that liberal democracy has become the norm throughout Europe and overt autocracy persists only in countries with markedly different cultures and social structures, the standards for evaluating what governments do (and how they do it) will become increasingly “internal” to the discourse of normative democratic theory, that is to what differing conceptions of democracy have promised over time and for which citizens have struggled so hard in the past. Therefore, there should be a tendency towards a convergence in formal institutions and informal practices within Europe that will, in turn, lead to a narrower and higher range of political standards.

Second, new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the western parts of the former Soviet Union will find it increasingly difficult to legitimate themselves simply by arguing that they are so burdened by their respective autocratic heritages that they cannot possibly respect the norms of behaviour and attain levels of performance set by established democracies. The standards that their recently liberated citizens will apply in evaluating their rulers will rapidly converge with those already in use in the rest of Europe. Polities failing to meet these standards will experience more frequent electoral turnover in power and may even be threatened by popular rebellion, unless their newly empowered rulers respect the rules established by the “real-existing” democracies to their West.

Third, in both cases, the polities involved will usually be able to improve the quality of their respective democratic institutions and practices only by means of partial and gradual reforms. Moreover, these reforms will have to be drafted, approved and implemented according to pre-existent norms. Rarely, if ever, will the opportunity present itself for a more thorough-going, large-scale or “abnormal” change. After all, how much change in the rules of democracy can one expect from rulers who have themselves benefited from those rules? The usual rotation of parties and party alliances in and out of power will, at best, open up only modest opportunities for change.

Fourth, we should therefore be guided by “possibilism” in our choices with regard to potential reforms of formal institutions and informal practices. We will be less concerned with what may be emerging “probabilistically” from the various challenges and opportunities that face contemporary
democracies than with what we believe is possibly within their reach – provided that politicians can be convinced by citizens that the application of these reforms would make a significant improvement in the quality of their respective democracies.

Last, we must also be attentive to the principle of “transversality” which means that we will not limit ourselves to evaluating only the possible effects of any single reform measure, but always try to the best of our collective and interdisciplinary ability to seek out the interconnections and external effects that are likely to emerge if and when several reforms are implemented either simultaneously or sequentially. As one participant noted during the deliberations (citing R. W. Rhodes): “It is the mix that matters”.

Our guiding hypothesis throughout this Green Paper will be that the future of democracy in Europe lies less in fortifying and perpetuating existing formal institutions and informal practices than in changing them. Thus, our tasks are to:

- identify the challenges and opportunities posed to contemporary European democracy by rapid and irrevocable changes in its national, regional and global contexts;
- specify the processes and actors in both the formal institutions and informal practices that are being affected by these external challenges and opportunities, as well as by internal trends that are intrinsic to democracy itself;
- propose potential and desirable reforms that would improve the quality of democratic institutions in Europe.

The Challenges and Opportunities

For the first time, knowing the level of aggregation at which reforms should take place has become almost as important as knowing the substance of the reforms themselves. The classic question Que faire? has to be supplemented by Où faire?

The key problem will be finding the will to reform existing rules with the very rulers who have benefited by them and who usually cannot be compelled to do so by an overriding external threat to their security or tenure in office.

One generic issue dominates all speculation about the future of democracy – namely, how well do its well-established formal institutions and informal practices “fit” with the much more rapidly changing social, economic, cultural and technological arrangements that surround it and upon which democracy depends both materially and normatively?

In the box below, we identified a number of generic sources of change in the environments of European democracies. Each presents a challenge in the sense that it threatens the viability of existing rules and practices, but each in our judgement also represents an opportunity in the sense that it opens up the possibility for creative and imaginative reforms that could actually improve the performance of “real-existing” liberal democracies.

**Processes and Actors**

We used a generic working definition of democracy to guide our effort: Modern political democracy is a regime or system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and co-operation of their representatives.

Three types of actors combine through a variety of processes to produce the sumum bonum of political democracy, namely, accountability. We, therefore, divided our analyses of contemporary transformations and responses into those primarily affecting citizenship, representation or decision making. Specifically, we analyzed the impact of the above mentioned challenges and opportunities upon:

1. Citizenship; political discontent; and cultural identity and protest
2. Representation; political parties; and civil society
3. Decision making; “guarding the guardians;” and inter-level accountability mechanisms for direct citizen consultation

Our generic conclusion was that the “real existing” democracies of Europe had responded to these changes in their environment either weakly or by attempting to reinforce existing rules and practices. In some cases, we did find very innovative efforts to transform challenges into opportunities, but these were usually at the local level and had failed to prevent a decline in the quality of their respective national institutions. Citizens had become increasingly aware

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Schmitter, Continued on Page 18
Doing Democracy’s Work?

Studying The Transformation of Global Philanthropy in the Twentieth Century

By Steven Heydemann

The conviction that philanthropy supports democratic life and strengthens civil society is widely shared and deeply held. It guides the work of private foundations, provides the basis for public policies that promote philanthropy and regulate foundation practices, and shapes public perceptions about the appropriate role of philanthropy in a democratic society. References to this link are commonplace in the annual reports of foundations, in public discussions of philanthropy, and in the research literature. In 1999, a White House Conference on Philanthropy—the first of its kind—“underscored the ideas and traditions that make philanthropic giving and private voluntary action a distinctive characteristic of American life, one that deepens our democracy and strengthens our civil society.” In a speech at the conference, William White, President of the Mott Foundation, called philanthropy “just as much a core value of our nation as freedom of speech or freedom of worship.”

If this perspective is widely shared, however, it is also sharply contested. In keeping with the other core values White mentioned, the role of philanthropy in sustaining democracy and civil society is a focus of intense political activity and debate. Where and by what means to draw the boundary between foundation autonomy and public accountability is a subject of enduring political conflict. How to ensure that private foundations satisfy their legal obligations to serve public purposes is an equally divisive issue, as evident in recent disputes over the level at which foundations must distribute their assets. Beyond these particular concerns, however, progressives and conservatives struggle over a wide range of issues to mold philanthropy in light of competing visions of democracy, social policy, and the role of the state in society.

In addition, while the White House conference reinforced a widespread view of American philanthropy as distinctive, if not exceptional, in its support for democracy, the conviction that philanthropy is a source of democratic norms has become increasingly powerful outside the United States, as well. Democratization has spurred the global diffusion of ideas about the value of private philanthropy and voluntary action in creating and sustaining democratic civil societies, and in mobilizing communities around issues such as good governance, economic growth, human security, and a clean environment, among others. In the process, U.S. conceptions of how to organize and manage philanthropy are also taking hold in new settings. To the extent that the democratizing effects of philanthropy were ever peculiar to the United States, such claims are far less plausible today.

Yet even while the connection between philanthropy and democracy is celebrated, contested, and progressively more influential around the world, our understanding of how philanthropy does democracy’s work is increasingly inadequate. American philanthropy has been transformed in the period since WWII and is now being remade in many other parts of the world, as well. For some observers, philanthropy today is experiencing an unprecedented rate of change. The longstanding interest of philanthropy in addressing social problems has not diminished, but the nature of the problems that now occupy the attention of philanthropists and the strategies they use to advance their aims reflect deep shifts in conceptions of philanthropy, in the theories of social change that animate it, and in the relationship between philanthropic institutions, the state, and society. In turn, the organization of philanthropy has also been recast—institutionally, geographically, and bureaucratically.

These developments are taking place within the third sector, but outside it as well, through new forms of corporate philanthropy, and the growing reliance of private, nonprofit foundations on market-based modes of governance, operations, and evaluation. New philanthropic actors and new models of philanthropy have emerged, including social justice philanthropy, venture philanthropy, and others. From the proliferation of local-level charities and family or community foundations to the growth of transnational networks that link foundations, firms, NGOs, and governments the landscape of philanthropy has become enormously varied and complex. In the process, the relationship of philanthropy to state, society, and the market has altered dramatically, with major implications for how (and whether) philanthropy sustains democratic values and strengthens civil society.

Heydemann, Continued on Page 20
Foreign Aid and Civil Society: How External Aid is Detrimental to Southern NGOs and Social Movements

By Rita Jalali

Introduction

In recent decades there has been an explosion in the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations in the developing world. One author states, “we are in the midst of a global ‘associational revolution’ that may prove to be as significant to the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the latter nineteenth” (Salamon, 1993:1). The proliferation of NGOs has been accompanied by a new generation of social movements that are seeking to transform societies in the South. The diversity of their struggles is immense - from environmental struggles, women’s rights, and indigenous rights to struggles for freedom and peace. Even NGOs that focus on development and relief work have been drawn to social transformatory projects involving the poor and the disadvantaged. Southern groups involved in such political projects have flourished to a large degree because of international support. Even social movement organizations (SMOs) receive considerable financial and other material support from foreign sources.

Some suggest that international support of NGOs and SMOs has fostered democratic political change by altering government discourse, influencing state policy, monitoring state compliance with international agreements, and providing developing norms on issues including the environment, gender, and development strategies. My previous work on the Indian women’s movement showed that foreign funds made SMOs more viable, facilitated the incorporation of women’s issues into public policy, and helped institutionalize women’s studies in the country (Jalali 1998). Here, I seek to highlight the negative effects of foreign funding, particularly how such external sources undermine the social movements’ ability for mass mobilization—an issue which has received little systematic attention in the literature.

Many foreign-supported NGOs and SMOs enjoy a very narrow base of support. Evidence from India indicates that foreign-funded resource-rich movements have been unable to produce the massive mobilization found in other successful Indian movements with access to fewer resources. By making constituency support irrelevant, internationalization through financial assistance has transformed conflict movements to consensus movements—a model that follows an institutional-resource-dependent, project based, non-conflictual strategy. A comparison of two movements in India—the women’s movement dependent on foreign aid and the anti-caste, Dalit movement which relies on indigenous resources serves as an illustration.

The Effects of the Rise in Foreign Funds for NGOs and SMOs

An important reason for the rise in the number of NGOs is their popularity with western governments and official aid agencies. My data from India provide some evidence of this. India is widely believed to have a vibrant civic society, with voluntary organizations numbering in the thousands. This growth has taken place in the last 15-20 years as foreign and state aid to the voluntary sector has steadily increased. According to information compiled from the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 1984, only 3,612 voluntary associations received funds from abroad. In 2001-02, 15,618 voluntary associations in India received funds from abroad. Unlike NGOs in industrialized countries, where government and user fees and payments account for a much larger share of NGO resources (Uvin 2000), NGOs in developing countries have limited contributions from members.

Women’s organizations in India, which has one of the most vibrant women’s movements in the third world, receive considerable support from international aid agencies. Evidence from my survey of all women’s movement organizations in the state of Maharashtra reveals a high degree of dependency on external sources - 78% of organizations derive three quarters of their revenue from outside their constituency (state, foreign and other). In all, forty percent of the women’s movement organizations in the state rely primarily on foreign sources of funding. Many women’s groups in Maharashtra and elsewhere also receive funds from central and state governments.
Despite this access to state and foreign resources, the base of the Indian women’s movement is small and largely urban. A regional workshop organized by the Center for Women’s Development Studies issued a report (CWDS 1994) which noted that the women’s movement in India had failed to establish links with the mass of women. Another activist writes that the main support bases of the urban ‘feminist establishment’ are international agencies. “Since they have not built any constituency among the wider cross-section of Indian women, they can only make a weak claim to represent them” (Kishwar 1999: 269). My survey data shows that the membership size of most women’s movement organizations remains small—57% of the organizations had less than 100 members, while nearly 21% had no paid members at all.

The two social movements in India with the greatest mass mobilizing power, the anti-caste Dalit movement and the farmers’ movement, have had less access to funding than the women’s movement (Omvedt 1993: 191) but greater mobilizing power. Here I will only focus on the Dalit movement in the southern state of Karnataka. The Dalits, also known as Scheduled Castes (or untouchables), are the most disadvantaged group in Indian society. The Dalit movement is a typical conflict movement—it confronts organized opposition from powerful upper caste Hindus in rural and urban areas, receives no government funds, relies only on indigenous sources, and encounters widespread hostility from the public. Movement leaders’ lack of skill and knowledge about grant writing means they have little access to foreign sources of funds. In addition, since Dalits constantly challenge local and state authorities, their activities are often perceived as subversive and hence unlikely to be given the government clearance which makes foreign donation possible.

The Dalit movement is very well organized, with a strong grass-roots support base in hundreds of villages as well as in cities (Jalali 1993). Their funds are collected largely from contributions by Dalit government employees in the form of union fees (Jalali 1993). The movement also has available highly committed activists willing to engage in protest actions. These activists frequently participated in demonstrations, boycotts, and even violent attacks on upper castes in rural areas. At a countrywide level, the strength of the Dalit mass base is reflected in the growing electoral support that one of the Dalit parties, Bahujan Samaj, has received in the last few elections. The party’s initial mobilizing structure derived much of its financial support and volunteer labor from various employees’ unions. The Dalit movement thus has relied entirely on constituency support to seek change.

By making CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT IRRELEVANT, INTERNATIONALIZATION THROUGH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE HAS TRANSFORMED CONFLICT MOVEMENTS TO CONSENSUS MOVEMENTS.

Why are groups with greater resources unable to produce the massive mobilization of movements with fewer resources? Some scholars argue that dependence on external funding is likely to prevent mass mobilization because of the free rider problem (Schwartz and Paul 1992). Social movements that do not have to rely on their constituency for financial support pursue strategies that do not involve a large membership. Such movements, known as consensus movements, are different from conflict movements because they are absorbed in lobbying and other institutionally based activities which make few demands on members or supporters. The primary work of consensus organizations is carried out in legislative halls, political offices, and the mass media. Ordinary members cannot frame better legislation than legislators, they cannot lobby better than lobbyists. “These ‘capacity-to-contribute’ shortcomings are endemic in consensus organizational structure: insofar as a group can enlist a wide variety of institutional activities, it cannot convince ordinary people that their contribution is valuable or even necessary. Most people will not join such a group, no matter how fervently they support its goals, because they are, simply, not needed. This is the basic contradiction in consensus groups: their strength—broad institutional support—becomes their weakness” (Schwartz and Paul 1992: 215).

When we compare the Indian women’s movement to the anti-caste, Dalit movement, the former appears more like a consensus movement and the latter a conflict movement. In contrast to Dalit organizations which challenge the dominance of the upper castes, many women’s movement organizations receive broad institutional support (from the government and the media) and face little organized opposition. Many of their demands, particularly those concerning gender violence and “women in development,” now have wide attitudinal support; many groups receive grants for project activity; and many activists are invited by the government to serve on committees, advisory boards and other high-powered bodies. If we extend the notion of institutional support to include aid from international sources, Indian women’s groups compared to Dalit groups are very fortunate. They have the government blessing which is necessary for voluntary organizations to access foreign sources of funding.

Looking beyond these two movements, foreign-supported NGOs in India have significantly altered civil society space in the last two decades. This shift is reflected in the changing terminology used to define civil society organizations, from the 1970’s “voluntary sector” to today’s “development sector,” or NGOs. The terminology clearly indicates “the
Global Society Embeddedness and Democracy: Redundant Factors of Social Development?

By Wade T. Roberts

Democracy and global civil society have both received considerable scholarly attention in recent years with respect to their relation to national development. This reflects a growing recognition among both scholars and development practitioners that institutional contexts and associational milieus matter in cultivating and mediating the impact of capital inputs and globalization. For some time now, democracy has not only served as an end in itself, but as a postulated means to more equitable and effective development. On the other hand, global civil society has only recently established itself as a “significant, even paradigmatic concept in the field of development policy and practice” (Howell and Pearce 2001:1). Much less than democracy, though, the exact impact global civil society has on development is a point of ongoing debate. While a number of scholars view global civil society organizations as a positive force in the developing world, providing complementary capacities to states, promoting participatory forms of development, and serving as carriers of progressive development models, others view the expanding role of NGOs as serving a neoliberal agenda, undermining state capacity and masking systemic inequities in the global order.

The findings suggest that autocratic countries with dense ties to the INGO sector are qualitatively distinct from autocracies that are more isolated from global civil society.

development in less-developed countries. In the process, I follow implicit leads in the literature, proposing democracy and global society embeddedness as alternative pathways to more social developmental states.

Democracy and Development

The theoretical link between democracy and social development has its roots in Hewitt’s (1977) “simple democratic hypothesis.” Democracy, it is argued, facilitates social development by providing mechanisms by which the needs of the poor and other marginalized groups are addressed (Frey and Al-Roumi 1999; Hewitt 1977). Politically open societies not only allow such groups to press their needs directly, but electoral incentives, bolstered by competitive elections and the activities of opposition parties, make state officials more responsive to the demands of the population. Additionally, a free press facilitates political participation and government accountability, contributing to the disciplining of the state. Thus, democracy is theorized to promote national development, in large part, through fostering more effective and responsive governance. Democratic regimes, responding to electoral and popular pressures, adopt policies and structures that service social development ends. This hypothesized relationship between democracy and social development is supported by significant empirical research (Frey and Al-Roumi 1999; Gough and Thomas 1994; Moon and Dixon 1985; Przeworski et al. 2000; Sen 1999; Shin 1989; Zweifel and Navia 2000).

Global Society and Development

Global civil society has also been theoretically and empirically linked to national development. World society scholars, operating within the institutionalist perspective, posit global civil society as a source of prescriptive models, scripts, and global cultural principles. These become institutionalized in the national structures and policies of “embedded” nation-states. As Frank et al. (2000) argue, “Blueprints for the nation-state are drawn in world society from which they diffuse to individual countries” (p. 101). States (and societies) embedded in the global associational
Empirically, global society embeddedness mimicking “modern” state structures. States more thoroughly entwined with world polity organizations feel significant pressure to conform to global prescriptions. Global civil society organizations also pressure states directly to adopt progressive development measures, using their surveillance capacity and connections to international organizations to hold states accountable to global standards. International exposure fosters isomorphic behavior among states, particularly those financially dependent on international development organizations. Finally, the mere presence of development NGOs serves to diffuse modern development conventions. States, responding to the competing legitimacy claims of global civil society organizations, adopt comparable development programs as a way of shoring up loyalty to and dependence on the state. No matter the specific mechanisms at work in any particular case, states more deeply embedded in global associational networks endure significantly more pressure to conform to contemporary models of development, many of which bear the mark of global civil society.

Empirically, global society embeddedness has been linked to the diffusion of such institutional forms as environmentalism and its related state structures (Frank 1997, 1999; Frank et al. 2000), scientific and professional authority (Schofer 1999), mass education (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992), and women’s suffrage rights (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997). Global society is also linked to the construction and diffusion of world cultural principles (Boli and Thomas 1999). The concept of “sustainable development,” for example, was shaped in large part by the INGO sector (Boli and Thomas 1999; Fisher 1994). Seen in this light, global civil society has served as an agent of state-building and transformation in the modern world. In that respect, it shares common ground (and mechanisms of development) with democracy.

Recognizing Redundancy: Democracy and Global Society Embeddedness as Alternative Pathways to the Social Developmental State

A comparative read of the respective literatures on democracy and global society reveals significant points of overlap in the imputed mechanisms by which they each affect social development. Simply put, the theories imply a potential redundancy, by which I do not mean mere collinearity. In fact, the distribution of INGO sector ties is not significantly correlated with political context in the developing world. Rather, the mechanisms attributed to both flow through a common, more immediate factor of development—the quality and capacity of state governance. Democracy and global society are believed to improve state intervention in social development by enhancing the state’s capacity and propensity to effectively formulate and implement social policy. Democracy accomplishes this through institutionalizing electoral competition and providing mechanisms for popular input and accountability. Democracy provides incentives for governments to adopt policies and structures that service popular needs. Global society, on the other hand, accomplishes similar transformative outcomes by exerting external pressures on states to adopt “modern” state structures and policies, as well as fostering greater government accountability through advocacy, watchdogging, and international exposure. States, seeking global legitimacy and the financial benefits it may entail, adopt the conventions promoted by international organizations and global civil society. Thus, a comparative read of the literature on democracy and global civil society leads to an “alternative pathways” hypothesis—global society embeddedness and democracy offer alternative pathways to more social developmental states.

Analysis and Results

To test this hypothesis, I use quantitative, cross-national analyses of 60 less-developed countries, representing much of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Panel OLS regression is used to measure change in social development (e.g., under-5 child survival and infant mortality) between 1980 and 2000. Incorporating an interaction term for democracy and global society embeddedness allows me to assess those factors’ independent effects, as well as test for their potential redundancy. The results confirm a significant, positive effect of both democracy and global society embeddedness on social development. What is more, the interaction of the terms indicates significant redundancy. There is a clear diminishing return to each factor as the level of the other increases, to the point where there is little or no benefit to having high levels of both. Democracy or global society embeddedness is sufficient.

In practical terms, the findings suggest that autocratic countries with dense ties to the INGO sector are qualita-
tively distinct from autocracies that are more isolated and thus more insulated from the cultural, instrumental, and institutional pressures of global society. Simply put, “embedded autocracies” exhibit a similar institutional capacity and propensity for social development as their democratic counterparts, embedded or not. It is isolated autocracies that stand apart, providing a potentially important clue into the nature of failed states.

To examine this redundancy, I introduce a measure of the social developmental state—the Family Planning Program Effort Index (FPE) (Ross and Stover 2001). The FPE index effectively captures countries’ commitment to, and institutional capacity for, child health and well-being—the measures of social development in this particular study. I assess FPE as both a mediating variable and as a dependent variable in its own panel model. When included as a mediating variable in the social development models, the FPE measure assumes nearly all the impact of global society embeddedness and democracy, supporting the hypothesis that the two factors achieve their effects through fostering more effective, responsive governance. Moreover, panel models measuring change in states’ FPE index scores over time show the same redundant effects for democracy and global society embeddedness. Combined, the findings support the “alternative pathways” hypothesis. Democracy and global society embeddedness not only produce redundant effects with respect to social development, they exhibit the same redundancy concerning the development of states’ family planning programs.

**There is a significant, positive effect of both democracy and global civil society embeddedness on social development.**

By “connecting the dots”—establishing the relationship between democracy, global society, state structures, and associated development outcomes—several important insights are revealed. First, one cannot legitimately separate national political and social development. Institutional and associational factors matter for development. Second, it is important to move beyond establishing a relationship between democracy and global civil society to identify the mechanisms by which each of those factors impacts development outcomes. I argue that democracy and global society achieve their effects on social development through their transformative impact on the quality and structure of the state—the more immediate factor of development. In achieving their development effects through a common institutional mechanism, democracy and global society serve as alternative pathways to more social developmental states.

**Concluding Thoughts**

References


Endnotes

1 I use the abbreviated term global society to refer to the INGO sector, global civil society, and world society—all of which reference the same set of organizations in the literature.

2 Aggregate level analyses, such as those reported on here, cannot easily determine the specific mechanisms at work; they can only assess the strength of any potential relationship. Qualitative case studies are better suited to the unpacking of complex mechanisms.

3 Global society embeddedness is most commonly measured as the number of INGO membership ties held by a country’s civil society, logarithmically transformed to correct for population effects and skewness.

4 In my analyses, they exhibit a correlation coefficient of .26.

5 Countries were identified as less-developed on the basis of United Nations Population Division classification.

6 Democracy is measured using the Polity IV Index. Global society embeddedness is measured as it is described in endnote 2. Both of these measures correspond to measures used in the literature.

7 I control for such other factors as level of development (GDP per capita, 1980), foreign investment dependence (avg. 1975-95), IMF debt dependence (avg. 1975-95), and ethno-linguistic fractionalization—all of which have been linked to social development in the literature.
It is true that the service idea took an important new institutional form when President Clinton succeeded in pushing his AmeriCorps program through Congress. Clinton talks of it to this day as one of his proudest achievements. But it is worth remembering that, at the time and for many years afterward, there were many Republicans, like former Rep. Dick Armey, who denounced the idea as “a welfare program for aspiring yuppies” and as “government-managed, well-paid social activism.”

Many Americans also doubt the basic premise that they or their fellow citizens actually “owe” anything to a country whose main business they see as preserving individual liberty, personal as well as economic. In a free society, liberty is the right of all, worthy and unworthy alike.

Finally, Americans differ widely over which kinds of national service are genuinely valuable. Many who honor military service are skeptical of voluntarism that might look like, in Armey’s terms, “social activism.” Supporters of work among the poor are often dubious of military service. Most Americans honor both forms of devotion to country. But in public arguments, the skeptical voices are often the loudest.

The Service Idea and the American Experiment

Divisions over the meaning of service are rooted deeply in our history. When the United States was founded, liberal and civic republican ideas jostled for dominance. The liberals—they might now be called libertarians—viewed personal freedom as the heart of the American experiment. The civic republicans valued freedom, too, but they stressed that self-rule demanded a great deal from citizens. The liberals stressed rights. The civic republicans stressed obligations to a common good and, as the philosopher Michael Sandel argued in Democracy’s Discontents, “a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake.” In our time, the clash between these older traditions lives on in the intellectual wars between libertarians and communitarians. On national service, libertarians lean toward skepticism, communitarians toward a warm embrace.
America has changed since September 11, 2001. Respect for service soared as the nation forged a new and stronger sense of solidarity in the face of deadly enemies. What has been said so often still bears repeating: our view of heroes underwent a remarkable and sudden change. The new heroes are public servants—police, firefighters, rescue workers, postal workers whose lives were threatened, men and women in uniform—not the CEOs, high-tech wizards, rock stars, or sports figures who dominated the 1990s. At a time when citizens focus on urgent national needs, those who serve their country naturally rise in public esteem. Robert Putnam, a pioneer in research on civic engagement, captures the post-9/11 moment powerfully. He argues that because of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—and the courage shown by those on the plane that went down over Pennsylvania—"we have a more capacious sense of 'we' than we have had in the adult experience of most Americans now alive."

**The debate** over national service is a debate over how we Americans think of ourselves.

**September 11 and the Transformation of the Service Ideal**

Accordingly, the politics of national service have been transformed. Even before the attacks of September 11, President Bush had signaled a warmer view of service than many in his party. In choosing two Republican supporters of the idea—former Mayor Steve Goldsmith of Indianapolis and Leslie Lenkowsky, CEO of the Corporation for National and Community Service—to head his administration’s service effort, Bush made clear he intended to take it seriously.

After September 11, service became a stronger theme in the president’s rhetoric. In his 2001 State of the Union message, he called on Americans to give two years of service to the nation over their lifetimes and announced the creation of the USA Freedom Corps. It was a patriotic, post-September 11 gloss on the old Clinton ideas—and the ideas of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Bush’s father, the first President Bush, who offered the nation a thousand points of light.

There is also a new acknowledgment across the political divides that government support for volunteers can provide essential help for valuable institutions that we too often take for granted. It is easy for politicians to talk about the urgency of strengthening “civil society.” But through AmeriCorps and other programs, the government has found a practical (and not particularly costly) way to make the talk real. Paradoxically, as the journalist Steven Waldman points out, AmeriCorps, a Democratic initiative, fit neatly with the Republicans’ emphasis on faith-based programs. Democrats accepted the need to strengthen programs outside of government; Republicans accepted that voluntary programs could use government’s help. This interplay between government and independent communal action may be especially important in the United States, where powerful and intricate links have always existed—long before the term “faith-based organizations” was invented—between the religious and civic spheres.

It is an important achievement that national service has become a bipartisan goal, reflected in the White House’s Citizen Service Act and in bills cosponsored by, among others, Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Evan Bayh (D-Ind.). Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) has made an ambitious service proposal a centerpiece of his presidential campaign. These legislative ideas mirrored the spirit of the moment. As Marc Magee and Steven Nider of the Progressive Policy Institute reported a year ago, in the first nine months after September 11 applications for AmeriCorps jumped 50 percent, those for the Peace Corps doubled, and those for Teach for America tripled. Yes, a difficult private economy certainly pushed more young Americans toward such public endeavors. Nonetheless, their choices point to the continued power of the service idea.

**Citizenship and Service**

Citizenship cannot be reduced to service. The good works of faith communities and the private sector—or “communities of character,” as President Bush has called them—cannot replace the responsibilities of government. Service can become a form of cheap grace, a generalized call on citizens to do kind things as an alternative to a genuine summons for national sacrifice or a fair apportionment of burdens among the more and less powerful, the more and less wealthy. But when service is seen as a bridge to genuine political and civic responsibility, it can strengthen democratic government and foster republican virtues.

Lenkowsky made this connection when he urged attendees at a Corporation for National and Community Service conference to turn “civic outrage into civic engagement” by increasing the reach and effectiveness of volunteer programs. No one can dispute visionaries like former Senator Harris Wofford, chairman of America’s Promise, and Alan Khazei, cofounder and CEO of City Year who have shown how AmeriCorps, VISTA, the Senior Corps, and the Peace Corps have transformed communities. But Paul Light of the Brookings Institution’s Center for Public Service questions whether this transformation is sustainable. Can episodic volunteerism build the capacity and effectiveness of public and nonprofit organizations? Will the new respect...
for service make government bashing less satisfying as a hobby? It’s possible, but we are not holding our breath.

Underlying the debate over national service is an argument over whether service is necessary or merely “nice.” If service is just a nice thing to do, it is easy to understand why critics of national service, such as Bruce Chapman who, in 1966, wrote The Wrong Man in Uniform, one of the earliest calls for a volunteer military, express such strong reservations about government-led service programs. But service has the potential to be far more than something nice.

Will Marshall and Marc Magee of the Progressive Policy Institute argue that the service idea could be a departure comparable to breakthroughs in earlier eras toward a stronger sense of citizenship. “Like settlement houses and night school, which helped America absorb waves of immigration,” they write, “national service opens new paths of upward mobility for young Americans and the people they serve. And, like the G.I. Bill, national service should be seen as a long-term investment in the education, skills and ingenuity of our people.”

Service, then, is not simply a good in itself, but a means to many ends. It creates bridges between groups that have little to do with each other on any given day, and as the New Left’s Port Huron Statement put it forty years ago, draws citizens “out of isolation and into community.” Michael Brown, the co-founder of City Year, says service can activate “people’s justice nerve,” creating a thirst for social improvement. It could foster civic and political participation in a society that seems not to hold public service in the highest esteem.

But this very plurality of ends creates a certain skepticism about service. If it offers something for everyone, how serious can the idea really be? Michael Lind, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, is right when he says that “within the small but vocal community of national service enthusiasts, there is far more agreement on the policy of national service than on its purpose.” In the post-September 11 environment, he argues that the one compelling case for citizen service would rest on the need to expand the nation’s capacity to prepare for and respond to domestic emergencies, notably those caused by terrorism.

**Answering the Call to Service**

However one conceives of service, surely one of its ends—or, at least, one of the ends that wins the broadest assent—is the urgency of finding new ways to engage young Americans in public life after a long period of estrangement. Many surveys suggest that young Americans are deeply engaged in civic activity. For example, a survey by Harvard’s Kennedy Institute of Politics in October 2002 found that 61 percent of its national sample of undergraduates reported performing some form of community service in the past year. In his 2000 campaign, Senator McCain—initially a skeptic of national service, now a strong supporter—won a wide following among the young by urging them to aspire to things “beyond your own self-interest.” Service learning, increasingly popular in our public schools, has been linked with a heightened sense of civic responsibility and personal effectiveness.

If the new generation connected its impulses to service with a workable politics, it could become one of the great reforming generations in American history. Service could become a pathway to a stronger sense of citizenship. As the columnist Jane Eisner argues, service “must produce more than individual fulfillment for those involved and temporary assistance for communities in need.” It should, she says, “lead to an appetite for substantive change, a commitment to address the social problems that have created the need for service in the first place.” Eisner, and others, have suggested that as a nation, we should celebrate the First Vote cast by young people with the same fanfare that greets other moments of passage to adult responsibility. The goal would be to encourage a new generation to make the connection “between service to the community and participation in the very process that governs community life.”

A focus on the links service forges between the rights and responsibilities of citizenship could offer new ways out of old political impasses. For example, Andrew Stern, the president of the Service Employees International Union, suggests that a two-year commitment to national service could become a pathway for undocumented workers to legalize their status and for legal immigrants to speed their passage to citizenship. Stern also suggests that former felons now denied voting rights might “earn credits toward restoration of full citizenship” through service.

At its best, service is not make-work, but what Harry Boyte and Nancy Kari, in their book, Building America, have called “public work.” It is work that “is visible, open to inspection, whose significance is widely recognized” and can be carried out by “a mix of people whose interests, backgrounds, and resources may be quite different.” Service as public work is the essence of the democratic project. It solves common problems and creates common things. Public work entails not only altruism, but also enlightened self-interest—a desire to build a society in which the serving citizen wants to live.

**Skepticism, Realism, and Hope**

Service alone cannot build a stronger sense of citizenship. Citizenship is meaningless unless citizens have the power to achieve their goals and to change their communities and the nation. It is thus possible to be skeptical about the new call to service, and it is absolutely necessary to be realistic. Speeches about service can be a convenient way for
politicians to call for sacrifice without demanding much of citizens. At little cost to themselves, advocates of both conservative and liberal individualism can use service to shroud their real intentions behind the decent drapery of community feeling.

William Galston, a scholar who has devoted years of energy to promoting research and action to excite young Americans to public engagement, worries that the failure to link post-September 11 rhetoric about service to actual calls for civic action could lead to the very sort of cynicism service advocates decry.

“Would Pearl Harbor have been a defining event if it had not been followed by a national mobilization and four years of war that altered the lives of soldiers and civilians alike?” Galston asks, “In the immediate wake of September 11, the administration’s failure to call for any real sacrifice from citizens fortified my belief that the terrorist attack would be the functional equivalent of Pearl Harbor without World War II, intensifying insecurity without altering civic behavior.”

Theda Skocpol, another wise student of the last century and a half of American civic life, sounds an equally useful warning in her new book Diminished Democracy. “Absent organizational innovations and new public policies,” she writes in an essay, drawing on themes from the book, “the reinvigorated sense of the American ‘we’ that was born of the travails of 9/11 may well gradually dissipate, leaving only ripples on the managerial routines of contemporary U.S. civic life.” In fact, as Skocpol and Galston suggest, mere exhortation to serve will do little to foster public—and especially political—participation if too many citizens see the public realm as broken.

The issue of whether Americans have been called to any real sort of sacrifice is, of course, the point of Rep. Rangel calling for a renewal of the draft. It is neither race-baiting nor class warfare—Rangel was accused of both—to suggest that a democratic society has a problem when members of its most privileged classes are not among the first to rally to the colors at a time of trouble.

This problem also worries Charles Moskos, the nation’s premier student of service and the military experience. Moskos has explored ways of expanding the circle of commitment and promoting the idea of the “citizen soldier.” This idea has caught on in a wide range of political circles. As Stanley Kurtz wrote in the National Review in April, “In a world of looming military challenges, the citizen-soldier program may be our last chance to expand the armed forces without a draft.” John Lehman, the Navy Secretary under Ronald Reagan, has also offered helpful remedies short of a draft to overcome what he agrees is a fundamental problem: “the burdens of defense and the perils of combat do not fall even close to fairly across all of our society.”

### From Service to Citizenship

If the problems of inequality are vexing where military service is concerned, they can also be troubling for service at home. Service, badly conceived, can distance citizens from public problems by seeing the server more as a missionary uplifting the needy than as a fellow citizen. Michael Schudson, a professor of sociology at University of California, San Diego, sees that President Bush’s ideal citizen is a “Rotarian, moved by a sense of neighborliness, Christian charity, and social responsibility, but untouched by having a personal stake in public justice.” Schudson’s point is not to knock Rotarians. It is to argue that self-interest in pursuit of justice is a virtue. As Schudson notes in describing the civil rights movement, the most dramatic expansion of democracy and citizenship in our lifetime was brought about by citizens “driven not by a desire to serve but by an effort to overcome indignities they themselves have suffered.” The point is brought home powerfully by Charles Cobb who sees the civil rights movement as being best understood “as a movement of community organizing rather than one of protest.” The civil rights movement performed a huge national service—and inspired many specific forms of service, including the registration of thousands of voters. This quintessentially civic, “good government” act, the registration of new voters, was also a powerful form of rebellion in places that denied African Americans the right to vote.

These are essential points. Yet it is also true that Rotarians are good citizens. Neighborliness, charity, and social responsibility are genuine virtues. And it is just possible that a nation responding to the call to service would, over time, become a nation deeply engaged in questions of public justice.

The debate over national service is a debate over how we Americans think of ourselves. It is a debate over how we will solve public problems and what we owe to our country and to each other. If our nation is to continue to prosper, it is a debate we will have in every generation. For if we decide that there are no public things to which we should be willing to pledge some of our time and some of our effort—not to mention “our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor”—we will be breaking faith with our nation’s experiment in liberty rooted in mutual assistance and democratic aspiration.

E.J. Dionne, Jr., University Professor in the Foundations of Democracy and Culture, Georgetown University. Kayla Meltzer Drogosz, Visiting Faculty Fellow, Center for Democracy and the Third Sector, Georgetown University. Parts of this essay were drawn from United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship edited by E.J. Dionne Jr., Kayla Meltzer Drogosz and Robert Litan.
or providing services, adding a clear economic dimension to their activities.

In this context, it is no wonder that labels like "social economy" and "social enterprise" bring together attributes that are separated by the opposition of "for-profit" and "non-profit." As far as the social economy is concerned, a few different ways of using the label will be discussed below.

**Analyses of the third sector need to include both historical strands—the voluntary and charitable traditions on the one hand, and the cooperative and mutualist ones on the other.**

**The social economy as an historical part of the third sector**

The first interpretation points back to history. In many European countries, labor movements initially sought practical ways of creating alternatives to the market economy, especially in sectors of major importance for the living conditions of workers: social security, health, housing, and food. From there, two important social innovations evolved:

- **The cooperative.** In this entity, every member contributes to the resources of the respective organization for production and/or distribution, and every member receives resources in return, profiting by membership through products, services and economic gains. This was an innovative organizational model that has been likewise applicable for production, distribution and banking.
- **The mutual society/social security organization.** Contrary to private insurance, the contributions paid to this organization are tailored according to the individual economic situation of the member while the services are the same for everyone.

In many countries, alongside these solidaristic organizations, theories took shape that established these organizations as parts of a self-administered reform economy. This provided a chance for a different or even alternative reform-economy to take shape alongside and contrary to the market economy. This concept is the historical notion of what has been called (especially in Latin Europe) the "social economy"—an economy by and for members that is socially and politically constructed and embodies principles that are different from both for-profit enterprises and a state-planned economy.

As it is well known, this reform movement has had modest economic success, but little contemporary significance as a social and political alternative. Often cooperative banking and mutual insurance make little difference to state-based and private organizations. Nevertheless, no "social origins theory" (Salamon and Anheier 1997) of the third sector can ignore this part of the legacy of the European third sector; it is more than charities and voluntary organizations. However, some research programs have set it aside; the Johns Hopkins project (see Salamon and Anheier 1998) measures the sector internationally according to U.S. definitions and leaves the social economy part of the third sector aside; in the U.S., social economy has not played a role comparable to the one it has had in most parts of Europe (and elsewhere as well).

**Social economy as a different way of defining the third sector**

Considering economic and social policy, there are at least two different ways of conceiving the third sector. On the one hand, the third sector can be approached as a product of its voluntary and charitable roots (to be found on both sides of the Atlantic). This neglects the social economy side—issues of solidarity which are different from altruism, giving, and charity—and other economic issues that I discuss below. On the other hand, one can attempt to speak about the third sector by referring to the social economy debate, thereby missing the special ingredients of civic traditions often found behind the altruism and giving of voluntary organizations, charities and other philanthropic institutions.

What is neglected most by both approaches are those large parts of the third sector that are not about organizing services or material help (be it for members or for others in need). These organizations, usually called NGOs, represent new ways of associating and giving social, cultural, and political concerns within civil society a voice that matters on the level of professional politics.

**Social economy notions do not offer easy answers**

It seems undeniable that sensitive analyses of the third sector need to include (contrary to the Johns Hopkins project approach) both historical strands of self organizing in civil society—the voluntary and charitable traditions on the one hand, and the cooperative and mutualist ones on the other (see the country chapters in Evers and Laville 2004). Yet, neither conception gives us a complete understanding
of the third sector. Whatever stand is taken on behalf of social economy, a broad number of burning issues in the third sector debate linger. One of them is the question of whether and when “sector” and nonprofit character actually make a difference (see Dekker 2001 for a critique of sector-related assumptions). It can be argued that most of the reformist and ethical principles that were so “strong” and “encompassing” in the history of third sector organizations are now represented only in a small number of organizations, including some voluntary organizations and cooperatives, but have become, at the same time, diffused in a weaker form throughout society as a whole.

**Issues raised by the social economy debate that have a wider impact**

There is possibly more at stake in the social economy debate than enlarging our views of what constitutes a third sector and considering a different approach to the sector. One of the most important challenges is the question of what “economy” might mean in third sector organizations—especially in those that offer goods and services (in contrast to NGOs that focus on advocacy). In particular, French colleagues refer to historians and sociologists (such as Braudel and Polanyi) and insist that the economy is by no means solely to be identified with the state and the market; it can be “socially embedded” in different ways. In particular, local small scale economies often demonstrate social—and not just market—principles (imagine small shop-owners making a living in a disadvantaged urban neighborhood). In this way, not only is the market economy present within the third sector; it is also the case that parts of the market economy can be not (only) for profit.

Furthermore, there is the consciously constructed “reform economy” of cooperatives, which organizes politically and socially around a different conception of production and distribution. Thus the “economic impact” of the third sector can be discussed not only in terms of statistics that compare it to the contributions of the public or private sectors (e.g., number of employees, percentage of GDP), but in theoretical terms as well. In what ways is the economy of philanthropic or voluntary service organizations constructed differently? What about considering a “plural economy” (see Laville) when we try to make third sector organizations a part of the economic landscape? How and to what degree do other ways of organizing production and distribution really matter? What constitutes the specificity of the economy of a large nonprofit when it is described as becoming “commercialized?” As these issues suggest, the idea of a social economy poses interesting research questions.

**Defining “social enterprise”**

Given this background, it is not very difficult to sort out the possible meanings for the label “social enterprise.” Once again there can be a more historical meaning, referring to all those organizations which saw themselves as alternative forms of organizing or distributing goods and services—such as housing, consumer cooperatives, and others that have by tradition considered themselves social enterprises. Other meanings of the term social enterprise can come out of the attempt to create a classification of third sector organizations that are engaged in the provision of goods and services (see the introduction of Borzaga and Defourny 2001). In my contribution to that book, an analytical concept is proposed: what is special about third sector organizations that provide services is that they have a multi-goal and multi-resource structure; instead of the fixed dominance of the formal for-profit goal, these organizations balance several concrete social purposes at the same time. In addition to resources from the market (via sales) or the state (via special tax and legal status), they rely upon aspects of social capital much more than do other enterprises—these social capital aspects include trust, support, voluntary commitment, donations, social networking, and other features of a civil society. These are central commodities for these organizations; however (as in the case of social capital) these commodities are also something they cultivate actively. By this concept, we acknowledge that the search for profit, building resources in the social market, and state funding all play a role for most service-producing third sector organizations. But in contrast to American debates on social enterprise as a mere two-component mix of market and third sector ingredients, the focus in this concept of social enterprise is on the degree to which social capital resources as a third element can limit and counterbalance the commercial and state-related dimensions. In such an approach, it is suggested that all organizations which produce goods and services in the third sector are a kind of social enterprise—as opposed to identifying them with what is left over from the social economy heritage, or by classifying them as a subgroup apart from voluntary organizations and charities offering services.

**What is special about third sector organizations that provide services is that they have a multi-goal and multi-resource structure.** Besides resources from the market and the state, they rely upon aspects of social capital.

**From social economy to solidaristic economy?**

Finally, there is a third label to be mentioned when speaking about social economy and social enterprises: the notion of the “solidaristic economy” (or, as its French supporters say, “économie solidaire”). Looking at all organizations that offer services as being constituted and kept alive by various forms of solidarity is not so different from the
argument made above about social capital as the key element for social enterprises. As stated in the debate on the solidaristic economy, today’s solidarities are mostly local and community-based, and therefore the notion of an économie solidaire is very much linked to studying (micro) movements and networks (Laville and Nyssens 2000); this includes those informal and semiformal solidarities and economies of survival in today’s cities, neighborhoods, and favelas (the notion of économie solidaire is strong in Brazil, both on the ground and in the academia). The nearness to grassroots movements and less institutionalized parts of the third sector inspires additional interesting research and policy challenges. Like other features of the social economy debate, it presents something that diverges from the well-ordered, and as I have argued here, limited world of Johns Hopkins’ style third sector research.

Conclusions

Concluding with an eye toward approaches and themes for research – especially when focusing on the U.S. – five points are important to note:

1. Traditional definitions of what does (not) belong to the third sector should reflect the multiple historical trajectories that have shaped it in diverse contexts, including that of the U.S.

2. There should be debate about the economy of the third sector that goes beyond statistics. What is special about the economy of third sector organizations and what is different, especially compared to mainstream market organizations?

3. While it has become widely understood that grey areas between the public and private for-profit sector are widening, third sector research should become more sensitive to the manifold forms of small-scale “solidaristic economies,” the community- and neighborhood-based networks of mutual support. These are often semi-formal, unstable, and difficult to “count,” but matter a great deal in the everyday lives of many citizens.

4. Besides focusing on a sector, researchers should focus increasingly on the overall role of factors and mechanisms that have made third sector organizations so fascinating in the first place. For example, it may be much more interesting to focus on the forms and fate of voluntary action across sectors, instead of pretending that the principles of the third sector are exclusive.

5. Because many third sector organizations that provide services have to act as quasi-enterprises in a competitive environment, the debate should be taken up again regarding what makes them social enterprises. The emphasis should be placed not so much on government regulations but rather on the ways they operate with the social capital of civil society.

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References


of this and focused much of their discontent upon representatives, such as politicians and parties.

**Recommendations for Reform**

We discovered that politicians and citizens were not only aware of pressing needs for reform, but they were also responding to these needs. Contrary to the prevailing impression that the well-established democracies in the West are too sclerotic to make any substantial changes in their rules and practices and that the neo-democracies to the East are concerned only with mimicking these very same rules and practices, we found many examples of innovation and experimentation. These efforts were often scattered and too recent to be able to evaluate their potential contribution. Many were emerging from local levels or specialized arenas of government, and often these reforms aimed at greater transparency and participation in decision making by citizens and “stakeholders”.

Several of our recommendations for reform were inspired by the dispersed efforts that European democracies are already making to meet the challenges and opportunities of the “interesting times” in which we have been condemned to live. Unfortunately, however, many of these are so recent that we cannot be sure that they will succeed in improving the quality of democracy. Moreover, we also have to recognize that there are several problematic areas in which very little has been tried. For example, there is common recognition that citizens are less and less likely to vote or to join political parties, but few serious efforts are trying to change this.

When recommending specific institutional reforms, we found it imperative to return to our starting point, which is, “democracy is the word for something that does not exist.”

First, we recognized that promoting democracy will always be “unfinished business.” Successes in coping with particular challenges or seizing particular opportunities will only shift expectations towards new ones in the future. Citizens will focus their demands for equality on new sources of discrimination, for accountability to new relations of domination, for self-respect to new arenas of collective identity. All that we can realistically hope for is that the reform measures we advocate will move the polity in a positive direction—never that they will definitively fill “the democracy deficit.”

Second, we reject the notion that there is one ideal type of democracy that all European countries should adopt at once or even converge towards gradually. Therefore, it should not be the task of the Council of Europe to identify and advocate a set of identical reforms that would do this. Each member state will have to find its “proper” way of coping with the unprecedented range of challenges and opportunities that face the region as a whole. The Council of Europe must play an active role in fostering inter-country learning, but the points of departure are different as are the magnitude and mix of challenges and opportunities. Hence, reforms in institutions and rules will not produce the same effects in all countries that adopt them. Reforms welcomed by the citizens of some member states might be resoundingly rejected by others. Such a diversity in meanings and expectations is a healthy thing for the future of democracy in Europe. It ensures a continuous diversity of political experiments within a world region whose units are highly interdependent and capable of learning—positively and negatively—from each other's experiences.

The recommendations for reform listed in the accompanying text box are not guided exclusively by any one of the three contemporary models of democracy, but by the conviction that all “real-existing” democracies in Europe are based on some mix of all of them—and that this is a good thing. These recommendations are by no means endorsed with equal enthusiasm by all of the participants in our working group, but we have tried to follow the same guidelines and discussed them extensively among ourselves before proposing them.

**Conclusions**

Liberal political democracy, as presently practiced in Europe, is not “the end of history.” Not only can it be improved, it must be if it is to retain the legitimate respect of its citizens. This has been done several times previously in response to emerging challenges and opportunities, and could be done again in the present.

In this Green Paper, we have tried to use our collective imagination as theorists and practitioners of politics to come up with suggestions for reforms that could improve the quality of democracy in Europe and make it more legitimate in the future. Some of these have already been introduced—usually on an experimental basis—in a few polities; most, however, have never been tried. Not all of these reforms are equally urgent or feasible or even desirable. It is the task of democratic politicians to decide which are best and which deserve priority treatment.

It is our collective judgement that the major generic problem of contemporary European democracy concerns declining citizen trust in political institutions and participation in democratic processes. Therefore, those reforms that promise to increase voter turnout, stimulate membership in political parties, associations and movements, and improve citizen confidence in the role of politicians...
as representatives deserve priority consideration. Another important problem concerns the increasing number of foreign residents and the political status of denizens in almost all European democracies. Measures to incorporate these non-citizens within the political process should also be given a high priority.

We also wish to conclude by introducing a note of caution. Single reforms in the rules of the democratic game have rarely been efficacious “on their own.” It has been packages of interrelated reforms that have been most successful in improving performance and legitimacy. Sometimes this was the result of an explicit and rational calculation of the interdependencies involved; most often, however, it was the product of the political process itself with its inevitable need for legislative alliances, compromises among competing forces, and side payments to recalcitrant groups. In other words, in “real-existing” democracies, the design of reform measures is almost always imperfect, especially when the intent is to change the future rules of competition and co-operation between political forces.

Moreover, reformers have usually not been successful in predicting all of the consequences of the measures they have introduced. Almost always, these changes have generated unintended consequences, some positive, some not. One should never forget that in a free society and democratic polity the individuals and organizations affected by political innovations will react to them and quite often in unpredictable ways. Most significantly, they will try to exploit these innovations in ways that benefit themselves, and not infrequently, distort their intent in order to protect established interests.

All of this pleads for caution—especially when introducing reforms that are genuinely innovative. Ideally, such measures should initially be treated as political experiments and conducted in specially selected sites—normally, at the local or regional level. Only after their effects have been systematically monitored and evaluated, hopefully by an impartial and multinational agency such as the Council of Europe, should they be transposed to other levels within the same polity or to other member states.

We repeat: our democracies in Europe can be reformed. In so doing, they can regain the trust in institutions and the legitimacy in processes that they seem to have lost over recent decades. But it will not be easy and it will take the collective wisdom of political theorists and practitioners in all of the forty-five member states of the Council of Europe to identify which reforms seem to be the most desirable, to evaluate what their consequences have been and, finally, to share the lessons from these experiences among each other. With this Green Paper to the Council of Europe, we hope that we have made a contribution to initiating this process.

**Endnotes**

1. Needless to say, the recommendations and conventions of the Council of Europe have played a key role in setting and monitoring norms in both of these groups of countries.

**The Future of Democracy in Europe**

**Schmitter**

**Wish List of Recommended Reforms**

1. Universal citizenship
2. Discretionary voting
3. Lotteries for electors
4. Shared mandates
5. Specialized elected councils
6. Democracy kiosks
7. Citizenship mentors
8. Council of Denizens
9. Voting rights for denizens
10. Civic service
11. Education for political participation
12. Guardians to watch the guardians
13. Special guardians for media guardians
14. Freedom of information
15. A “yellow card” provision for legislatures
16. Incompatibility of mandates
17. Framework legislation
18. Participatory budgeting by citizens
19. A Citizens’ Assembly
20. Variable thresholds for election
21. Intra-party democracy
22. Vouchers for funding organizations in civil society
23. Vouchers for financing political parties
24. Referendums and initiatives
25. Electronic support for candidates and parliaments (“smart voting”)
26. Electronic monitoring and online deliberation systems
27. Postal and electronic voting
28. The Council of Europe as an agent for promoting democratic reform
Doing Democracy’s Work

Heydemann

Heydemann, Continued from Page 5

Despite the scale of these changes, however, researchers have paid surprisingly little attention to how shifts in the organization of philanthropy affect its role in supporting democratic life. Understandings of the philanthropy–democracy link tend to rely on firmly held, but not always critically examined, assumptions that may tell us relatively little about how the new landscape of philanthropy operates to support, extend, or possibly erode and weaken, democratic norms and practices.

Indeed, contemporary claims about the importance of philanthropy for democracy are often largely rhetorical, recalling traditions of volunteerism, self-help, and citizen participation that fail to capture both the diversity of forms through which such practices take place and the strains and tensions that are moving them in new, multiple, and not always compatible directions. And while the link between civil society and democracy has attracted significant attention, systematic efforts to re-examine the relationship between philanthropy and democracy are largely missing, whether in the research literature, in the work of practitioners concerned to strengthen philanthropic practices, or in public debate about the future of philanthropy.

As a result, we now confront a significant gap between prevailing conceptions of the relationship between philanthropy and democracy, on one hand, and the way this relationship is being restructured, on the other. This gap is both empirical and theoretical, reflecting the limits of existing assumptions about the philanthropy-democracy link to explain systematically how the nature of that link has changed, why it has changed in particular ways, and what these changes mean for contemporary society.

The implications of this gap are significant—for funders and practitioners as much as for researchers. There are meaningful connections between the assumptions we hold about the role of philanthropy in a democracy and how philanthropic practices and institutions become organized; the way in which programs are designed and resources allocated; the kinds of coalitions, partnerships, and networks that foundations construct; and how programs are evaluated. These connections also extend to the discourses that are used to legitimate philanthropic activities. Moreover, as philanthropy itself becomes the subject of training and degree programs and capacity building initiatives, prevailing conceptions about its role in a democratic society are reinforced by an impressive (and growing) array of mechanisms.

Transformations in philanthropy and the democratic contexts in which it operates make it increasingly important to reexamine these assumptions. Perhaps most important, while we often take for granted that philanthropy is a force for change, we have not yet taken account of how philanthropy itself is being reshaped by social, political, demographic, and economic changes in democratic states, both old and new; by the continuing reorganization of the arrangements that link the state to the third sector; by globalization and the emergence of new transnational, regional, and local networks of social and political actors; or by changes in technology and in the organization of firms.

In particular, we have not yet come to terms with the implications of these changes for how philanthropic practices influence the political and social arenas within which democracy is legitimated, held accountable, challenged, and contested. Nor have we developed the analytic frameworks that would help us explain the changes reshaping philanthropy. Why is it, for example, that new and hybrid forms of philanthropy are emerging, and emerging now? Why do they seem more prominent in some areas than others? What are the links between the rise of global liberalism and the transformations underway in philanthropy? What are the social and political mechanisms through which these links make their impacts felt? How, for example, can we explain philanthropic responses to the restructuring of welfare? Why do such responses vary from country to country, and from one issue area to another? How does demographic change and the growing diversity of national populations affect the structures of philanthropy and public policies that regulate philanthropy? How do ideas about what constitute appropriate philanthropic practices develop and move across national boundaries? What are the social, economic, and political implications of the diffusion of private foundations based on American models into new settings—where they intersect with conceptions of citizenship, democracy, and rights grounded in distinctive political experiences? How can we adjudicate among competing claims about the effectiveness of different models of philanthropy in deepening democratic norms and practices?

These questions, and many others we might pose, underscore the need for empirically-grounded analytic frameworks that can help us account for the transformations that are reshaping philanthropy and redefining its relationship to democratic society, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. To generate such frameworks, the Center for Democracy and the Third Sector intends to develop activities—seminars, workshops, and research—that will focus attention on the changing relationship between philanthropy and democracy. The broad intent of our efforts will be to reassess the roles and purposes of philanthropy in a democratic society, and to use research and teaching to improve public understanding of the changes that have reshaped the relationship between philanthropy and democracy over the past several decades. We propose a research agenda addressing three core areas: (1) developing new historical frameworks for understanding changes in the relationship between philanthropy, democracy, and society in contemporary American life; (2) examining the causes, character, and implications...
for democracy and civil society of shifts in the institutional ecology of philanthropy in the United States and internationally; and (3) exploring the social and political implications of the global diffusion of American models of philanthropy, including the spread of these models in states that are undergoing or have recently undergone transitions to democracy.

**Philanthropy, Politics, and Society in Post-War America**

Assessing shifts in the relationship between state, society, and philanthropy in post-war America is crucial for understanding how the role of philanthropy in American democracy has itself been transformed. Pre-war conceptions of the role of philanthropy in democracy reflected an understanding of the value of philanthropy in maintaining and reproducing a particular social order, in part by fostering cross-class ties between the well to do and the poor. Norms of giving that stressed the publicness and visibility of philanthropic work—even if actual transfers of assets were small—helped to convey a sense of reciprocity and commitment that muted the effects of economic inequality. Scientistic notions about the origins of social problems and how to address them moved philanthropy beyond the realm of charity, reflecting the era’s valorization of scientific expertise, its confidence in the possibility of reshaping social conditions, and the self-identification of philanthropists as partners of the state in the management and improvement of American society.7

Throughout the post-war period, however, these conceptions have undergone significant change. Philanthropic institutions found new sources of legitimacy as critics of the state and advocates of social reform. Certainly, elements of continuity linked post-war philanthropy to its pre-war identity, but leading foundations increasingly asserted their standing as autonomous actors whose interests diverged from those of government. Interaction between the state and philanthropy continued, but shifts in the allocation of funds and changing patterns of social intervention also contributed to the tightening of government regulation. These shifts overlapped and interacted with broader processes of social change, some internal to philanthropy (increasing professionalization, the move from scientific expertise to advocacy and practice as preferred mechanisms of social change) and some in the broader political arena (deepening concern with civil rights and reproductive rights, Johnson’s Great Society programs, and social polarization around the war in Vietnam, to name a few).8

These shifts were significant as starting points for the more critical modes of philanthropy that have emerged in the past two decades—not least as a result of earlier efforts by funders to create national infrastructures for social advocacy and grassroots politics. New philanthropic practices reflect the increasing ideological diversity of philanthropy, but also the deepening of divisions over the challenges confronting democracy and how to address them most effectively. While there remains a strong core of policy-oriented liberal activism among philanthropic institutions, both progressive and conservative actors are redrawing the boundaries between philanthropy, the state, and society.

Collectively, these shifts are redefining longstanding patterns of interaction between philanthropy and politics, both domestically and internationally. These changes are by no means uniform or coherent. They are driven by complex and not always well-understood phenomena. Yet we lack an account that situates the transformation of philanthropy in the context of American social and political history of the period. We have not seen, to take just one example, adequate analytic attention to questions relating to the accountability and legitimacy of foundations in the post-war period. Without this, policy debates about the appropriate roles of philanthropy continue to be defined by the somewhat bi-polar divide between organizations that view private foundations as insufficiently accountable and requiring increased regulation, and those who view foundation autonomy as a prerequisite for its capacity to advance the public good. As concerns about foundation accountability surface again today, there is a clear need to move beyond this conception of the issues toward more fully articulated understandings of how the social and political position of philanthropic foundations has changed over time, and how these shifts play into public debates over their accountability and legitimacy. Similarly, we have not taken account of the ways in which changing patterns of foundation autonomy and regulation over time affect the core relationship between philanthropy and democracy—including whether and how foundation giving trends over past 50 years have shaped political agendas and to what effect.

**The Changing Institutional Landscape of Philanthropy**

A second focus of this proposed research agenda would address the causes, profile, and implications for democracy and civil society of shifts in the institutional ecology of philanthropy. As social institutions, shifts in the structures, organizational practices, and self-justifications of philanthropies are themselves important subjects. They serve as useful indicators of broader social conditions and are especially valuable as lenses through which we can perceive how processes of voice, representation, participation, patterns of inclusion, preferences about redistribution versus self-help, etc., are being organized and contested in contemporary societies through decisions about and struggles over the uses of philanthropic resources. Moreover, these shifts offer an opportunity to illuminate how philanthropic institutions emerge and adapt in response to changing external conditions. While philanthropies like to depict themselves...
as agents of social change, they are themselves products of social change, and taking account of how the two interact during a period in which democratic contexts globally are being reshaped is essential for understanding the contemporary relationship between philanthropy and democracy.

In addition, a focus on the institutional ecology of philanthropy can promote greater attention to particular kinds of philanthropic institutions, notably organizations such as community foundations and other local forms of philanthropy that represent the vast majority of the almost 30,000 foundations created between 1987 and 2001. It is striking that debates about foundations and democracy have tended to focus almost entirely on large scale, multi-purpose foundations, leaving us with virtually no research on the role of these smaller foundations in supporting values consistent with a democracy polity, such as accountability, transparency, equity, and community. The absence of research on the role of community foundations in supporting, undermining, defining, or redefining the relationship between philanthropy and democracy weakens our capacity to understand that relationship, at a moment when it is coming under intense public and political scrutiny.

Globalization, Philanthropy, and Democracy

Among the most important of the institutional transformations of philanthropy—and one whose effects on democratic practices are both potentially significant and poorly understood—is the increasing diffusion outside the United States of American models for the organization of philanthropy. This process has been driven, in part, by the explicit intent of funders to promote the development of philanthropy in societies in transition; it has also been advanced by legislative reforms in France and elsewhere in Western Europe easing the establishment of private foundations. As a result, institutional models once seen as distinctive to the United States are taking root in new settings. If the density and scale of private foundations in the U.S. still distinguish American philanthropy from that of Europe, this institutional form is nonetheless expanding, slowly and gradually, even in cases where private foundations have historically been scarce, and associations remain the dominant form for the organization of philanthropic activity. The deepening of these processes partly reflects the extent to which assumptions about the positive role of organized philanthropy in strengthening civil societies and thus democracies have themselves become global. Yet whether these assumptions travel well is an open question. To take account of these processes of diffusion, research should focus on the scope, implications, and effects for democracy of the globalization of a distinctive form of philanthropic institution.

As scholars of philanthropy in the United States have noted, one of the perceived advantages of private foundations is their capacity to engage in “positive discrimination,” that is, to target the allocation of resources toward particularistic purposes, where the state is bound by the equality of citizens under law. Different criteria for access to funding permit private foundations to discriminate in their allocation of resources. Thus, local ethnic or sectarian foundations can allocate resources on identitarian grounds, while the state typically may not do so—though this distinction is being blurred in the U.S. by new faith-based initiatives of the Bush Administration. In the U.S. tradition, this capacity for targeted allocation of resources is seen as beneficial. It is felt to provide alternative channels for the accumulation and distribution of capital that can accommodate particularistic needs and preferences—outside the formal political arena. The model that has shaped this perception of state-foundation relations is one of reciprocity and complementarity, though critics of private foundations might question whether these forms of discrimination have been positive in their effects.

In contrast, Western and Northern Europe experienced competition and antagonism between the state and institutions controlling private assets, in particular, the Catholic Church. The autonomous standing of the Church was cast as antagonistic to the consolidation of state authority, and inconsistent with the public management of welfare and service provision organized around egalitarian and inclusive conceptions of citizenship, rather than faith, as the basis for access to resources. As a result, states actively intervened to constrain the formation of private foundations, to more tightly regulate charitable institutions, and to centralize social service provision within encompassing welfare systems.

These variations in national experience have enormous implications in considering possibilities for the diffusion of private foundations as an institutional form into Europe. In Western and Northern Europe, the deregulation of private foundations invokes deep historical questions about the division of labor among state, society, and the third sector that continue to be hotly debated. At the same time, however, the increasing heterogeneity of European populations suggests that new models for the management of particularisms will become increasingly attractive to European policy makers in coming years.

Will this deregulation of philanthropy simply be a way for the state to retreat from the task of building political communities grounded in egalitarian conceptions of national identity and citizenship in the face of increasingly heterogeneous populations? Is it a way for the state to withdraw from the provision of welfare? What will be the consequences of introducing multiple norms of inclusion and participation in societies that have stressed formal equality of citizens? Recent trends hold out the possibility that, together with the broader erosion of welfare regimes, Europe could be on the verge of a moment comparable to the American “philanthropic revolution” of the early 20th-century, signaling...
significant shifts in large-scale patterns of state-society relations. The implications of these changes for social capital, norms of inclusion, and the encompassing conceptions of welfare that have been prominent in Europe remain to be seen, but cannot be assumed to be positive.

In highlighting these concerns, our aim is to provide a more adequate understanding of the globalization of philanthropy and its effects on processes of democratization as well as democratic norms and practices in established democracies. Our hope is that CDATS will promote research and public debate over the next several years about the diffusion of new institutional forms for the organization of philanthropy, the implications of this process for the quality of democracy in particular settings, the stresses that democracy encounters in such settings, and the role of philanthropy in ameliorating or deepening those stresses. Of particular interest is how global liberalism and the rise of market-based regimes are changing the role of philanthropy in society and generating new forms of philanthropy; the impact of new modes of philanthropy in societies that continue to experience transitions from the immediate phase of post-communism to liberal or semi-liberal forms of democracy; and the implications for European states that are redefining commitments to welfare as they also move toward a broader and more tightly consolidated regional union. Improving our understanding of these questions, and others, is an essential step in assessing whether philanthropy is doing democracy’s work in the 21st century, and if so, how.

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ENDNOTES

3 Moreover, the shared commitment to social advocacy and social change that these new models of philanthropy reflect can obscure important differences in their underlying assumptions. While social justice philanthropy has an intense interest in problems of exclusion, rights, and distributive justice among disadvantaged communities, venture philanthropy reflects a market-driven conception of the role that private entrepreneurialism can play in improving social conditions for the less well off.
4 One element of this complexity is variation in the extent to which new models of philanthropy have emerged in different fields of work. The institutional ecology of philanthropy has changed unevenly, with some fields—civil rights, for instance—exhibiting less institutional innovation than others—e.g., environmental advocacy. Understanding why some fields exhibit higher levels of institutional innovation than others is an important element of a larger effort to account for broader shifts in the organization of philanthropy in its relationship to democratic norms and practices.
5 For example, two decades ago a search of corporate annual reports would have turned up virtually no references to the corporation as a “citizen,” or as a member of a community with social obligations (“giving back to the community”) that mirror those of individuals. Today, such references are omnipresent in corporate rhetoric.
6 To give just one example, the number of non-profit programs at U.S. universities has grown from only a handful in 1986, to 62 in 1996, to more than 240 in 2000, with one projection estimating that more than 400 programs will exist by 2005. These programs are not focused solely on philanthropy, but most certainly include it as part of their overall programs. CenterPoint Institute, “Building Bridges: Between Practice and Knowledge in Nonprofit Management Education,” Report to the Trustees of the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, March 2001; Current data on nonprofit management programs is from Roseanne M. Mirabella and Naomi B. Wish, “Census of Nonprofit Management Programs,” which can be found at: http://pirate.shu.edu/~mirabero/Kellogg.html
7 These conceptions are summarized well in Barry D. Karl and Stanley Katz, “The American Philanthropic Private Foundation and the Public Sphere, 1890–1930.” Minerva 19 (1981), pp. 236–270. However, the Karl and Katz view that private philanthropy emerged in areas where the state could not or would not act probably underestimates the extent to which philanthropy of this period served state purposes.
8 For some, these changes were more evolutionary than revolutionary. From this perspective, a continuing commitment to foundation-government partnerships in addressing social problems and a preference for reform rather than social transformation marked the reluctance of major foundations to engage in “political struggle, ideological conflict, and grass roots organizing as a means of influencing social policy.” Alice O’Connor, “The Ford Foundation and Philanthropic Activism in the 1960s,” in Philanthropic Foundations, ed. Ellen C. Lagemann (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 169-194. Nonetheless, as Zunn stresses, transformations of philanthropy in these years reflected new patterns in its relationship to the state and in conceptions of how philanthropy could most effectively serve the ends of democracy.
9 Community foundations are an important part of the philanthropic landscape, but are vastly exceeded in number by both corporate foundations and private, typically family-based, foundations. Compared to some 600 reporting community foundations in 2001, there were 2,700 reporting corporate foundations. Nonetheless, how the work of small family and corporate foundations shapes broader public perceptions of the relationship between philanthropy and democracy is an important question, as is how the practices of these foundations reflect their donors’ understandings about the public obligations of philanthropy.
10 These efforts extend well beyond philanthropy, and could easily be seen as including the work of agencies like the US Agency for International Development in democracy promotion via the strengthening of civil societies worldwide.
character of the civil society institutions that now work as professional organizations instead of the Gandhi-inspired voluntary efforts for social and development work” (Behar and Prakash 2004: 198).

By making constituency support virtually irrelevant, international financial assistance has transformed conflict movements into consensus movements. These arguments can be generalized to other parts of the developing world, where many social movement organizations are dependent on foreign state aid. Very few rely on membership contributions for the maintenance of their organization. Paid staff rather than volunteers dominate such groups. This is also true of NGOs.7 Contrary to their rhetoric of autonomy, self-reliance and self-sufficiency, many NGOs rely on grants from the government and foreign donors, often structuring their programs to qualify for such funds. In Nicaragua, for example, the women’s movement is composed largely of NGOs run by paid, middle-class professional women, as opposed to membership-based, grassroots, or neighborhood organizations (Ewig 1999). These organizations are largely supported by international organizations, foreign governments and foundations, and international feminist networks, and fit the model of southern groups that follow the institutional-resource-dependent, project based, non-conflictual strategy.

Is the rise of consensus movements through external aid problematic for southern societies? Although consensus movements are able to achieve some positive impact even with limited mobilization (such as changes in norms and agendas of the state), their dependence on institutional sources of support raises several problems. First, because consensus movements in developing countries have relied heavily on support from external actors their cause has less legitimacy within the country. In India, charges of being “guided by a foreign hand” have frequently been leveled against women’s groups. Second, by relying on foreign funds for organizational survival, a group makes itself vulnerable to the fickle nature of foreign aid both with regards to its continuing availability and changing priorities.8 As Aldaba et al. (2000) note, southern groups need to break out of the narrow confines and relative comfort of the aid system. They need to increase self-sustainability by establishing closer ties with the surrounding environment. Third, consensus movements are less able to develop new strategies to deal with failure because of constraints from the institutions upon which they are dependent. (Schwartz and Paul 1992).

Fourth, consensus movements which have limited constituency support are always in danger of being defeated by any challenger with a large mass following. Many Indian feminist scholars warn that “the failure of women’s movement to establish links with mass of women and find a language to build necessary rapport has forced many such women to join right wing organizations using caste and religion …The absence of a powerful secular democratic women’s movement is a big handicap” (CWDS 1994, quoted from Sharma 2003: 4565). Women’s rights activists are concerned that India’s secular democratic foundations are threatened by its inability to challenge Hindu fundamentalist forces which have proven able to mobilize masses of Indian men and women and which are likely to undermine feminist causes that activists hold dear. In many countries where Islamic fundamentalist forces are on the rise, women’s movements may find that seeking international support without building a domestic base is a costly strategy.

Finally, lack of mass support has weakened the ability of the women’s movement to monitor the implementation of hard fought legal changes, such as those concerning rape and dowry deaths.9 Institutional resources can help a social movement organization win a place on the political agenda or demand adoption of new legislative measures. However, ensuring that the legislation is enforced may also require the capacity to monitor the activities of enforcement agencies. To enact this monitoring, movements need more than a presence in official corridors and international arenas—the existence of a strong grass-roots network of activists on the ground is essential.

Conclusion

While much of the literature has focused on the enabling aspects of transnational links, I have argued here that such links, particularly funding ties, have the unintended effect of weakening domestic movements by limiting their capacity for mass mobilization. By suggesting that foreign funds can be detrimental to social movements, I do not mean to underemphasize the continuing impact of other factors in the lack of grass-roots mobilization. However, greater dependence on a group’s constituency rather than on foreign sources facilitates mass mobilization. Financial dependence on outsiders raises fundamental issues of representation and accountability for all social movements and NGOs.

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Endnotes

1 The issues raised in this paper are of relevance to SMOs and those NGOs that seek to empower people and are committed to social change. For the similarities and differences between the two types of organizations see Jalali 1998.

3 Others have been more critical of western funding of NGOs (for example see Hulme and Edwards 1997, and Fukuyama 2004).

4 These figures do not fully capture the financial links between foreign and domestic groups as some foreign funds are channeled through the state rather than given directly to groups.

5 The word Dalit means oppressed and refers to groups who are at the bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy. They are a minority, forming 16 per cent of the country’s population.

6 Consensus movements enjoy broad institutional support and encounter little organized opposition. Conflict movements on the other hand confront organized opposition and rely on constituent support. The principle difference between consensus and conflict movements is that the former “need not (and do not) attempt to convert high attitudinal support into committed and active rank and file” (Schwartz and Paul 1992: 212). Over time, according to Schwartz and Paul, a consensus group shows a greater tendency to evolve into a classic interest groups that relies exclusively on direct connections to policymakers and not at all on large-scale mobilizations.

7 For example, according to Aldaba et al. (2000), unofficial estimates of donor dependency of Philippine developmental NGOs range from 50% to 95% of their annual budgets.

8 For example, foreign aid to South American and Philippine developmental NGOs is dwindling (Aldaba et al. (2000). Also in 2003, the Indian government revised its policy towards foreign aid, which amongst other changes affects aid from small bilateral donors and also places new restrictions on NGOs’ access to foreign aid. The impact of these changes are not as yet clear.

9 Indian feminist lawyers and other activists have frequently noted the failure of the movement to monitor the implementation of the reformed laws. See Agnes 1992, Agnihotri and Mazumdar 1995, Kishwar 1999, Phadke 2003.

References


These two volumes are essential reading for anyone interested in the current state of democratic politics in advanced democratic countries. On the one hand, the books are a veritable treasure trove of data, statistics and information—from official sources usefully compiled in one place (for example on subnational versus central government revenue, levels of political trust and various participatory initiatives), and original data generated by the authors. On the other hand, the books are tightly focused around several conceptual themes, from which hypotheses are derived and rigorously tested, and around a clear set of cases (OECD countries) and time period (early 1960s until late 1990s). This original research, especially in the Dalton book, sustains and updates existing traditions such as the consequences of cognitive mobilization and the postmaterialist shift, as well as furthering our understanding of advanced democracies in new ways.

Russell Dalton’s *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, takes up many of the themes that he has discussed in previous works such as *Citizen Politics* and *Parties without Partisans*. Situating the book in the Eastonian tradition of political behavior, he differentiates among three levels of political support—the political community, the regime and political authorities and two types—evaluative and affective. Dalton observes a significant change in the political orientations of contemporary citizens, characterized by disengagement from conventional forms of political action and a spiral of distrust (11). Evidence of such change is broad, convincing and, most importantly, is a cross-national phenomenon, manifested in decreasing confidence in politicians, parliament and government, and a decline in partisan identification (33). All countries now contain a new breed of dissatisfied democrats or critical citizens. Nevertheless, system affect, support for the political community (national pride) and democratic norms have remained constant or increased.
The bulk of the book delves into the factors behind changing attitudes. Overall, there is no unequivocal explanation for the decrease in support. Indeed, many of the usual suspects are weak predictors: evaluations of economic performance and levels of income are insignificant, as are measures of media effects. In one of the most important findings in the book, Dalton finds little support for ‘legitimation crisis’ theses that poorer economic and political performance is the reason for the decline—by many measures both types of performance are better than in previous decades. Longitudinal analyses of change clearly support a positive effects hypothesis—the greatest decline has been among the best educated, higher-status groups, and given higher levels of education over time, increasingly in the younger generations. Indeed, postmaterialist value change, as a consequence of social modernization, is one of the biggest predictors of levels of disaffection. In yet another paradox, parties are converging in their ideological profiles, but voters perceive a greater gap between their own positions and the parties, as well as between the parties. Dalton explains these dynamics by rising expectations, the fragmentation of policy preferences and their advocates (special interests), and, more importantly, in the ever-increasing complexity of modern governance. This rise of a multi-dimensional policy space with orthogonal issue dimensions complicating the older socio-economic cleavage, means that no policy can ever satisfy all interests or even find an acceptable median position.

Dalton concludes that changing expectations, a passion for the democratic creed, accounts for 20-30% of the decline in political support. Of equal explanatory weight is the proliferation of special interests, the greater diversity of preferences to be accommodated and the greater difficulty of doing so successfully under conditions of complex governance. Although some level of skepticism may be healthy for democracy, lower levels of trust are more expensive and reduce a system’s steering capacity. A basic paradox remains: “contemporary democracies do not suffer from a surplus of interest articulation, but from a lack of institutions and processes that can aggregate and balance divergent interests into a coherent policy program that participants can accept” (205). Dalton believes that this is happening and ends on a hopeful note. It is these new forms of interest articulation, aggregation and participation that the authors in the Cain volume directly and comprehensively address.

The point of departure of Democracy Transformed? is that “the public’s preferred mode of democratic decision-making is moving toward new forms of more direct involvement in the political process … (which) we should expect when nineteenth-century concepts meet twenty-first century realities” (2). The book attempts to answer questions generated from this second reform wave (in contrast to the first, populist wave of the earlier 20th century) concerning how real and how fundamental the shift is. Three modes of democracy, representative, direct and advocacy (where citizens affect the policy process as opposed to outcomes as in the second type) and three principles, access, transparency and accountability, structure the individual contributions. Each chapter contains excellent literature reviews, useful descriptive data and critical analyses, and each is categorized under the rubrics of electoral change and shifts in non-electoral institutions.

Dalton and Gray begin by looking at the expansion of the electoral marketplace in four ways—voting more often, at more levels, adding more voters and providing more choices. There has been only a slight increase in the number of elections over the time period, despite the addition of elections at many more levels (most of the increase is due to the introduction of European Parliamentary elections in 1979 and the increased use of referendums in countries like Italy). Turnout is down in all countries considered, which is explained by the increased complexity of governance (thereby decreasing accountability) and the increase in the amount of elective. However, there has been a marked increase in the portion of the citizenry eligible to vote (32). Scarrow looks at the reduced role of parties in elections, noting that even though the number of referendums in most countries has increased slightly from 1970 to 2001, national party politicians still control the agenda. Outside of the US and Switzerland, “in most countries the referendum remains a device for resolving occasional policy questions rather than being a central or dominant political procedure” (53).

Turning to possible effects within parties, Kittilson and Scarrow find little increase in the emphasis given to issues of democracy in party manifestos. Even though there has been a modest shift toward more democratic candidate selection procedures and many rule changes in a similar direction, most parties “have adopted outcome-oriented organizational strategies that are validated primarily by parties’ electoral success, not by the extent to which they broaden the scope of individual participation” (67). In an analysis of electoral systems and a test of Katz and Mair’s cartel party thesis, Bowler, Carter and Fowler find little change over forty years, with a couple of well-known exceptions (Italy). In terms of changes in electoral laws, access to ballots has become more difficult since the 1960s, access to the media has remained constant, yet state subventions have been loosened and increased, creating an overall trend of fewer restrictions. Nevertheless, there seems to be greater access in form, not in function, with the larger, well-established parties benefiting disproportionately.

The chapters on changes in non-electoral institutions are especially interesting and empirically novel. Cain, Egan and Fabbri look at freedom of information laws, which have increased everywhere, and at their effects on creating more open and transparent systems. Several creative case
studies of the United States, France, Italy and the EU show that that such initiatives have empowered individual citizens more successfully in some countries than in others, because of differences in administrative hurdles and the vigor of a country’s press culture. In an equally brilliant chapter, Ansell and Gingrich discuss trends in decentralization, not only providing excellent cross-national data, but also testing various theoretical models of what kinds of reforms occur in different institutional environments, centered on whether neo-liberal or democratic accountability agendas are furthered. Unitary states, majoritarian systems and those states with territorially based, vertically integrated administrative structures should produce more comprehensive reform movements and more potential for democratizing decentralization. Corporatist traditions should push reforms in the democratic accountability direction. They find some but not overwhelming evidence for most of these hypotheses.

Those authors also use the same basic framework to analyze various reforms to the administrative state—centering on procedural and legal liberalization (the increased use of ombudsmen) and on substantive/deliberative alternatives (citizens’ juries and charters, visioning committees). They find a slight increase in the use of such techniques, but even though they may become important in the future, they are still rather experimental techniques. The final chapter in the section written by Cichowski and Sweet looks at courts and the legal system. Over the last decades, they observe a common trend in all systems (British Commonwealth, European Continental and North American) toward the judicialization of policy-making, including: “the breakdown of the relatively strict separation of powers norms reduces the centrality or primacy of legislatures as sites of rule innovation and enhances the role of judges” (195). One common factor is the rise of rights politics and the inclusion of various rights codes in constitutions that necessarily throw more issues to the judiciary. There is also a creeping democratization of access through more liberal norms of standing and justiciability. Detailed case studies of the US, Canada, Australia, Japan and the EU show ambivalent effects: greater citizen access yet a greater role given to the institutions with the least democratic legitimation (216).

The volume concludes penultimately with an outstanding political thought piece by Mark Warren that endeavors to assess normatively the observed second wave of democratization, with the goal of determining whether changes are indeed more democratic and, more generally, whether the cumulative changes result in the emergence of a new form of democracy. His normative criteria of assessment include: inclusion as the overriding norm, franchise and autonomy as general implementation norms, a norm defining the political arena and norms dealing with the modes and scope of participation. Warren’s discussion is comprehensive, containing an exhaustive list of normative criteria that can be applied to any case, as well as sufficiently nuanced, open to trade-offs and conflicts.

Such sentiments are shared by the editors in their concluding chapter. They show changes (some substantial, some not) in all three arenas of contemporary democracy—representative, direct and advocacy. However, they are also aware that new forms of inequality may be arising, stemming from the fact that the best educated are the ones that disproportionately avail themselves to new or liberalized opportunities to participate and that the duties placed on citizens have significantly increased, perhaps beyond the capacity of many. In fact, they conclude:

A new model of democracy is evolving. The contemporary democratic process requires more of its citizens. It also challenges politicians and bureaucrats to figure out what it means to move past a trustee model of politics without abdicating political leadership. But the result may be a further democratization of advanced industrial democracies and the betterment of society and politics that this may produce (274).

In sum, these volumes are important contributions to scholarly understanding. There are some limitations in the analyses, which are, however, largely beyond the authors’ control. In many instances rigorous, cross-national datasets simply do not exist or are first attempts that will be refined and retested in the future. Indeed, the most methodologically sound findings deal with traditional research concerns (such as testing the economic performance hypothesis), but, despite limitations, the more original research is still highly informative. Finally, although the authors are very transparent concerning the size and significance of their (statistical) findings, periodically there is a tendency to over-exaggerate the importance of some of the trends that they set out to study. Overall, there have only been marginal changes, which do not add up to the revolutionary changes in the functioning and institutions of advanced democracies for which some of the authors seem to wish.


Review by Gregory Baldi, Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University
disinclined or ill-equipped to deal with many of transnational problems facing humanity in the twenty-first century, including environmental destruction, infectious disease, and growing economic inequality. Florini believes that successfully addressing such cross-border challenges depends on the establishment of a new set of global rules and on an activist transnational civil society, the members of which have increasingly been filling the gap between global society and global decision-makers by educating publics, mobilizing actors, and demanding transparency and accountability from businesses, national governments, and international organizations.

The book begins by outlining how technological advances and changing norms are rendering global decision making more transparent and thus more accountable and effective than ever. Building on this idea, Florini examines how shifts towards more cosmopolitan conceptions of identity are driving transnational participation in systems of “transparency-based governance.” Through these systems, civil society groups can help ensure that decision makers keep their commitments by subjecting them to the scrutiny of voters, investors, and other stakeholders who can exert pressure on them. While some maintain that identities are always created in opposition or rivalry to another group, Florini emphasizes the potential for changing conceptions of identity, arguing that this new era may witness the creation of new collectivities characterized by their members’ shared commitments to solving global problems.

The book then examines governments (including intergovernmental organizations), private enterprises, and civil society. Here Florini argues that when left alone, most governments and businesses will either fail to respond to or exacerbate global problems. However, when transnational civil society actors monitor behavior and expose globally detrimental practices, these organizations are much more likely to act in a globally responsible fashion on issues ranging from intellectual property rights to sustainable development to workplace conditions. Florini analyzes two of the most significant areas for global decision making: economic integration and the environment. These chapters provide an excellent overview of the consequences of global developments such as increasing capital flows, falling national trade barriers, and climate change and include a series of mini-studies on some of the key institutions, agreements, and practices associated with globalization. The focus in these sections remains firmly on the problem-solving potential of global civil society and particularly transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In the conclusion, Florini engages in some (admittedly) crystal ball gazing, placing herself in the year 2020 and – in a fictional retrospective – commenting on how technology, transparency, and transnational civil society have helped to revolutionize global governance, maximize self-rule, and contribute to a more peaceful, sustainable, and equitable world since the turn of the century.

As pleasant as Florini’s possible future may be, several elements in her arguments raise questions about whether we really could collectively get there. First, there is an almost functionalist logic of global politics evident in The Coming Democracy. In Florini’s view, the identification of transnational collective action problems and the failure of traditional actors to deal with them results in a shift of loyalties from the national to the global level, engendering the formation of transnational NGOs that solve these global issues. But can we really assume that history will be that efficient and tidy, particularly given the entrenched power and interests of traditional actors?

One could argue that Florini’s conception of transnational civil society as a type of honesty enforcer in the international community reflects an unjustifiably optimistic view that undersells the relevance and power of states and firms and oversells the capacity of transnational civil society to change behavior. Much of the problem is rooted in the influence she attributes to the role of transparency in compelling governments and private enterprise to address global issues. Most people would probably agree that increased transparency among global power brokers, including NGOs themselves, has been a positive development. There is little doubt that this transparency, along with advances in technology, has made available to civil society actors new sanctioning methods against governments and businesses. Yet to rely on transparency as the ordering principle for a new form of global governance confers on the concept a transformative power that is debatable, to say the least.

In addition, there is nothing particularly democratic about “transparency-based governance” and there is less discussion of democracy in the book generally than would expect, given the rather dramatic title. Transnational NGOs may provide a voice to their members and those whom they purport to represent, but what about the countless others who may be affected by the decisions they influence? While it is true that civil society can help make decision makers more accountable, the question of civil society’s own democratic accountability remains a thorny and unresolved problem for Florini.

To her credit, Florini recognizes that the world she imagines in 2020 is hardly assured and she acknowledges many of these counterarguments to her conception of global governance. Ultimately, however, this book is not concerned with constructing impenetrable arguments or identifying determined outcomes, but with laying out the potential for a better global future. Taken on those terms, The Coming Democracy represents a valuable contribution to current discussions on global governance in the twenty-first century.
n 1990, President George H. W. Bush spoke of his vision for a new world order, one in which the states in the international system would work in concert, rather than in competition, in the interest of promoting justice and freedom. Similarly, Anne-Marie Slaughter’s vision of a new world order is premised on states working in concert, but is focused instead on disaggregated states rather than on the unitary states that Bush, as well as scholars of the realist and liberal traditions, see as the unit of analysis. According to Slaughter’s analytical framework, the disaggregated components of government—whether regulatory, judicial, or legislative institutions—interact with each other domestically and with foreign and supranational counterparts. The result is a dense web of government networks, not unlike those described by Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence, in which transnational relations occur through multiple channels that include but are not exclusive of state agents. A New World Order offers an exhaustive study of government networks and global governance that will provide a useful resource for policy makers. Unfortunately, Slaughter’s account is overly descriptive and theoretically vacuous and, as a consequence, does little to advance the scholarly literature in the field.

Introducing the idea of government networks, Slaughter offers a useful heuristic to explain how she sees the world political system: the statue of Atlas, a globe with a web of networks, both horizontal and vertical. In horizontal networks, governance takes place within specific issue-area channels, with regulators, judges, and legislators working together with their counterparts both domestically and across their borders. The finance network is one type of horizontal network that has proliferated in the new world order. Central bankers and finance ministers convene to resolve national, regional, or international financial crises, often under the auspices of the G-8 or G-20 group of nations. Environmental networks offer another illustration of the disaggregation of the unitary state into different issue-area components. Face-to-face encounters occur, for example, between the US Environmental Protection Agency and its Mexican counterpart, promoting the exchange of “best practices” and the resolution of cross-border issues.

Vertical networks also require disaggregation of the state but refer to the ways in which supranational organizations interact with their national counterparts. In illustrating the salience of vertical networks, Slaughter’s previous work on international law—and specifically on matters of European Union jurisprudence—manifests itself particularly clearly. How the European Court of Justice (ECJ) hands down judgments that are implemented at the national and subnational level is especially intriguing to the author.

Most of the author’s vignettes, although thorough and precise, provoke unanswered theoretical questions. Networks are clearly the dependent variables but their development and proliferation are underdetermined. Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action features on page 199, but only as a perfunctory explanation for how small groups can help members of overcome problems of collective action. Discussing game theory is certainly not a sine qua non for a fruitful discussion on networks, but the author’s sketchy reference to Olson fails to move beyond a “layman definition” of socialization and collective action and marks a lost opportunity.

How do different parts of networks cooperate under conditions of systemic anarchy? How do they overcome concerns of relative gains and increase the shadow of the future, both of which might affect cooperation propensities? How do the particular face-to-face encounters Slaughter describes help build community, trust, and, ultimately, social capital? Slaughter raises but does not answer these questions.

Not only would Slaughter’s description benefit from an explanation of the theories that implicitly undergird global governance, but it would also benefit from a discussion of the theoretical “so what?” question. In other words, what does the new world order mean for existing theories of political science? For example, the author acknowledges that vertical networks “pierce the shell of state sovereignty” by making states responsible for implementing decisions made by supranational institutions, but she fails to take the next step by addressing the longer term implications for state sovereignty. It is clear that she does not foresee the evanescence of the state, but it is unclear how she reconciles this view with her advocacy of a more robust set of vertical networks in which supranational institutions continue to infringe on state autonomy.

On a more pragmatic level, this reader wonders how the virtues of vertical networks such as the ECJ might be extended to include American participation. If historical resistance to international legal regimes such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) is any indication, the US is unlikely to relinquish legal sovereignty by accepting the adjudication of any supranational court. Explaining the limitations of global governance in the context of US preponderance and an American interest that prizes legal autarky would be important to understanding the real relevance of, or limits to, Slaughter’s vision for world order.
The decade of research that Slaughter put into this book is apparent; examples of government networks are meticulous, varied, and accessible to any reader. A separate question, however, is which reader she has targeted. Given the theoretically barren nature of the book, it seems that the author has not intended the book to be read by graduate students hoping for a follow-on to Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence, or John Ruggie’s work that problematizes territory in the modern international system. Nor does it seem well-suited for international relations scholars seeking to advance the broader contours of international relations theory. Rather, the book appears to have been written for policy makers, bureaucrats, and non-governmental organizations. By understanding the existing nodes in the system of global governance, these individuals and groups might better exploit the vertical and horizontal networks and create new nodes that will lead to a more effective world order. A more analytic work, however, would have provided theoretical grounding that could have served both scholars and policy makers in this endeavor.


Review by Sara Beth Wallace, Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University

Helmut Anheier’s methodologically innovative contribution, Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, and Policy, attempts both rigorous analytical considerations on the concept of civil society as well as new ways of conceptualizing and assessing it. The motivation behind developing the “Civil Society Diamond” (the visual tool, modified from Social Watch, used here to illustrate the dynamics and “health” of civil society) was to write a sort of common map, a shared language with which to guide conversations both within and across cases. Briefly described, the Civil Society Diamond (CSD) plots quantitative measurements along a number of axes (depending on the number of indicators the researcher chooses to describe that country’s civil society). These axes (indicators) cross into four conceptual dimensions of civil society: structure, value, impact and space.

These conceptual dimensions, in addition to well-thought out distinctions in levels of analysis, stand out as an impressive theoretical contribution in unpacking the otherwise grey concept of civil society. Anheier demonstrates substantial care when choosing and characterizing indicators; an entire appendix, in fact, is dedicated to the categorization and evaluation of prominent civil society indicators (such as membership and trust). Indeed, it is a practical resource for new scholars eager to use the inchoate data on civil society.

It is useful to ask, however, after considering all of Anheier’s important conceptual and measurement contributions on civil society, what is the value added of quantifying civil society? While certainly holistic and deliberative, the CSD is ultimately hindered by its own foundation—data. To use the CSD, you must have well-organized data. To have organized data where none already exists, a massive undertaking must be conducted in new civil society spheres. And while this does encourage civil society-focused data collection and proliferation of the concept, it may veer towards describing any associative life which resembles civic associations as such; it is inconclusive whether civil society is descriptively appropriate or appropriable for all societies. The availability of good data for civil society studies is rare, so the utility of a model built on this already exceptional find is tenuous.

Given the dearth of good data, one is hard-pressed to find the value-added in the holistic views offered by the CSD that could not be portrayed in rich case study analysis, particularly if the goal of employing the model is assessment. If the purpose of a CSD is plotting for strengths and weaknesses of civil society, what sort of evaluation can follow? What constitutes enough trust? And furthermore, if a goal of illustrating civil society is for comparative purposes, the CSD can be quite deceptive. As Anheier’s chapter on case work shows, though Belarus and Canada’s CSD’s bear proportional resemblance, would it be empirically honest to consider them as bearing similarly robust civil societies? While Anheier acknowledges the different conditions under which civil societies operate, this does not seem to impede his deterministic evaluations: the implication is that the more a country’s CSD “fits the line” of the ideal-type diamond, the more robust and “healthy” its civil society.

The consequences of over-quantifying, or over-conceptualizing, civil society is the emergence of an empirical gap between theory and reality. Because the CSD may show a state to have vigorous civil society, this does not mean it feels vigorous. The goal Anheier lays out in this book is ambitious; the notion that what the field needs is a more systematized procedure to both discuss and promote research on civil society is laudable and important. However, what is clear, despite his analytical contributions, is that the method offered in this book is more for practitioners than it is for political scientists, who may not see an added value in visualizing civil society for purposes of assessment, and more to the point, prognosis.
In his latest book, *The Expediency of Culture*, George Yúdice analyzes culture’s role in the current era of globalization. The strength of Yúdice’s analysis lies in his ability to examine local communities and social movements and to extrapolate from these the institutional super-structures that influence the production of culture. Unfortunately, these impressive findings are easily overlooked due to the book’s ineffective structure and overly complex language. Despite Yúdice’s many insights, his book is more frustrating than compelling.

Yúdice’s central thesis is that culture has become a primary resource for governments and institutions to achieve a variety of sociopolitical and economic ends. To illustrate the ways in which this process works, Yúdice relies heavily on the work of Judith Butler. Butler believes in the centrality of human conditioning through norms, stating that “the maintenance of the status quo… is achieved by repeatedly performing norms” (47). This repeated performance of norms is best thought of as “ritual,” which then forges “identity.” Society’s use of these performative acts to create a national identity is evident in many ways: the creation and promotion of national museums, the singing of national anthems and the celebration of national holidays. Concurrently, social movements and minority groups utilize symbols to distinguish their members from the mainstream and to fortify the messages they send. Together, these experiences communicate to individuals what it means to be members of a community. As mediums in which messages of identity are transmitted, cultural art forms enable institutions to entrench existing social norms, even as they simultaneously empower groups campaigning for social change.

Yúdice also follows numerous other postmodernist scholars of culture by stating that globalization has boosted the number of opportunities for people to encounter and interact with each other and that, as a consequence, nation states and individuals are constantly negotiating identity (11). Nation states realize that they have a vested interest in establishing national identities that distinguish their citizens from foreigners in a process that Yúdice calls “cultural citizenship.” In some cases, a country may imply that its indigenous culture also have high social capital (13).

Yúdice also shows himself to be an astute observer of the hidden social structures that are responsible for so much of the culture we consume. For example, he claims that the city of Miami is a cosmopolitan center fabricated by entertainment industry leaders to serve as a platform for launching their multicultural artists and expanding their media empires. In this analysis, Yúdice not only illustrates his knowledge of current pop culture, but also showcases his ability to piece together the highly complex, big picture. In stating that culture reflects “the conditionings, elicitations, and pressure exerted by the multidimensional field of social and institutional relations” (39), he persuasively argues that any painting, film, music, article of clothing, or other piece of culture we consume is not simply the expression of one individual’s creativity, but is instead the end product of a complex network of institutional missions, trade organizations, and national laws.

Though these case studies are insightful, they cannot disguise the fact that Yúdice’s book is unable to present a cohesive and complete discussion on the expediency of culture. The chief problem is one the author himself readily admits: *The Expediency of Culture* is a collection of writings originally produced over a number of years for different purposes. Unfortunately, prior to the publication of this book, Yúdice clearly failed to revisit the text with an eye toward cohesiveness. The pacing is bizarre, with two chapters specifically dedicated to a discussion of Brazilian youth movements, one on Miami, and one on a Mexico/U.S. art exhibit. Interspersed among the case studies are chapters on consumption, citizenship, free trade, and culture. These chapters are more theoretical in tone, and the reader senses they were freshly written for this book, though there appears to be no rationale that explains the disjointed order in which they appear. It would have been a far better approach to include the case studies as a separate appendix.

In order to provide unity to his finished work Yúdice includes conclusion sections for a handful of chapters. Sadly, these conclusions read more like polite segues to the next chapter than concrete, conclusive claims. Furthermore, it is frustrating that not all of his chapters have conclusions. The end result of this book’s inconsistency is a central thesis that is difficult to grasp. While Yúdice’s observations contain significant value for non-profit arts organizations, foundations, educational institutions, and federal legislators, the book’s haphazard construction rends these important lessons on cultural heritage difficult to grasp. Yúdice’s book reads more like a series of thoughtful articles and case
The final weakness of Yúdice’s book is his failure to account for the use of culture as a resource. His discussion of the collaboration of institutions in producing culture without consideration of the impact of social networks on the final creative product is a clear example of avoiding the proverbial elephant in the room. We use culture in an attempt to achieve social ends without understanding the ways in which these exercises change the very content of the culture. Without understanding this integral two-way relationship, we risk misrepresenting the very minorities we seek to understand.


Review by Jennifer Darrah, Ph.D. Candidate, Brown University

Joseph Pekkanen, in this volume edited by Muthiah Alagappa, observes that “civil society comprises a motley crew.” Indeed, this important book offers new perspectives on the (sometimes dizzying) heterogeneity of civil society, and sheds important light on key debates in the literature through an impressive set of case studies from Asia. Alagappa and his co-authors contend that civil society is normatively neutral and that it can both promote and hinder liberalization and democracy. In short, they find that civil society has an ambiguous relationship with political change, and that we should focus our attention on ways that civil society operates in tandem with political and social institutions, states, laws, and social structures.

Alagappa synthesizes the findings of the book’s twelve case studies in terms of six major propositions: 1) Long and robust histories of civil society in Asia refute the notion that the concept of civil society is irrelevant for a study of Asia. 2) Civil society has many sources in Asia, arising from social reform efforts and in response to repressive rule. 3) Civil societies in Asia are “highly diverse in composition, resource endowment, and goals.” 4) Civil societies continue to change. 5) Civil society organizations in Asia exhibit both Neo-Tocquevillian and Neo-Gramscian elements. In particular, when a state is viewed as legitimate, civil society tends to operate in a Tocquevillian manner to check the power of the state, but when a state is viewed as illegitimate, civil society is the terrain upon which the hegemony of the state and the dominant groups is contested. Finally, 6) the growth of civil society has not emerged concomitantly with the institutionalization of the “public sphere,” or what Alagappa understands as basic social rights. The lesson is this: civil society in Asia persists in many guises, even in situations in which theory suggests it should be muffled, weak or non-existent.

Focusing on Asia addresses several important lacunae in the literature. Alagappa and colleagues dismiss the essentialist arguments of the so-called Asian values literature. Instead, they engage seriously with the unique histories of their cases, offering valuable historical data for both the contextualization and testing of key propositions about civil society. Most intriguingly, the analysis of Asia affords an examination of multiple types of political regimes, from pseudo-democracy to military authoritarianism, allowing consideration of the differing roles that variations of civil society can play during different political stages. Finally, the serious engagement with cases highlights the important, though varied, legacies of colonial structures. The authors repeatedly demonstrate how the roots of civil society were formed in engagement with or response to colonial institutions in ways that continue to impact politics (p. 456). The breadth of the issues addressed, and the historical detail offered by case experts, provide an invaluable resource for scholars of democracy and civil society.

Alagappa and his co-authors contribute to criticisms of those who have been challenged for overestimating the normative or democratizing potential of civil society. Several authors confirm Sheri Berman’s finding that civil society can be as much a carrier of authoritarianism as a harbinger of democracy or liberalization. Indeed, several demonstrate that civil society can be the site of violent and anti-democratic struggle, and even a breeding ground for exclusionary and communalist movements (for example, in the cases of Sri Lanka and India).

At some levels, this book calls into question the utility of using the concept of civil society as an independent variable. Many thinkers (Peter Houtzager and others) have bemoaned the fuzziness of the concept of civil society. Alagappa chooses a very broad, encompassing definition of civil society, which is mostly adopted by the contributing authors. If civil society is so broadly defined, then it is not surprising that as a singular force, it can lead to both everything and nothing.

Alagappa’s book lays the groundwork for important theoretical advancement. The contributors invite further serious and systematic examination of the differing roles that civil society can play in differing political regimes and in the wake of differing colonial legacies. Most importantly, he and his colleagues offer an unprecedented and important examination of a region which has been under-explored in the literature.
Announcing the Ion Ratiu Democracy Lecture

CDATS announces the inauguration of the Ion Ratiu Democracy Lecture, established to bring visibility to the ideas and accomplishments of individuals around the world working on behalf of democracy. This annual event expresses the deep commitment to democracy of the late Ion Ratiu, the prominent Romanian statesman and philanthropist who worked to build democratic governance in his native country and around the world.

The Center is proud to consider the Lecture among its most important activities. In addition to honoring the work and accomplishments of an individual through formal presentation and reception, the lecturership will include opportunities to interact with faculty and students and to meet with groups in Washington that are active in effort to strengthen democracy and improve the quality of political life. Thus the lecture will not only benefit those who hear each year’s speaker, but will help each honored recipient build networks and make new contacts in the Washington area.

The ideal candidate for this award will be a man or woman of principle, a person whose life reflects a deep commitment to the ideals and practices of democracy. Recipients of the lecture award may be thoughtful practitioners or engaged thinkers. They may be drawn from government or academia, but we expect our primary focus to be on civil society leaders who are either established or emerging figures in a democracy movement. In particular, the lecture should give emerging figures in democracy movements an opportunity to share their ideas, experiences, and aspiration, including on the part of those who struggle for political change under difficult conditions, with few opportunities for local recognition and support.

The Ratiu Family has long been a generous contributor to Georgetown University, endowing the Ratiu Chair in Romanian Studies in the Walsh School of Foreign Service. On March 2, a reception was held at the Cosmos Club to launch the Democracy Lecture and establish a Friends of the Ratiu Lecture group. More than 80 invited guests, including former Senator Charles Percy and his wife, joined Elizabeth Ratiu, Indrei Ratiu, and others to celebrate the late Ion Ratiu’s contributions as a lifelong democracy advocate and to support the newly-established Ion Ratiu lecture at CDATS. The first recipient of the Ion Ratiu Democracy Lectureship will be named by summer 2005, and the inaugural lecture will be held in fall 2005. The lecture carries a prize of $7,500.

CDATS Events & Lectures

This spring, the center has continued its sponsorship and organization of high quality lectures targeted at the Georgetown community and beyond.

Center Lectures this semester include:

- Daniel Chirot (University of Washington) “Intractable Ethnic Conflicts and the Problematic Future of Democracy in West Africa” Commentator: Herbert Howe
- Ken Jowitt (Hoover Institution, University of California, Berkeley) “Dizzy with Democracy”

CDATS also continues its speaker series on the Quality of Democracy, which addresses new conceptual, methodological, and substantive debates within the field of democracy studies.

Events this semester include:

- Seyla Benhabib (Yale University) “The Right to Have Rights in Contemporary Europe” Commentators: Dario Castiglione and Gerald Mara
- Sheri Berman (Barnard College) “The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Ideological Dynamics of the 20th Century” Commentator: Daniel Nexon
- Rudra Sil (University of Pennsylvania) [Event co-sponsored with the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies] “The Puzzle of the Postcommunist Proletariat: Russian Labor in Comparative-Historical Perspective” Commentator: Harley Balzer
- Jim Sleeper (Yale University) “Neoconservatives and the American Republic” Commentator: E.J. Dionne
Center Highlights

■ Affiliated Faculty and Fellows Accomplishments

In January 2005, Associate Professor Daniel Brumberg was named as Special Advisor to the Muslim World Initiative of the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C.

Visiting Faculty Fellow Kenneth Greene gave presentations at the University of Pennsylvania, Georgetown University, and the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE) in Mexico City. He also served as a Co-PI on NSF grant (requested) for “The Mexico 2006 Voter and Elite Panel Study.” We wish Ken luck in his position as a Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame for Fall 2005.

CDATS Director Steven Heydemann participated in the capstone conference of the Social Science Research Council’s Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector, which took place at Villa la Pietra in Florence from March 24-26, and will be co-editing a conference volume, with the working title of Philanthropic Projections of Power: Sending Institutional Logics Abroad. Heydemann also participated in a two-day planning meeting on March 4-5 sponsored by the Aspen Institute Nonprofit Sector Research Fund to discuss a project on the Contributions of Foundations to Society. He will be preparing a chapter for the project on the contributions of international foundations.


Assistant Professor Marc Morjé Howard is the co-editor (with Vladimir Tismaneanu and Rudra Sil) of a volume, tentatively entitled World Order After Leninism, which has been accepted for publication by the University of Washington Press. In addition, he has recently published two working papers as part of the Studies in Public Policy series of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde: “Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews” (with James L. Gibson) and “Opposition Coalitions and Political Liberalization in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes” (with Philip G. Roessler). Howard has also given talks this academic year at Johns Hopkins, Maryland, and Harvard.

CDATS Graduate Fellow David Madland coauthored with Clyde Wilcox and Carin Larson “Political Activity by Religious Organizations in Virginia,” in Religion and Politics at the State Level (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

Associate Professor Mark Carl Rom presented the paper “Are the States Effective Laboratories of Democracy?” at the conference “Promoting the General Welfare: American Democracy and the Political Economy of Government Performance” at the University of Virginia in November 2004.

CDATS Graduate Fellow Marni Schultz presented a paper on “Empowering the Next Generation: How Young Women Can and Must Help Elect Our First Woman President,” at the Siena College First Woman President Symposium.

Assistant Professor Leslie Vinjamuri presented a paper, “Strategies of Justice and Postwar Settlements, 1945-2004” at Dartmouth College’s John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding. This paper draws on the manuscript she is currently completing, Strategies of Justice and Postwar Peacebuilding.

■ Call for Working Papers

To facilitate an expansion of the working papers page on the CDATS website, we invite our readers to submit papers for review. Approved requests will be linked to our website, providing a broader audience for your work. Email cdats@georgetown.edu for more information.

■ About this Publication

Democracy & Society is published twice a year, and CDATS welcomes submissions from scholars around the world. Please visit http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/democracyandsociety.htm or email cdatsnews@georgetown.edu for more details.

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