The New Religious Pluralism and American Democracy

By Thomas Banchoff

On the face of it, “new religious pluralism” is a misnomer – at least in the American context. Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, dominant norms of tolerance, and patterns of immigration have long driven a diverse landscape in the United States marked by the coexistence of multiple religious traditions. Pluralism understood not just as diversity but as the interaction of religious communities within civil society and the state is also nothing new. The historical growth of Catholicism and the tensions it engendered provide the clearest precedent. From the anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant appeals of the Know-Nothings to John Kennedy’s presidential run, religious pluralism shaped US electoral politics. Education policy also proved a crucial political and constitutional battleground into the 20th century. The growth of Catholicism challenged the largely Protestant ethos of public education and drove a struggle over state support for parochial schools. By the 1960s, however, religious pluralism had lost much of its political salience. A “Judeo-Christian heritage” that subsumed Protestant-Catholic tensions and acknowledged the contributions of Jewish-Americans became a cornerstone of “American civil religion” (Bellah) and national identity.

Only against this historical backdrop do the distinctive contours of today’s religious pluralism emerge. There is a sociological component.

Religion and Democratic Support: Evidence from the World Values Survey

By Daniel Tope & Katherine Meyer

World events have sparked increased discussion about the relationship between religion and democracy. Much of it focuses on the presence or absence of legislative bodies in countries with large religious majorities – especially predominantly Muslim societies. While important, such discussions gloss over other components of democratic systems. Stable democracies not only require participative structures of governance but also rely upon legitimation from populations that are or would be governed by such a system. Citizen support for democracy therefore has important implications for democratic development, consolidation, and longevity.

Examining Democratic Support

In a tradition that can be traced back at least to Max Weber, the idea that shared beliefs and values in a political culture contribute to political development has held much currency. Numerous scholars have explored associations between the predominant religious cultures of particular states
This fall, CDATS and the Government Department marked a significant achievement with the creation of a new M.A. program in Democracy Studies. Housed in the Government Department, and administered jointly with CDATS, the program is the first in the country to offer a degree in the emerging field of democracy studies. The program, jointly developed by CDATS and the Government Department, will utilize faculty from a variety of disciplines and fields. We look forward to welcoming our first class of students for the 2006 fall term.

According to M.A. program director Professor Daniel Brumberg, the two year program is “designed to link theory and practice by providing a conceptually rigorous and comprehensive curriculum, one that highlights problems of democratic practice in contemporary democracies and, of course, the diverse challenges and obstacles to promoting sustained democratization in developing states.”

In general terms, the goal of the Democracy Studies M.A. program is to provide students with a systematic understanding of the history and theory of democracy, the forms and practices of democratic governance, the theory and practice of democratization, and the relationship between democracy and development. The coursework has been designed for both aspiring scholars and for present and future practitioners in government, business, and the non-profit sector. We also welcome applications from international students and practitioners.

The program will provide training organized around four central themes: 1) history and theories of democracy, 2) governance and representation, 3) democratization in theory and practice, and 4) democracy and development. In addition, students will take courses that provide exposure to issues of democratization in particular world regions. Coursework will also be supplemented by a required internship.

Further information about the program is available from the CDATS website, http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdat/mawelcome.htm.

The Government Department application materials can be found at the following URL: http://grad.georgetown.edu/pages/graduate_programs.cfm. The deadline for receipt of applications is Friday, March 3, 2006.

CDATS recorded another important milestone this fall. On November 8, we sponsored the first annual Ion Ratiu Democracy Lecture, an event supported by a generous contribution to the Center from the Ratiu Family Charitable Foundation. The lecture is a collaboration between CDATS and the Foundation to bring visibility to the ideas and accomplishments of individuals working on behalf of democracy around the world. It expresses the deep commitment to democracy of the late Romanian philanthropist, democracy advocate, and statesman, Ion Ratiu. The inaugural lecture was delivered by Professor Sergio Aguayo of the Colegio de Mexico, who spoke on “Mexican Democracy and the 2006 Presidential Elections.” His address was preceded by an appreciation of Ion Ratiu delivered by his son and Foundation trustee, Indrei Ratiu.

Professor Aguayo was nominated for the lecture prize by Jonathan Fanton, President of the MacArthur Foundation. The selection committee saw Professor Aguayo’s career and achievements as a wonderful expression of the purposes for which the lecture was established. He is one of Mexico’s most prominent human rights and democracy advocates, a scholar and teacher, and the author or editor of more than 20 books, as well as numerous articles, book chapters, and contributions to the Mexican and Latin American media. In the course of his work he helped start a newspaper, La Jornada, helped found Sedepac, an NGO devoted to democratic development, and co-founded Civic Alliance, an umbrella organization whose 30,000-plus members have pioneered anti-corruption efforts and the reform of governance in Mexico. In all of these achievements, Professor Aguayo embodied the idea that the Ratiu Lecturer would be a person of principle, an engaged intellectual, and a thoughtful activist.

We are now in the very early stages of soliciting nominations for the second Ion Ratiu Lecture to be held in fall 2006. We encourage readers of Democracy and Society to send us the names of accomplished democrats and democracy activists from around the world to be considered as potential candidates for the 2006 lecture prize.

Steven Heydemann (Ph.D., U. Chicago) has served as director of CDATS since its opening in 2003.
The Democratization of the Sacred

By Giuseppe Giordan

The reappearance of religion in modern society comprises heterogeneous elements open to a multitude of interpretations which aim to define the individualization of religious feeling and the subjectivity of belief, for example, the challenge represented by fundamentalist movements which use religion as a key to ethnicity and identity. Religion and democracy mutually define themselves as they negotiate and renegotiate the borders and areas of action. As religion has played an important role in the definition of the concept of democracy, democracy is now increasingly important at the heart of religion: the emergence of the “spirituality” category in contemporary sociology highlights the very process of the “democratization of the sacred.”

Contrary to the beliefs of various religious sociologists of the 1960s and 1970s, not only has religion not disappeared from society, neither has it been relegated to only a marginal and residual role (Casanova 1994). On the contrary, through recent global events, in particular since 9/11, we have seen what may be termed “religious excess:” once we theorized on the so-called “death of God,” now we are reflecting on his “return.” Nevertheless, it is useful to highlight the fact that the so-called “return” of God is proving problematic for many and is difficult to interpret. God of modern times cannot be compared to God of past tradition and His return is debated, with concern, in the public arena. Recent examples include the public European debate regarding “Christian roots” in the European “constitution,” reforms of marriage laws in Zapatero’s government in Spain, the fertility referendum in Italy, and the rejection of the Italian minister Rocco Buttiglione by the European Parliament on grounds of religiously-informed prejudice.

The sociological debate regarding the transformation of religion at the center of social change has characterized the transition from tradition to modernity. This debate has been crystallized by the well-discussed theory of secularization which presents religion and modernity as reciprocally incompatible, with the ascendance of one leading to the eventual disappearance of the other. In recent decades, it has become clear that religion is not destined to disappear but rather certain displays of it: in Europe outward displays of religiousness and those entering the Church are fewer; however, there are new religious movements and a new religious consciousness. Moreover, religion has played, and continues to play, an important role in the legitimation of various political choices. It is also being used for both individual and collective identification.

Discussion of the relationship between religion and politics, and more specifically the relationship between religion and democracy, may be inserted into this background. One wonders if, on the one hand, the term “religion” is compatible with that of “democracy” and if, on the other hand, pluralist democracy can guarantee and protect individual free religious expression. The complexity of the relationship between religion and democracy disappears and reappears: can religion, which is based on the claim of a monopoly on the truth, enter into the arena with democracy, which is based on a vote of majority? Up to what point can the absolute solidarity of belief agree with the relativity and the temporary inherent in individuals’ freedom of choice? Up to what point can democracy allow the expression of “pretexts” by religious institutions before its own profound nature, inspired by lay criteria and established for the protection of the freedom of all, believers and non?

Religion and democracy have been connected by both alliances and conflict-reciprocal exploitation: a presumed incompatibility is sometimes replaced by a mutual need for help, but are there criteria by which these two elements can co-exist? What happens when democracy is self-misrepresented by accepting the dynamics of religion and when religion becomes something different as a result of allowing the logics of democracy into its very heart (Guolo 2004)?

The concept of laity has become the emblem for new ways of regulating the relationship between religion and politics in modern society. As cited by Emile Poulat (1987 and 1994), “visible laity,” which refers to the social reduction of the room allowed by state law for the various churches, does not fully capture the importance of this phenomenon. “Total revolution” requiring the re-thinking of the foundations of such a relationship with the meaning of both individual and collective existence is needed for addressing this issue. If all in the traditional world was regulated by the unchanging and transcendent grace of God, now all is regulat—

Giordan, Continued on Page 18
Religion and the Authoritarian State: The Case of Syria

BY PAUL L. HECK

The impact of religion on society can be said to derive partly from the fact that religion represents an authority which the nation state, irrespective of its own configuration, can never fully usurp. This is especially noteworthy in the case of an authoritarian state, such as Syria, which is assumed to have arrogated – through cooption or suppression – all alternative sources of authority. While it is true that this appropriation of power has happened in Syria constitutionally and institutionally, it is not clear whether non-state actors, even if incorporated into state-defined networks, are unable to set expectations for society. This has been observed in Syria’s private sector.1 Is it also true of religion? Syria offers particularly useful perspective, for it can be argued that the state there has been more successful than others in the region – Turkey, Egypt, or Jordan – in coopting local religious institutions and suppressing religious opposition.2 Yet, religion in Syria seems to maintain an independence enabling the production of unexpected changes that even the state must recognize.

It is to be noted, firstly, that the explanatory value of religion for understanding Syria has largely been dismissed in favor of politics and economics.3 Despite the occasional article,4 we have no comprehensive picture of religion in contemporary Syria. Research focusing on Ottoman and French colonial periods is more exact in noting the function of religion as an alternative, purportedly superior, authority and way of life over and against increasingly influential European-inspired paradigms of civilization.5 Religious actors, even if formulating reforms in European categories,6 maintained a local moral identity that diverged from state definitions and, in that sense, helped preserve at least the conception of civil society. Does Islam continue to play such a role in Syria today, now vis-à-vis the Ba’thist project? If so, is it necessary to refine how we assume religion to function under an authoritarian state?

The suggestion is that Islam in Syria cannot be reduced to state-qualified categories of suppression and cooptation. Recognition of religion certainly benefits the state as a source of legitimacy in a society where religion is highly valued, especially when the state’s legitimacy is in question; this thus awards religion a latent authority that can mobilize people to civil action under certain circumstances, concrete examples of which do exist.6 Even when speaking of religious institutions as a sector within a state-defined context, religion still stands apart from Ba’thist ideology – not as direct challenge to the regime, but as alternative viewpoint with a mediating capacity between state and people.

Moreover, the commonly perceived division of Islam in Syria into a state-coopted Sufism (spiritual and quietist) and a state-suppressed Salafism (textual and activist) fails to see them as two strands of a single religion which are never finally separable. Both elements participated in the Sunni insurrection that culminated in the 1982 massacre at Hamah.7 Religious leaders of Sufi and Salafi orientation, sometimes combined in single figures, attend the same conferences, read the same publications, and teach the same religious heritage. This is not to overlook differences, even antagonism, between the two, but rather to note that leaders of both positions acknowledge common textual origins and common reformist goals.10 The Sufi-Salafi dynamic is better viewed not as essential division, but dialogue, sometimes hostile, that affects both sides. There are certainly extremist elements, such as “The Army of Damascus for Monotheism and Jihad,” but to speak of pious Muslims in Syria, Sufi and Salafi alike, is to speak overwhelmingly of a conservative, not an extremist, attitude. Those who hope for a greater place for Islam in the laws and policies, as well as the identity, of the nation, view it as a gradual process in line with the pace of reform set by the state.

By its willingness to operate within a Ba’thist defined framework, the religious establishment set the stage for a greater Islamization of society, as evident today in attire, behavior, values, and mind-set. The fact that the secular opposition is so insignificant is due not only to state strate-
Scholars have established that the third wave of democratization has not firmly taken hold in the Muslim world, particularly in the Arab Middle East. While some scholars argue that Islamic values are a barrier to the democratization process because of the lack of emphasis on individualism and the difficulty of separating religion and politics in Islam, others argue that political, not religious, explanations are necessary in order to understand the lack of democracy in the Arab world. The latter suggest that rentier economies, Arab regimes’ fear of moderate and radical political Islam, lack of human development, lack of openness in the political structure (especially for opposition parties), and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the resulting high amounts of military spending in the region, are barriers to the democratization process. All of these factors strengthen authoritarian regimes at the expense of democratization.

Examining public opinion and the activities of civil society provide signs of hope that the region could democratize. Despite the undemocratic regimes found in much of the Muslim world, scholars using the World Values Survey and those using a national survey of the Kuwaiti citizen population have consistently found high support for democracy among highly religious citizens in Muslim countries (e.g. Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). Individual identification with Islamic religion and culture does not seem to be a barrier to wanting a democratic government, at least in the abstract.

However, scholars are now debating whether or not Islamic culture is compatible with women’s empowerment and participation in society. As Inglehart, Norris and Welzel illustrate, the positive correlation between support for gender equality and democratic rule was overwhelming (r=.82) for 55 of the countries in the World Values Survey. They conclude that historically,

“democratic institutions, by themselves, do not guarantee gender equality. But does it work the other way around: does rising emphasis on gender equality improve the chances that democratic institutions will emerge and flourish? The answer seems to be yes.”

In virtually every authoritarian society, a majority of the public believes that men make better political leaders than women; in virtually every stable democracy a clear majority of the public rejects this belief…

Valentine Moghadam furthers this argument:

The empowerment of women and the establishment of gender equality are crucial to democracy. Democracy is as much about citizenship rights, participation and inclusion as it is about political parties, elections, and checks and balances. The quality of democracy is determined not only by the form of institutions, but also by the extent that different social groups participate in these institutions. In this regard, the gender of democracy matters profoundly. The absence of women from political life results in democratization with a male face or in a “male democracy” – an incomplete and very biased form of democracy.

In the Muslim world in particular, with its lack of gender equality, low status of women, and prevalence of attitudes that are against women’s empowerment, equality and participation are additional factors that make democratization difficult.

But do religious beliefs and practices prevent individuals from supporting gender equality? Interpretations of Islamic teachings can be used to justify patriarchal gender roles and norms as well as to support women’s empowerment and participation in society. Women themselves (secular, religious, and Islamist) in Iran, Egypt and Kuwait, for example, are using Islamic principles, such as the Qur’anic teachings that all are equal before God and that men and women are equally responsible for their own sin, to justify women’s equality, access to resources and participation in the public sphere. My own research on Kuwait examines the complex

Interpretations of Islamic Teachings Can Be Used to Justify Patriarchal Gender Roles and Norms as Well as to Support Women’s Empowerment and Participation in Society.
What Would Jesus Tax:
How Religion Shapes Views on Economic Policy

By David Madland

Introduction

Some people argue that the free-market is part of God’s plan; others assert that the market ignores the needs of the poor and should, according to their religious beliefs, be tempered with government redistribution on behalf of the needy. How can we understand these differences?

Even before Max Weber argued that the Protestant ethic was important to fostering capitalism, scholars have contended that there is a connection between religion and economic views (Weber, 2001). However, the state of knowledge about this relationship is low, and has often focused unsuccessfully on trying to link certain economic views with frequency of church attendance or biblical literalism (Hart 1996; Wuthnow 1994; Wuthnow 1973).

Other research has focused on the role of denominations in shaping economic policy views. According to this logic, called the denominational model in this paper, official doctrine, or views held by leadership, help create the policy positions of lay members of the church.

Though the denominational model has had some success predicting the economic policy preferences of church members, it is an incomplete theory. The denominational model ignores the actual religious attitudes held by church members. These religious attitudes can influence economic attitudes, independent of the position held by denomination leadership.

The religious attitudes model developed in this paper argues that broad religious ideas that cross denominations, such as the individual’s role in salvation, can help shape a person’s position on government redistribution.

Denominational Model

There are a number of reasons to expect a person’s denomination will impact their economic policy positions. Denomination appears to influence other types of political attitudes, and denominational views on economic policy vary considerably. To demonstrate this variation, I briefly outline differences in economic policy between Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Evangelical Protestant churches. While this overview cannot express completely the views of leadership or explore disagreements in leadership, the general outline I provide is representative and illustrates why we would expect a person’s denomination to influence their views on economic policy.

Overall, the Catholic Church is skeptical of the morality of the market and believes that government intervention is necessary and some redistribution is justified. Pope John Paul II wrote that the Catholic tradition calls for a society which, “is not directed against the market, but demands that the market be appropriately controlled by the forces of society and by the state to assure that the basic needs of the whole society are satisfied” (Pope John Paul II 1991).

Because of the general lack of institutional hierarchy among white Evangelical Protestant churches, it is more difficult to pin down the views of their leaders. However, the dominant position of Evangelical leadership, according to Michael Lienesch, is to believe in the market and oppose all forms of government interference, including redistribution (Lienesch 1993).1

By comparison, Mainline Protestant leadership tends to speak much less favorably of the market than Evangelical leadership. As can be seen in the following statement from the Presbyterian Church U.S.A., Mainline Protestant leadership generally argues that there is a necessary role for government to play in the market, though not as strongly as the Catholic Church.2 “Presbyterian General Assemblies [supports] a federal economic policy which is humane and sensitive to the needs of persons; taxes on the basis of equity; and, while supporting private initiative, does not allow private interests to trample the poor, disenfranchised or unemployed (Presbyterian Church U.S.A 2004).”

In keeping with these expectations, scholars have found some evidence that Catholics are more supportive of government redistribution than are Evangelical and Mainline Protestants (Steensland et al. 2000; Hart 1996).

However, the denominational model has several limitations. Sometimes, the average position of a denomination does not fit expectations, or there is no statistical differ-

---

1 popejohnpaulii1991

2 PresbyterianChurchUSA2004
ence between the policy positions of members of different denominations. Stephen Hart, for example, finds that on certain economic policies Catholics are less supportive of government redistribution than are Protestants, contrary to what we would expect based on the denominational model (Hart 1996). Most importantly, the denominational model cannot adequately explain why, controlling for non-religious factors, members of the same church would have different policy preferences.

Religious Attitudes Model

Academic research supports the insight that people use broad ideas, including religious ones, to form their own policy opinions (Yamane 1999; Sholz and Lubell 1998; Lakoff 1996; Greeley 1988; Welch and Lege 1988). Wald, Silverman and Fridy note that religious doctrines are resources that can be used to support a number of political positions (Wald, Silverman and Fridy 2002).

But the question of how religious attitudes shape economic policy attitudes has not been fully explored. Interview research by Hart as well as Benson and Williams has found strong evidence that religious attitudes that cross denominations, such as belief in individual freedom and working together with God, are linked with certain economic viewpoints (Hart 1996, Benson and Williams 1982). However, these findings have not been tested with generally representative survey data.1 I draw upon the research of Hart as well as Benson and Williams to develop and empirically test a religious attitudes model.

In general, religious attitudes that emphasize the community are related to support for policies that redistribute wealth, while religious attitudes that emphasize the individual and specific benefits to the individual are related to opposition to policies that redistribute wealth.

Specifically, the religious attitudes model predicts:

- Belief that the individual is responsible for the direction of their lives leads to opposition to government involvement in redistribution. According to this view, the individual is self-reliant in all spheres of life, which means they individually work towards their salvation and individually work towards their economic sufficiency (Hart 1996). The individual is solely responsible for shouldering these burdens. Government redistribution is unneeded and would undermine this individual responsibility. By contrast, people who are fatalistic believe there is nothing they personally can do to alter the course of their life—the individual is reliant on outside forces for both salvation and economic prosperity.

- Being comforted by your religion is correlated with opposition to government redistribution of income. Being comforted by religion gives a person justification for their life-choices and leads to a belief that if people just follow the correct path they will be similarly rewarded (Benson and Williams 1982). This comforting reward system leads to self-satisfaction, contentment with the world and support for the status quo. With the right life choices, God provides comfort; there is no need for government redistribution.

- Belief in life after death is correlated with opposition to government redistribution of income. Certainty in life after death also gives a person justification for their life-choice. Like being comforted by religion, certainty in life after death is a similarly comforting reward system that leads to contentment with the world, support for the status quo and opposition to government redistribution (Benson and Williams 1982).

- Belief in working together with God is correlated with support for redistribution. Working together with God “where each part of the social body needs every other part, and all parts have to work together in harmony” is connected to liberal economic views (Hart 1996). In this communal, as opposed to individualistic view, people think about themselves in relation to other human beings and think of the community as an extension of God (Benson and Williams 1982). The community, including government, has a responsibility to share its resources and care for the less fortunate.

Methods

In this paper I analyze the ability of the denominational and religious attitudes models to help us understand a person’s support for government redistribution of income. The denominational and religious attitudes models are not incompatible. In fact, they can be viewed as complementary, each providing part of the explanation for how religion shapes economic views. My data come from the 1998 General Social Survey, the only year the study included questions that enable a full test of the models.

While it is possible that denomination helps shape religious attitudes, the model used in this paper treats denomination and religious attitude as if each has a separate effect. This is a reasonable assumption because the religious attitudes considered in the model exhibit wide variation throughout each denomination and there is not excessive correlation between denominations and religious attitudes.

I also model each religious attitude separately. While the four attitudes are related, each is a distinct concept.

I control for race, age, education, income, sex and party affiliation. Women have been found to have more liberal views on economic policy (Alvarez and McCaffery 2003).
Expectations for the other demographic variables are so widely known that I do not provide additional explanation.

**Results**

As can be seen in Table 1, the religious attitudes model is strongly supported by the data. Two components of the religious attitudes model, belief in individual freedom and working together with God, are more statistically significant than all other variables except income and party affiliation. Being comforted by your religion (finding inner peace and harmony) is also significant, though at a lower level. The remaining variable in the religious emphasis model, belief in life after death, is not statistically significant, though its sign is in the predicted direction.

As mentioned previously in the paper, oftentimes denomination is a relatively weak predictor of economic views. These results are stable and do not change based on alternative specifications. As expected, including measures of religiosity such as frequency of prayer, frequency of service attendance or biblical literalism, does not affect the overall results (Hart 1996; Wuthnow 1994; Wuthnow 1973).

**Conclusion: Religious Attitudes Matter**

While denomination will remain an important variable in understanding the impact of religion on policy preferences, denomination is not the whole story. Religious attitudes matter as well, and in some cases, possibly more so than denomination. As this study demonstrates, people do not always simply accept the policy positions of their church, but rather sometimes use broad religious ideas to come to their own conclusions about policy. Future research about the role of religion in politics can gain leverage by incorporating the insight that religious attitudes are important to shaping people’s policy views.

David Madland is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a Graduate Fellow at the Center for Democracy and the Third Sector (CDATS).

**References**


The New Religious Pluralism

BANCOFF

The decades since the 1960s have seen significant demographic changes. More diverse Christian and Jewish communities now exist alongside growing numbers of Muslims, Buddhists, and adherents of other faiths. The idea of a “Judeo-Christian” identity does not map onto demographic reality as it once did. It would be wrong, however, to rest the case for a new pluralism on these numbers alone. There is still a clear majority faith; more than 90% of religious Americans self-identify as Christian. A component of the new pluralism not captured by these statistics is the individualization of belief – the decline of mainline denominations and the emergence of more hybrid, personal forms of religious expression. As traditional observation has declined and established communities have fragmented, new forms of religious identity and association have proliferated.

How is this pluralism playing out in politics, in civil society and the democratic state? September 11, 2001 and subsequent bombings in Madrid and London have centered attention on Islam. The widespread public identification of Islam with terrorism, fed by fear and ignorance, has sharpened the political atmosphere. In response to anti-Muslim prejudice and restrictions on civil liberties that disproportionately affect Arab and Muslim Americans, the Islamic community has begun to mobilize more effectively. President George Bush has publicly insisted that Islam is a religion of peace, that Christians and Muslims pray to the same God, and that terrorists are a violent minority. Other mainstream political leaders have echoed the same themes. The idea that the Abrahamic faiths constitute a shared religious and cultural heritage is a powerful, but contested one. Whether American civil religion and the “Judeo-Christian heritage” can make room for Islam – and Islam can fit in – will be a crucial issue in decades to come.

There is another political front in the new religious pluralism – the place of non-monotheistic traditions in civil society and the state. Recent controversies about the public display of the Ten Commandments or the “under God” clause of the Pledge of Allegiance have reproduced the familiar religious/secular divides of the culture wars. But increasing religious pluralism has muddied the picture. In the Commandments case an amicus curiae brief introduced by Buddhist and Hindu groups asserted that “Non-Judeo-Christians,” who “do not adhere to the religious views that the Ten Commandments either state or symbolize cannot fail to perceive the placement of such a monument on the grounds of the Texas Capitol as an endorsement of Judeo-Christian beliefs over their own.” Justice John Paul Stevens, in dissenting from the majority opinion allowing for such displays under certain circumstances, embraced this line of argument. Any such monument, he argued, would “run
and their systems of governance. The basic idea behind such inquiries is that broadly shared values facilitate distinct forms of political development. In this same vein, some have noted the lack of democratic development in the Arab world and have argued that the shared cultural values of Muslims are antithetical to democratic development and stability (Kedourie 1994; Huntington 1996). They maintain that this situation stems from the aims of Islamic law to regulate the personal, social, and political aspects of daily life in an authoritarian manner.

Despite these assertions, there is increasing evidence that most populations around the world, including those living in predominantly Muslim countries, are supportive of democracy or important components thereof. For example, Meyer et al. (1998) demonstrate that religious orthodoxy does not dampen Kuwaiti citizens' enthusiasm for extending the rights of citizenship to women or stateless people. Along similar lines, Grant and Tessler (2002) use attitudinal surveys from Palestinian citizens to examine potential links between Islam and democratic ideas. Their findings suggest that those voicing support for political Islam are also likely to believe that Islam and democracy are compatible. In addition, for many Palestinians, support for political Islam is associated with a high degree of political tolerance. Similarly, other scholars, such as Rose (2002), Tessler (2002), and al-Braizat (2002) did not find that being Muslim, adhering to Islamic beliefs, or being devoted to religion discouraged support for democracy. Given these outcomes, Grant and Tessler argue that "Islam is not the obstacle to democratization that some analysts assert" (2002:16). Evidence from these studies and others suggests that Islam is far from monolithic and that a good number of Arab citizens embrace at least some important democratic values, including tolerance, which conveys a willingness to bring others into the political fold and is a potential precursor to democratic politics. These studies challenge generalizations that suggest that popular legitimation of democratic regimes does not exist in the Middle East.

Other aspects of religion also have important empirical associations with democratic development. Patterson (2004) found that religious intensity or devoutness rather than religious affiliation influenced democratic values in Argentina and Chile. The more religiously devout individuals exhibited stronger support for democratic regimes than the citizenry at large. In our research we focus on both the influence of broader religious cultures of a society and of individuals' religious practices on democratic sentiment. In particular, our research addresses: 1) whether the citizens of predominantly Islamic countries exhibit less support for democracy than those from other countries;

Greater religious diversity and the mobilization of non-monotheistic faiths raise questions about the relationship of religion and democracy in the US. Some see a necessary connection between monotheism and democratic stability. In a speech last year, for example, Justice Antonin Scalia approvingly cited a 1940s Supreme Court opinion: “We are a religious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Historically, there is a sense in which he is right. A coalition of Protestants and deists crafted American political institutions, and Christians subsequently dominated them. A substantial majority of American still believe in God. But there is no logical connection between monotheism and democracy, as a quick glance abroad demonstrates. Only one in six Swedes believes in God. Japan and India are stable democracies. Wherever one comes down on the proper relationship between religion and politics and church and state, it is wrong to construe a necessary conflict between greater religious pluralism, on the one hand, and the health of democracy, on the other. In years to come, much will turn on whether American civil religion – the shared norms and narratives that bind the national political community – can accommodate a more plural landscape marked by greater diversity and the political mobilization of traditions outside the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Greater religious diversity and the mobilization of non-monotheistic faiths raise questions about the relationship of religion and democracy in the US.

---

Thomas Banchoff is Associate Professor, Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, and Director of Georgetown University's Initiative on Religion, Politics, and Peace (trpp.georgetown.edu). He is editor of Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism, forthcoming with Oxford University Press.
and 2) whether various aspects of religious engagement are associated with democratic support.

**Analytic Approach**

The extension of the fourth wave of the world values survey to numerous Muslim countries provides an opportunity to examine the extent of citizens’ support for democracy in Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike. We use a sample of 46 countries, resulting in 72,251 individual surveys. While examining the association between religion and democracy in these nations, we confront some limits in prior research. First, studies involving religion usually view it as either a structural characteristic, such as the prevalence of religious denominations in a nation, or as a personal one, such as the beliefs and practices of individual citizens (e.g., al-Braizat 2002; Grant and Tessler 2002). The recent development of analytic methods that can simultaneously manage both macro-structural and micro-individual estimators makes it possible to see how both sets of factors influence citizens’ support for democracy. We use a multi-level approach to model citizens’ democratic attitudes as the outcome of not only their personal beliefs and practices but also of the broader context in which they reside. We theorize that individuals’ support for democracy or lack thereof springs from their own theologies and observances. But, the structure of a nation’s broader religious culture also forms the background for personal religiosity and, in turn, is influenced by it (Tope et al. 2005).

Also, we consider important interactions. Though often elaborate in detail, research on the compatibility of Islam and democracy often skims over potentially important interactions between religious beliefs and practices and political opinions. Thus, many case-based analyses may be accurate without being “dead-right” (see Demerath 2003). Put in analytic terms, theoretical models remain under-identified. It is important to know if individual citizens’ religious beliefs and practices are associated with their support for democracy or if the influence is more nuanced for certain groups or types of individuals or for populations from nations that have particular features or histories.

**Findings**

Our findings contribute substantially to understanding associations between religion and democracy. As far as the influence of general Islamic culture, we find that residents of predominantly Muslim states voice democratic support at levels similar to residents of other countries. Somewhat surprisingly, citizens from predominantly Muslim societies voice greater support than do residents of the former-Soviet nations of Eastern Europe. In terms of religious practice, our findings illustrate that net of other factors, self-identified religiously devout people tend to be highly supportive of democracy. Yet, whether individuals regularly attend church, synagogue, or mosque is not related to their opinions of democracy. Membership in higher status (e.g., gender, occupation, and education) groups is associated with high levels of democratic support.

Perhaps our most intriguing finding is from the interaction between citizens’ political activity and advocating a blend of religion and politics. All else being equal, individuals who are highly politically active and believe in blending religion with politics tend to be among the most anti-democratic citizens. This finding is highly significant and robust across a number of statistical models.

In addition, our analysis indicates that some national structural arrangements matter for citizens’ democratic support. Individuals from highly globalized countries view democracy positively. Those from nations with a Communist legacy, however, are much more likely to hold a pessimistic view of democracy. This helps explain why residents of former-Soviet countries tend to hold a lower view of democracy than do those residing in predominantly Islamic countries. More generally, only a small percentage (6 to 8 percent) of the variation in democratic support can be explained by the broad structural components of countries. The beliefs, activities, and social statuses of individuals demonstrated much greater influence in citizens’ opinions of democratic governance.
Chu et al. (2001) argue that the realization of democracy necessitates "sustained, internalized belief in and commitment to the legitimacy of democracy among the citizenry at large." Although the Arab world stands apart from other countries in terms of its movement toward democracy, its citizens appear to be no less supportive of democratic advancement than those in other regions of the globe. Religious engagement in general, even in Muslim countries, appears to be more of a help than a hindrance to citizen democratic support. Yet, it appears that particular activist-oriented subgroups seeking to impose religious guidelines on the state are those most likely to be democracy’s detractors.

Much of the recent discourse on religion and democracy makes broad claims about religious cultures and whether they impede democratization. Arguments that particular religious faiths are inimical to democratic development are tenuous at best. Country-level arrangements are no doubt important for political maintenance and change. But, the assumed influence of these factors should be tempered by nuanced analyses that consider citizen proclivities and traits as well as broader cultural and political contexts. Recent advances in the availability of survey data from understudied populations make such analyses possible. The growth in this area presents an excellent opportunity to extend knowledge in numerous areas pertinent to current events of interest to scholars and the world at large.

Daniel Tope is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at the Ohio State University. His research focuses on politics, social movements, and labor issues.

Katherine Meyer is Professor of Sociology and Associate Provost at the Ohio State University. She has numerous publications on religion, gender, politics and democracy, especially in the Middle East.

References


gies, but also to the freedom the religious establishment has had – to open schools and centers, distribute publications, teach, and preach a way of life, thereby cultivating a societal moral consciousness shaped by the authority of Islam. Advice in decision-making, including legal decisions, continues to be sought from religious authorities who receive a traditional “licensing” in the law of Islam not from any state agency but the personal authorization of a recognized sheikh. Religious leaders do at times parrot state rhetoric, even with conviction. They also enjoy considerable leeway to promote religion and even introduce it into the national discourse, forcing state circles to respond with their own conceptualization of Islam. The secularist, socialist state has become a player in the game of defining religion – a game it does not have the authority to win in the end, even if it has shown some success in playing it.

State legitimacy has been framed largely in terms of the economic needs of the people and commercial aspirations of the private sector. Religion too, as a sector incorporated into the state, has become a constituency to be patronized. The state has funded a now widespread network of elementary-level centers, often attached to mosques, for the memorization of the Qur’ān. Degree-granting programs, through the doctorate, have been opened under the supervision of the religious establishment, e.g. at Abū Nur and Masjid al-Fath. Aside from the religion curriculum of state schools, which functions to promote the pan-Arabism of Ba’thist ideology, popular education in Islam as provided by the religious establishment serves other purposes. It introduces Islam into the life of the nation in a way that goes beyond the symbolism of its constitutional status as the religion of the president and a possible source of legislation. To be sure, the state monitors religious activity, but its existence outside state institutions has worked to preserve, even strengthen, the influence of religion.

This can explain recent state concessions to Islam: the decision to allow prayer, a kind of religious association, in the military; and the licenses granted to the first Islamic banks. Who is coopting whom? Is the state going Islamic? No, but it cannot neglect the religiously imbued loyalties and aspirations of its people. The few members of parliament known to represent Islam, there as a way to integrate Islam into the state, bring an official sanction to their proposed measures in the name of Islam. Their project, for example, to renew “religious speech” (al-khitāb al-dini) does coincide with state interests in defining “true” Islam as a moderate religion, but it also awards Islam an effective, nationally recognized position from which to speak to contemporary society.

While the path to liberalization seems a never-ending process, it is worth asking about Islamic political parties in Syria’s future. The recent Tenth Ba’th Party Congress called for – even if it did not formulate details for implementing – change, including non-state-regulated political parties. This, however, is limited to secularly – not religiously or ethnically-oriented parties. Given the weakness of the secular opposition, the viability of such parties will depend on their ability to form alliances with the state-banned religious opposition. The state has made clear it will not tolerate this. A combined secular-religious opposition, however, is not the only scenario for the political future of Islam in Syria.

MPs who represent Islam, having unsuccessfully requested state reconsideration of religiously oriented parties, still discuss publicly the importance of political representation that is religious but does not reduce religion to politics. This, to them, would lead not to the politicization of Islam, but the preservation of its moral integrity. Allowing Islam a public voice in the form of political parties as so conceived would effectively allow the religion to address popular sentiment, shape the moral discourse of the nation, and prevent the politicization of Islam by extremist elements claiming to speak in the name of God. Religious actors are thus seeking to ensure the societal influence of Islam in view of anticipated change but with the goal of Islam as moral authority not political end. Implicit in this strategizing is a conception of Islam as civic-minded religion where toleration, not coercion, is paramount principle: an affirmation of religious pluralism emerging from within religious circles committed to preventing the distortion of Islam by extremists, who, in the opinion of these MPs, would undermine its credibility as formative agent of the moral fabric of Syrian society.

Islam in Syria is in a position to participate in and even facilitate the political transformation envisioned by the state and demanded by current domestic and regional challenges. This is not to suggest a one-to-one correspondence between state and religion thinking on a pluralistic future – even within a Ba’thist framework – but rather a partnership, wherein both sides have goals of self-preservation that may produce unexpected results. The religion, seeking to protect its moral authority, is showing signs of
framing at least the beginnings of democratic procedure. Wherever things end up, it is at the very least necessary for us to revise our perception of religion in Syria. Along with other sectors, amidst shifting circumstances and needs, religion needs to be taken into account in explaining (civil) society within the context of the authoritarian state.

Paul L. Heck, Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from the University of Chicago, has been at Georgetown University since 2004 as Assistant Professor (Theology Department). He has been visiting Syria since 1994 and considers Damascus a second home.

Endnotes


2 A. Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad, Freiburg 1998.

3 For example: R. Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, London 2001; and V. Perthes, Syria under Bashar al-Asad. Modernisation and the Limits of Change, Oxford 2004. This is not to depreciate the value of these works, but to suggest the need for more nuanced analysis of religion in the study of Syria.


7 The Arab press has not failed to call into question Syrian Ba’thism, e.g. a three-part series appearing on the front page of the “analysis” section of the Lebanese al-Nahâr (February 4, 5, and 6, 2004).

8 For example, in Dârây, a town a few miles from Damascus. M. Kilû, “Sujanâ’ Dârây,” al-Nahâr, January 24, 2004, p. 18. A group of young people, inspired specifically by Islam, began to work to eradicate local corruption (perhaps the most serious flaw of government institutions in Syria); to educate the populace in local problem-solving, in rights as safe-guarded by Islam, and in various sciences and job skills; and to mobilize local action for environment protection, religious tolerance and the extra-judiciary settlement of local disputes. Kilû, a well-known Syrian advocate of civil society, concludes, “Perhaps the uniqueness of the experience [in Dârây] resides in the capacity of non-partisan youth, members of Syria’s civil society, to advance a civil reading of Islam that led them to a political engagement with the problems of their small community that can serve as a model for a [similar] engagement with the problems of the other cities and towns of Syria, in all of which are youth resembling the youth of Dârây.”


10 For example, Älmad Kufûrû (d. 2004), former long-standing Grand Mufti of Syria and leader of the Naqshbani-Khâlídi Sufi order, who was known for his promotion of Sufi-Salafi rapprochement.


enlighten women's voluntary associations – an important base for women's social participation and involvement. The research included a range of women's associations – ten in all. The leaders of the ten associations were interviewed extensively and a sample of 125 members was surveyed during January - March 1998. Leaders were identified through a snowball technique that began with colleagues and key informants at Kuwait University and then leaders distributed the surveys to their active members. The leaders provided information about the background, goals, structure and activities of their organizations, especially on the topic of women's political rights. Both leaders and members were asked about their perceptions of women's problems, descriptions of their activism and routine political participation, and their attitudes toward including women more fully in Kuwaiti society and politics.

A divide between the more numerous service organizations and the professional women's groups existed. The leaders of the professional associations supported the notion that achieving women's formal political rights was an important goal. The leaders of the service organizations were more concerned with religious and social service activities than obtaining political rights for women. A few, especially among the Islamist service associations, were even opposed to granting such political rights based on religious interpretations that claim that Islam forbids women to govern or rule.

Moreover, there were divisions among the professional groups that prevented them from working together to achieve women's political rights, in part based on differences in religious worldviews. Two of the professional organizations were more secular in outlook while the third was an Islamist group. More specifically, the Islamist professionals did not want to separate religion from politics, especially in terms of women's rights. They argued that Islam respects women and that God gave women political rights through the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Thus, Kuwaiti society is being un-Islamic by denying women these rights. On the other hand, the secular groups preferred to keep Islam out of the debate on women's rights, even though they were religious individuals and agreed with the Islamists that women have a respected place within Islam. In separate interviews, these leaders expressed their feeling that some men misinterpret or misuse Islam in order to justify keeping women out of politics. Instead, they preferred to use a more secular argument – that women deserved formal political rights because they were citizens of an emerging democratic society.

When examining the members' attitudes and perspectives, I found that Islam was not inherently incompatible with support for gender equality and women's public participation. Religious beliefs and practices were not barriers for members of both types of groups in either their political participation or in their support for women's citizenship rights. Instead, holding strong Islamic beliefs (adhering to the theology; orthodoxy) was compatible with support for extending political rights to women even after controlling for other factors. Thus, as the growth of religious feminism around the world attests, secularization at the individual level is not a necessary condition to supporting women's rights and political participation.

Kuwait is an important case study because it has arguably gone the furthest of any Gulf state in the process of democratization and development of civil society. It demonstrates
the potential to combine democratic practices, especially women's empowerment, with a religious citizenry. The current conservative, Islamist-dominated parliament (which holds 21 of the 50 seats in parliament) voted on May 16, 2005 to give women the right to vote and run for political office starting in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Less than one month later, on June 12, 2005, the emir appointed the first woman to the cabinet, Massouma al-Mubarak, as well as appointing the first two women to the municipal council earlier in the month. Kuwait women's rights supporters have finally won the battle for formal political rights. Thus Kuwait has joined its Gulf neighbors in the wave of increasing women's rights to political participation, which has intensified in the last five years. Female citizens in Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and now Kuwait have gained the rights of voting and holding political office.13

The divisions over democratization and women's rights in Kuwait are very similar to debates found across the Middle East. Many countries in the region such as Bahrain, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq and Afghanistan are ambivalent about women's roles and public participation due to the desire to “modernize” while maintaining “tradition”.14 More specifically, we find in Kuwait and in the Middle East more broadly that those who support women's rights tend to be professional women, secular and Islamic feminists, those who believe in Arab nationalism, some liberals and secularists, those who hold orthodox religious beliefs, Shia Islamists, members of formal voluntary organizations, those who follow the media regularly, and urban residents. In contrast, groups that do not support women's rights tend to be women who believe in “traditional” gender roles, Sunni Islamists, rural residents and members of tribal groups, and citizens who support more traditional religious practices.15 Thus, the relationship between religion and democratization, particularly women's empowerment, is complex. We find religious people in both camps of the women's rights debates across the Middle East. However, Kuwait demonstrates that a Muslim country with a religious population can implement democratic reform by increasing women's rights, moving closer to full democratization and gender equality.

HELEN RIZZO is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the American University in Cairo and can be reached at hrizzo@aucegypt.edu. Her article is based on her recent book with Routledge Press (2005) entitled, Islam, Democracy and the Status of Women: The Case of Kuwait.

ENDNOTES


8 Ibid., 2.


- Ion Ratiu Democracy Lecture Award

CDATS is pleased to announce that professor Sergio Aguayo from El Colegio de Mexico has been chosen as the first annual Ion Ratiu Democracy Lecture award recipient. On November 8, Professor Aguayo held his inaugural lecture titled “Mexican Democracy and the 2006 Presidential Elections” at Georgetown University.

The inauguration of the Ion Ratiu Democracy Lecture expresses the deep commitment to democracy of the late Ion Ratiu, the prominent Romanian statesman and philanthropist who worked to build democratic governance in his native country and around the world. The Ratiu Family has long been a generous contributor to Georgetown University, endowing the Ratiu Chair in Romanian Studies in the Walsh School of Foreign Service.

CDATS is proud to consider the Lecture among its most important activities. In addition to honoring the work and accomplishments of an individual through formal presentation and reception, the lectureship includes opportunities to interact with faculty and students and to meet with groups in Washington that are active in efforts to strengthen democracy and improve the quality of political life.

- To sign up, go to www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/mailinglist.htm or email us at cdatsnews@georgetown.edu
ed by man’s freedom and his ever-evolving opportunities, all within the bounds of society. This does not signal the end of religion, but rather a radical change of its legitimization. Traditionally, it was religious authority that defined the limits and borders of secular power; now it is political power that defines the limits of expression of religion. This concept of laity has gradually evolved and taken on a specific identity according to its nation of origin: French laity is different from that of Italy, and both differ from German and English models. The new process of legitimization of political power is common to all models and is pivotal to democracy itself; in the words of Marcel Gauchet (1998), since the three modern revolutions (English, American and French), power is no longer dictated from “upon high” but is instead much more down to earth and “on man’s level.” Thus democratic power, totally free from the transcendent, represents only itself and the free will of those who use it as a medium. If, traditionally, politics was defined by its relationship with religion, the tables have now completely turned (Michel 1994).

This reversal, which we shall briefly concentrate upon, also has consequences in the religious sphere. As a result of “democratic mentality” and growing pluralism at the center of various European contexts, the relationship with the sacred is undergoing profound changes (Giordan 2003; Pace 1997). Traditionally, this relationship was formed by obedience to official institutions of belief: the central aspect of belief was represented by the loyalty to dogma and liturgy and conforming to moral rules. Of course, personal belief never went perfectly hand in hand with Church teachings, but the possibility of regulated reintegration was offered by the sanctions of confession and penitence. The relationship with the sacred was thus “surveyed” thanks to doctrine: various unacceptable actions and their necessary punishment were stabilized, as were virtuous actions and their successive rewards. The borders between belief and non-belief were clear-cut and unquestionable, as were those who decided what to do and how to pray. Christian history can be read again in the light of negotiation between institutional dictates and the free expression of individual and group religiousness.

The transition from tradition to modernity and the growing emphasis on the individual’s freedom of choice has redefined the signs that regulate access to the sacred. No longer are there “traffic lights” which stabilize and control the flow of belief in a heteronomous manner; now there are “roundabouts” which ensure that passage is open to all and voyagers may choose when and how to enter the game. The roundabout mentality is certainly more democratic than that of the traffic lights, however it is not the case of judging one system as “better” or “worse” but merely contrasting diverse dynamics and their consequences for those negotiating the system.

The term “spirituality” has been part of the sociological debate regarding religious phenomenon for at least the past decade and this term is used with dialectic tension, if not in opposition to that of “religion” (Roof 1993 and 1999; Wuthnow 1998; Fuller 2001; Heelas 2002). Heelas and Woodhead (2005) have recently been speaking about “spiritual revolution.” This refers to both the progressive shattering of traditional forms of belief which were centred around the practice of liturgical rites and obedience to the moral laws dictated by traditional churches, and also to the progressive assertion of a new type of relationship with the sacred. This new relationship with the sacred is based on individual choice – the importance attributed to personal experience and the need for well-being, the meaning of daily tasks, and the desire to creatively express one’s own feelings and emotions. It is possible to consider two different models, which may be partly integrated: the “religious model” is based on official institutions of belief and the “spirituality model,” which does not exclude symbolic resources and traditional religious belief, but is based on an individual’s free choice and needs.

It is this very concept of “spirituality,” so in need of deeper study at both a theoretical and empirical level, which is subject to the shifting axis of legitimization of the experience of the sacred in the democratic and pluralist West. The repositioning of the experience of the aforesaid with the transcendent in “acceptably democratic” terms has rendered the “delegation” of the meaning itinerary somewhat marginal and residual. Democracy thus seems to supply the language and context for the regulation of the relationship between politics and religion and also for the co-habitation of different religious traditions and different movements of the same religion. Whilst traditional religions, which were based on the principle of exclusive identity, marked borders and indicated differences, contemporary spirituality seems more open to diversity and to the recognition of the legitimacy of the plural routes which may guide us to the sacred.

Comprehending one’s own religious identity in a spiritual manner does not mean that one must dilute or negate the plausibility and the foundations of personal conviction: doing so would be to fall into a dangerous form of relativism. More simply, the democratization of the sacred would...
prevent the diverse moral and ritual forms of different religious traditions from clashing in their desire exclusively to affirm their reason and uniqueness regarding the truth. In a world which is ever-more global and pluralist, only by respecting others can religion be re-defined without the negation of both its own traditions and those of others. Obviously, the "spiritualization of religion" which places the liberty of the individual at the centre, rather than just the obedience to institutional authority, opens our minds to the possibility of other beliefs and to reciprocal respect. The legitimization of one’s own religious convictions will thus no longer be founded on the discrediting and repudiation of other beliefs. Beyond defusing possible conflict, accepting the challenge of a comparison with others may lead to a deeper analysis of personal beliefs and stripping the aforesaid of any controversial and apologetic elements. In this manner, religion would no longer be an obstacle for democracy and many more or less hidden conflicts in various European nations (this would be even more decisive for Muslim countries) would be reassembled and reinstated in terms of “normal” public debates.

The democratic political system should no longer fear comparison with different religious traditions. These religious points of reference may offer significant added value to the co-habitation of different cultures, lifestyles, and social and cultural traditions in the common effort to make solid and credible the robust form of shared rules. This democratization of the sacred in spiritual terms may be an antidote to fundamentalism, both Islamic and Christian. As stated at the outset, the result of the process of secularization does not mark the end of religion, but rather the return of a “personal religious” element which is safeguarded from political and ethnic exploitation. It is frightening that the cry for peace of practically all religious leaders is neglected by those who profess to belong to these very religions. "Spiritualization" of religion could open the doors for communication and the “democratic” welcome for the challenge to accept diversity and comparison. It must be noted that as part of the move of the democratization process, both ways of believing and “ways of making us believe” must change. Religious institutions are already moving in this direction, even if they sometimes seem still to be weighed down by historical incrustation connected to social and cultural models which are far removed from contemporary democratic mentality.

---

**References**


---

**Contemporary spirituality seems more open to diversity and to the recognition of the legitimacy of the plural routes which may guide us to the sacred.**

In this manner, religion would no longer be an obstacle for democracy and many more or less hidden conflicts in various European nations (this would be even more decisive for Muslim countries) would be reassembled and reinstated in terms of “normal” public debates.

The democratic political system should no longer fear comparison with different religious traditions. These religious points of reference may offer significant added value to the co-habitation of different cultures, lifestyles, and social and cultural traditions in the common effort to make solid and credible the robust form of shared rules.
On March 2, 2005, the CDATS “Quality of Democracy” speaker series hosted a lecture by Professor Seyla Benhabib, the Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University. Benhabib presented a paper drawn from her latest book, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), which derived from her delivery of the Seeley Lectures at the University of Cambridge. The book has since received the best book award of the North American Society for Social Philosophy, and it was also the co-winner of the Ralph Bunche Award of the American Political Science Association.

The symposium that follows includes three sets of comments on Benhabib’s book, which provide different perspectives on its arguments and contributions, followed by a response by Benhabib. Dario Castiglione, a Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Exeter and a CDATS Visiting Faculty Fellow in 2003-2004, focuses on Benhabib’s discussion of the “right to have rights.” Gerald Mara, Professorial Lecturer in the Department of Government at Georgetown and Executive Associate Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, addresses the implications of Benhabib’s argument about the need for “democratic iterations” that would engage citizens while also ensuring greater and broader human and citizenship rights. Andrew Tucker, a recent Georgetown Ph.D. in political theory, tackles the “paradox of democratic legitimacy” raised by Benhabib’s work, as well as her proposal for “democratic iterations” that will strengthen the quality of citizenship and democracy. Seyla Benhabib then responds to her commentators, providing some of the intellectual history that led to the writing of *The Rights of Others* and engaging the comments raised by Castiglione, Mara, and Tucker.

As the contributions to this symposium make clear, *The Rights of Others* is a rare and remarkable combination of informed political theorizing and contemporary empirical application to real world challenges.

**Dario Castiglione**

One of the central points of Seyla Benhabib’s thought-provoking book on *The Rights of Others* is her interpretation of the “right to have rights,” and how this applies to aliens. She rightly suggests that the “right to have rights” has many meanings. I would here like to expound on her discussion. There are, I think, three main meanings to the expression, and three different views of citizenship emanating from them. The view proposed by Benhabib in turn gives rise to two different interpretations.

First, the “right to have rights” can be taken as the recognition of the citizen as the “bearer of rights.” This is a citizenship-as-rights model, fundamentally liberal, individualistic, and mainly passive. Such an interpretation has recently been signaled (though not endorsed) by Will Kymlicka, who cites the use made of the expression in the 1958 American Constitutional Court decision on *Trop v Dulles.* I shall refer to this as the “liberal” version for brevity’s sake.

Second, we can talk of the “right to have rights” as the recognition of the citizen’s “claim to participation” in a community of equals. Jeremy Waldron has defended such a conception by referring to what William Cobbett called the “right of rights.” This meaning reverses the liberal interpretation, stressing the importance of active participation, and of the role that the citizens themselves play in both establishing and defining their common rights. I shall refer to this as the “democratic” version.

Benhabib argues for an interpretation, starting from Hannah Arendt, that is different from either of the previous two. Contrary to Waldron’s democratic interpretation, Benhabib’s interpretation does not logically involve active participation (though it may not exclude it either). Contrary to the liberal view, this third interpretation tends to distinguish the general claim to have rights (a moral claim) from the particular claims engendered by the rights themselves (legal claims).

I wish to suggest that there are two possible interpretations for the meaning proposed by Benhabib, and that these two meanings incline towards the democratic and the liberal versions respectively. The meaning inclined towards the democratic version is implicitly suggested by Hannah Arendt, who formulates the “right to have rights” as a claim to membership – in a political community, rather than in a culturally or ethnically defined community. This “right,” as Arendt suggests, is paradoxical, for it can only be recognized in negative terms, as when it is lost. I believe this is why Arendt rules out
that such a right could have been formulated in the 18th century, for the contemporary conception saw rights as emanating directly from nature. As Arendt observes, it is only when we are excluded from the community in which we are born that the importance of such a right becomes clear. For the same reason, it is only within political communities — and not as a member of a general humanity — that one can have one’s right of membership recognized. Accordingly, Arendt insists on the concrete nature of such a right to membership: a right to action rather than to generic freedom; a right to hold opinions rather than to a generic freedom of thought.

Partly following Frank Michelman, Benhabib gives a different twist to this interpretation of “a right to have rights,” suggesting that such a right amounts to the recognition of “legal personality.” In other words, a person’s dignity (as a member of humanity in general) can only be fully recognized within a legal system through its civil and political features. The difference between these two interpretations is subtle, but nonetheless real. Benhabib’s reading of the “right to have rights” has different universalistic implications than the one suggested by Arendt, and takes us closer to the liberal version. The implication of this interpretation can be seen in relation to her conception of the development of EU citizenship.

EU citizenship started as a series of “liberties” and “guarantees” functional to the freedom of movement necessary for the construction of a common market. In essence, this was a sort of market citizenship. Since Maastricht, European citizenship has acquired a more political dimension, but its logic is still that of complementing, rather than replacing, national citizenship. Yet, European citizenship has shown to have a rather expansionist quality, extending to both economically inactive persons and third country nationals. The figure of third country nationals, comprising mainly economic migrants, is perhaps the greatest test of the porosity allowed by the normative definition of European citizenship, and of whether this can be taken beyond both its original market-based view and its present narrow political dimension.

It appears to me that Benhabib’s analysis of how this may happen is based on a paradigm of citizenship resting entirely on the inclusionary/exclusionary model made popular by Brubaker’s study of France and Germany. This model is based on the rules of membership, which, however important, fail to capture the true democratic role of modern citizenship. For European citizenship to be able to provide a normative model with a more expanded conception of the Demos, as suggested by Benhabib, we need to look beyond the law at a more active and socially engaged conception of citizenship, one where the boundaries between political and social activism are fundamentally re-drawn.

**Endnotes**


**Gerald Mara**

Seyla Benhabib’s *The Rights of Others* is an important and compelling attempt to connect developments in political theory with efforts to extend citizen rights and protections. For Benhabib, new forms of political theory and practice are necessary because of unprecedented dilemmas. Bringing war criminals to justice, preventing genocidal civil conflicts, and managing pressures created by increasing numbers of migrants and refugees pose challenges that cannot be met by the nation state system or outmoded forms of political thought (16).

Benhabib uses discourse ethics to argue for extending citizenship rights to those denied them within the nation state system. Pragmatically, she calls for civic practices designated as democratic iterations to revisit and recraft terms of political membership (179). Discourse ethics allows the formulation of universal norms without depending on an untenable and premodern metaphysics. Democratic iterations can institutionalize universal imperatives while taking seriously particular needs and shared meanings. The resulting politics depends less on sovereign pronouncements of states and more on the active involvement of citizens. Such democratic iterations contribute to a cosmopolitan federalism that is neither world government nor the retention of Westphalian state sovereignty.

This book’s most important virtue is its stimulation of critical thinking about innovative political possibilities and modes of political thought. There are three areas in which further conversation should occur.

First, Benhabib’s assessments should encourage consideration of positive roles for state sovereignty in establishing human rights norms. Historically, the contribution of nations to establishing human rights extends from the formulation of the Universal Declaration in 1948 (cf. Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, Princeton, 2001, pp. 5-6) to Benhabib’s own example of pre-EU attempts by the Schleswig-Holstein provincial assembly to extend voting rights to non-nationals holding citizenship in reciprocating countries (202-3). More generally, improving and extending human rights policies within nations can be stimulated by recognizing commitments and prohibitions that other sovereign
states take seriously enough to enforce through the rule of law. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision that found the death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional took its bearings in part from the established practices of other states.

Second, Benhabib’s use of discourse ethics provides an opportunity to revisit the strengths and limitations of that approach. For all of discourse ethics’ careful development, there is something arbitrary about the claim that we inhabit a postmetaphysical age, if being postmetaphysical means getting past attempts to articulate needs and responsibilities defined by membership in the human species. It is not clear that attempts to move beyond substantive considerations of a human being’s needs or capabilities (Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s term) can or should succeed, especially in contexts where deeper and more extended civic conversations are essential. Benhabib’s insistence that we think postmetaphysically arises from a critique of Enlightenment social contract theories (129–130). Yet while her criticisms plausibly apply to these targets, they do not undercut all approaches to the human in political theory. Plato and Aristotle treat the relation of nature, culture, and the content of the human as matters of unresolved but persistent concern. Closer to home, serious conversations over the resignification of rights and identities, Benhabib’s preferred outcome in debates over the wearing of scarves by French Muslim women (193–7), themselves seem incomplete absent considerations of how ethnic, religious or gender memberships can develop or retard human needs and possibilities. Retaining a concern for the significance of the human would counter those who “reduce the demands of morality to the claims of specific ethical, cultural and political communities” (15).

Finally, Benhabib’s enthusiasm for democratic iterations encourages attempts to identify aspects of democracy that not only accommodate but also resist cosmopolitan norms. This need is suggested by the recent rejections of the proposed EU constitution in France and the Netherlands through democratic referenda. Modern democratic theory often assumes that enhancing prospects for rational interaction or constructive political engagements is inextricably linked to the expansion and deepening of democracy. Influences that strengthen communicative rationality or energize participatory politics are democratic. Those that distort communication or debase political engagement are foreign invaders that weaken or pathologize an otherwise healthy organism. Is this perhaps too simple? The metaphors we use to compare democratic politics may need to be extended beyond scope (more or less) and strength (stronger or weaker) to include considerations of quality (better or worse).

These conversations can continue in a variety of ways and Benhabib would surely see some directions and advances as more fruitful than others. There can be no doubt, however, about the importance of these questions or about Seyla Benhabib’s contributions by raising them with the utmost urgency and greatest clarity.

Andrew Tucker

Two of the unsuccessful suicide bombers who targeted the London Tube and bus network in July are legal immigrants. Perhaps inevitably, the British tabloid press has interpreted this fact as an indictment of all immigrants, legal and illegal, for being insufficiently British (whatever that means) and demanded that their rights – civil, political, welfare, cultural – be rescinded. That these would-be Islamic martyrs were given sanctuary by British society as children from civil war elsewhere is not portrayed as a source of national pride but as a vulnerability to international terrorism. What rights then should “aliens” be accorded and what rights can they demand? Benhabib’s exemplary new book stakes out the ground where these difficult questions can be answered.

In this short review, I shall only address two – one conceptual, the other methodological – of the various important arguments that underpin her case and are substantively related. I choose these because they are suggestive of where democratic theorists might turn for answers.

First, Benhabib conceptualizes the paradox of democratic legitimacy. That is, “those whose rights to inclusion and exclusion from the demos are being decided upon will not themselves be the ones to decide upon these rules” (206). This is paradoxical in that it exposes the limitations of deliberation as a normative goal of democratic politics caught between universal human rights and the sovereign legitimacy of self-defining peoples. According to deliberative theorists, all those affected by a collective decision must have the opportunity to be included in the decision-making process. At the same time, sovereign legitimacy is traditionally territorial and therefore exclusionary. This paradox has become central to democratic politics following the demise of the Westphalian system of nation states under pressure from globalization, the inadequacy of distributive justice models to deal with migration claims, and the confused moral basis of legal mechanisms of membership. Caught in the middle of these currents are stateless refugees claiming human rights from sovereign nations that are under varying legal obligations to recognize them.

Benhabib focuses on the moral imperative to offer criteria by which aliens can be incorporated into full rights-
bearing citizenship. Incorporation is usually achieved gradually through a multi-stage process, beginning with social benefits like health care and concluding with political rights of participation and representation. But, because aliens by definition lack the full participatory rights of citizens, others must speak on their behalf in the political process. The conceptual question to be addressed is how these informal representatives, such as associations and religious community leaders, may be judged legitimate and representative of aliens’ interests and beliefs. Solving this problem offers the potential to cut the Gordian knot linking territoriality, representation, and democratic voice that Benhabib concludes prevents progress on this question (219).

Second, she offers a highly productive methodology. Benhabib seeks to bridge the gap between normative political theory and the political sociology of the modern state by focusing on what she calls “democratic iterations.” These are “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized . . . throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society” (179). The iterative process is driven both by the analytical rigor practiced by democratic theorists and the rough and tumble of democratic politics practiced by human rights campaigners. Democratic iterations are essential to the health and vibrancy of our democracies because they challenge us to explain what we mean when we claim to act under the banner “We, the people”.

As Benhabib points out, the conditions that have created the paradox of democratic legitimacy also tend, in practice, to disaggregate the unitary concept of citizenship. Within the European Union, for example, citizenship carries different (and potentially contradictory) rights at sub-national, national and transnational levels. Within this diverse model of citizenship, new models of representation are appearing at each level which may be better addressed by political sociology than democratic theory. For example, how do citizens choose who best represents their environmental concerns: a self-appointed local Greenpeace chapter, an elected British MP, or an unelected European Commissioner? Increasingly, citizens recognize all three as supplementary forms of representation, chosen according to one’s political identity, needs, and conditions.

Benhabib demonstrates in The Rights of Others that accepting and implementing aliens’ “right to have rights” is a core task of a well-functioning representative democracy. She also makes clear how much more work is needed here to realize such a democracy.

Rights, Representation and Security
Response to Castiglione, Mara, and Tucker

By Seyla Benhabib

I would like to thank Dario Castiglione, Gerald Mara and Andrew Tucker for their constructive comments on The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens.1 The questions which inspired this book first became vivid to me in the mid-1990’s, when the raging ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia on the one hand and the process of European unification on the other, were producing daily images of thousands of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons pouring into the EU through various borders across Hungary (which was not then an EU member), Greece and Austria, among others. The disjunction between processes of post-national unification and the persistence of borders in deciding the life and death of many thousands alerted me to the paradoxical nature of more generalizable developments: namely, the much-discussed crisis of Westphalian models of sovereignty that presuppose that territoriality, state jurisdiction, and representation are coterminous with increasingly porous borders and the uncoupling of territoriality, jurisdiction and identity. “We are like travelers,” I wrote, “navigating an unknown terrain with the help of old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. While the terrain we are traveling on, the world society of states, has changed, our normative map has not” (6).

In addition to these political developments, two philosophical lines of inquiry preoccupied me prior to writing The Rights of Others. While concluding my 1996 book on The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt2 I was stuck by Arendt’s claim that “statelessness” was not only one of the enabling sources of totalitarianism but that it would
remain one of the political evils of the future as well. How or why were human beings rendered stateless? How could a world community which subscribed to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights still countenance statelessness at a growing rate among the world population?

The second line of inquiry derived from my interests in discourse ethics, the philosophical elucidation of which I have pursued over the last twenty years. Discourse ethics articulates a universalist moral standpoint, according to which each and every human being is potentially a moral conversation partner with whom I can, at any point in time, enter into a moral discourse of justification. From this standpoint, political boundaries are arbitrary. However, a shared feature of all norms of membership, including but not only norms of citizenship, is that those who are affected by the consequences of these norms, and initially by criteria of exclusion, per definitionem cannot be party to their articulation. Membership norms affect those who are not members precisely by distinguishing insiders from outsiders, citizens from non-citizens. The dilemma is this: either a discourse theory is simply irrelevant to membership practices in that it cannot articulate any justifiable criteria of exclusion, or it simply accepts existing practices of exclusion as morally neutral historical contingencies that require no further validation. This would suggest that a discourse theory of democracy is itself chimerical insofar as democracy would seem to require a morally justifiable closure which discourse ethics cannot deliver (15).

Can there then be a discourse-theoretical justification of democratic closure? I answered that there were some practices of democratic closure which were more justifiable than others but that potentially all practices of democratic justification were open to challenge, resignification, and deinstitutionalization (17). The “right to have rights” (Arendt) always and inevitably combined the universal human right to membership with a delimitation of the content of that membership in juridical-legal terms, in accordance with the schedule of rights of each country.

Dario Castiglione notes an interesting ambivalence in this concept between what he calls, for brevity’s sake, the “liberal” and “democratic” versions. In the first version, there is a citizenship-as-rights model; in the second, the model is citizenship-as-participation. Castiglione further notes that my interpretation fits neither model and that I “distinguish the general claim to have rights (a moral claim) from the particular claims involved by the rights themselves (legal claims).” This third version can itself be read in a way which inclines toward either the liberal or the republican model. He interprets Arendt as viewing “right to have rights” as a right to membership, as a right to action and opinion and takes issue with my suggestion that “the right to have rights” amounts to the recognition of universal legal personality.

Castiglione believes that mine is a privatistic, or better still, privatizing, reading. His concern is that I have given a liberal rather than republican interpretation of European citizenship claims and have underestimated “a more active and socially engaged conception of citizenship.” Although I find these distinctions very helpful, they can be overdrawn as well: neither the liberal nor the republican versions answer how ‘just membership’ is to be attained. In both models, the boundaries of the demos are already taken as given, whereas my concern is precisely with interrogating practices and justification for setting those boundaries. The right to membership, interpreted as the right to democratic participation, presupposes the recognition of the person as one who is entitled to participate. How is such recognition given? Why is it denied?

Liberal and republican conceptions are also much more interdependent than this typology suggests. As I argue in chapter 4, the interpretation of rights claims along property entitlements was a consequence of early capitalist developments which shaped the moral imagination of liberal political theory (129 ff). However, the civil rights which early liberalism defended, such as the rights to life, liberty, property, and due process, as well as certain rights of association such as commercial, religious and matrimonial ones, are neither individualistic nor passive, as Castiglione suggests. They used to be referred to by tradition as “natural rights.” As we have replaced talk of natural rights with talk of basic and civil rights, it has also become clear that these rights are necessary but not sufficient conditions of citizenship. All activities of republican citizenship, ranging from the rights of association, demonstration, publication, and remonstration to the rights to vote and run for office, presuppose the guarantees provided by basic rights to civil equality in the eyes of the law. I follow John Rawls in thinking that liberty is only meaningful when it is accompanied by practices and institutions which guarantee “the equal value of liberty.” The universal claim to legal personality means the entitlement of each human being worldwide to a schedule of basic civil rights. The debate today is how widely or narrowly such civil rights ought to be interpreted and whether an equal package of social and political rights, and maybe even cultural rights, must be included in a guarantee of universal legal personality.

Gerald Mara is right to note that states have a positive role in establishing human rights norms, but I would add that states’ relations to these norms is also conflictual: as long as sovereign states are the only signatories to international human rights treaties, they are also the addressees of rights claims. However, international human rights treaties – for example, The Convention Against the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) – set standards in both juridical and moral senses against which the ac-
tions as well as laws and practices of states can be measured. Human rights treaties give rise to human rights regimes with their own agencies for monitoring compliance; civil society groups emerge, advocating for the passage of specific legislation; and NGOs and INGOs get to work, publicizing and raising consciousness about the meaning of these norms and conditions for satisfying them. The state is not the sole sovereign in interpreting its own compliance with human rights norms.

If the right to have rights, the international human rights regime, crimes against humanity, the Genocide Convention, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and the like play such an important role in my argument, can we avoid a more robust conception of the “needs and responsibilities defined by membership in the human species”? (Mara) Isn’t there something arbitrary and unsatisfying about my claim that we are in a “postmetaphysical age,” if by “postmetaphysical” is meant that substantive views of human nature and possibilities are overhauled or are indefensible?

In The Rights of Others I built upon work on the foundations of ethical theory which I had principally undertaken in Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. By the term ‘postmetaphysical’ I meant the conceptual difficulty, but not impossibility, of grounding our view of human nature, of its needs and capabilities, upon a more comprehensive vision of the universe. In scientific and philosophical circles, overarching worldviews have fallen into disrepute, although, in popular culture all around the world, a revival of interest in such general visions is manifesting itself. In The Rights of Others I followed the strategy of disassociating the political from the metaphysical, but Gerald Mara is certainly right in suggesting that the justification of human rights will involve retaining a concern “for the significance of the human.” Moral universalism is, after all, a form of humanism.

Since September 11, 2001, discourses of immigration and the “rights of others” have become embroiled with security concerns. Beginning with the passage of the Patriot Act in the USA and the absorption of the Immigration and Naturalization Service by the office of Homeland Security, the immigrant, and even the ordinary tourist, is increasingly viewed as a threat, as the potential “enemy alien.” September 11 revealed the porous nature of borders. Since then, the Madrid bombings of March 2003 and the London bombings of July 2005 have only added to nation-states’ sense of vulnerability. The rights of others are in danger of being replaced by the wrongs of others: as political discourse collapses all distinctions among strangers, foreigners and immigrants, and refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented aliens and enemy aliens, democracies are in danger of losing their own commitment to the rule of law and the rights of others.

Andrew Tucker is quite right to begin his comments by reminding us of this changed world political condition. Under such conditions the paradox of democratic legitimacy, “that those whose rights to inclusion and exclusion from the demos are being decided upon will not themselves be the ones to decide upon these rules,” (The Rights of Others, 206) becomes even more poignant. As Tucker observes, it is often informal representatives “such as associations and religious community leaders” who represent aliens’ interests and beliefs within national civil society.

While I find the paradox of democratic legitimacy conceptually in-controvertible, I agree that the distinction of member vs. non-member needs to be more refined sociologically. Immigrants, who are non-citizens, are also members at various stages of incorporation and they have voice in school parent-teacher associations, in neighborhoods, in religious organizations, in the business community and throughout civil society. The incorporation of non-members into democratic societies shows gradations of voice and representation; these groups and their representatives are participants in the decision-making process concerning the rights of others as they transition from non-member to citizen status. Immigration and citizenship discourses take place today in a complex public sphere in which legal resident aliens, undocumented workers, refugees, asylum seekers, and their representatives seek to influence public policy outcomes. Highlighting this point, which was implicit in my discussion of “l’affaire du foulard,” (181-198) as well as the German case about alien suffrage rights (202-207), may not be sufficient to “cut the Gordian knot linking territoriality, representation and democratic voice,” but Tucker is correct to draw attention to the need for further reflection on representation.

Castiglione ends his comments with a similar concern: the need to look “beyond the law toward a more active and socially engaged conception of citizenship, one where the boundaries between political and social activism are fundamentally re-drawn.” There is a complex relationship between political membership and political agency. Conditions of membership do not necessarily determine conditions of agency: sometimes nonmembers become active and empowered political agents, and very often, even membership is not an inspiration to political activism. Today’s immigrant communities, all over the world and particularly in urban centers, whatever the legal status of their membership, are in the process of generating new modes of trans- and international and diasporic forms of activism. Alas, global terrorism as well as more positive

Benhabib, Continued on Page 29
Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices Undermine Citizenship Participation and What We Can Do About it.
By Stephen Macedo, et al.
Reviewed by Russell Dalton

Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights.
By Carol C. Gould.
Reviewed by Tabassum Siraj


This book is a result of a collaborative project by the American Political Science Association to focus academic scholarship on the health of American democracy. It begins with an ominous warning: American democracy is at risk. The risk comes not from some external threat but from disturbing internal trends: an erosion of the activities and capacities of citizenship. Americans have turned away from politics and the public sphere in large numbers, leaving our civic life impoverished. Citizens participate in public affairs less frequently, with less knowledge and enthusiasm, in fewer venues, and less equally than is healthy for a vibrant democratic polity (1).

How can one read this, and not want to read on? The book begins like the old Saturday matinee: democracy is tied to the rails, the train is approaching; can democracy be saved?

Moreover, the ensemble cast for this volume is among the best in political science. Nineteen leading political scientists present, analyze, and discuss current research evidence on the health of American democracy. The project involved a series of conferences, panels at professional meetings, and a launching at the 2005 APSA meetings. This is a ‘must read’ book for those interested in democracy and American politics. It makes the reader ponder what democracy is about, how we are doing, and what the prospects are for the future.

The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the debate on civic engagement in America, and provides the empirical foundation for the volume. This chapter presents the familiar conclusion from Putnam’s Bowling Alone and related works. Too few of us are voting, we are disconnected from our fellow citizens and lacking in social capital, and too few people possess a sufficient understanding of politics. The project proceeds on the assumption that when citizens are involved and engaged with others, their lives and their communities are better. Thus, the erosion of engagement creates the contemporary risk for American democracy. This is Tocqueville revisited, only easier reading and in English.

Chapter 2 focuses on national electoral processes. The project presents evidence that it believes reflects a strong consensus in the research literature. This means that the results will be well-known to scholars—but perhaps not so well-known to students and political activists. The chapter describes the declining turnout in presidential and congres-
sional elections, and in some forms of campaign activity. Moreover, the authors emphasize the generational component of these trends: more than older Americans, the young are tuning out and staying home at election time. To explain these trends, the authors point to personal factors: limited political knowledge, decreased interest in elections, weakening party attachments, and eroding social capital. In addition, structural factors, such as the media environment and changes in party mobilization, contribute to the decline in electoral involvement. One of the best features of the book is the reforms proposed after the empirical evidence in each chapter. This chapter concludes with reforms to increase the quantity, quality and equality of electoral participation. These are reasonable ideas, some are new and creative, and it is valuable to translate the empirical evidence into a discussion of real politics.

Chapter 3 discusses local political life in the American metropolis. Metropolitan regions have experienced dramatic growth, decentralization, and diversification over the past several decades. This creates a new pattern of complex governance and changes in the local context of citizenship. Yet, perhaps because of this increasing complexity, the implications for democracy and citizenship are unclear. When Americans elect 500,000 local office holders (by contrast, the British elect only 25,000), is this a sign of democracy at risk? It is also unclear whether local engagement is really decreasing beyond election turnout. Regardless, the chapter ends with a set of reasonable reform proposals—worth discussing, but readers may be uncertain of their necessity, or their actual effect if implemented.

Chapter 4 explores associational life and the nonprofit and philanthropic sectors. One expects a familiar tune, thus it is surprising to read a different and more positive view of citizenship in America. This chapter stresses the vitality of volunteerism and philanthropy in America. The average American claims to volunteer regularly, and even if this is a socially conditioned overstatement, volunteerism certainly exceeds electoral participation. Building on this evidence, the chapter concludes by suggesting reforms to increase the quality and quantity of associational life.

Chapter 5 is a summation, raising some of the important questions of the project. However, the blanket claim that the quantity and quality of participation is lacking has not been convincingly demonstrated. I worry that many reforms to fix “X” will have greater unintended and undesired negative repercussions on “Y.” Suggesting that we invite citizens to participate “when it matters rather than for frivolous issues or in meaningless exercises” sounds a bit retrogressive. Suggesting that we increase turnout by shortening campaigns and lessening the number of elections ignores the role of elections as tool of civic education. These questions demonstrate the richness of the debate this book will stimulate. Despite my sincere admiration, some points generate reservations. First, the book succumbs to the belief that to sell a book, one has to find a crisis. “Democracy at Risk” generates more attention than “101 Ways to Improve American Democracy.” Too often I felt the evidence is selectively presented to emphasize the negative features. For instance, Chapter 2 focuses on the decline in turnout, but the full data series for the American National Election Study does not find a broad and equivalent trend in all forms of campaign activity. Chapter 3 cites one study showing that attendance at local government meetings had decreased; but in the same paragraph overlooks evidence of increased local contacting and local community work between 1967 and 1987 (the Verba et al. study cited on p. 91).

Second, the project does not give equal attention to the consensual evidence of positive changes in citizenship. For example, several forms of non-electoral participation are constant or increasing over time. Contemporary citizenship has improved in other ways: increased tolerance, greater support for social needs, and other elements of citizenship. Chapter 4 is the notable exception to the melancholy view of Americans. To really understand current politics and improve American democracy, researchers need a full and accurate audit—the positives as well as the negatives.

Third, the book focuses on young Americans—but only discusses their faults. This reflects a retrospective view of American democracy: How do we get people to act like they used to? How do we get the young to vote like their grandparents did? Rather than asking the young to act like their elders, we might ask how democracy can adapt to what is arguably the most educated, politically tolerant and socially engaged generation in American history— and one that struggles with political institutions designed for a different era.

Finally, much of this book is an introspective view of the U.S. case, lacking the comparative dimension that generated Tocqueville’s insights. For instance, the myth of the disengaged American is seldom evident in cross-national comparisons with other established democracies. The most recent data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org) finds that American campaign participation and other non-electoral engagement ranks among the highest of any nation in the project. Those high turnout nations referenced in this book lack the quantity and quality of citizen engagement that Americans display. Comparison would also provide new insights (and a potential corrective) in defining the causal processes producing the trends in this volume and hence the appropriate reforms.

This book is an important contribution to the contemporary debate on American democracy. I will use it in my teaching to provoke students and make them think about
these critical issues. But I’ll also tell them that at the end of the matinee, the train does not run over democracy.


Review by Tabassum Siraj, a graduate student at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute.

Given the current controversial implications surrounding globalization and democracy, especially in the context of the United States’ support of democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, Carol Gould’s new book is a laudable attempt to address the complex questions that ensue in any philosophical debate on the universality of particular politico-cultural institutions and human rights. The sheer breadth of the work is impressive, encompassing as it does the concepts of universality, human rights, justice, feminism, the body, politics, consensus, and individual agency. What is equally impressive is Gould’s detailed consideration of the hard questions faced by any thinker attempting to tackle the complexities of political philosophy. In keeping with the magnitude of her task, Gould divides her book into four parts, whereby she develops the structure of her thought on human and group rights.

The philosophical underpinnings of Gould’s intellectual inquiry encompass the caring and empathic feminism best epitomized by Martha Nussbaum and the Rawlsian ideas of justice, which then extend into the realm of economic and political rights. Even as she laments that the ideas of justice and democracy have long been debated separately, Gould acknowledges what she terms a “conceptual bind” characterizing the relation between democracy and human rights, rights that she argues extend beyond those of citizens in any nation state into broader individual human rights that recognize no political boundaries. She outlines in detail the arguments by Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls elevating justice, but gives equal consideration to Robert Dahl’s elaboration of democratic theory. Finding the positions articulated by both sides problematic and ultimately inadequate, Gould responds by formulating a concept in which individual human rights can “delimit” democratic decision making.

Gould employs the normative framework developed in her earlier book Rethinking Democracy in her new discussion of global democracy, and it is her emphasis on the individual that renders her approach to the democratic process unique. Any discussion of the individual for Gould is intertwined with the feminist notions of caring, empathy, and solidarity. These concepts inform her fundamental yet multifaceted position that humans are free agents and that the twin ideas of individual agency and social solidarity go hand in hand. Her argument is especially relevant today given the proliferation of transnational organizations that transform individual human empathy and agency into networks of joint social activity.

Since the very concept of democracy has generated fierce resistance in many cultures and nations as a foreign idea designed to further Western cultural and political hegemony at the expense of traditional forms of political practice, Gould is especially careful to avoid any accusations of cultural imperialism in her definition of democracy. Thus, instead of narrowing democracy to the model of representation in Western political systems, she extends the concept to validate the democratic credentials of consensus or near-consensus decision making, prevalent among the Zulus of South Africa, the Akan of Ghana, the Bugandans of Uganda, as well as among the indigenous peoples of North America. Gould also refuses to fall prey to the intellectual trap of cultural relativism. She joins Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in criticizing anthropologists who seek to enshrine unjust cultural practices in the quest for diversity. Nonetheless, she points to the possible “hubris” that taints even Sen’s “capabilities” approach, endorsed by Nussbaum, simply because of its claims to universality. Again, Gould’s own response is to offer an alternative conception of universality which integrates equal freedom and human rights, an approach that recognizes the multiplicity of even its basic components. Her emphasis on multiplicity thus allows her model of universal human rights and human functioning to evolve over time. Because it embraces change in the context of the particularities of history, culture, and society, Gould’s universalism is flexible and non-coercive, a central concern for Gould.

Gould’s discussions on women and the body are especially rewarding for students of feminist political thought. Her ability to present all sides of an argument before presenting her own is in keeping with her notion of caring. As a result, her discussion of feminism includes the positions held not only by feminists such as Sara Ruddick and Carole Pateman, but also by Nietzsche, and Claude Lefort. Her notion of “embodied community” or the “communal body” successfully avoids the essentialism she finds troubling in most feminist and Marxist thought.

Part Three of Gould’s book is valuable for its discussion of globalization. Gould moves beyond the international political and economic institutions that are making the nation state less relevant to mention the growing interconnectedness of individuals who then form networks, a process she terms “intersocialization.” Recognizing the troublesome implications of international institutions for democratic
theory, she fittingly prioritizes individual rights over impersonal, colossal international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, NATO, and the United Nations. Gould’s reference to the vacuum of democratic accountability in which global bodies operate is invaluable, in light of recent scandals involving UN peacekeepers in Central Africa and NATO troops in Eastern Europe.

One wishes Gould had devoted more time to her discussion of current applications of global democracy, especially in the context of the internet, terrorism, and the Bush administration’s global war on terror. Perhaps in her bid to transcend the limitations of cultural specificity and subsequent bias, and to focus exclusively on political philosophy, Gould has ignored some controversial issues that define the current global political landscape. This quibble notwithstanding, Gould’s work is an immensely valuable and timely contribution to the long-standing debate on political philosophy.

---

**Georgetown University offers a Master’s in Democracy Studies**

Georgetown University’s Department of Government and the Center for Democracy and the Third Sector (CDATS) recently launched a new master’s degree program in democracy studies to begin the fall of 2006. Application deadline is March 3, 2006.

For detailed information on this program, including admission procedure, please visit Graduate School of Arts and Sciences website http://grad.georgetown.edu. If you have any questions, please contact us at cdats@georgetown.edu.

---

**Benhabib, Continued from Page 25**

...forms of global citizenship emerge from this same milieu and use the same networks and resources.

The expansion and deepening of democracy through democratic iterations, therefore, is not an inevitable process, as Mara rightly reminds us. Certainly, xenophobic and populist sentiments against so-called “undeserving migrants,” who were viewed as threatening European welfare societies economically as well as morally, were part of what led the French and the Dutch voters to reject the EU Constitution in late May and early June 2005. Our response cannot be a retraction of democratic iterations but must be a more heightened awareness of how “the rights of others” are an integral aspect of the quality of our very democratic institutions; for when security trumps tolerance and liberality, as is happening in the majority of western democracies today, actions against the alien at the border eventually will come to target some as the “enemy” within.

---

**Endnotes**

1 Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004. All references are to this edition.


CDATS Events & Lectures, Fall 2005:

- **Professor Sergio Aguayo** (El Colegio de Mexico), “Mexican democracy and the 2006 presidential elections,” *Introduction*: John Bailey (Georgetown University)

CDATS is pleased to welcome its new fellows and graduate students.

2005-2006 Visiting Fellows:

Alnoor Ebrahim is an Associate Professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), where he also codirects the Institute for Governance and Accountabilities. He earned a doctorate at Stanford University (1999). Dr. Ebrahim focused his research on accountability and organizational learning in civil society organizations. He is the author of *NGOs and Organizational Change: Discourse, Reporting, and Learning* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), which received the 2004 Outstanding Book Award from the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA). Currently, he is engaged in research that examines “Constructions of Accountability” in the relations of multilateral development banks with civil society organizations. Dr. Ebrahim is also completing an edited book, with Edward Weisband, *Forging Global Accountabilities: Institutional Problematics and Participatory Practices*.

Benjamin Read is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science department at the University of Iowa. A specialist on the politics of China and Taiwan, his interest in these areas was sparked by a year spent as a student in a Beijing elementary school in the early 1980s. He earned a B.A. at Cornell (1993), an M.A. at UC-Berkeley (1997), and a doctorate at Harvard (2003). His work has received a Fulbright-Hays grant as well as support from the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China, the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, and the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation, among other institutions. Dr. Read’s main project investigates what he terms “state-society grassroots engagement.” This project examines China’s urban neighborhood organizations as a case of this kind of grassroots engagement between state and society, with similar institutions in Taiwan and South Korea as secondary field sites.

Georgetown University Faculty Fellows:

Denise Brennan is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. She is the author of *What’s Love Got to Do with It? Transnational Desires and Sex Tourism in the Dominican Republic* (Duke University Press 2004). Currently she is writing a book on the recovery and resettlement process of trafficked persons to the United States, *Life After Trafficking: Forced Labor and Servitude in the United States Today* for which she was awarded an American Association of University Women Postdoctoral Fellowship to conduct field research in 2003-2004.

Susan Terrio is an Associate Professor of French and Anthropology in the Department of French. She has deferred her fellowship to academic year 2006-2007. Currently, she is a residential fellow at the Radcliffe Institute of Advanced Study at Harvard University where she is writing a book manuscript entitled, *Judging Mohammed at the Paris Palace of Justice: Juvenile Delinquency, (Im)migration, and Exclusion*. Based on four years of ethnographic and archival research at the largest and most influential juvenile court in France, the book examines shifting French approaches to the identification, representation, and treatment of troubled youth. This project was also supported by fellowships from the Wilson Center in Washington and the National Humanities Center (which had to be declined).

Graduate Assistants:

CDATS welcomes new graduate assistants Hamutal Bernstein (Government Department), Sarah Cross (Government Department), Vaibhav Gupta (Georgetown Public Policy Institute), Becky Kinsey (Georgetown Public Policy Institute), and Stipica Mudrazija (Georgetown Public Policy Institute).

The Center also welcomes back graduate assistants David Madland (Government Department), Hilen Meirovich (Government Department), Marni Schultz (Georgetown Public Policy Institute), and Leah Smith (Government Department).
Center Highlights

■ Affiliated Faculty and Fellows Accomplishments

CDATS director Steven Heydemann received a 2-year grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation to research and write a book, Why is the Middle East Still Authoritarian? Meeting the Challenge of Democracy in the Middle East. He also has a co-edited volume, The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations, accepted for publication by Russell Sage Press. The volume is forthcoming in 2006.

Professor of Government and Foreign Service John Bailey finished an edited volume, Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas, with Lucia Dammert Flacso-Chile, which is going to be published by the University of Pittsburgh Press (English edition) and by Siglo XXI (Spanish edition). He has also co-authored an article, “Perceptions and Attitudes about Corruption and Democracy in Mexico,” with Pablo Paras, which is to be published in the Journal of Mexican Studies. In June 2005, professor Bailey presented a paper, “Security Traps and Democracy in Latin America,” at a conference at Nuffield College, Oxford.

Professor Clyde Wilcox from the Department of Government had the 2nd edition of Interest Groups in American Elections, with coauthors Mark Rozell and CDATS Graduate Fellow David Madland, published at CQ. Wilcox also co-authored The Christian Right and the Presidential Election of 2004 with Manfred Brocker, which is included in a volume edited by Torsten Oppelland, Die USA im Wahljahr 2004, and published by Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Atlantische Texte in 2005 (German edition). In addition, he recently presented two papers, “Saving Marriage by Banning Marriage: The Christian Right Finds a New Issue in 2004,” with David Beer and Linda Merolla, at the annual meeting of the World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Stockholm, Sweden, and “Radical Dreams and Political Realities: Religion, Social Movements, and Radical Politics in the U.S,” at the Seminar on Religion and Radicalism, Antwerp, Belgium.

Assistant Professor Marc Morjé Howard recently published an article entitled “Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU,” in the Fall 2005 issue of the International Migration Review. He has also written several articles that were recently accepted for publication: “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes” (with Philip G. Roessler) will appear in the April 2006 issue of the American Journal of Political Science; “Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews” (with James L. Gibson) is forthcoming in the British Journal of Political Science in 2006; and “Conceptual and Methodological Suggestions for Improving Cross-National Measures of Civil Society” will be published in the Fall 2005 issue of the Journal of Civil Society. His co-edited volume (with Vladimir Tismaneanu and Rudra Sil), World Order After Leninism, will be published by the University of Washington Press in 2006.

■ CDATS GU Faculty Research Fellowship – Call for Applications

CDATS is pleased to announce internal Georgetown University Faculty Research Fellowships that will be available for Fall 2006 or Spring 2007. Awards will take the form of a $15,000 payment to the faculty member’s department. Departments will use these funds to provide release time for one semester. The deadline for applications is Friday, January 13, 2006. Completed applications should be delivered by 5:00 pm on January 13 to:

CDATS
Internal Faculty Fellowships
3240 Prospect Street, NW Lower Level
Washington, DC 20007

Full-time Georgetown University faculty at all levels and from all departments and schools are eligible to apply. For more information, download an Information and Application Package from our website at http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/visitors.htm.

■ About this Publication

Democracy & Society is published twice a year, and CDATS welcomes submissions from scholars around the world. Please visit http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdats/democracyandsociety.htm or email cdatsnews@georgetown.edu for more details.

This issue was edited by Marni Schultz and Stipica Mudrazija.