...[T]he process of immigration policy decision making in a given state is driven by two very different sets of considerations, each of which relates to a distinct sphere of social interaction. In the perspective of capitalist dynamics, immigrants of any kind—including refugees—are considered primarily as “labor.” Accordingly, immigration policies are shaped by the prevailing “class compromise” and the specific configuration of economic interests in the country in question, in keeping with the imperatives of prevailing technological and economic condi-

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**Immigrant-Led Organizers for Social Change and Community Integration**

**Introduction**

The United States is experiencing historically unprecedented levels of immigration. As of March 2005, there were 37 million foreign-born persons in the United States, making up 12 percent of the population.\(^1\) Approximately 14 million immigrants arrived during the 1990s.\(^2\) From the early 1990s to 2000, the number of immigrants increased by 61 percent. Today, immigrants are changing the face of the cities in which they settle. Some have argued that, in many cases, immigrants themselves have taken the primary initiative to integrate into U.S. society. Many have chosen organizing as a powerful way of doing this.

The way an immigrant enters a foreign country deeply impacts his or her life. Immigrants leave their home communities with the hope of improving their lives and creating other communities to which they can... [Continued, Page 20]
Immigration and the Challenge of Inclusion

Democracies around the world struggle with questions of inclusion. Who belongs? On what terms? How do we legitimately exclude those who seek to join us as citizens? What kind of democratic criteria can be applied to deny the benefits of membership?

As Aristide Zolberg’s extraordinary history of U.S. immigration policy reminds us, these questions have a long and contentious place in America’s political arena. Yet in the past few years they have emerged with exceptional force—and not only in the U.S. Across Europe, as well, immigration, citizenship, and democracy are again focal points of political debate, social conflict, and in some instances, social violence. This November marked the first anniversary of rioting that swept across France in a wave of unrest among immigrant youth, angered, in many instances, by the failure of citizenship to deliver the opportunities that membership in a democracy is expected to provide. For much of the past year, immigration politics have been no less visible and only slightly less contentious in America. We have experienced them here at Georgetown, where a lecture this fall by a representative of the Minutemen Project sparked spirited opposition from students who reject the use of vigilante methods as a legitimate way to respond to illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico border.

This issue of D&S explores the relationship between citizenship, democracy, and immigration in the U.S. and Europe from a variety of perspectives; through both original contributions and excerpts from recently published research, by Georgetown faculty and graduate students and by practitioners who confront the challenges of U.S. immigration policy on a daily basis. In keeping with past practice, we also include a contribution from our former faculty fellow, Professor Ben Read, about state-sponsored civil society organizations in China.

This fall also marks a number of important developments at the Center. We changed our name to the Center for Democracy and Civil Society to more clearly identify the core focus of our work. We launched a new M.A. program in Democracy Studies, the first two-year degree program of its kind in the U.S. This fall, eleven students joined the entering class at Georgetown to inaugurate the M.A. program. We are excited to have them with us and delighted by their enthusiasm and energy. Information about the M.A. program is provided here, and we encourage you to visit the M.A. program website at http://cdacs.georgetown.edu/democracystudies.

We are also delighted by the new editorial team for D&S. Sarah Cross and Julie Lantrip, both Ph.D. students in the Department of Government, began working even before the start of the term. They have done a fabulous job on their first outing and are now busy planning the Spring 2007 issue. I’m very pleased to welcome them aboard as editors, and look forward to working with them in the future.

Steven Heydemann, (Ph.D., U. Chicago) has served as director of CDACS since its opening in 2003.
Challenges for the Future
An excerpt from Beyond the Gateway: Immigrants in a Changing America

[Elzbieta M. Gozdziak and Susan F. Martin]


In spite of being a country largely shaped by immigration, the United States does not have immigrant policies. No federal laws explicitly promote social, economic, or civic integration. The best practices identified in [Beyond the Gateway] emerged through trial and error, shaped by variables in each community including demographics and previous experiences with immigrants. While governments of other large receiving countries such as Canada and Australia have implemented policies designed to bring immigrants into the fold, newcomers are not necessarily worse off under the U.S. system.

Without officially endorsing multiculturalism, the U.S. government has developed a legal framework that nevertheless protects newcomers and guarantees a broad array of rights. Several policies protect both citizens and immigrants from discrimination on the basis of race, religion, nationality, and, in some cases, citizenship. Employers, for example, may be penalized for refusing to hire a foreign-sounding or foreign-looking person on suspicion that the applicant does not have appropriate documentation. These laws do not end prejudice, but they provide solid footing for immigrants to defend their rights.

The private sector has also taken a lead role in promoting integration in the United States. Family members and employers sponsor immigrants and take principal responsibility for ensuring their successful adaptation to their new country. A flexible labor market has facilitated the efforts of immigrant advocates by making employment easy to find. Although many jobs do not pay well, it is possible for immigrants to improve their lot and even own their own businesses. Given their high levels of employment, immigrants are frequently characterized as hardworking contributors to the nation’s economy, which also eases the integration process.

Integration is also aided indirectly by several broad and long-standing government policies. Among the most important is birthright citizenship, granted automatically to children of immigrants if they are born on U.S. territory. The provision applies even to the children of undocumented migrants. As a result only one generation carries the label of “foreigner,” in contrast to many European countries where third and fourth generations are still considered outsiders. Such policies reflect a deep-rooted national conviction that immigration is good for the country and immigrants are its future. The basic framework for naturalization dates to the early nineteenth century and the ideas of the founding fathers, who generally saw immigrants as presumptive citizens who should enjoy the same rights and privileges as other Americans.

While children of immigrants may be considered Americans from the day they are born, economic, cultural and political integration takes place over the span of many generations. Like the children of immigrants who came decades ago, those who arrived in the most recent wave of migration see themselves as Americans and will almost certainly integrate more easily than their parents. But that is not to say they will achieve equal footing with the counterparts born to established residents. Integration does not happen overnight. The achievements…[in] new settlement areas with limited previous exposure to migration appear all the more successful in light of the social changes and paradigm shifts demanded of both newcomers and host society.

Time and the overarching policy framework both indirectly favor integration, but neither is a substitute for action at the community level where the web of local relationships determines the immigrant experience. Indeed, one consequence of the federal government’s hands-off approach to integration is an even greater reliance on communities and community leadership. Experiences at local levels shape not only immigrant attitudes toward their new country but also the cohesiveness of the neighborhoods, towns, and cities they adopt as their new homes . . . . [L]ocal actors including the newcomers themselves have found novel ways to assume this responsibility and foster the incorporation of newly arrived immigrants into broader society.

The dynamics of integration, of course, cannot be reduced to a negotiation between two groups. A categorization of two camps, such as “established residents” and “newcomers” classifies individuals according only to when they arrived and does not account for infinite social divisions along ethnic, racial, and religious lines. The American host society itself is composed of different waves of newcomers, some more empathetic than others to the newest arrivals. Today’s immigrant population is also comprised of several subcategories. Newcomers with refugee status benefit from generous U.S. assistance programs that can become a source of tension with other immigrants. In some cases, long-standing ethnic divisions are renewed in this country, as illus-
trated by tribal rivalries among Somali immigrants. This complexity means that immigrants arrive to find a country more diverse than the lands they leave behind. Integration becomes a multipronged process, with newcomers finding their way among the many segments of mainstream society and other immigrant communities.

….One obstacle that arises in several new settlement areas is a perception among some established residents that new immigrants will leave as quickly as they came, thereby making it unnecessary to include them in broad society. The history of migrant workers in agricultural areas, for example, frequently conditions business leaders and communities to view immigrants as temporary residents. Even as Hispanics and other immigrants gain permanent employment, stereotypes of poor, wayward laborers remain prevalent in the public eye. In Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley, the perception that immigrants comprised a transient workforce was transformed in some cases into a denial of responsibility for Hispanic health care, education, housing, and retirement needs.

The exclusion of immigrants from conceptions of local communities, beyond contributing to their marginalization, can also lead to depictions of newcomers as liabilities. Particularly amid economic difficulties, immigrants perceived as lacking other links to a community are frequently seen to take advantage of support networks or, worse yet, take jobs that would otherwise go to established residents. In Faribault, Minnesota, working-class Caucasians expressed fears that declines in local industries could make immigrants dependent on public assistance. African, Asian and Latino immigrants were seen not as full-fledged members of the community, but rather temporary residents without reason to stay once their labor was no longer needed.

….The news media significantly influence the popular perception of immigrants, reinforcing stereotypes in some cases while empathizing with the foreigner’s experience in others. Particularly in new settlement areas with little previous ethnic diversity, the arrival of newcomers has attracted substantial news coverage, magnifying their presence. Newcomer status frequently influences the tone of the media’s treatment. Compared to other immigrants arriving in Atlanta, for example, refugees have generally received more positive attention. Undocumented immigrants have been portrayed occasionally as criminal aliens, but they are more often described as an important source of labor. Regrettably, coverage of immigrant issues frequently concentrates on moments of conflict between natives and newcomers. And particularly in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, carried out by nineteen foreign nationals, local media outlets have been more likely to cast newcomers in a menacing light. In Minnesota, media attention focused on the local Somali population and the arrests of individuals involved with Muslim charities.

A common challenge is to emphasize the contributions made by newcomers, encouraging their acceptance as full-fledged members of the community and promoting tolerance. Whether focused on economic or social aspects, successful integration programs have generally helped established residents to acknowledge that immigrants bring something of value. Beyond labor, immigrant contributions highlighted by advocates have included economic investment, cultural diversity, and the resuscitation of depopulated urban and rural areas. Responding to rising social tensions, the Atlanta suburb of Chamblee, Georgia, not only made public services more responsive to its newly diverse community but also took advantage of newcomers’ economic and cultural activity to develop an “international village” with cross-cultural appeal. Elsewhere, however, the business community, while profiting from inexpensive labor, has been notably absent from the public dialogue on immigration. In cases where police, school and health care representatives have depicted newcomers as a strain on community services, the business sector might stress that they also represent an irreplaceable resource.

By the same token, integration depends on the empowerment of immigrants for participation in the wider community. In both social and economic terms, it is important to stress opportunities and obligations as much as rights and entitlements. One of the largest obstacles to this goal is that mediating institutions such as schools, hospitals, and local governments often overlook the newcomer voice. This condition owes largely to the immigrants’ lack of familiarity with their new communities. Links of incorporation within newcomer groups and with broad society remedy this condition over time, but several smaller initiatives have potential to accelerate this orientation. Latino soccer tournaments organized in Salt Lake City, in one example, have encouraged players to identify with the communities represented by more than three hundred teams.

Much as the benefits of immigration must be realized, integration also requires an honest and clear assessment of the problems faced by newcomers. To ignore the costs of immigration — whether the fiscal costs to institutions unused to providing services to limited English proficient clients, or the social costs when immigrants knowingly or inadvertently break laws or violate community norms — is to jeopardize the future integration of immigrants…. Economically, opportunities for upward mobility represent a crucial incentive for newcomers to integrate themselves. Investment and professional advancement beyond ethnic businesses not only promote linkages with the host society but also help newcomers build foundations for their children. Some authors have concluded that these opportunities are unlikely to be extended by the host community and depend on the organization of immigrants to demand fair treatment. Even when the established business community
does seek to incorporate newcomers, language and cultural barriers make it difficult to connect. In Greensboro, North Carolina, the Chamber of Commerce tried to recruit members of the immigrant community to participate in a diversity committee on small business issues. But wary of mainstream events like immigrant groups elsewhere, the Latino business owners in North Carolina demurred because they did not appreciate the chamber as a resource.

Whatever the level of integration, one pivotal task for new settlement areas is to ensure that newcomers are not disenfranchised. Low graduation rates among immigrant high school students reflect a failure of integration efforts to date, given the lack of student engagement. By limiting the number of bilingual role models in public schools, the trend also promotes a vicious cycle and increases the likelihood of greater challenges in the future. Initiatives such as the Dream Act, proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah to make higher education more accessible to immigrants, represent promising top-down responses to such challenges.

In the context of the “war on terror,” warnings against disenfranchisement of newcomers have taken on new resonance. Detentions of foreign-born residents are a high-profile example of what many have called a widespread erosion of immigrants’ civil liberties. Raids targeting undocumented workers at transportation hubs and other workplaces, for example, have elicited protests and heightened social tensions. Although most newcomers are not suspected of criminal intentions, federal officials have argued that immigrants without the proper documents could become victims of extortion by international terrorists. Perceptions of antagonism nevertheless might make newcomers more reluctant to embrace and participate in their new communities.

At the most basic level, a culture of exchange among newcomers and established communities depends on establishing a baseline level of trust. Ideally, newcomers would receive a thorough orientation to the social mores, laws, and legal systems of their new country. For better or worse, law enforcement authorities become one of the most visible points of contact, setting a tone for wider community relations in their interactions with immigrants. Too often, police lack the resources to communicate with non-English-speaking newcomers, who frequently distrust law enforcement because of experiences in their homelands. A focus on immigration status, rather than a holistic approach that also views newcomers as potential victims and witnesses, can further antagonize relations. In this sense, attempts by several states to give local officers the authority to arrest residents for lacking appropriate documentation set a troubling precedent.

For all the efforts by host communities to facilitate integration, newcomers take charge of their own lives in this country soon after their arrival. As they negotiate their own transition from newcomers to established residents, their success depends in part on the degree to which they coordinate their efforts with one another. Just as immigrants maximize their power vis-à-vis broader society by articulating common political and economic interests, they improve their own prospects in integration by asserting themselves with one voice. A united front is most crucial in states such as Utah where cultural or religious homogeneity marginalizes outsiders, but all newcomer communities benefit from coordinating the efforts of internal subgroups and advocates. Such efforts allow newcomer groups to pursue their objectives more effectively, improve communication with the host society, and create political space that will benefit future generations.

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The Importance of National Citizenship


Marc Morjé Howard

What exactly is citizenship, and what does it entail? On the most basic level, citizenship bestows upon individuals membership in a national political community. In liberal democracies, it gives them the right to vote, to run for office, and to participate freely in public activities, while also requiring the obligation of paying taxes and possibly serving in the military. In terms of the larger international community, citizenship serves as what Rogers Brubaker calls “a powerful instrument of social closure,” in two respects. First, the boundary of citizenship allows rich states to draw a line that separates its citizens from potential immigrants from poor countries. Second, it allows states to create internal boundaries that separate citizens from foreign residents, by associating certain rights and privileges with national citizenship.

Citizenship therefore evokes a fundamental paradox within liberal democracies, namely, what Seyla Benhabib calls “the paradox of democratic legitimacy.” Liberal democracies are based on the universal language of fundamental human rights, along with the free association and participation of “the people,” yet they also delineate clear and enforceable borders and boundaries. This refers not only to territorial borders, but also to the boundaries of political membership. Determining who is included in the concept of “the people” also implies at least an implicit understanding of who is excluded. In essence, the paradox is that liberal democracies are “internally inclusive” while remaining “externally exclusive.”

In other words, my understanding and use of citizenship here is as a legal category, rather than as a feature of civil society, social capital, or state-society relations more generally—although, of course, this category has tremendous social ramifications. I focus on the rights that formal citizenship entails, and especially the formal legal requirements for having access to those rights, rather than on the beliefs or practices of citizens. Although this may deviate somewhat from some contemporary discussions that use the term citizenship as a synonym for civic engagement and related concepts, it provides a more focused and grounded definition, while staying true to the theoretical and empirical debates that started with Aristotle.

In a major contribution—one that is both theoretical and empirical—to the study of citizenship, T.H. Marshall developed a model of citizenship based on the experience of industrialization and the emergence of democracy, and his work raises questions that are still relevant for contemporary debates about the future of citizenship. Marshall argued that the extension of rights and benefits go in a specific historical sequence as democracy develops and expands, starting with basic civil rights (freedom of conscience, protection of property, and some associational liberties), leading eventually to political rights (to vote, hold office, speak and associate freely), and finally culminating in social rights (to form labor unions, and eventually to receive the many social benefits that welfare states provide). The argument is compelling, and it fits the historical experience of the United Kingdom—and to some extent Western Europe in general—quite well.

In recent decades, however, the development and establishment of the welfare state has created a new logic that is quite different from Marshall’s historical account. In most liberal democracies today, wide-ranging civil as well as social rights are extended to almost all workers and legal residents, even if they are not citizens, and therefore do not have political rights. In other words, political rights are no longer a prerequisite for social rights. Moreover, in an increasing number of places in both Western Europe and North America, non-citizens are being granted local or regional (but not national) voting rights. At the same time as this sub-national political participation has been expanding, citizens of countries that are members of the supra-national EU can now choose to vote in European elections in their EU country of residence, rather than their country of origin.

While Marshall’s historical progression may no longer apply to the contemporary situation, many scholars agree with his normative conclusions concerning social rights as the ultimate priority and objective. But this has, in turn, led some scholars to proclaim the current or impending empirical irrelevance of citizenship in the nation-state. According to this argument, since social rights can now be achieved without political rights, and since an increasing number of political rights are now available on the subnational and supra-national level, national citizenship no longer matters. As one proponent of this view argues, “when it comes to social services (education, health insurance, welfare, unemployment benefits) citizenship status is of minor importance in the United States and in Western Europe.” In short, this type of argument places great
emphasize on the recent emergence of transnational and “postnational” norms based on individual human rights, which undermine the previously dominant system of nation-states. 10

For a number of reasons, however, it is far too early to dismiss the relevance of the nation-state and national citizenship. And this is even the case in the EU — where the broader umbrella of “European citizenship” entitles citizens of any EU member state to have a vast set of rights and privileges across the territory of the union — since EU citizenship is itself strictly derivative of national citizenship.

As a result, “third-country nationals” (people who are not citizens of an EU country) still face limitations on their rights and opportunities, and the citizen v. noncitizen distinction therefore remains very important to them and to the society in which they live.

First, the right to vote and run for office in national elections is still extremely consequential in all countries. Non-citizens, even if they are permanent residents and long-time workers, have no opportunity to participate in the democratic process on the national level. And since citizenship, immigration, and asylum policies are generally implemented on the national level, this means that non-citizens are excluded from taking part in decisions that may directly affect their own lives.

Second, despite exaggerated claims that social rights are guaranteed to all, regardless of national citizenship, in many countries non-citizens are still excluded from significant social benefits. For example, five of the nine provinces in Austria do not provide their social assistance programs to people who are not citizens of Austria or another EU country. Many other countries place significant restrictions on the rights granted to new immigrants, particularly third-country nationals, who often receive lower benefits, and in many cases are barred from noncontributory social programs for a certain number of years after arrival. 11 In short, while the modern welfare state undoubtedly provides greater benefits to immigrants than did nation-states at earlier points in history, non-citizens still receive significantly fewer social rights than do people with national citizenship. And for that reason, the citizenship distinction really matters in people’s lives.

Third, although citizenship is generally less relevant for most private-sector employment, 12 it is still very important in the allocation of public sector jobs. For example, France only accepts French or EU citizens in railway, postal, and hospital jobs; in Germany, government service employment positions in such areas as public transportation and education are restricted to German or EU citizens; and to cite a non-European case, the U.S. government can restrict such postings as public school teachers, state troopers, and probation officers to American citizens. 13 Within the EU itself, it should be added, while citizens of an EU country automatically have the right to live and work in another EU country, third-country nationals can generally only reside and work in the country into which they have immigrated. In other words, non-citizens face de facto restrictions on their labor mobility that EU citizens do not.

A fourth reason why national citizenship is still quite significant has to do with the eventual integration of immigrants into the host society. Many scholars have argued that immigrants who become naturalized citizens are likely to become much more integrated in their new country than those who remain non-citizen residents, or “denizens.” 14 Although more empirical research on these questions is still needed, it is logical to assume that naturalized citizens will tend to have better command of the national language, to experience more loyalty to the new country, to be relatively accepted by their fellow citizens, and of course to enjoy some protections that are only available to citizens, such as the right not to be deported. In other words, while there is considerable variability across groups and countries, citizenship acquisition can serve as a rough measure of integration, and the different possibilities to acquire citizenship will have lasting implications for the long-term integration of immigrants.

A final, and much more practical and policy-oriented, dilemma facing the advanced industrialized world — and EU countries in particular — has to do with demographics. European countries have among the lowest birth rates in the world, and they desperately need more workers in order to prevent their pension systems from collapsing over the coming two decades. 15 One obvious (though partial) solution to this problem, which has been recognized by scholars and political elites for years, involves increasing levels of immigration and naturalization. Yet the resistance and outright hostility to immigrants has increased noticeably over the past decade, whether measured by public opinion surveys, support for extreme-right parties and candidates, or criminal attacks against foreigners. These two countervailing pressures — the need to incorporate more immigrant workers within a context of an often xenophobic public opposition — will have to be resolved, in one form or another, over time. And political elites will struggle with these contradictory demands, though politicians tend to be more responsive to the short-term nature of the electoral process. The demographic problem, however, is a longer-term one, and a key part of its eventual resolution will depend on how these countries define and enforce their citizenship policies.

In short, whether in terms of politics and elections, welfare state benefits, public-sector employment, social integration,
or demographics and pension systems, national citizenship remains an essential and enduring feature of modern life—even in the “supra-national” European Union.

Marc Morjé Howard, Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University, is currently writing a new book, tentatively entitled Varieties of Citizenship in the European Union, which is under contract with Cambridge University Press.

Endnotes


5 Historically, of course, many groups—women, slaves, non-Christians, non-property owners, and others who would fit Kant’s category of “mere auxiliaries to the commonwealth”—have been excluded from citizenship in democracies. See Kant 1996 [1797], 92 (cited by Benhabib 2002, 451–452).


12 Nonetheless, discrimination against non-citizens in private employment is not unheard of, and immigrants are generally in less secure positions than citizens. Moreover, family members of immigrants are often excluded from working altogether, even in the private sector, for a certain number of years (e.g., four to eight years in Austria). See Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002, 67–68.


Immigrant integration has become one of the most socially important and politically complex national goals in post-war European countries. As waves of large-scale migration—including recruited labor, asylum-seekers, and illegal immigrants—arrive, a state confronts the challenge of both integrating ethnically diverse newcomers and maintaining a distinct sense of national identity. This tension, which has re-invigorated debates on national community and the ultimate fate of national identity, is especially pronounced in Great Britain which, unlike its more ethnic (e.g. Germany) or assimilationist (e.g. France) counterparts, already has a relatively open and continually re-constructed sense of national identity. This challenge was placed into stark relief on July 7, 2005, when the bombings in London made clear that even second-generation British nationals lacked a fundamental commitment to Britain and the liberal values which bind its national community.

Immigration and citizenship policies have always been mechanisms for controlling the movement and settlement of people. I argue that these policies are further used for the purpose of achieving immigrant integration within a nationally distinct framework. This strategy is pursued through the deliberate and simultaneous reconstruction of immigration and citizenship policies, first in the 2002 Home Office White Paper, “Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain” (hereafter “Secure Borders”) and later in the 2005 five-year strategy “Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain” (hereafter “Controlling Our Borders”). These policy papers make immigrant entry more restrictive by introducing a five-tiered, points-based system (PBS) driven by identified domestic labor shortages. In contrast, naturalization policies that require evidence of English-speaking ability and knowledge of life in the UK have resulted in an expansive, meaningful citizenship, which emphasizes cohesion in spite of ethnic or racial distinctions. This simultaneous pursuit of restriction and inclusion constitutes a state strategy I call controlled cohesion as a response to immigrant-related diversity.

**Controlled Cohesion**

Controlled cohesion represents a state-level response to immigrant-related diversity through the re-shaping of contemporary British migration policy. It aims to control the process for entry through restrictive immigration policy and encourage cohesion of those admitted. By aligning these two policies, Britain has organized a response to the external challenges of immigration and internal challenges of integration inside a deliberate national framework.

The relationship between immigration and citizenship is often taken for granted. Scholars present citizenship as the model of full integration, with the acquisition of nationality (a legal transformation) parallel to the expectations of integration (a social transformation). This is because citizenship simultaneously establishes legal bonds to the state through the accumulation of rights and responsibilities and social bonds to the nation-state through full membership (Bauböck 1995). Immigration is valued insomuch as it presents the possibility—either through legal or clandestine channels—for this process of naturalization and citizenship acquisition to unfold. But not all immigrants become citizens, and not all citizens were once immigrants. While immigration and citizenship policies are formally related in that citizenship became “internally inclusive and externally exclusive” through the process of interterritorial distinction (Brubaker 1992), these migration policies are related only as much as they are deliberately designed to be, as in Britain’s coordinated strategy of controlled cohesion.

But what explains the simultaneous limiting and inclusion of immigrants? What were the conditions under which Britain came to determine this strategy as the most effective means to foster national integration? First and foremost, the economic imperative identified by the government to recruit labor to Britain is an underlying factor in reshaping immigration policy. An aging population combined with declining birth rates has rendered migration “vital for [the British] economy” (HO 2006b: 1). By simultaneously recruiting highly-skilled migrants to maintain economic competitiveness and, at the other end of the skill spectrum, opening up its labor market to low-skilled workers from the A8 Accession countries, notably Poland and Lithuania, the British government has made the economic imperative for immigration a clear, motivating factor in re-structuring immigration policy.

Often running against such openness demanded by labor
needs, however, is public opinion. Public opinion generally takes a more restrictive posture toward immigration than policymakers, due to either a localized perception of competition (Money 1999) or limited information on immigration generally (Freeman 1995). But while public opinion is “unstable and easily manipulated,” Lahav suggests that it still matters in “conditioning the debate” (2004: 105, 97). The value of garnering public support is not overlooked by the British government, who made clear through abundant language in the five-year strategy, that “public confidence in the immigration system is a top priority” (2005: 7).

While these first two factors, labor needs and public opinion, influenced policy changes in immigration, it was primarily two other factors—the nature of diversity and lessons from an ill-implemented multiculturalism—that ushered important changes in citizenship policies. While national diversity (e.g. Welsh, Scottish) has always informed British identity (see Colley 1992), non-White diversity has only been a reality since the influx of post-war migration. The empirical fact is that immigration to Britain, unlike traditional settler states, began after the formation of the nation-state, not alongside it. Large-scale, globalized migration introduced varying types of non-racial qua national diversity to Britain, and the understanding of diversity has therefore expanded to encompass ethnicity.

Finally, Britain’s troubled experience with multiculturalism as an integration strategy left meaningful lessons for the goal of national group making. Multicultural Britain encouraged the “right to be different” in the public sphere. But what resulted from minority cultures being recognized as “distinct groups” (Kymlicka and Norman 2000) was the establishment of permanent minorities. Newcomers remained permanent outsiders and ethnic communities self-perpetuated in their separate spaces.

These four factors underpin the coordinated design of controlled cohesion through migration policy. Whereas Britain already had the distinction of being the model par excellence of combining “relatively easy access to nationality with strict migration controls,” being both slightly more liberal and more restrictive in each area of policy in comparison to the rest of Europe (Hansen 2000: 207), British migration policy under Tony Blair’s Labour government has built on and refined this strategy of controlled cohesion.

Restrictive Immigration and Control

The goal of meeting Britain’s economic needs while projecting the perception of control and closure (see Freeman 1995, Joppke 1999) are evident in the restrictive changes to immigration policy under Blair’s government. First, the purpose of managed migrations is to boost public confidence in the immigration system by explaining “who we are allowing into the [country] and why,” and “that the system is not being abused” (HO 2006a: 16). This was evident in the design of a lengthy, ten-month process of active consultation following the launch of the five-year strategy, from July through November 2005. Soliciting opinions and concerns from groups as varied as the Commission for Racial Equality to the Confederation of British Industry, this consultation demonstrated a clear intent of framing immigration policy changes to “respond” to public opinion and to serve the interests of employers and migrants.

Second, it was clear in the managed migration scheme that Britain would be meeting labor imperatives in the restructuring. The points-based system (PBS) expands upon the established Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP) by creating a five-tiered points-based entry scheme for newcomers based on varying skill levels. This systematic point valuation overhauls an immigration system of over eighty schemes and quota arrangements, which evolved to meet particular economic needs along the way. The phasing out of the low-skilled migrant route is the most consequential change in shifting to the PBS and the most significant towards restriction. The fact is that low-skilled and temporary work would be met primarily by the pool of labor offered by EU enlargement, closing off these routes to non-European workers.

Inclusive Citizenship and Cohesion

For those admitted to residency, the new citizenship policies seek to remedy the deficiencies of past diversity and multicultural strategies by stressing the need for a cohesive meaning to British citizenship. Pointing to low naturalization rates for eligible residents, the Life in the UK Advisory Group undertook development of an inclusive dimension to citizenship by first sketching a unifying, de-racialized meaning of British identity and belonging:

To be British … mean[s] that we respect the laws, the elected parliamentary and democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual tolerance, respect for equal rights and mutual concern; and that we give our allegiance to the state (as commonly symbolized in the Crown) in return for its protection. To be British is to respect those overarching specific institutions, values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and cultures together in peace and in a legal order (2004: 14).

Determining that the first, most integral, step toward inclusion is the acquisition of English, the Advisory Group set forth in advising on two routes to naturalization split along English-speaking ability. In effect since November 1, 2005, applicants with sufficient English are required to take a 24-question, multiple-choice, computer-based citizenship test, “Life in the UK.” The second route is for applicants to take citizenship lessons (a recommended 20 hours) through the ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) ‘Skills for
Life’ curriculum, the Department for Education Service’s national strategy for improving adult literacy and numeracy skills. The second route, though less politicized, provides newcomers who qualify for citizenship a setting for integration by learning English and citizenship life skills in a classroom with others at their level.

But the successes of ESOL citizenship lessons and the citizenship test have been uneven. The large number of workers from the A8 Accession states seeking to improve their English for better employment opportunity, and who do not have to pay for classes, have led to ESOL classes becoming “grievously overstretched” (ABNI 2006: ii). Also, rules requiring non-EU/EAA immigrants to be residents for three years before receiving fee remission for ESOL classes are at odds with the goal of beginning integration at the earliest stage possible. The citizenship test has been plagued with widespread reports of cheating and generally low passing rates. The handbook to prepare for the “Life in the UK” test has been criticized as containing historical inaccuracies, including regional omissions, and being written far above an ESOL Entry Level Three, the required English proficiency needed to take the exam (Kiwan 2006).

Despite these setbacks, British citizenship criteria have been colored with decidedly inclusive components (particularly the citizenship ceremony) to pursue goals of cohesion. Citizenship takes on a meaningful dimension to foster the goal of national group making.

Conclusion

The changes in Great Britain’s migration strategy, where a more restrictive immigration system makes entry difficult based on domestic labor needs and an inclusive citizenship creates a broader, meaningful definition of Britishness, represent a coordinated social strategy of controlled cohesion as a response to immigrant-related diversity. By emphasizing cohesion and integration as a response to alienation and social exclusion, Britain is widening its community. Even five years from now, British society will look and be different. By influencing the source and parameters of its national community, British migration policy is consequently influencing the identity of those members in it.

References


Rethinking the Civic Properties of State-Linked Associations

Civil society is occasionally defined in abstract terms as a “space,” “arena,” “realm,” or “sphere” in which political action of certain kinds plays out. In contrast to this approach, I take the heart of civil society theory to be claims about particular categories of organizations. The universe of associations potentially contains every organization that’s neither state nor business — everything from labor unions to community swimming pools to the Red Cross to MoveOn.org. Accounts of civil society typically approach this complexity by hiving off a subset of this associational world. This subset expands or contracts somewhat depending on the particular definition used. But one thing all definitions agree upon is that organizations within this set must be essentially independent from the state.

These theories go on to assert that civil society groups contribute to various salutary outcomes — partly by way of unintended side-effects, through action that is only incidental to the organizations’ primary purposes. Most crucially, they are said to have internal effects on members, making them better citizens by encouraging political participation and providing practice in democratic self-governance, and external effects on the state, making it more responsive by representing the group’s interests and exerting pressure. Scholars in fact advance many other claims about the possible benefits of associations; for example, that they can cross-cut and thus mitigate societal cleavages. The two that are mentioned here, however, lie at the core of this body of theory and resonate with its widely embraced Tocquevillian aspects.

There are reasonable theoretical grounds, and certainly ample empirical examples, for the expectation that state links are incompatible with civil society. State involvement, sponsorship, and co-optation could indeed defeat these democratic effects. State domination could snuff out internal democracy; one could point to many institutions designed precisely with this in mind, such as in the “administered mass organizations” that Gregory Kasza surveyed. Government involvement could also encourage tendencies toward oligarchical organization structures. Finally, “state corporatism,” the heavy-handed structuring of interest groups theorized by Schmitter and implemented under numerous authoritarian regimes, unquestionably blunts the expression of demands.

Yet under the right conditions, state presence could also strengthen associations’ internal and external democratic properties. How could this be so? First, there is no universal law of social science dictating that non-state citizen organizations will automatically adopt democratic practices. In fact, doing so is often difficult and inconvenient. Associations’ leaders or most active members, having invested a great deal of personal time and effort in whatever their group is up to, may neglect to hold those open meetings or internal ballots that give the rank-and-file members veto authority. Sometimes, factional strife within an organization can paralyze all decisionmaking, democratic or otherwise. Second, while state corporatism generally works in such a way as to shut the door to citizen pressure, other kinds of structured ties between public institutions and grassroots-level organizations can provide channels of access into the halls of government. This is the fundamental claim of books like The Rebirth of Urban Democracy, which investigated cities like Dayton and St. Paul to understand how they “reach out to their neighborhoods and successfully incorporate the participation of average citizens into public policymaking.”

Large sectors of associational life in many kinds of countries — democratic and authoritarian alike — neither entirely belong to the state nor fit into the category of civil society. They combine some of the properties of each, and we need to understand these organizations better than we currently do. There are many ways in which actual associations can be said to “straddle,” if you will, the state-society divide. An extreme version is when government officials actually run organizations themselves. Much more commonly, of course, states provide funding for groups: through grants and contracting, if not paying their budgets outright. Even organizations that in most ways fall squarely within civil society often are connected to the state in at least this way. As Lester Salamon reminds us, 36 percent of the funding of the U.S. nonprofit sector comes from government. States also sometimes get associations to do things for them, whether that’s collecting information, publicizing state policies, distributing specific items, such as coupons for subsidized food, and so forth. At the less statist end of the spectrum, groups may be part of electoral-machine politics, they may be granted special access to decision making as in certain types of corporatist arrangements, or governments may merely register groups or otherwise convey their imprimatur. Researchers are aware of these phenomena, but
there has been very little serious study of how the political and social properties of associations themselves change when they take on these functions.

Much of my research concerns a form of neighborhood-based grassroots organization that engages popular participation but is also closely linked to city governments. These groups can be found in many parts of the world, but are particularly prevalent in East and Southeast Asia, under democratic and authoritarian regimes alike. In South Korean cities, for instance, groups of just a few dozen households are clustered together in ban, which hold regular or at least occasional meetings. In Thailand, Community Consultative Councils have recently been established in many cities with the purpose of decentralizing decisionmaking and bringing citizens into closer contact with municipal government. China’s neighborhoods feature organizations called Residents’ Committees, whose staff are paid monthly stipends and essentially serve as full-time liaisons to the city authorities.7

Many of these bodies have historical roots in systems of collective responsibility and social control implemented by oppressive governments, including China during the dynastic and Republican eras and Japan in its period of colonization and conquest in the first half of the twentieth century. In some of the most statist cases, such as today’s China, they retain a focus on information-gathering and surveillance in the service of state security, and are hardly models of democratic organization.

In other cases, however, these hybrid institutions belie their origins and exhibit a number of surprising characteristics. The official community organizations in the cities of Taiwan, for example, are led by lizhang, or simply, neighborhood heads (NH). These individuals are elected for four-year terms and choose a set of 20 or more linzhang (block captains) to assist them in their duties. They work hand-in-hand with a liganshi, an unelected civil servant from the district government, who draws on community ties in carrying out tasks like working with welfare recipients and facilitating military conscription.

NH elections were once pro forma exercises and wholly dominated by members of the Nationalist Party (KMT), which used this institution as a way to co-opt the Taiwanese population into a system of government led by exiles from mainland China. In the past two decades, however, these elections, rigorously run by municipal election commissions, have become highly competitive and the neighborhood leaders politically diverse. In 2003, an average of three candidates stood for election in each of the 449 neighborhoods in the capital city of Taipei, up from just 1.3 in 1985. More than two-fifths of the winners were non-KMT, up from virtually zero in the past.

The neighborhood organizations serve as a locus of civic activity in several ways. The NH elections themselves attract a surprisingly high turnout rate (around 40 percent in Taipei) by the standards of local elections. The community groups also mobilize voters for participation in elections for higher-level offices, such as for mayors and national legislators. Within the neighborhood itself, the NH coordinate a bewildering array of voluntary and social activities, from local festivals to foreign-language classes to sight-seeing excursions. Grassroots movements of many kinds—efforts to preserve or expand green space, promote or resist development projects, improve infrastructure, obtain compensation for pollution, and so forth—all exert their energies on the neighborhood organization. In turn, the NH are often able to bend the ear of high-level municipal officials; indeed, their protests led to the transfer of one of the immediate subordinates of then-Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou four years ago. They also compete for city funding of neighborhood improvement projects involving repaving roads, sprucing up parks, and the like.

Naturally, the NH system has its flaws, and certainly its flawed local leaders. One lizhang elected in 2003 was removed from his position shortly afterward, and later convicted, for hiring a hit man to kill a city councilman, to give one example. More generally, Taipei’s NH run the gamut from clan elders who rely on real-estate holdings and kinship ties to cement their positions, to reformists who bring transparency, participatory meetings, and programmatic efforts to re-invigorate their neighborhoods. Outside the capital, some NH continue the time-honored practice of buying votes, although this has died out in Taipei itself. At their best, anyway, they demonstrate the possibilities of a civic yet hardly autonomous organizational form.

Connections linking the state and nonprofits, associations or communities have drawn occasional scholarly attention.8 In some quarters, such as research on “state-society synergy” in the field of development, certain kinds of links between localities and government agents are celebrated for their potential to facilitate such laudable programs as affordable sewer systems in poor communities and irrigation arrangements in villages. But these studies don’t always answer the question of whether state involvement dampens (or enhances) the civic properties of associations.

We know that crude state control of grassroots organizations kills them off as channels for political participation as this term is generally defined. We know that excessive dependence on government funding can lead nonprofits to drift away from the roots of their volunteer base or their founding ideals in a mercenary drive for more and different contracts. Yet in many respects, empirical research on the nexus of state and association is still in its infancy. Cases like the Taiwanese neighborhoods suggest that even if state penetration of associations, in the forms that I surveyed...
at the outset, can have negative effects, these can also be balanced with institutional features that reinforce popular accountability rather than undermine it. The key ingredients seem to be the inclusion of strong mechanisms to ensure democratic accountability, and opening up rather than shutting off avenues by which ordinary people can have a meaningful effect on decision making within the state itself. For well-functioning democratic states, neither requires too great a stretch of the imagination: the running of fair, open elections is a competency that can be extended outside the government itself, and participatory processes should be welcomed rather than feared.

Does all this mean that the very concept of civil society—which so centrally embodies the principle of independence from government—ought to be scrapped? Some scholars take this stance. I believe there are several reasons for caution, however. First, the existing body of research on this topic includes major contributions and is not to be dismissed lightly. Second, blurry as the state-society boundary can be at the margins, there are significant differences between polities that allow truly autonomous groups and those that do not. Third, there are important forms of political action, such as transformative social movements, contentious calls for justice, noisy demands for redress of official malfeasance, that are unlikely to emerge from state-society hybrids. The notion of civil society helps remind us of these facts.

Nonetheless, the idea of a white-and-black, binary distinction between groups inside and outside of civil society makes it hard to do justice to large swaths of actually existing organizations. I argue that we need to develop much more fine-grained categories with which to understand the associational universe. This is, in fact, what some of the best scholarship of the past ten years strives to do, whether we take this stance. I believe there are several reasons for caution. I think of Mark Warren’s categorizations, or Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s study highlighting specific types of organizations (unions and churches) and their role in building civic skills. As we pursue this, we will no doubt find that organizations independent from government don’t have a monopoly on civic qualities, and that sometimes the state can—perhaps surprisingly—do more good than harm as it engages with associational life.


1 More comprehensive statements of claimed effects can be found in Larry Diamond, “Civil Society,” chapter 6 of Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), and

2 Gregory J. Kasza, The Conscript Society: Administered Mass Organizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Kasza gathers under this umbrella concept such organizations as fascist youth groups, official women’s associations, state-dominated unions and production cooperatives, and so forth, all drawn from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.


4 In my research on the emerging homeowner groups in newly built private neighborhoods in mainland China, I have been struck by the practical impediments to establishing democratic forms of self-governance. See, for instance, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Homeowner Self-Organization in Urban China,” The China Journal No. 49 (2003), 31-59.


6 Lester M. Salamon, America’s Nonprofit Sector: A Primer, Second Edition (New York: The Foundation Center, 1999), 36. To be more precise, this figure refers to the funding sources not of the entirety of the U.S. nonprofit sector, but public-benefit service organizations, which constitute most of it.

7 The neighborhood organizations of urban Japan provide another prominent example. See Robert Pekkanen’s recent analysis, Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), and Theodore C. Bestor’s vivid case study, Neighborhood Tokyo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).


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**CDACS Announcement:**

*Data from Survey on American Civic Engagement Publicly Released*

The data from the U.S. “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” (CID) survey, conducted in the spring/summer of 2005, are now publicly available. The survey presents an unusually broad and deep picture of American civic engagement in comparative perspective. Among other themes, it includes a comprehensive set of questions on the composition and diversity of informal social networks, involvement in voluntary associations, democratic values, and tolerance. A subset of the survey was replicated from the European Social Survey (ESS), thus allowing for comparisons between the U.S. and 22 European countries.

The U.S. CID survey was directed by Marc Morjé Howard (Georgetown University), with the assistance of associate directors James L. Gibson (Washington University in St. Louis) and Dietlind Stolle (McGill University).

For more information on the survey, including instructions for downloading the data, see www.uscidsurvey.org For more on the Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDACS) at Georgetown University, see http://cdacs.georgetown.edu

CDACS is also pleased to announce the inauguration of its Occasional Papers series. The first Occasional Paper, *Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America: The Good News Is ... the Bad News Is Wrong*, by Professor Russell J. Dalton (UC Irvine), is available at http://cdacs.georgetown.edu/occasionalpapers.htm.
Immigrants are characteristically welcomed by employers because they reduce the unit cost of labor (that is, lower wages) and also increase its elasticity; conversely, they are characteristically resented by resident workers as unfair competitors willing to accept lower wages (which constitute an improvement over their income in the country of origin) and below-standard conditions. At worst, they may not only lower wages but also altogether displace natives. However, even the most profit-driven capitalists are unlikely to favor a huge and sudden increase in labor supply, as that would occasion major social disruptions; hence, in contemporary capitalist democracies, arguments on behalf of “open borders” appear perennially as the playful musings of free-market ideologues, such as Julian Simon in the Wall Street Journal, but almost never in actual policy debates.  

These considerations, usually cast in a Marxian framework, have given rise to a considerable body of work accounting for the tendency of advanced industrial societies to recruit “guest workers” from less developed countries. An alternative explanation was provided by the theory of labor segmentation, whereby under conditions of the welfare state the upper strata of the workforce are assimilated into “fixed” capital, leading to the institutionalization of a distinct “flexible” segment, for which again “guest workers” of one sort or another are very convenient. In the United States, this analysis is applicable not only to the importation of Chinese workers to the West Coast from 1850 on, and of Mexican workers in World War I and World War II, as well as in the 1950s, but also by extension to the long-standing tolerance of “regular irregular” (in other words, undocumented) workers from the same neighbor. However, in recent years matters have been complicated by the reliance of some labor unions on such workers for the survival of their industry.

Still in the economic sphere, immigrants are also consumers of goods and services, both the ordinary kind that one buys and the “public goods” that are automatically available to all residents. Whereas they tend to be welcomed by sellers of individual goods and services — for example, real estate agents of port-of-entry cities — from the perspective of public goods the situation is more complex. Recent U.S. debates regarding the “balance sheet” of immigration in relation to welfare highlight the difficulty of establishing whether immigrants contribute more in taxes than they consume in public services or whether they are “free riders”; and the subject is understandably much hotter in European countries with more extensive welfare states. Moreover, because different units of aggregation are used to draw up a balance sheet of the various costs and benefits involved, immigrants may be “good” for the whole economy, but “bad” for a particular locality or social group — or vice versa (for example, they may reinvigorate declining “rust belt” cities). Incidentally, similar considerations are applicable also to international level assessments of the economic value of particular human flows by sending and receiving countries as a whole.

However, all types of immigrants — including even temporary workers — also constitute a political and cultural presence, which evokes a distinctive dimension of consideration pertaining to the putative impact of immigration on the host country’s “way of life,” “cohesiveness,” or, in current discourse, “identity.” Although the process in question is well evoked by classical sociology’s concept of “integration,” from Emile Durkheim through Talcott Parsons, I shall use the term “identity axis.” In almost any immigration situation, there are significant groups among the hosts who believe that newcomers in general, or particular groups among them, would jeopardize the established national ways. In the United States alone, just about every cultural attribute imaginable was found objectionable at one time or another, notably “race,” as constructed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, referring to not only “Asiatics” and blacks but also “mixed-breed” Mexicans, different European nationalities, and Jews; religion, notably Roman Catholics from the eighteenth century until quite recently; and language, starting with German speakers at the time of the founding and again in the early twentieth century, and Spanish speakers today. Similar hostile responses have surfaced elsewhere, notably toward Jews from eastern Europe in most of western Europe yesterday, Arabs and Muslims more generally throughout Europe today, or when “oriental” Sephardic Jews began arriving in Israel in the 1950s and when Ethiopian Jews began arriving later on.

Although reactions such as these are attributable in large part to prejudice and xenophobia that tend to exaggerate the problematic aspects of the situation, it should be recognized that the settlement — or prospective settlement — of any substantial group of people whose culture diverges markedly from the hosts’ is likely to call the established “cultural compromise” pertaining to religious, linguistic, and racial diversity into question, and hence is a legitimate source of concern. The key questions are always “How different can we be?” and “How alike must we be?” and, when they are answered, how the answers are to be implemented organizationally and materially.

As it enters into play with regard to immigration, “identity” centers on nationality. Originating largely in the course of efforts to institutionalize “predatory rule” in late medieval European states, modern nations have succeeded in socializing their populations to perceive one another as fellow members of intimate, family-like bodies, with a common ancestry and a common destiny. Although the formula for identity is usually founded on some objective characteristics of the society, such as the language actually
spoken by much of the population and the religion many of them share, the culture of the rulers is usually accorded pride of place. However, political culture and ideological orientation may be invoked also, as in the United States and France following their democratic revolutions, or in the confrontation between “the West” and “the East” in the Cold War decades.9

Much less noted by writers on nationality and nationalism is that the formation of identity always involves a negative aspect as well. As conceptualized by the anthropologist Fredrik Barth, it entails the elaboration of a boundary between “us” and “them”: thus, we are who we are by virtue of who we are not.10 In this light, nationality involves the delineation of a boundary, denoting simultaneously inclusion and exclusion. Whatever the objective realities may have been in the early modern era, princes and their serving intellectuals emphasized similarities within the national borders and differences between the nation and its neighbors.11 Although the negative “others” are commonly close neighbors with whom perennial wars are fought, from whom “we” must distinguish ourselves by any means possible, they can also be remote aliens, regarding whom little is known and therefore much can be invented. Groups originally recruited as low-skilled “workers” are especially likely to belong to the “non-us” world, a difference that is functional to their subjection within a status hierarchy; but this “wanted but not welcome” syndrome creates problematic situations if and when the workers begin turning into permanent settlers, akin to the dynamics of “liminality” analyzed by Victor Turner.12

Differing assessments along these lines precipitate confrontations not only between “natives” and “foreigners” but also among the “natives” themselves, between those who perceive the newcomers as a threat in relation to what is deemed a fragile status quo, and others more confident in the society’s ability to weather change, or who welcome the diversity the newcomers would contribute as an enrichment. These alignments are probably related to a comprehensive cultural cleavage that is emerging as the contemporary equivalent of the older rift between religious and secular camps, and encompasses other “cultural” and “moral” issues such as abortion, feminism, gay rights, or the death penalty. However, the camp of those positively disposed toward immigrants may also include “natives” who are not particularly open to change, but who feel an affinity with particular groups of newcomers, notably fellow religious or ethnic groups. This sometimes involves the national community as a whole, with respect to populations located in other states who are regarded as “external nationals,” on whose behalf the state may devise a “law of return” or some other unusually generous immigration policy.13

Refugee policy has tended to be driven by strategic considerations arising quite directly from the dynamics of the international political system: providing asylum to the victims of one’s enemies was consistent with the imperatives of realpolitik in that it demonstrated the antagonist’s evil ways and undermined its legitimacy. Concomitantly, refugees tended to be ranked high on the positive side of the “identity” axis throughout western countries; this was almost by definition, as in earlier times they were welcomed exclusively on the basis of religious or political affinity with the receivers, and therefore were not strangers but brothers and sisters in need. Under these conditions, statecraft and humanitarianism went hand in hand. By the same token, states were not inclined to help victims not “like us”: proletarian Communards had almost no place to go after their defeat in 1871, and Jewish victims of Nazism were denied havens as well.

However, in the post-World War II period the international community began moving toward a more cosmopolitan approach, eventually extending refugee status to all those, anywhere in the world, who are outside their country and without government protection as consequences of “reasonable fear” of persecution. Concurrently, the superpowers expanded the domain of their strategic confrontations to encompass many regions of the Third World, contributing to a vast enlargement of the refugee pool. Although the overwhelming majority remained in their region of origin, some came knocking at the door of the affluent countries, and the fact that an increasing proportion of those who sought asylum were poor people of color — and thereby akin, from the perspective of the receivers, to immigrant workers — triggered alarm bells and prompted a reconsideration of established politics. This revisionism was facilitated by the end of the Cold War, which eliminated at one blow the “realist” foundations of the postwar refugee regime. The United States retained a refugee policy founded almost exclusively on “realist” foreign and security considerations until about 1980; although it then subscribed to the international regime, its actual policy continued to be driven by “realism,” with some intrusion of constituency pressures (particularly with regard to eastern European Jews). The end of the Cold War, which eliminated at one blow the “realistic” foundations of the postwar refugee regime, has led to a sharp narrowing of the scope of the affluent democracies’ refugee policy, including in the United States.

The persistent coexistence of these two very different dimensions of consideration and, concomitantly, of interests, the one pertaining to the putative or actual effects of immigration on material conditions, the other for cultural and political conditions, can be represented by cross-cutting axes, each with positive and negative poles, providing for a continuum of alignments from “for” to “against.” Hence it is possible to adopt a positive position on immigration with respect to one dimension, and a negative one in relation to another. This accounts for the often remarked
upon tendency of immigration politics to straddle the ordinary “liberal/conservative” divide, and concomitantly the emergence of “strange bedfellow” coalitions for or against particular proposals. Successive attempts to resolve these disparate imperatives in the face of changing conditions shape immigration policy into complex and often inconsistent configurations, such as the segmentation of U.S. policy into a “main gate” dealing with general immigration, a side door for refugees, and a “back door” dealing with the procurement of temporary agricultural workers.

Overall, in distinction from the prevailing view of American immigration policy as a single historical line weaving between openness and restriction at different points in time, I believe it has involved from the outset a combination of disparate elements designed to facilitate or even stimulate the entry of immigrations deemed valuable while determining those considered undesirable, and occasionally even going beyond this to rid the nation of populations already in its midst. The result of deliberate efforts by policy makers responding to changing circumstances at home and abroad, these elements have intermittently crystallized into policy settlements anchored in concrete bureaucratic institutions, amounting to an “immigration regime.” Once they have come into being, a protracted process spread over a half-century or so, these regimes acquire inertial power by way of the sheer weight of established institutions of the interests of certain actors in preserving the status quo, turning attempts to change policy into an uphill struggle and thereby shaping the subsequent courts of history, in keeping with the notion of “path dependency.”

This approach provides the framework for a revised understanding of the history of American immigration policy as beginning with the formation of an immigration regime in the 1750–1820 period, combining elements of colonial legacy with newly wrought bits of state and federal policy. Despite changing circumstances in both the United States and Europe, which triggered numerous policy initiatives, this foundational regime survived pressures to change throughout the antebellum period. Elaboration of a successor regime, designed to meet the challenges of the industrial age and of globalization, began as early as the 1870s but was not completed until the 1920s; in the intervening period, however, immigration was shaped largely in accordance with the residual older design. Efforts to substantially modify the second regime were launched as early as the 1930s, but largely failed until 1965, when the principal elements of a third edifice were set in place, with complementary pieces added over the next two decades. Once again, even as the regime was still being completed, challengers initiated efforts to replace it altogether. At the turn of the millennium, however, the outcome was by no means evident, as the imperatives of globalization pulled in opposite directions. While the formation of a North American economic zone fostered a consideration of modifications allowing for greater freedom of movement, the events of 9/11 abruptly revived obsolescent concerns over immigration as a threat to national security, and hence fostered a tightening of borders.

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Endnotes


5 National Research Council, The New Americas: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1997). It is noteworthy that, in contrast some European planners in countries with declining populations advocate additional immigration (because immigrants tend to be younger than the general population) as a way of securing additional income for near-bankrupt old age insurance funds.

6 The parallel with “class” is more than metaphoric; as with class, “cultural compromises” can be thought of as “peace settlements” in the wake of “culture wars” pertaining to such matters as the degree of “recognition” of the culture in question, and institutional arrangements in spheres of work, education, and the like. However, contemporary democracies are less well equipped institutionally to deal with cultural matters than with those pertaining to “class,” perhaps in part because “culture” has not received the same degree of theoretical elaboration from social scientists.
dealing with capitalist democracies, whose reluctance to deal with the subject has left a vacuum that is being filled largely by “cultural studies.” As with “class,” the question is what intellectual tools are most appropriate for tackling the subject, what information should be relied on to assess putative effects, what are appropriate objectives, and what measures should be used in the evaluation of strategies to achieve them.


8 My approach owes a great deal to the following works: Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic books, 1973); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: New Left Books, 1983); and Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). However, I am putting greater emphasis on “agency in the form of sustained action by political elites. The notion of a “formula” was suggested by my former colleague Leonard Binder.

9 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and German (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). But whereas Brubaker treats the “ethnic” and “political foundations of nationality as contrasting ideal types, represented by Germany and France, I am inclined to view them as more or less complementary elements, which can and do coexist.

10 I owe this notion to Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.


13 I am grateful to Litt Woon Long for pointing out the distinctiveness of “partials” as a special category of immigrants and for suggesting how they might fit into this framework. The best-known cases are, of course, Israel and Germany; however, nearly all other countries that had an extensive experience of emigration provide for special arrangements as well, including Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.


About this Publication

Democracy & Society is published twice a year, and CDACS welcomes submissions from scholars around the world. Please visit http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs/democracyandsociety.htm or email cdacsnews@georgetown.edu for more details.

This issue was edited by Sarah Cross and Julie Lantrip.
belong. During this process, an immigrant struggles to gain the respect that has been eroded by the difficult entry experience. Community organizing is about creating a bond to connect people to each other and to help them work on difficult issues that the particular community or society at large is facing. It is about gaining both personal and communal respect in a constantly changing and challenging society.

Immigrants come with a variety of experiences. Some have been active in their home countries, while others have utilized passivity as a technique to survive politically hostile environments at home. Such profound experiences guide and influence immigrants' organizing in the United States; every group has its own perspectives, weaknesses, and strengths. While it is helpful to have American-born organizers assist immigrants in community organizing, it is also crucial that immigrants do this for themselves, adapting their ways to those of their current environment. This experience often involves a deep shift in immigrants' way of thinking and working, but it is clear that no matter where they come from, immigrants can organize effectively.

At its core, organizing is an expression of democracy. It is this very notion that attracts many to live in the United States. But democracy does not often come easily for those who are disadvantaged. Many immigrants associate organizing with political engagement, but the range of topics around which immigrants organize today encompasses much more than the political sphere. Depending on the constituency, along with the needs and assets of a particular community and its neighbors, organizing groups work on a variety of pertinent issues. Often, partnerships are created among communities of varying perspectives and interests. Depending on the issues, immigrants can collaborate with the native-born, the undocumented, labor and tenant groups, and others. Organizing efforts are not only a vital part of the immigrant community; they are also effective in helping address society-wide struggles.

According to the Urban Institute, immigrants in the last decade have settled primarily in non-traditional states, such as those in the Southeast, Midwest, and the Rocky Mountain region. These immigrants have fewer marketable skills, are generally poorer, and have weaker English-language skills. In addition, these states lack experienced bilingual teachers and immigrant support organizations, and have limited public benefits and social safety nets. Thus, new immigrants desperately need the leadership of effective organizers. For this reason, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) documented the practices and opinions of immigrant organizers for other leaders and volunteers in a report entitled *Immigrant-Led Organizers in Their Own Voices: Local Realities and Shared Visions*. The full report is available free online at http://www.cliniclegal.org under “Publications” and “Reports.”

**Methodology and Purpose of the Report**

Over the course of three years (2001-2004), with funds from the Catholic Campaign for Human Development of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, CLINIC provided grants and technical assistance to 17 immigrant-led, non-profit community organizing groups across the country that are engaged in fighting systemic barriers to immigrant integration and civic participation. Active in communities as geographically and socio-economically disparate as the *colonias* along the U.S.-Mexico border and African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods in Wichita, Kansas, these organizations shared the common objective of empowering low-income immigrants to engage in civic participation and community integration.

Focusing on these 17 organizations, *Immigrant-Led Organizers in Their Own Voices* looks closely at the birth, development, and maintenance of the organizing process among immigrants. The report attempts to give voice to immigrants as they struggle in their migration and integration experiences. As a result, it contains numerous quotes from community organizers, particularly on why and how they organize.

CLINIC gathered information for the report through phone interviews with immigrant organizers across the United States. As such, it is rooted in the experience of community organizing practices. Interviewees ranged from staff of large national groups to organizers of grassroots community efforts. Geography was varied as well, with four West Coast organizations; four Southwestern; three Midwestern; and six on the East Coast. The majority of interviewees work with immigrant communities in large cities, such as Boston, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C., while a few organize smaller rural or suburban communities in Des Moines, El Paso, Las Cruces, and Wichita. Organizers were of diverse ethnicity and national origin, with varying degrees of organizing experience and educational backgrounds.

**Report Summary**

**Leadership:** A central challenge in immigrant-led community organizing is to develop and retain leaders. Immigrants — newly arrived immigrants, in particular — struggle with myriad difficulties: language barriers, low income, family separation, and unfamiliarity with the social, political, and economic realities of their new country, to name a few. Many are intimidated by power, while others fear reprisal — such as job loss — if they become involved in groups working to effect change.
Despite these challenges, organizations are identifying and developing talented leaders. Sometimes leaders are identified as a result of a pre-existing client-to-social service provider relationship. Leaders may also come to the attention of the organization through a “Know Your Rights” presentation, focus groups, one-on-one interviews, volunteer drives, or referral from other leaders. Leaders are not always the most vocal or dominant personalities in a group; nor do they have to be. Organizations look for commitment, compassion, the ability to work with others, and a willingness to learn.

Leadership development is not necessarily a linear process, but it does involve stages. Leaders are trained using popular education techniques to learn leadership skills, U.S. social and political processes, human and civil rights in the international and U.S. context, and the reality of their own communities. For many, a key part of the training process is power-mapping; a process of identifying decision-makers in the community by name, entity, and function.

“A goal for leadership development is that people learn a process that they can apply in many situations and to many issues.” —Sheila Black, Colonias Development Council, Las Cruces, New Mexico.

The return on even basic leadership training can be tremendous. El Buen Samaritano, which serves the Stony Point neighborhood of Austin, Texas—home to some of the poorest Latino immigrants in the central Texas region—has seen a community transformed through leadership development.

“El Buen Samaritano is helping residents work with government officials to improve services in the area. After a course in leadership training that included learning how to work with government, transportation, health, and education systems, these men and women are making progress getting their roads fixed and establishing new bus routes that will help them with employment and medical services.” —Rev. Ed Gomez, Austin, Texas.

Community groups employ a variety of means to retain leaders including advanced training and special celebrations of victories for desired change. For many organizers, seeing the fruits of their work is a compelling enough reason to continue working for change.

“A goal for leadership development is that people learn a process that they can apply in many situations and to many issues.” —Sheila Black, Colonias Development Council, Las Cruces, New Mexico.

Partnerships: Success is achieved in large part thanks to the commitment and resources partnerships bring to a cause. Partnerships take many forms, including those between individuals and organizations with similar goals; community leaders and power-brokers; civic organizations; volunteers; and national networks.

“Leaders in community organizing do not come in to do what others tell them to do. They come in with ideas and to build relationships.” —Sister Mignonne Konecny, Austin Interfaith Sponsoring Committee, Austin, Texas.

Each type of partnership brings unique rewards and challenges. For example, difficulties arise when organizing work conflicts with the priorities or strategies of other community groups and leaders.

“We have encouraged our leaders that, regardless of where we come from, our main issues should be the advancement of our community.” —Gladys Vega, Chelsea Latino Immigrant Committee, Chelsea, Massachusetts.

Home-country social relationships, cultural norms, and political concerns play a significant role in how immigrants
view community life, and how they perceive community organizing in the United States. Immigrant organizing groups need to confront the dual concerns immigrants have for their native countries and the new communities in which they live. Immigrants engaged in local organizing efforts are often compelled to build new and larger social networks between immigrant groups, and establish principles for how people work together on shared concerns.

Churches and faith-based organizations can be rich resources, both institutionally and as communities where supportive individuals can be found. Many religious traditions strongly value human rights and social justice. In addition, faith can instill hope and motivate and inspire action.

“There is a natural alliance between immigrant-led and faith-based organizations, partly because they share the same constituency base. Leaders in community organizations often turn immediately toward faith-based groups because their leadership and religious congregants provide spiritual and moral support as well as political power.” —Tom Chabolla, Catholic Campaign for Human Development, Washington, D.C.

Partnerships are also essential because immigrant organizing groups have to work with limited resources. Raising money from outside sources is difficult, as is generating revenue from inside the community. But some organizations have found creative ways to increase their revenue streams. One way is to create a “membership” organization where community members contribute a small sum, $10 or less a year, which can help defray the cost of events or postage for mass communication. Some organizers believe that immigrants place the organization’s work in higher esteem and hold it accountable if they are required to contribute monetarily to it.

**Evaluation:** Another challenge too easily ignored is how to evaluate the outcomes of organizing campaigns, which include any strategic actions taken together to address a specific issue. Determining what makes a campaign successful cannot always be quantified. In most cases, organizing is a long-term process that must respond to changing political, economic, and cultural environments.

Promising approaches to evaluating community organizing are process-oriented, flexible, and participatory. Process-oriented outcomes look not only to quantifiable measures, such as the group’s size and number of new leaders developed, but also at the steps necessary to build power that will effect change. Flexibility allows groups to evaluate their work regularly and to change benchmarks for “success” based on evolving conditions. Participatory evaluation directly involves community members in identifying outcomes, selecting how data will be gathered, analyzing the information, and writing the evaluation. Such methods try to take into account the changing nature of organizing, while ensuring that the evaluation’s results actually reflect what the organizers are experiencing.

**Report Conclusion**

At its core, community organizing is an expression of democracy. The freedom to effect change is a powerful right, and the work of immigrant-led organizers toward achieving fair and just policies represents a meaningful way to integrate them into our participatory democracy. Immigrants are changing the face of the United States, and it is essential that their voices and experiences contribute to positive social change.

[The author of this article wishes to thank his co-authors of the report, Sibora Gjecovi, Esther James and Linda Plitt Donaldson, Ph.D.]

Jeff Chenoweth is the director of the Division of National Programs for the Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC). The full report is available online at the following address: http://www.cliniclegal.org/Publications/Freepublications/CLINIC_Reportonorganizers_final.pdf

**Endnotes**


6 Those interviewed were staff members of the 17 community organizing groups mentioned above.

7 For example, an organizing campaign might include a boycott, mass letter writing drive and a public hearing to improve worker safety in an agricultural field owned by one company.
Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France
by Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse

Reviewed by Elizabeth Grimm, Ph.D. student in Government at Georgetown University

In the aftermath of the headscarf ban and the 2005 riots in the banlieue, alarmist stereotypes of the “Islamization of France” and the rise of “Eurabia” pervaded the media. Integrating Islam, by Jonathan Laurence, an American political scientist, and Justin Vaisse, a French historian, challenges this oversimplification of the Muslim experience in France and presents a nuanced and ultimately optimistic analysis of the compatibility of minarets and the Marianne. The authors argue that the primary challenge of this current wave of immigrant integration is socio-economic rather than religious: rampant unemployment, chronic discrimination, and a lack of educational capital fuel domestic unrest among the Muslim immigrant population. Integrating Islam is a refreshing break from the superficial diagnoses of French and Muslim assimilation that frequently capture the media’s attention; Laurence and Vaisse point instead to the many positive sociological realities and trends in this relationship. Their work is an important read for anyone trying to understand the complexities of Islamic integration into the European mainstream and an extremely valuable contribution to the field of migration studies.

The strict separation of church and state in France was enshrined in a 1905 law prohibiting both official recognition of religious communities and public funding of religion. Thus, many commentators see integrating Islam as a direct challenge to the separation of church and state and a catalyst for Islamophobia in France. Furthermore, France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe. Muslims constitute the majority of the prison population and maintain high unemployment rates. Their population is steadily rising and the immigrant communities tend to concentrate in circumscribed poor neighborhoods.

Despite these facts, Laurence and Vaisse reject the argument that these conditions ipso facto incubate terrorism. They argue that the current problems are not novel, but typical of the immigrant experience. Immigrants are often poor, ill educated, under-employed, and alienated populations torn between two countries and two cultures—feeling neither at home in the place they live nor in their parents’ homeland. Ignorance of the integration process and its attendant social and economic challenges, rather than an inherent clash of civilizations, thus invites radicalization of immigrant youth. The current French case is consistent with this historical antecedent: Laurence and Vaisse argue...
that poor future prospects and a lack of national identity drive Muslim youth to appropriate a religious identity. Fueled by foreign imams (only one in five imams is a French citizen), youth such as Zacarias Moussaoui may be propelled to extremism.

The authors are optimistic, however, about the profound desire of Muslims to integrate in France. The publication of the Danish cartoons of Mohammed and the notorious headscarf ban incited little domestic Muslim opposition in France. The violence during the summer of 2005 resulted from perceived alienation from French society and economic and social injustices—not from a larger religious intifada. In fact, the optimistic outlook of Integrating Islam is confirmed in a Pew Global Attitudes study, published in July 2006 after the book went to print. According to their survey results, French Muslims consider themselves French at rates greater than other European Muslim immigrants identify with their respective host countries.

Despite the importance Laurence and Vaisse ascribe to domestic politics and the need for internal reforms, they do not consider how the upcoming presidential elections in April 2007 will affect the prospects for Muslim integration. Though they acknowledge the different approaches to integration held by President Chirac and the right-wing Interior Minister and presidential hopeful Nicholas Sarkozy, they decline to address how this difference may play itself out in the upcoming elections.

Yet, the authors conclude that the current trends are promising. Despite the reforms already made, future Muslim compatibility with the Republic will only occur when the French government fosters greater educational and job opportunities for Muslim youth and when the individual French citizens overcome their allergy to Islam.

By presenting a thorough background of France’s history as a country of immigration as well as the unique contours that the Muslim population adds to French domestic and foreign politics, Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse proffer a rich assessment of the everyday realities of Muslims in France. Accessible to readers with varying levels of familiarity with French or Islamic culture and tradition, Integrating Islam is an essential work for anyone who wishes to develop a textured understanding of this internationally relevant issue.

Migration and Citizenship is a report of the working group on citizenship, legal status and political participation of the International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion network (IMISCOE). It provides a descriptive overview of the main areas of research in the intersections between migration and citizenship, a discussion and evaluation of influential theories, and current research perspectives and topics in need of further exploration for each of the areas.

Even though the authors did not conceive it as a “comprehensive and high level overview,” and the area of study is geographically restricted, this book presents a systematic introduction to a growing and important field of interdisciplinary research. And it illustrates the advantages and deficiencies of the genre. The first chapter, by Bauböck, outlines the main conceptual discussions around citizenship and migration studies, provides clarifying definitions, and delineates the complexity surrounding notions of citizenship, nationality, membership, identity, belonging, and associated concepts and typologies. The review and evaluation of related theories about the developments and trends in the regulation of these statuses across countries is also instructive.

The book’s streamlined approach allows for covering a lot of ground in the three main areas investigated: the legal status of immigrants and their access to nationality (Albert Kraler), the rights of third country nationals and European citizenship (Bernhard Perchining), and political participation, mobilization and representation of migrants (Marco Martiniello). The down side of this streamlined approach is that it does not address two central areas of widespread interest directly connected to these topics — issues of identity and the economic aspects of migration — because they belong to other research areas within the IMISCOE project.

The authors competently address the main areas of debate in the literature, and they provide quick and reasonable evaluations of the limitations of the most influential theories in the fields of citizenship and migration. The book highlights the inadequacy of categories developed in recent but already classic works, such as those of Rogers Brubaker, as a basis for fruitful research and the weak evidence for optimistic post-national accounts, such as those of Yasemin Soysal. The report also describes the uncertainties about the standing and sustainability of interim statuses like den-
The underlying debate about whether transnationalism is an adequate conceptual framework for the study of current trends is one of the positive contributions of the study.

Despite the book’s interdisciplinary orientation, its organization betrays the rigid legal categories on which it is built. A good deal of overlap in the discussions of the different chapters and the reference to coinciding trends leave the impression that these issues could be more fruitfully discussed jointly; this shows how tentative the analysis still is in this relatively recent area of research. This also highlights the need for a better framework to understand the complex dynamics created by today’s migration trends and for concurrent transformations in our understanding of citizenship, as well as its legal and regulatory instantiations. The insufficient delimitation of normative analyses, empirical trends and causal explanations in the discussion reinforces these concerns.

**Migration and Citizenship** provides a useful summary of the state of research about the confluence of these areas, while often lacking the depth of analysis and prodding, as well as the degree of argumentation that the question deserves. It is a sophisticated introduction to the field — and not merely for area specialists. Compensating for the limitations of the presentation, the book provides an up to date bibliography that serves as a general guide to the literature on the fundamental aspects of research in this area. The commonsensical approach and the directness of style help draw out the thinness of our certainties. While the report shows the limits of current influential generalizations, it does little in the way of providing a renewed general approach beyond pointing at trends and sketching the complexity of the field. Perhaps this is one of its central virtues.

- *Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century: A New Deal or a Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf?* by Demetrios G. Papademetriou (editor)

**Review by James Poulos, Ph.D. student in Government at Georgetown University.**

That the United States and Europe experience levels of immigration which cannot be ignored is a commonplace of politics and policy. Whether, in the totality of the economic, demographic, and social circumstances of the West, that experience constitutes a crisis or a challenge is an open question — one shaped more by perspective, perhaps, than fact.

For the writers gathered under the auspices of Papademetriou’s Migration Policy Institute, the language of crisis reflects an unenlightened approach which casts immigration in adversarial terms. Stark legal and political lines divide “us” from “them;” the onus is on the state to keep out the unwanted and unauthorized and on immigrant communities to conform to the rules and customs of the host country.

A better-informed approach, the authors argue, recognizes that the West — especially Europe — cannot sustain the working population necessary to pay for its social benefits regime without robust immigration. Moreover, levels of economic performance to which the West has grown accustomed, courtesy of globally mobile capital, cannot be sustained without complementarily mobile labor. Thus the issue is less immigration than *migration*. This shift in thinking prompts a shift in policy prescription, away from rigid categories of citizenship and toward a fluid and generous system of political rights keyed to the social, economic, and transitory rights necessary to support the positive role migrants play in maintaining vibrant societies.

But the persuasiveness of such an argument depends upon one’s perspective on the nature and purpose of government and citizenship. The authors, dealing primarily with Europe, take a generally European posture toward both — that is, subnational and supranational actors take precedence over national ones. The political project is understood as a socioeconomic undertaking in which states and communities work together to fashion an inclusive and freely-changing environment conducive to shared human thriving. The validity of this project, for which unencumbered and actively supported migration is an urgent necessity, trumps the old narrow notions of blood, soil, and politically exclusive membership participation in the benefit of national goods.

Europe, on the other hand, faces a far more complex problem. Its socioeconomic premises are put to the test of its political and cultural preferences. Without a radical — or reactionary — change in the fundamental arrangements anchored by the European Union and state welfare policies, Europe confronts demographic realities and ideological promises that cannot endure short of inclusive, cooperative policies toward groups that may not desire or require full citizenship. For anyone intent on squaring such a future with the present, the package of research and initiatives assembled by Papademetriou is probably indispensable.
The problem of immigrant integration in Europe has become a source for social inquiry and political consequence. National strategies for cohesion have proven unsuccessful in countering some larger trends among immigrants and their generations of self-segregation and alienation. Beginning with the recruitment of temporary migrants in the post-war period, the changing demographic composition resulting from subsequent waves of family reunification and prolonged residence have led scholars to look beyond the nation-state to correct for the omission of rights experienced by non-nationals within nationally bound citizenship frameworks. Given that citizenship confers both full membership and rights, including the right to participate in the institutions and political life of a polity, what is an alternative source of rights to persons excluded from national citizenship?

Spearheaded by Yasemin Soysal’s *Limits of Citizenship* (1994), alternatives to national citizenship have been found in both postnational and transnational frameworks (see work by Saskia Sassen, Rainer Bauböck, and David Jacobson). According to these models, the extension of rights to non-nationals is predicated on the universal rights of personhood—established in international human rights treaties—and not national membership or historical/cultural ties. In the case of Europe, the hope for postnationalists is that the European Union can facilitate an extension of rights that transcend the state. Maarten Vink’s *Limits of European Citizenship* (2005) puts this hope under examination by both evaluating the coherence of European citizenship as a form of postnational membership and testing the effects of Europeanization (European integration) on domestic policymaking, specifically in the areas of asylum, resident status, and nationality. The extent to which the European Union has influenced change in domestic immigration policies is the basis by which Vink evaluates the viability of the postnational membership model.

To examine domestic policy change, Vink turns to the Netherlands as a critical case: “[I]f European integration can be expected to impact on domestic immigration policies, it should at least be visible in the Netherlands” (20). In turning to the three policy areas, Vink notes with well-researched detail a meaningful influence of European-level decision-making, particularly from bodies like the European Court of Justices but not so substantial as to substitute or subordinate national immigration and citizenship policies. “Although European policies and norms are certainly relevant, they do not decisively affect domestic politics” (164).

Regarding asylum, intergovernmental burden-sharing has provided the opportunity structure for supranational cooperation and proportional distribution of asylum-seekers, but the “fear of being more ‘generous’ than its neighbors” has stymied any common asylum policy (108). With respect to resident status, Vink presents an interesting and balanced discussion on the evolution of preferential treatment for Union citizens vis-à-vis third-country nationals (TCNs), but concludes that neither of these statues are as valuable as formal membership to the national political community. Finally, and perhaps the least surprising of all of his conclusions, he explores the limited Europeanization of Dutch citizenship policy. He concludes, noting how neither the EU nor the Council of Europe has been able to impact dual nationality legislation, that “citizenship policy is probably one of the last policy fields to be Europeanized” (157).

But none of these conclusions ultimately condemn European citizenship or postnational membership to the “dustbin of history” for Vink. While Union membership is still a “derivative of member state nationality” (159), he discusses postnational claims as not necessarily wrong but “premature” (167). Citing that although “Europe increasingly becomes part of national politics, and there is little doubt that it does so even in a field such as immigration policy that is strongly linked to national sovereignty, it is a mistake to think that greater European integration implies an unqualified hollowing out of the national state” (167). Vink takes care to establish caveats critiquing what many scholars have already described as an empirically questionable concept (see Christian Joppke’s *Immigration and the Nation-State*), that he could afford to be a bit more bold. And while published before the state referendums on the Constitutional Treaty, its failure almost certainly means an end to any deterrioralizing citizenship rights from the nation-state.

Vink’s contribution is important. By untangling the complex legal and political evolution of European citizenship and immigration policy, Vink fills the much needed empirical gap often overrun by theoretical analyses of rights and alienage. And unlike these analyses, European integration for Vink is not the moral pursuit of wide applications of universal rights-based principles but the incremental deregulation of the movement of persons for the purposes of realizing the internal market. And while the central question of European integration on (Dutch) national politics is obfuscated by an unrestrained examination of European level decision making in the first half of the book, the conclusion is not lost to academicians or policymakers interested in evaluating the real relationship between supranational and national citizenship and immigration policymaking.
Center Highlights

- Last fall Professor Clyde Wilcox took State Department trips to Kenya and Turkey and was a keynote speaker at a conference on religion and gender in Copenhagen. He also published a paper in the American Political Science Review on religion and politics.

- Professor Carol Lancaster’s book, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, has just been published by the University of Chicago Press.


- CDACS Graduate Fellow Ariel Ahram won the Georgetown Department of Government’s 2006 prize for best graduate student paper in comparative politics. His paper, “Trade and Corruption in the Middle East and Post-Communist Regions” was originally written for Marc Howard’s seminar on democratization. Ariel presented it at the Second World Congress of Middle Eastern Studies in Amman, Jordan in June 2006.

- Several students from the Democracy Studies masters program have received internships. Chris Neu is a research assistant at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where he is working with Dr. Hassan Barari to compile information for a study of “The Failure of Israeli Studies in the Arab World.” Evan Smith is serving as an assistant to the Registrar at the Fairfax County Office of Elections, working to streamline Election Day activities and update procedures prior to the implementation of a new statewide voter registration system. He recently served as liaison to a team of observers from the Australian Electoral Commission. Miki Wilkins worked as a Project Assistant at Middle East North Africa office of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, writing monthly political updates and keeping the office appraised of the situation in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Kyle Layman is working with Protestant Campus Ministries at Georgetown on voter education and civil rights. Andrew Mandelbaum is working with the US Institute of Peace on political opposition in the Arab World Project. Jennifer Hollinger is working at the Institute for the Study of International Migration as a research assistant on a project examining the trafficking of minors and how cultural backgrounds affect the post-trafficking services that they need.

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
“Democracy & Society” Volume 4, Issue 2

We are seeking well-written, interesting submissions of 800-2000 words on the themes below, including summaries and/or excerpts of recently completed research, new publications, and work in progress. Submissions for the issue are due Friday, February 23, 2007.

Democratization on the Defensive

Democracy promotion is on the defensive. Almost two decades after the Velvet Revolution and the peak of the Third Wave, the future of democratization is in doubt. In China and elsewhere in Asia, hybrid forms of governance that combine markets and authoritarianism have proven to be highly resilient. In Russia, Central Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe, governments have re-centralized authority, reduced the scope of political participation, restricted freedom of expression, and raised concerns about a return to authoritarian forms of rule that includes active efforts to reign in and contain the activities of independent civil society organizations. America’s experience in Iraq has generated concerns within Congress and among the public about the possibility for constructing democracy in the Arab world, and whether democracy promotion should remain a core priority of U.S. foreign policy.

Do these trends signal a turning point in the global process of democratization? Is authoritarianism re-emerging as a viable mode of governance in the 21st century? If so, what are the implications for civil societies and nonprofit sectors around the world?

This issue will explore the questions raised above and address the implications of current and future projects aimed at democracy promotion.

For additional information, please visit http://cdacs.georgetown.edu/newsletter.htm or contact Julie Lantrip or Sarah Cross at cdats06@gmail.com.
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