in his analysis of the cultural Pax Americana that the Establishment sought to impose in Latin America and other continents after 1945, Edward Berman wrote that one of the aims of the educational and philanthropic policy it pursued was to create “a worldwide network of elites whose approach to governance and change would be efficient, professional, moderate, incremental, and nonthreatening to the class interests of those who, like Messrs. Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller, had established the foundations” (1983: 15). Because it reflected the same, deep-seated “set of beliefs, anxieties, prejudices, and values” (Latham 1998: 206), modernization theory was an integral part of this project, of which it was both the theory and the vector. Through its secular arm, the Alliance for Progress, or through its own internationalization in foreign universities, modernization theory furthered this conception of social change and its adoption by the relevant actors. We have seen in [Continued, Page 8]


Democracy and Security in the Middle East

TO the dismay of democracy promoters inside and outside the American government, the Middle East is now experiencing a process of autocratization. Across the region, regimes are using myriad tactics to silence or weaken a fractious array of opposition groups and organizations. The recent sentencing of a prominent Egyptian blogger to four years imprisonment demonstrates that whenever activists cross the murky lines of unacceptable dissent they will suffer arbitrary punishment at the hands of judiciaries that are ultimately subservient to unaccountable executives.

All of this comes less than two years after the creation of an Iraqi government that was supposed to shine a beacon of democratic light on the region. Pointing to the threat of terrorism, Islamist electoral victories, growing Iranian influence, and the associated phenomenon of Sunni-Shi’ite conflict, Arab leaders are backing away from reforms.

That autocrats would use the region’s deteriorating security situation to justify this retreat is predictable. More troubling is the fairly tepid response from our policy makers. Indeed, in recent months, the discourse of “freedom and democracy” has given way to a modified version of the old realism. Of particular note is the call to “isolate extremists and support moderates,” code words for subordinating democracy promotion to the geo-strategic priorities of the region’s power brokers. In a similar vein, American leaders [Continued, Page 12]

The Uncertain Future of Democracy Promotion

As this column is being written, the U.S. Congress is beginning debate about the President's 2008 funding request for democracy promotion assistance. The total request, some $1.45 billion, represents a 17 percent increase and a jump of almost eighty percent in funding for democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East, notably in Iraq. As in any budget there are losers as well as winners, however, and leading democracy promotion groups are actively lobbying to roll back proposed cuts in funding for Asia, Eastern Europe, and Russia even while endorsing proposed increases for other regions.

This year’s budget request, however, is not likely to play out as a case of politics as usual. Routine funding battles cannot obscure the more important debate underway in Washington and around the world about the future of democracy promotion. While a retreat from current commitments is unlikely, concerns about U.S. policy have been building for some time. In mid-2006, the Senate sponsored hearings on “The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance” where Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, testified about the growing resistance of governments in Russia and Eastern Europe to U.S. democracy promotion programs. In Iraq—the centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s “Freedom Agenda”—the depth of America’s failure has placed the entire project of democracy promotion at risk, leading former Secretary of State Madeline Albright to urge Congress in May 2006 to rethink, not abandon, its commitment to democracy promotion. She called for a “realistic idealism” in the pursuit of democratic change, arguing that “the failures [in Iraq] were of leadership and intelligence, not a too-fervent commitment to democracy.”

As Albright’s comments suggest, a backlash against democracy is underway not only in Moscow, Cairo, and Kiev, but also in Washington, where the experience of Iraq and “unhelpful” electoral outcomes from Palestine to Nicaragua have shaken the confidence of American officials in the virtues of collective self-governance. These larger questions about what the U.S. can realistically expect to accomplish in the promotion of democracy, and real doubts about whether it should remain the centerpiece of U.S. policy, are likely to become even more prominent in the run-up to the 2008 elections.

In this issue of D&S, we highlight the problematic experiences of democratization in several world regions with articles by Daniel Brumberg on the Middle East and Eric Hershberg on Latin America. Nicolas Guilhot, in an excerpt from his recent book, The Democracy Makers, provides a critical account of the rise of democracy and human rights as ordering principles in the post-war international system. Khalil Gebara reflects on the experience of democracy in contemporary Lebanon.

This issue arrives at the close of the Center’s fourth year. During that time I’ve had the challenging but also enormously satisfying job of helping an idea to become an institution. And institution we have become. This fall our second class of Democracy Studies M.A. students will arrive on campus. The first of the Ph.D. students we funded in 2003 will complete their degrees. Democracy and Civil Society Studies has become a minor field in the Department of Government. This newsletter now reaches more than 1,000 readers in hard copy and multiples of that number electronically. There is much more for the Center to do but for me personally this was the right moment to take on new challenges. Beginning in July, I will move to the U.S. Institute of Peace. My warm thanks to all of the colleagues and friends at Georgetown, staff, students, and faculty, who have helped to make the last four years so rewarding. I look forward to continuing to work with you from across town, and to watching the future development of the Center.

Steven Heydemann


Democracy Promotion in Latin America


democracy promotion has a long and checkered history in Latin America, with governments and NGOs from various parts of the world playing roles of varying significance at different points in time and in different countries. In many instances international actors have assisted domestic groups seeking to undermine authoritarian regimes and have helped to consolidate civilian opposition to dictatorship. Over the past decade or so external support for strengthening accountability in fragile democratic settings has been widespread and often significant. Moreover, at several key junctures — in Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru most notably — interventions by international organizations such as the OAS and by governments throughout the hemisphere have constrained efforts by executive authorities to reverse the trend toward democratic rule. Yet democracy promotion, particularly as undertaken by the United States in Nicaragua during the 1980s and in Venezuela more recently, has arguably served as a frequent cover for partisan efforts aimed at strengthening the hand of political groups at odds with constitutionally legitimate governments of the left. A review of the history of U.S. democracy promotion in Latin America reveals several distinct periods and scenarios, the importance of which have ebbed and flowed over time and across country settings. At the time of this writing, in March 2007, the rhetoric of democracy promotion remains a crucial component of U.S. policies toward the region and of Latin American governments’ approach to regional affairs. Whether as a façade masking other objectives or as a well intentioned strategy for enhancing democratic accountability, all signs suggest that democracy promotion is likely to remain prominent on the agenda for the foreseeable future.

Democracy promotion in Latin America can be traced as far back as the Alliance for Progress, a strategy put forth by the U.S. government during the Kennedy administration in response to fears that the Cuban revolution could be replicated elsewhere in the region (Guilhot, 2005). Moderate reformist governments were considered the principal bulwark against revolution, and efforts to encourage political participation within a liberal democratic framework became central to U.S. involvement in the hemisphere. The Alliance was shortlived, however, as the Johnson administration, distracted by the foreign policy challenge of the Vietnam War, was inclined to support authoritarian regimes where these appeared to impede the real or imagined possibility of socialist transformation. Democracy promotion was not to resurface until the administration of President Jimmy Carter, whose policies diverged notably from those of the Nixon-Kissinger years, during which the obsession with combatting the Communist threat in the Latin America translated into support for unambiguously authoritarian regimes.

Carter’s human rights agenda marked a significant departure from the Latin America policies pursued by his immediate predecessors. Most notably in Argentina and Guatemala (though not in El Salvador), the administration cut off military assistance and articulated forceful opposition to singularly brutal dictatorships. International NGOs meanwhile collaborated with local partners to defend human rights that were being violated systematically by military regimes, particularly in Central America and the Southern Cone, that had frequently benefited from U.S. support for their efforts (Sikkink, 2004).

U.S.-based actors were not alone in attempting to aid democratic reform in this era: the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a growing European role in Central America and elsewhere in Latin America, as governments and foundations associated with social democratic parties condemned authoritarian rule and sought to buttress democratic oppositions (Mujal-Leon, 1984). These initiatives were important, if by no means determinant, in undermining authoritarian regimes and laying the groundwork necessary to construct more democratic political systems (Carothers, 1991; Whitehead, 2001).

Rhetorical and material support for democracy promotion emerged as prominent during the Reagan era, even if in its initial years the virulently anti-Communist Republican administration reversed the measures designed by the Carter administration to isolate the rightwing Latin American regimes responsible for human rights abuses. Beginning with Central America from 1983 or so onward, and extending to the Southern Cone by the second half of the decade, U.S. policy toward the region was increasingly articulated in terms of democracy promotion (Carothers, 1991). On the other hand, this coincided with strong support for militarized but elected governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as with backing for the Nicaraguan contras, armed insurgents who were hardly a force for democratic rule but who were seen as crucial to preventing Communist influence in the Isthmus.
It was during the Reagan administration that the U.S. government established institutions aimed at publicly supporting democratic rule around the globe. From this point forward, overt engagement in democracy promotion was to replace covert intervention. Most notable among these new institutions was the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which persists to this day with an annual operating budget of roughly $80 million. During the 1980s the NED funneled resources to moderate political parties and NGOs opposed to the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, as well as to civil society organizations in Central America. The NED, as noted below, has played an especially prominent role in recent U.S. policy toward the Andean countries and Cuba.

A new set of actors emerged during the 1990s as crucial players in the business of democracy promotion: Latin American governments themselves. Attempts to remove democratic regimes in Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru met with strong condemnation from governments throughout the hemisphere, including from the U.S., as well as from multi-lateral institutions such as the OAS. Yet Latin American governments have not always sided with U.S. actions that are couched in terms of democracy promotion. In Cuba and Venezuela, in particular, Washington’s putatively pro-democratic policies have been strenuously opposed by governments elsewhere, which interpret them as focused not on strengthening democratic processes but instead on effecting regime change (Martínez-Soliman, 2006).

Today, democracy promotion remains very much on the U.S. and European agenda in Central America and the Andes. It is in these sub-regions of Latin America where the rule of law remains tenuous and where multiple security threats, such as guerrilla movements and drug-related violence, undermine democratic governance. Numerous objectives underlie efforts by the U.S., European governments and multilateral agencies to strengthen democratic institutions in settings where political violence remains unchecked and where accountability of security forces is inadequate. Channeling support through states as well as NGOs, external actors have sought to strengthen public institutions and justice administration, professionalize police forces and increase government accountability vis-à-vis the citizenry (Ungar, 2002; Adams, 2003). Such “good governance” initiatives, which enjoy European as well as U.S. backing, are as legitimate today as at any time in the recent past. They can be expected to endure, and even if they fail to achieve systemic change, their incremental effects have tangible consequences for the quality of democracy in settings plagued by weak institutions, particularly in the judicial arena.

Yet it would be a mistake to ignore the dark underside of the democracy promotion business. Three cases merit attention in this regard, as they illustrate both the abuse of democracy promotion and the risks associated with misuse of democracy promotion rhetoric. First, with increasing frequency, policy initiatives couched in terms of democracy promotion have entailed assistance to military institutions that may themselves undermine democratic governance. Here, the Bush administration’s resumption of military aid to several Central American countries is troubling, as is its continuing emphasis on military solutions to the socio-political conflicts plaguing Colombia (Latin America Working Group, et. al., 2005). In the latter, as in Central America during the 1980s, there is a perverse tendency for governments supported by U.S. democracy assistance to be at odds with domestic human rights NGOs that see their own mandate as entailing democracy promotion. By repeatedly accusing human rights advocates of favoring subversion, officials of the Uribe government have risked the lives of some of that country’s most committed advocates of democracy.

Also problematic is Washington’s stance vis-à-vis Venezuela. Aside from heated rhetoric aimed against the elected government of President Hugo Chavez, the Bush administration appeared to endorse the 2002 coup d’état that briefly removed the Venezuelan president. The U.S. has used NED and other agencies as vehicles for supporting Chavez’s domestic opponents over the protest of numerous Latin American governments and has appeared determined to undermine the Venezuelan government. The ambiguities of U.S. democracy promotion in Venezuela are illustrated by a recent exchange between Lawrence Eagleburger and Fox News television interviewer David Asman. When asked whether the U.S. should “just wait for the economy to collapse or do we push it in that direction?”, Eagleburger replied: “I think we have to push...anything we can do to make their economy more difficult for them at this moment is a good thing… if we can get away with it” (Fox News, Jan. 26, 2007). In this context it is hardly surprising that the Chavez administration has condemned democracy promotion efforts as thinly veiled attempts to overthrow the government.

Finally, there is the case of Cuba, Latin America’s lone surviving dictatorship, where Washington’s stance is and will remain unambiguously in favor of regime change. A variety of mechanisms — ranging from condemnations in international forums to sponsorship of U.S.-based anti-Castro media to continued economic sanctions — aim explicitly to bring about the demise of the Cuban government and its replacement by a friendly regime. While European and Latin American governments share the U.S. concern with human rights abuses in Cuba, they have proven far more reluctant to confront the Castro regime directly, preferring to express their concerns through diplomatic channels and by emphasizing human rights rather than the broader objective of democratization. The Cuban government has responded aggressively in instances where domestic actors appear to have received support from democracy promotion efforts abroad, condemning them as agents of foreign
intervention in domestic affairs and thus as threats to national security. There is little space for democracy promotion in contemporary Cuba.

Democracy promotion is alive and well in Latin America, but it takes many forms, reflects diverse motivations, and has not lost its dark side. U.S. efforts are the most consistent over time, but they vary in nature, at times seeking to promote good governance in nascent democratic systems and on other occasions veering toward the goal of regime change. Meanwhile, Latin American governments feeling pressure from externally supported NGOs— principally Colombia and Venezuela but also, of course, Cuba—are increasingly inclined to curtail their space for operation, and to portray them and their domestic allies as threats to state security. While it is perhaps in these countries that democracy is most in need of help, it is also where democracy promotion is least likely to be effective.

Eric Hersberg is Director of the Latin America Studies Program and Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University

References


Endnotes

1 Indeed, the current scandals in Colombia concerning ties between the U.S. supported Uribe administration and paramilitary groups center around the latter’s involvement in killings and disappearances of leaders of civil society organizations at the forefront of democratization efforts in that troubled country.

To sign up, go to http://cdacs.georgetown.edu/mailinglist.htm or email us at cdacs@georgetown.edu
The Lebanese Entrapment

by Khalil Gebara

The summer of discontent in Lebanon that started in July 2006 has yet to cool down. Lebanon may have been under land, air and sea siege for more than one month in 2006, but the Lebanese government headed by Prime Minister Fouad Seniora has been under political siege since December 2006. On the surface, the current political quarrels in Lebanon might be seen as focusing on participation and proper representation. However, these quarrels underscore major differences that could be irreconcilable, could threaten the frail stability of Lebanon, and might even lead to its break-up.

Lebanon has always had a different track from the Arab countries surrounding it. Lebanon never witnessed coups d’etat or centralized economic systems. On the contrary, Lebanon has been known for its open political and economic systems and for the periodic, peaceful transitions of power. However, this model was one of the casualties of the civil war, suffering greatly during the past 15 years of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon; the Lebanese became acquainted with the continuous harassment of Syrian intelligence officers, and the Lebanese “model” became threatened by the increasing influence of the Syrian regime and its various intelligence and military agencies.

The assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri created new momentum in Lebanon. The peaceful demonstrations and public pressure, dubbed the Cedars’ Revolution, that followed the funeral of Hariri helped force the resignation of the then serving Prime Minister, Omar Karami, and the withdrawal of the Syrian army in April 2005. The Syrian army entered Lebanon for the first time in January 1976 and stayed for about 30 years, during much of which it was the supreme power broker in the country. Trying to capitalize on their success in attracting public support and sympathy, the newly emerging anti-Syrian opposition, known as the 14th of March block, pushed for legislative elections which were held in May and June 2005. During these elections, the 14th of March block was able to secure a relative parliamentary majority.

For the first time since the end of the civil war in 1990, Lebanon witnessed relatively free elections. The new government that was formed after the legislative elections contained representatives of the 14th of March block as well as representatives of the two main Shiite political groups: Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. Despite the targeted assassinations and volatile security situation, the Lebanese were still expecting that there would be a financially booming summer season, that the country was on the right path, and that the government would be able to deliver on the promised fiscal and political reforms. At the same time, the events in Lebanon were presented to the outside world as the continuation of the evolution of the Arab region, precipitated by the invasion of Iraq, which unleashed hope for change and democratic reforms which would put the pro-status quo Arab regimes on the defense.

The resurrection of the Lebanese model that is based on tolerance, political and economic reforms became the model that the promoters of democracy for the Arab region used in order to prove that it would be impossible this time to bypass the new wave of democratization and reforms. As a result, the Cedar Revolution was treated as a successful public demand for freedom and democratization in the same way that the Orange and the Purple Revolutions were treated beforehand.

For the die-hard followers of Lebanese politics, nothing is new. Every couple of decades, since independence from France in 1943, the Lebanese and the friends of Lebanon anticipate change and assume that the window of opportunity resulting from either a war or major upheaval will allow the country to get back on track and be rebuilt. Many such windows of opportunity have been mistakenly proclaimed over the years, including in 1958, 1983, and 1990.

The cynical observers of Lebanese politics were proven right. Several events have diminished any hope that Lebanon might be on the right track towards political reforms and modernization: the relative success of Hezbollah during the Israeli war on Lebanon; the open sit-in in downtown Beirut, and the resignation of the Shiite ministers directly before the government was scheduled to approve the bylaws of the international tribunal to try the suspects in the killing of former Prime Minister Hariri. Moreover, the violent strike and the communal clashes were a reminder that communal peace is still volatile and political quarrels can still lead to street clashes. By the end of 2006, it became apparent that the counter-revolution had taken the upper hand. The events in Beirut, as well the problems in Palestine since the success of Hamas in legislative elections and the continued worsening of the situation in Iraq, put all the advocates of democracy in the Arab region on the defensive, strengthening the position of the realists who have been promoting the preservation of the status quo. In particular, they warn about the results of an Iranian-led assault, which is using proxy local groups in three countries: Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine.
The Lebanese hoped that the Saudi-Iranian summit, which took place early March 2007, would lead to a break in the domestic political deadlock. Once again the solution for the Lebanese quagmire seemed to be either regionalizing or internationalizing it. During the 15 years of civil war, numerous international and regional summits tackled the Lebanese crisis, but none managed to end the civil war until a quick military operation in October 1990 led to the surrender of General Michel Aoun, who was leading the last pocket of resistance against the constitutional changes that were agreed upon in 1989 in the town of Ta’if in Saudi Arabia. Between that date and April 2005, Syria became the main power broker in Lebanon, and one of its functions was to ensure stability and communal peace.

The July-August war on Lebanon and the events that followed are another unpleasant reminder of the volatility of the Lebanese system and how easily and quickly it can become polarized. These events made the Lebanese, and those who study Lebanon, wonder whether the country is destined to be forever under the supervision of a regional power. Thus, two questions arise: Is Lebanon destined to be ruled, and why did the Syrians succeed in ensuring stability in Lebanon when everybody else failed?

The Syrians succeeded in stabilizing Lebanon in two main ways. First, the main impact of the Ta’if accord is that it took international affairs outside the scope of the Lebanese political elite. In other words, Lebanon surrendered its international affairs to the Syrians, who took charge of running Lebanon’s international affairs. Here it is worth noting that the major source of contention or even conflict in Lebanon has been the disagreement between the Lebanese political elite over regional and international alignment. In 1958, one of the reasons for the short civil war was the disagreement over whether Lebanon should join the Baghdad Pact. In 1975, the presence of various Palestinian groups and the usage of Lebanon as the base to attack Israel were some of the main reasons for the militarization of different Lebanese communities and the eruption of violence in 1975. Today, less than two years after the withdrawal of the Syrian army, the Lebanese are again in conflict over regional and international alignments and the question of whether Lebanon should disassociate itself from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second, the National Pact of 1943 and its successor the Ta’if Accord emphasized the pivotal role of the political elite. It made the Lebanese system elitist and dependent on the behavior of the political elite. Hence stability in this confessional and power-sharing system is positively correlated with consensus and cooperation. The main tool that the Syrian regime used to ensure that the Lebanese system functioned properly was the enforcement of competition inside the different Lebanese confessions. As mentioned earlier, one of the characteristics of the Lebanese system is that it relies on continuous elite cooperation and can be easily polarized. Hence, competition should not take place between confessions. Any competition needs to take place within confessions. In other words, the Syrian regime always made sure to prevent any political party or politician from securing a monopoly within a confession through assignment of access to state resources to different Lebanese parties, which arbitrarily helped in preserving this system.

Today, one of the main results of the legislative elections of summer 2005 has been the monopolization of the Sunni, Shiite and Druze communities. Saadeddine Hariri, the son of the late Lebanese Premier Rafik Hariri, has emerged as the main Sunni politician. The Hezbollah-Amal movement alliance swept all the seats reserved for the Shiite community and Walid Junblat preserved his position as the major Druze leader. As a result, any political disagreement between a Sunni and Shiite politician could easily be turned into a communal conflict.

Will Lebanon ever be able to overcome the need to rely on a regional power-broker to arbitrate between different political groups? Also, will Lebanon ever witness long-lasting democratic reforms? It seems that the answer to these questions is negative unless there are embedded mechanisms inside the rigid power-sharing arrangement that can make this system more dynamic and can ensure peaceful competition inside the different communities. Maybe introducing such mechanisms requires re-conceptualizing the Ta’if accord. However, more medium-term solutions might be less drastic, such as the introduction of a new, modern and democratic electoral law that ensures proper representation and a new, peaceful reshuffling of the Lebanese political elite.

Khalil Gebara is the Co-executive Director of the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) and the Executive Director of Arab Region Parliamentarians against Corruption (ARPAC). The views expressed in this piece are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of LTA or ARPAC.

Endnotes
1 Confessionalism in the context is defined as institutionalized separatism on a sectarian basis in the parliament, cabinet, and administration. See Michael Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics,” Comparative Politics 1 (January 1969), p. 251.
the previous chapter how it was progressively called into question, contested from within and from without.

The crisis of this scientific and ideological paradigm, however, also signaled the paradoxical success of its built-in political purpose. It succeeded not in spite of the failure of modernization theory, but precisely because of this failure. Its demise was indeed the result of an attack by scholars denouncing the collusion of dependent development, authoritarianism, and, often, U.S. foreign policy. Ironically, it is these scholars and their political and intellectual allies who ended up generating an international “network of elites” not unlike the one envisioned by the old establishment. Initially associated with rather critical positions, their political commitment to democracy evolved toward a pragmatic and moderate posture, more compatible with the concerns of their liberal sponsors, but also of the U.S. administration and major international institutions. Severing the link between democratization and more encompassing conceptions of social change, the literature on “transitions” to democracy that they produced rested on a conception of negotiated, orderly and, ultimately, manageable political change, kept distinct and separate from socioeconomic transformations. Their scientific productions emphasized, as Metin Heper put it, “gradual and controlled regime change” (Heper 1991: 193), thus echoing the long-sought goals of the establishment.

The advocacy of such gradual change explains why the development of contemporary democratization studies, and especially the approaches based on the concept of “transition,” have often been regarded as a revival of modernization theory. Both critics and exponents of the political development literature stress this continuity. This is, for instance, the perspective adopted by Cammack (1997) in his work on the evolution of the literature on political development from the 1950s to the 1980s. He sees the transition approach as “taking further” a doctrine that was already in the making, without solution of continuity. In a completely different vein, Pye, in his presidential address to the 1989 meeting of the American Political Science Association, argued that research on transitions to democracy showed the fallacy of dependency theory and, instead, vindicated modernization theory, which had identified early on the “key factors” that would play a role in the democratic transformations of the late twentieth century (1990: 7).

In the field of area studies, and especially in African studies, the contemporary discussions on the relation between the rule of law and economic performance, or on democratic governance, is perceived by many scholars as a resurgence of modernization theory (Barkan 1994). More generally, it has been acknowledged that the epochal transformation of 1989 called for a new macro-paradigm in political sociology that would combine structural aspects of societal change with a “stress on agency” that would also “renovate the voluntaristic basis of action theory” (Tiryakian 1991: 172). Tiryakian has suggested calling it “neo-modernization.” By analyzing democratization as the outcome of strategic choices actively made by a political elite in a con-
text of structurally determined opportunities, the new approach to transitions to democracy fully fitted that nascent research agenda.

This characterization is partially misleading. It ignores the very real struggles between different factions of the political science community. In particular, it ignores the tensions that opposed modernization or political development theorists and those who would later embody the transitions to democracy approach. These struggles often entailed a political dimension that cannot be underestimated. An account such as Cammack’s, for instance, in spite of its wealth of documentation and its solid argument, is too seamless. Theories of transition to democracy are not a mere outgrowth of modernization theories, even if they may fulfill the same political functions. Yet, as we shall see, they were ultimately used as the scientific ideology of a new foreign policy articulated around democracy promotion. The capacity of this scholarly discourse on democracy to generate consensus, illustrated by the existence of an organization such as the NED, and to accommodate simultaneously different meanings and different agendas has certainly contributed to its successful institutionalization. All the paradox of this scholarship, which is also a democratic discourse on democracy, is that it began as a heterodox critique of dominant paradigms but ultimately contributed to creating a new orthodoxy.

This “continuity within change” is an important aspect of the evolution of political science doctrines of democratization. The theoretical oppositions, the scholarly discussions and struggles between “transitologists” and modernization sociologists, between dependencistas and behavioralists but also between liberals and neorealists, paradoxically furthered the political goals that the search for a scientific theory of moderate, elite-driven and capitalistic change was supposed to legitimate and facilitate. I illustrate these processes by focusing on the research program on “transitions to democracy” that emerged in the late 1970s as a critical contribution to the debate on U.S.-Latin American relations, before becoming a major subdivision of political science. This success story—a critical approach that became institutionalized in a discipline that is traditionally close to the field of state power—is also the story of the transformation of this knowledge. In particular, I focus on the conversion of what I call a “critical knowledge of the state”—broadly speaking a political economy of the state inherited from dependency theory, or the critical functionalism specific to the theories of neocorporatism (e.g. Schmitter 1974) on which the analysis of authoritarianism and transitions to democracy was based—into a dominant policy expertise on democratization.

With powerful institutional resources at their disposal, the scholars who “invented” democratization studies in the 1980s sought to oppose neoconservatives by showing that democratization processes would not lead to socialist regimes mushrooming next door, but to democracies presenting the influence of “notables”—regimes that would maintain the power of those that Weber has called the “economic honoratiore.” They thus reinvested a structuralist analysis of the state in these moderate prescriptions which conformed with the expectations of foreign policy institutions and, more broadly, with the policies encapsulated in the Washington consensus. Another paradoxical outcome of the same theoretical legacy has been the development of a “new international political economy” which analyzed the political stakes of economic policies (in particular of structural adjustment) and ended up being adopted by the World Bank in the early 1990s.

Scholarly Institutions, Liberal Networks and Transitions to Democracy

The multi-volume work on democratization published in 1986 by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead is at the center of these transformations. It has become the foundation stone for the subsequent—and burgeoning—literature on democratization, and required reading in scholarly discussions on the matter. It offered the first major comparative study of contemporary processes of democratization. In doing so, it somehow indicated the subordinated position in which Latin American Studies had been confined by giving them a central position in the revival of comparative politics. As a critic argued, the collapse of authoritarian regimes that motivated this academic enterprise “added a new set of impatient area scholars to the ranks of comparative political scientists” (Hagopian 1993: 464), and it substituted a discredited modernization theory.

Never really at ease with the main assumptions of modernization theory, Latin American Studies scholars finally managed to break away from it at the time when developments in Latin America put their discipline in a position to renew the field of comparative politics. A generation of scholars whose names had been directly or indirectly associated with dependency theory and structuralist approaches to politics came to replace a more conservative “old guard.” By the same token, the fall of authoritarian regimes in the context of intensified capitalism led these political scientists to revise a number of assumptions of dependency theory. In particular, they thought it necessary to break with its alleged determinism and a political pessimism which, it was supposed, was its practical consequence. The attention to macro-structures progressively gave way to a concern for what the Chilean sociologist Manuel Garreton has called “the less predictable and more fluid elements of politics, political creativity and collective action” (Garreton 1988: 358–59). As we shall see, this transformation of scientific discourse entailed major consequences not only for the discipline of comparative politics—which abandoned the
study of social change in favor of political change, reduced however to the dimensions of palace revolutions — but also for the nature of emancipatory politics.

*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* also offers a perfect illustration of the type of studies produced by the transnational networks of activist scholars that were analyzed in the previous chapter. This scientific production was deeply influenced by the international context in which it developed and by the political commitments of its authors. In particular, the essays collected in the *Transitions* series raised to the level of theory the practical commitment in favor of democracy that animated the political and academic networks of protégés of the liberal establishment, at the same time that it stripped it of its more radical connotations. From a methodological point of view, this translated into a progressive detachment from the paradigm of dependency and, more generally, from structuralist explanations of regime change. Instead, a microanalysis of political elites that was sometimes close to rational choice or game theories and that assumed a relative autonomy of the political became the flagship of the new approach to democratic transitions. More paradoxically perhaps, given the past production of some of its prominent contributors and their involvement in the politics associated with the dependency school, the *Transitions* volumes not only theorize the irreversibility of capitalistic relations of production, but also reflect and sometimes explicitly assert the impossibility of implementing even moderate Keynesian arrangements in the context of a powerful international economic orthodoxy. As such, they illustrate the transformation of a dissident and critical strand of political science, linked to the intellectual moment of the 1970s, into a normative theory of non-revolutionary change under capitalistic economic conditions.

**Bibliography**


**Endnotes**

1 In the introduction to the volume on Latin America, O’Donnell writes indeed that the arguments “may apply to all cases of nonrevolutionary regime transition in countries that have a more than minimally activated popular sector and a reasonably complex capitalist economy” (1986: 5). He adds that the choice of studying only nonrevolutionary transitions stemmed from normative endorsement of political democracy.
Democracy Studies Students Launch Website to Bridge the Academic and Applied

By Daniel Adams

To wrap up the inaugural year of Georgetown University’s Democracy Studies MA program, the students launched the Democratic Piece (www.democraticpiece.com), the official blog of the Forum for the Study of Democracy and Autocracy, the recently created corresponding student organization.

The Democratic Piece will serve as an online area for Democracy Studies students to actively participate in the Forum’s mission to further the study of democracy, autocracy, political change and democracy promotion at Georgetown University and in the broader academic and advocacy communities.

The Forum offers the site as a resource for those interested in democratic theory, current events, political change, and democracy promotion. The Democratic Piece aims to serve as a nexus of communication between the academic and professional worlds by utilizing the knowledge and skills gained by the Democracy Studies program’s unique focus on academic and applied issues.

The website will include regular content featuring news and commentary on worldwide current events, updates regarding research and academic work in the field, and coverage of relevant conferences and events.

In order to serve as a space to foster communication and debate within the areas of political change and democracy promotion, the Democratic Piece welcomes commentary and contributions from outside sources. If you would like the Democratic Piece to link to your website or are interested in submitting content for posting consideration, please e-mail democraticpiece@gmail.com.

Daniel Adams is an M.A. Candidate in Democracy Studies at Georgetown University

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This issue was edited by Sarah Cross and Julie Lantrip.
have evinced more than a little hesitation when it comes to pushing the reform agenda with their Arab counterparts. Thus when the governments of Egypt and Bahrain closed the offices of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) — a wing of the Democratic Party that promotes democracy programs in many developing states — these actions hardly registered on foreign policy radar screens. While it is encouraging that Washington rebuked Cairo for passage of anti-democratic constitutional amendments recently secured through a fake referendum, the increasingly ambivalent position taken by the US has certainly been heard-and not merely by Arab leaders who have concluded that they can act with impunity. It has also been registered by Arab democrats, many of whom fear that Washington will now sacrifice the very institutions upon which they rely for protection wherever and whenever Arab leaders present a choice between democracy and security.¹

While manipulated for political purposes, this tension represents a familiar and very real challenge, one whose magnitude ebbs and flows in tandem with changing regional and global realities. In the Middle East it has been magnified by a series of missteps that have paradoxically strengthened the hand of Iran and its regional allies. As a result, the range of policies that might mitigate the potential trade-off between power and principle has been considerably narrowed. That said, unless American policy is fated to remain purely reactive, policy makers must forge a new democratic security strategy. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to provide a detailed account of such a strategy, the ups and most of all, the downs of American policy in the region suggest three lessons, the first of which I will elaborate in some detail before setting out the other two.

The first axiom is that political reform must never undermine — and where possible should strengthen — the capacity of states to enforce a measure of social peace. On first blush this seems relatively unimportant in a region dominated by strong states, not one of which is likely to suffer the exceptional fate of Iraq, i.e., an American-led invasion that destroys a regime. Indeed, the Bush administration has signaled to Arab leaders that Washington advocates state-managed reforms that do not threaten ruling establishments. Still, Iraq's singular experience does have wider regional resonance, as the sad tale of state decomposition in Lebanon and Palestine shows.

What these two cases share with Iraq is a history of religious, sectarian or ideological divisions that, to varying degrees, has inhibited democratic development and/or provided a rationale for autocracy. The reasons for this are well known to students of “divided society,” i.e., a society in which religious, cultural or ethnic identity coincides with political identity or party affiliation. Because election victors in divided societies can use the ballot to impose their cultural, religious or ideological project, electoral losers often view democracy as a threat. Saddam Hussein's Iraq "solved" this problem by brutally imposing Sunni dominance over the majority Shi’ite population. By contrast, Lebanese and Palestinian leaders took a more pluralistic approach, but one which provided a weak foundation for democratic reform.

Lebanon’s leaders tackled the conundrum of identity conflict and democracy through power sharing governments that stumbled along by virtue of a fragile elite consensus. Agreeing not to disagree, Lebanon's successive cabinets could never stomach major domestic or foreign policy decisions, the likes of which required a state that exercised sovereignty via a legitimate police and military. The collapse of this precarious experiment in the 1970s produced civil war, while its revival in the 1990s hinged on enforcement by Syria, the only state that had the means to act as a third party enforcer over Lebanon’s non-consensus consensus.

In Palestine, the divide between the nationalist Fatah and the Islamist Hamas was obscured by a process of peace and war making that postponed the politically explosive challenge of defining Palestinian sovereignty to some indefinite future. As a result, even a fragile state failed to materialize. This fact was hardly mitigated by the election in 1996 of a Palestinian Authority (PA), whose president was Yasir Arafat. Although elected, Arafat did not act on behalf of the PA. Rather, he represented the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a body that spoke for a patchwork of groups, “popular committees” and rival armed factions in the Palestinian Territories and the Palestinian diaspora. These militias were never fully integrated into a Palestinian police or military that, in any case, had no real authority because neither acted on behalf of a sovereign state.

In this context of weak or non-existent states, the effort to promote democracy — particularly in view of a non-existent Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli peace process (see below) — had two unfortunate consequences. In Lebanon, it helped to further erode the country’s fragile consensus system, while in the Palestinian Territories it propelled the Fatah-Hamas dispute to center stage in a way that ultimately facilitated the election success of Hamas last year.

Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 played a role in sparking the chain of events that eroded Lebanon’s confessional system. For a unilateral withdrawal that was not based on any negotiation between Israel and an actual state strengthened Hizbollah, and particularly its militia, at the expense of Lebanon’s virtual sovereignty and it military’s authority. But strange as it sounds, it was United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1559, which demanded Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, which really got the ball rolling. While the international community expected that
resolution would strengthen Lebanese sovereignty, its passage had the opposite effect. For like it or not, Syria held the system together. Once it withdrew, or at least appeared to be doing so, there was no third party to keep the peace, and in particular, to restrain Hezbollah. Moreover, Lebanon was the only card Syria has to play with Israel, and thus Damascus not only resented efforts to expel it; it also feared that former Prime Minister Hariri and his allies in the anti-Syrian, Lebanese sovereignty-first camp would use the withdrawal to advance their cause. Hence Hariri’s assassination, to which the international community, led by the UN, responded by creating an inquiry that then pointed the finger of blame towards Syria.

The assumption that the inquiry’s findings would help rescue Lebanon was proven wrong. Lebanon’s power sharing system survives so long as no group imposes unacceptable demands on the other. Thus while Prime Minister Seniora’s insistence that the Lebanese cabinet endorse the inquiry may have appeared as the first birth pang of a new democratic Lebanon, it gave Hezbollah and allies ample incentive to retaliate by demanding more seats in the cabinet, a demand that was followed up with military threats and a mass mobilization of its followers. Israel’s summer 2006 incursion into Lebanon—provoked by Hezbollah’s kidnapping of one its soldiers—advanced this disintegrative process by leaving Hezbollah in a much stronger political position.4

As for the Palestinian case, the intensifying of the Fatah-Hamas rivalry—as noted above—was partly the consequence of a prolonged peace process that undermined Fatah’s credibility and authority. The postponement of a settlement over final status issues, one that might have created a basis for Palestinian sovereignty, instead created space for greater corruption. Arafat compounded the problem by playing one militia against the other by encouraging a Second Intifada, which only provoked reprisals from Jerusalem. But Israel’s 2003 attack on Arafat’s headquarters—which Jerusalem thought would compel him to reign in the militias—left Arafat, literally and symbolically, with a pile of rubble that should have been the foundations for a state.

The assumption that a democratic election would salvage the situation proved disastrous. With Fatah’s leaders split in multiple factions and Hamas’s politicians and military united, the partial inclusion of a first-past-the-post electoral system in the 2005 Palestinian poll made it possible for Hamas to win 60 percent of the seats with an estimated 45 percent of the vote.5 Thus an election that was fairly evenly split, and which Fatah and independent candidates might have won had Fatah not been divided, was captured by Hamas, a development that set the stage for a possible civil war.6 Given the lessons suggested by these two stories, we can recast our first axiom as follows: in the Middle East, it is vital that democratization avoid preempts state building or state consolidation. Indeed, in some cases certain aspects of political reform—especially national elections—may also have to be postponed or slowed down. Thus in Lebanon the most effective way to avoid internal conflict and strengthen fragile representative institutions would have been to back a Israeli-Syrian peace process that—if successful—might have given Damascus an incentive to promote or tolerate the kind political reforms envisioned in UN resolution 1559. Similarly, in the Palestinian case, instead of postponing final status negotiations, the peace process should have defined the ultimate goal of the exercise from the start, with a move toward statehood as one of the first crucial steps. At that point, an elected Palestinian government representing a sovereign state would have been accountable to Palestinians (and to the international community) for its successes and failures. Assuming this government would score more of the former than the latter, democratic reforms would have been more likely.

This suggests a second crucial axiom, namely that regional conflicts require sustained attention and, where possible, resolution in concert with, and quite possibly in advance of, any effort to promote political change, particularly in countries affected by regional conflicts. A push for Palestinian-Israeli peace would not by itself have guaranteed a revival of democratic reforms. Yet as noted, it would have increased the odds that reform and peace could have then been pursued more harmoniously.

A final axiom is that prioritizing conflict resolution may sometimes require dealing with autocrats in ways that reinforce their power, at least in the short or medium term. Thus the US cannot call for regime change in Syria and at the same time expect Damascus to back Lebanese sovereignty or pursue peace with Israel.7 Similarly, the US went into Iraq suggesting that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was a prelude to regime change in Iran. To even hint at such a goal and expect Iran to sit idly by was unrealistic. On the contrary, during the first year following the invasion, when the US still had some cards to play, it would have been more prudent to engage Iran over Iraq, or over broader issues such as Tehran’s quest for nuclear power (or weapons). Paradoxically, now that Iran’s influence in Iraq has been greatly enhanced, Washington has decided to talk with a regime that is repressing Iran’s democratic reformists.

All of this does not add up to a recipe for tolerating autocracy or abandoning democracy promotion. Prioritizing US goals can in fact enhance the prospects for reform, especially in weak polities. Moreover, in the wider Middle East, regimes that are not directly involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or that are more firmly institutionalized (such as Morocco and Tunisia) should not only be pressed...
to pursue political reforms more vigorously, they should also be held to account when they use the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the threat of terrorism, to rationalize backtracking on reform.

Finally, the nature and content of reform is crucial. It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the age of American-sponsored forcible regime change in the Middle East has ended. Given the inseparable bonds between regimes and states, the first cannot be removed without undermining the second. Nevertheless, the US can and should push for a more graduated process of political reforms. It should demand, for example, an end to human rights abuses, the creation of more independent judiciaries, greater accountability and good governance — even from autocrats with whom we negotiate on matters of regional security. While growing security problems have increased the leverage of the region’s autocrats, Washington should not enhance that leverage by failing to defend energetically the myriad of American organizations, official, non-governmental and quasi-governmental, that provide cover for the region’s democrats. To speak credibly and effectively to the twin objectives of regional security and regional reform remains the great challenge.

Dr. Daniel Brumberg is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Director of the Democracy Studies Program at Georgetown University.

Endnotes

1 Consider the following remarks made by Secretary of State Rice after her discussions with Egyptian officials, during which she brought up the March 26 referendum on constitutional reforms. Her remarks echo the American ambivalence regarding democracy promotion. Moreover, as the transcript shows, Egyptian officials have defended their actions by likening the amendments to the US Patriot Act—a comparison that only highlights how the growing emphasis on security has reinforced the opponents of reform in the region.

March 25, 2007

QUESTION: Secretary Rice, before coming here, you said that you were disappointed in tomorrow’s upcoming referendum and that you intended to raise the issue with President Mubarak. Has your talk with him allayed your concerns and have your views now changed about tomorrow’s referendum? And to Mr. Aboul Gheit, many backers of the constitutional changes in Egypt have likened it to the US Patriot Act—a comparison that only highlights how the growing emphasis on security has reinforced the opponents of reform in the region. Do you agree with that? And if so, what exactly are those similarities?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, Helene, we have had a discussion. I’ve made my concerns known as well as my hopes for continued reform here in Egypt. I think what I said is that the process of reform is one that is difficult; it’s going to have its ups and downs. And we always discuss these matters in a way that is respectful, mutually respectful. But I’ve made my concerns known and we’ve had a good discussion.


3 Of course, this relationship also entailed Syria’s manipulation of Hezbollah for its own purposes.

4 Indeed, Hezbollah asserted that it would use its expanded representation to veto cabinet policies it rejected. But in a “mutual veto” system such as the one that has long existed in Lebanon, precisely because every group has a right to veto everyone else—regardless of the number of cabinet seats—it is assumed that everyone will refrain from using the veto because they fear a retaliatory veto, the use of which will create havoc. Hezbollah’s actions threatened this system. The question is whether Hezbollah is acting strategically or tactically?

5 This is a guess based on the percentage of the proportional vote.

6 See Jarrett Blanc, “Rules Do Matter: What the Iraqi and Palestinian Elections Tells Us,” Democracy at Large, Vo. 2. No. 2 http://www.democracyatlarge.org/vol2_no2/vol2_no2_rules.htm. In societies that exhibit a high degree of consensus over national identity, transforming pluralities into electoral parliamentary majorities often works, as the case of Britain demonstrated, at least until recently. But in divided societies, this system is a recipe for disaster.

7 This may help to explain why the current administration has exhibited little enthusiasm for Israeli-Syrian negotiations, even as Jerusalem has signaled some interest in restarting this particular track.
Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces. Edited by Gerdian Jonker and Valerie Amiraux

Review by Dina Shehata

Social Enterprise: At the Crossroads of Market, Public Policy, and Civil Society. Edited by Marthe Nyssens

Review by Aaron P. Boesenecker

Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics by M. Steven Fish

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Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia by Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom

Review by Aspen Brinton

Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen by Jillian Schwedler

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Every Vote Counts: The Role of Elections in Building Democracy. Edited by Richard Sondriette and Juliana Geran Pilon

Review by Evan Smith

Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces. Edited by Gerdian Jonker and Valerie Amiraux

Review by Dina Shehata, Ph.D. student in Government at Georgetown University

Gerdian Jonker and Valerie Amiraux’s edited book Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces is a welcome departure from the recent slew of alarmist and sensationalist literature about Muslim minorities in Europe and the challenges they pose for European values and security. By focusing on the experiences and biographies of a new generation of young European Muslims who are grappling with the multiple pressures imposed upon them by European societies and by dominant narratives and attitudes within their own communities, the writers of this volume offer a complex, differentiated and largely sympathetic perspective.

The overarching theme of this volume is young European Muslims ‘coming out’ of the realm of invisibility into the realm of visibility. After decades of mutual indifference between European Muslims and the larger European societies to which they belonged, the events of 9/11 and the London and Madrid bombings jolted European Muslims into the limelight. For young European Muslims this coming out has forced them to engage with multiple audiences and to perform multiple tasks. They have had to defend ‘real’ Islam against the ‘false’ Islam articulated by extremists and represented in the media. They have had to demonstrate that their religious commitments are not at odds with their civic commitments. Finally, they have had to challenge the traditionalism and isolationism of their own communities and promote a new ethic of civic activism and engagement with their larger European societies.
The chapters of this volume address the experiences of young Muslims in six European countries: France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain. These chapters also highlight a number of different themes. The chapter on France by Valerie Amiraux and the three chapters on Germany by Gerdien Jonker, Gokce Yurdakul and Hamad Abdel Samad emphasize internal pluralism and diversity among European Muslims. These chapters dispute the notion that Muslims in Europe are a homogeneous and uniform social group by demonstrating how they have responded differently to their growing visibility in the post 9/11 era. Some have chosen to embrace a conservative religious worldview, some have preferred an activist approach that seeks to defend the rights of Muslims as citizens, and finally some have adopted a secular worldview and have resisted being defined solely or primarily in terms of their religious identity.

The chapters on Muslims in Belgium, by Nadia Fadil, and in Italy, by Annalisa Frisina, focus on the divide between older and younger generations of Muslims in Europe and on the attempts of younger generations to depart from the traditional quietism and conservativism of their elders by adopting an activist approach that emphasizes their identity both as European citizens and as Muslims. Frisina’s account in particular highlights some of the tensions between younger generations, who have embraced the values of pluralism and diversity within their own communities, and an older generation that stifles dissent and seeks to impose internal unity.

Finally, the chapters on the Netherlands and Britain by Welmoet Boender and Philip Lewis, respectively, focus on the growing demand among European Muslims for home grown spiritual leaders who are able to address their own distinct problems and needs, a task which ‘imported’ Imams have largely failed to perform. These chapters indicate that even though some initial steps have been taken to address this demand, much remains to be done by both European governments and by the leaders of Muslim communities in Europe to address the increasingly complex spiritual needs of European Muslims.

Politics of Visibility offers a rich and complex portrayal of the experiences of young Muslims in Europe and of the multiple challenges they have had to confront in the post 9/11 era. However, the book leaves some important questions unanswered. For example, while noting the growing tendency of young European Muslims to recommit to their Muslim identities, the chapters of this book give little insight as to why and how this process is taking place and of the forces that are driving it. Moreover, while providing a rich portrayal of the counter-narratives that young Muslims are articulating, the reader does not get a sense of the dominant discourses articulated by earlier generations against which these young Muslims are rebelling. However, in spite of these shortcomings, Politics of Visibility is both a valuable piece of research and an invitation to European societies to positively engage a new generation of European Muslims who are eager to be treated as equal citizens and to have their identity as Muslims respected and normalized.

Social Enterprise: At the Crossroads of Market, Public Policy, and Civil Society. Edited by Marthe Nyssens

Review by Aaron P. Boesenecker, Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University, Department of Government. Visiting Doctoral Fellow, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany

Although much has been written about the challenges facing European societies, less attention has been devoted to the creative approaches that they have developed to address economic stagnation, unemployment, ageing populations, and social exclusion. In this sense, Social Enterprise is a welcome corrective. The second in a series of publications from the EMES European Research Network, Social Enterprise draws on a multi-year research project surveying the development of the third sector in Europe, with specific attention to the growth of social enterprises over the past 20 years.

Social enterprises are defined as organizations with an explicit aim to benefit the community, initiated by a group of citizens, and in which the material interest of capital investors is subject to limits, which constitute a unique type of actor located between the market, state, and “traditional” civil society. In effect, social enterprises are entrepreneurial organizations that produce goods and services, but place an avowed social purpose above the singular pursuit of profit. Within this broad organizational form, the volume focuses on “work integration social enterprises” (WISEs) designed to foster the occupational and social integration of disadvantaged individuals. The analytical framework centers around three key characteristics of WISEs: their multiple-actor, multiple-stakeholder, and multiple-resource nature. Using a combination of quantitative survey data and detailed case studies, the volume presents a comparative analysis of 160 WISEs in 11 EU countries that employed over 6,000 disadvantaged workers across Europe in 2001.

With so much empirical data, one would expect thorough quantitative analysis supported by rich case histories. Unfortunately, the awkward division of the book into three sections, each addressing one element of the analytical framework in isolation, inhibits a systematic analysis of the data. Moreover, the national “case studies” only loosely follow the analytical framework and present little more than summaries of macro-level descriptive statistics. Concrete
examples of WISEs and discussions of their actual work and social roles are woefully lacking, despite repeated references to “on the ground” qualitative research. Only a few chapters (notably those covering Italy, the UK, and Germany, as well as those providing a European overview) contain a systematic discussion of the data that is in turn linked to the broader institutional context of the case and the actual social context in which the organization is operating.

These criticisms aside, the study of social enterprises is important, because the social purpose embodied in WISEs has shaped economic decisionmaking and social structures within communities by influencing the purchase of goods and services (consumers and the public sector take the social purpose of a WISE into account), by empowering disadvantaged individuals, and by expanding conceptions of what constitutes “work” and what is considered a valid contribution to the community and economy. At the same time, the social and entrepreneurial ideals in WISEs pull such organizations in different directions, and several chapters show that WISEs are moving away from principles of voluntarism and semi-altruistic social activity towards professionalization and a pragmatic emphasis on entrepreneurial activity. The contributors note the linkage to Polanyi’s concept of “embeddedness,” but the volume would benefit from a more systematic treatment of well-developed sociological perspectives on reciprocity, social embeddedness and market-society relationships, such as those initially proposed by Durkheim and Polanyi and further developed by Granovetter and contemporary economic sociologists.

Overall, Social Enterprise paints a picture of immense diversity. Organizations range from independent social cooperatives with special legal status in Italy, to Belgian social enterprises that are interwoven with public sector labor market policy, to the still-developing social enterprise sector in Germany. This diversity is an important finding in its own right, illustrating the breadth of creative responses to unemployment and social exclusion in Europe. However, this heterogeneity of responses should be dealt with directly, instead of attempting to shoehorn the data into an unwieldy analytical framework. Indeed, the focus on demonstrating that social enterprises are “multi-goal, multi-stakeholder, multi-resource” actors only obscures the one clear pattern that emerges from the data, namely that social enterprises exhibit clear national patterns, filling niche roles within existing constellations of welfare state institutions. Instead of abstracting WISEs from this broader social and institutional context, a systematic analysis of these relationships would have been welcome.

Social Enterprise provides an impressive amount of empirical data, but falls victim to an overly ambitious analytical agenda. In attempting to systematize a wide range of social enterprise activity within a single framework, the real story of diversity and creativity is lost. Societies and local communities have drawn on unique institutional, cultural and historical resources in their (often successful) efforts to address social exclusion. The breadth of social enterprise activity in Europe suggests the need for rigorous qualitative case study comparison instead of broad quantitative surveys. In this sense, one looks forward to a third volume from the EMES project.

- Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics by M. Steven Fish

Review by Leah Gilbert, Ph.D. student in Government at Georgetown University

Russia has failed at democracy. While the recent string of poisonings and suspicious deaths of Putin’s critics diminish the novelty of this argument, M. Steven Fish’s careful quantitative and qualitative analysis of Russian politics leaves no doubt that Russia is no longer a democracy. However, the central question of Fish’s study is not Russia’s democratic status, but rather what explains its failed democratization. Fish uncovers three significant independent variables to explain Russia’s democratic deficit: limited economic reform, abundant natural resource endowment, and a constitution providing for a powerful presidency and weak legislature (which he refers to as superpresidentialism). These findings are an important contribution to our understanding of democratization both in Russia and in a broader comparative perspective.

In order to build his explanation of Russia’s failed democratization, Fish mainly employs descriptive statistics and regression analysis. He begins by examining Russian democratization in a cross-national regression analysis of regime type of 147 countries in 2000. For this broad sample, Fish finds that economic development, natural resource endowment, and Islam (Muslims as percentage of population) are significant predictors of regime type. Contrary to their prominent status in the democratization literature, British colonial heritage, ethnic fractionalization, orthodoxy, and a communist heritage are not found to be significant (for all variables see Table 4.2, 90). Fish also tests a number of mass public attitudes such as trust, intolerance, and support for authoritarian leadership, which are ultimately rejected (92). After examining the three initial significant variables of regime type more closely, Fish applies them to the case of Russia and discards two of them, leaving only natural resource endowment to explain Russia’s failed democracy. He maintains that the first variable, economic development, is not a viable explanation for Russia’s failed
democracy, as various indicators of wealth show that Russia is much less democratic than would be expected. The variable Islam is also rejected as it largely irrelevant to the wider Russian case.

After noting that natural resource endowment appears to be the most applicable predictor of regime type for the Russian case, Fish moves on to further test and specify the causes for Russia’s failed democratization in a more limited set of quantitative and qualitative comparisons. It is in this section of the book that Fish makes his most significant contribution. Not only does Fish effectively synthesize literatures on the relationship between democracy and natural resource endowment, economic reform, civil society, and institutions, but he also advances clear and well supported arguments about Russia’s failed democratization in light of this literature. For example, Fish astutely contends that natural resource endowment often inspires corruption, which in turn produces closed politics as unscrupulous businessmen and politicians do not want light shed on their misdeeds. Even more innovative, however, is Fish’s argument regarding the effect of superpresidentialism.

Moving beyond general analyses of constitutional type and democracy in his chapter on superpresidentialism, Fish develops an original and comprehensive index of parliamentary powers (PPI). Fish applies the PPI to twenty-five post-communist countries and finds a strong relationship between the PPI and democratization through correlation and regression analysis. Examining countries by their PPI, democratization, and formal constitutional type, Fish discovers that “whether a system is classified as parliamentary, semipresidential, or presidential is of less moment for democracy than is the strength of the legislature” (222). Superpresidentialism, a constitutional form in which the legislature is weak, derailed democracy rather than presidentialism or semipresidentialism as was famously claimed by Linz (1990, 1994). Fish thus adds a new and much more nuanced focus to the debate of institutional form and its relationship with democracy.

While Fish’s analysis of Russia’s failed democratization is a clear contribution to studies of post-communist democratization in particular and comparative politics in general, Fish’s methodology may at times be more of a liability than an asset. For example, when considering the issue of equifinality or multiple paths to the same outcome, Fish’s causal logic and use of regression analysis could generate misleading results. Russia’s failure to democratize may be the product of a unique set of factors, which Fish eliminates from his study based on their insignificance in a cross-national analysis. In addition it is difficult to model and measure path dependent processes in large N-analyses, which is perhaps why the communist legacy variable in Fish’s study was insignificant. Finally, at various points in his study, Fish himself notes that his analysis is limited by available quantifiable data (see for example page 252). Because large scale social and political change is most often the result of many complex causal patterns, and Fish’s own explanation of Russia’s failed democratization is no exception, his reliance on quantifiable data and linear regression analysis to advance his causal argument may not be entirely appropriate.

However, even with these methodological issues, Fish’s Democracy Derailed is still one of the most creative and analytically insightful books published to date on Russia’s post-communist political development. There is no doubt that Fish’s conclusions will play a prominent role in debates about democratization and post-communist politics for years to come.

1 The PPI is a measure of the average number of yeses out of thirty-two questions related to broad dimensions of parliamentary powers such as institutional autonomy, institutional capacity, and oversight of the president among others (201-204).

**Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia by Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom**

_Review by Aspen Brinton, Ph.D. student in Government at Georgetown University_

The democracy promotion business in the post-communist states of Eurasia has been trying to march forward in fits and starts for over a decade and a half. There have been the ‘success stories’ of Eastern European states stepping into the European Union with the celebratory fanfare of ‘consolidated’ democracy, the ‘problem stories’ of the former Yugoslav republics and the Caucasus, and the seemingly belated, in-between case of the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine. The case of Russia enigmatically falls into both all and none of these categories. By examining a detailed slice of the democracy promotion business in Russia, Lisa M. Sundstrom’s Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia demonstrates this enigma of Russia: a success and a failure, democratic yet undemocratic, pluralistic but authoritarian. By turning to the question of how civil society has been promoted by foreign democracy assistance programs within Russia, Sundstrom suggests that Russia’s vastness and the uneven pace of change leaves it in a category unto itself on the spectrum of democratic success and failure.

Through detailed interviews of women’s organizations and soldiers rights organizations in six cities, large and small, well-known to donors and ignored by donors, she finds...
wide variation in the degree to which foreign donors have been effective at promoting democratic consolidation. By bringing together both the theoretical concerns within international relations about how transnational actors influence domestic contexts, as well as comparative politics literature on democratization, Sundstrom concludes that two conditions determine viability of foreign assistance programs to civil society: the degree to which the norms of the foreign donors resonate with the norms of the local population, and the degree to which the local political opportunity structure is friendly to NGOs.

The structure of Sundstrom’s study effectively takes into account something that it has taken foreign donors a long time — and a lot of money — to learn: the local environment, including culture and political structure, will largely determine the relative success of civil society aid programs. No matter how successful a program has been in a different region or a different country, if templates of action and ideas are imposed from above to match only the priorities of western donors and their often inappropriate expectations, the assistance will not create sustainable and effective civil society organizations. Sundstrom goes as far as to accuse donors of a “missionary-like approach,” (175) which fails to take into account local aspirations and needs. This is not, however, to say that all aid to civil society in Russia has been a failure. She marks cases of success, where foreign aid was a key factor in promoting more open, democratic public spheres. The key is whether local elites provided an adequate place of petition for NGOs and their work, including not just material support, but freedom from harassment and intimidation. To make this distinction is to necessarily highlight that such undemocratic practices are rampant in some places in Russia.

Within the context of international relations scholarship, and in particular discussions of ‘global civil society,’ the decidedly local explanations Sundstrom offers for the effectiveness differentials of aid programs challenge assumptions that there is a ‘global’ civil society converging around a set of shared, global norms. Norms are societal, not global. This study therefore implicitly highlights the need for more research on other cases of normative alignment and misalignment between states and transnational actors. The main problem with the contextualization of this research, however, is that the theoretical implications remain just that: implicit. Her final analysis does not make explicit enough how this research can contribute to international relations scholarship by challenging assumptions about what states can do, short of war and occupation, to change the behavior of other states.

If the implicit implication of Sundstrom’s research is that global civil society might not be as normatively convergent as some scholars have suggested, then the research itself needs to be more trans-nationally situated to overcome the limitations of a one-country case study. The brief references made to other similar studies in Africa and Latin America, for example, could have been developed into a wider conversation about the theoretical implications of the normative misalignment between ‘the local’ and ‘the global.’ While she suggests that some norms — such as that against bodily harm — might be cross-culturally applicable, this idea dangles in a tantalizing yet undeveloped way, leading the reader to wonder whether the relationship between normative alignment and the success of transnational actors in changing domestic politics might explain more about the success and failure of democracy promotion beyond the Russian cases.

Sundstrom’s last word is reserved for Putin and the bleak future of Russian civil society under his suspicious gaze and tightening grip. Russian democracy and civil society, despite the efforts of transnational actors to support it, has become endangered. This should lead scholars to further question the influence of transnational actors on domestic politics, but it should also remind us of the fragility of all democratization projects around the globe.

■ Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen by Jillian Schwedler

Review by Jocelyn S. Weiner, Ph.D. student in Government at Georgetown University

The question of whether Islamist parties — regardless of their initial ideologies — will moderate once included in democratic processes is a particularly important topic in contemporary study of Middle Eastern political development. The problem with applying this debate, known as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999), to cases in the Middle East is that existing political frameworks in many of these countries are not democratic, and thus cannot guarantee each participating group the “specific minimum probability” of electoral success that would ensure their continued loyalty to the system (Przeworski 1991). Thus, it is an open question whether Islamist parties are participating due to intrinsic support for the political process or due to instrumental reasons alone. It is this puzzle that Jillian Schwedler directly addresses in her study, Faith in Moderation.

Beginning with an incisive critique of the transitology literature, Schwedler argues that, despite the lack of democracy in the region, it is still possible to study ideological moderation in Islamist political parties over time. Using a new institutionalist approach, Schwedler isolates three
interconnected variables that produce moderation in pluralist political processes: political opportunity structures, internal group strategies and norms, and cultural boundaries of justifiable action. Schwedler’s structured-focused case study analysis of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and the Islah in Yemen, carried out over the course of 38 months of fieldwork, is able to explain why the IAF has moderated, while the Islah has not, despite both groups’ participation in pluralist processes. Her insights are important for the study of political development, particularly within nondemocratic contexts, and address an issue of crucial importance to academics and policy-makers alike.

Many scholars have noted that elite strategies differ depending on whether the regime is a monarchy or a presidential system (Brumberg 1995, 2003; Brynen et al. 1995). Schwedler builds this observation into her model by noting that the position of the regime determines the political opportunity structures of contestation allowed in the public space. The monarchy of Jordan is removed from direct competition, so its elites allow for a greater degree of political freedom than do the elites in Yemen’s presidential regime.

The changes in these political opportunity structures, in turn, restructure the strategies and choices available to the opposition within the political arena. Schwedler (2006, 83) follows Gramsci, Mitchell, and Wedeen “in exploring the complex ways in which the state exercises power over a field of political contestation, but does not control it absolutely.” Schwedler notes that the transitologist predilection for viewing political development on a one-dimensional continuum often obscures the effect of structural changes, however minute, on the internal strategies and norms of each political group as they react and respond to the new public space. While the Islah party is fragmented, hierarchical, and static in its organization and decision-making practices, the IAF has cohesive central leadership and democratic internal practices. These agentic differences evolved due to both the changing structures of contestation and to a third variable, the group’s ability to justify its new behaviors based on its ideological tenets.

Schwedler devotes much of the second half of her book to an exploration of the ideational dimensions of the Islamist groups’ cultural worldview. As she argues, actors cannot choose a strategic path—and be successful in its implementation—without being able to imagine pursuing and justifying that choice within the ideational boundaries of their cultural worldview. Schwedler defines moderation not through behaviors, which could be feigned, but through evidence that a group’s tolerance for alternative viewpoints has changed from unimaginable to justifiable. She finds that ideological moderation occurs when the group is able to expand its concept of Islamic permissiveness in order to justify its new political practices. We see this ability in Jordan’s IAF, but not in Yemen’s Islah. This third, “most pivotal” variable completes the account of why the IAF has seen meaningful evolution in its ideology, while the Islah has not, despite both groups’ participation in pluralist politics.

Schwedler’s contribution is important. By addressing the gaps in the transitology literature regarding the nondemocratic contexts found in the Middle East, she is able to show how Islamists moderate their worldviews even without achieving Przeworski’s “specific minimum probability” of electoral success. By defining moderation through change in ideology, she is able to move past the debate over whether Islamist political actors are supporting pluralist politics for instrumental, rather than intrinsic, reasons. As Schwedler herself notes, one of the drawbacks of the study was its small-n approach, which requires further study for the results to be generalizable. However, her in-depth case study approach, which combines both within- and cross-case comparison, allows her to differentiate between the several competing causal mechanisms. In addition, Schwedler combines all three major branches of new institutionalism (historical, rational, and sociological) into a comprehensive, yet powerful model that provides a framework for future avenues of research in the Middle East and elsewhere. Both theoretically grounded and analytically detailed, Schwedler’s Faith in Moderation will help to re-integrate the Middle East region into the larger study of political development, and provides intriguing answers to a topic of both academic and policy interest.
In the first section, the book offers three chapters that provide alternative frameworks and ways to reconceptualize civil society within the Latin American context. Waisman’s chapter was the most compelling and could have sustained an entire book of in-depth case studies, but instead its clear framework is left without empirical follow-up. Most useful for future empirical work is his attempt to operationalize “strong civil society” based on assessments of civil societies’ organization across elite and non-elite groups, autonomy of organizations from government control, and level of non-polarizing engagement in democratic institutions. Waisman also carefully lays out three major challenges to Latin American democracies: the remnants of authoritarian rule, weak rule of law, and state corporatism. He further argues that Latin American civil societies are often dualistic, with strong civil society in some regions and weaker civil society in others, depending on development factors such as economic liberalization patterns.

Waisman’s operationalization of these key factors could have been effectively used to unify the case studies in the second half of the book. However, instead of one unifying theoretical chapter, the book offers two additional theoretical chapters that also make strong alternative arguments for how to conceptualize civil society in Latin America. These chapters contribute a Latin American–oriented perspective to the debate. This is particularly true of Oxhorn’s chapter, which challenges Western-dominated conceptions of civil society and calls for a more collective rather than an exclusively individualistic concept. In the last theoretical chapter, Avritzer calls for a tiered typology of civil societies based on their development and roles within society, a theory that might work well if clarified and meshed with the idea of relative strength along different dimensions, perhaps similar to Waisman’s concepts for operationalizing “strong” civil society.

The second section of the book presents country case studies that provide analysis of how civil society has emerged in contemporary Latin America, though unfortunately the case studies do not include Latin countries outside of South America. These chapters are somewhat disappointing in that they do not directly apply or address the frameworks suggested in the preceding theoretical chapters; rather, they develop their own conceptions of civil society and theorize about its connection to quality of democracy. For example, Levine explicitly develops a new conception of civil society in terms of the role of empowerment and disempowerment in his study of Venezuela. Two of the case studies, however, do draw to some degree on the theoretical chapters, though not explicitly. Mora y Araujo’s presentation of evidence that Argentina may be moving toward a strong civil society does note some elements similar to those discussed in Waisman’s chapter, but does not use his framework systematically. Wolford’s case study uses the concept of “social capital” that is mostly absent from the conceptualizations in the theoretical chapters, but also addresses to some degree Oxhorn’s question regarding the relationship between the state and the construction of an oppositional identity in Brazil’s Landless Peasant’s Movement (MST).

Readers hoping for both a unified framework for understanding civil society in the Latin American context and an empirical application of that framework to case studies from across the region may be disappointed by the book. However, the book succeeds in offering several Latin American conceptions of civil society through what appears to be a “grounded theory” approach in the case studies, as well as in its more purely theoretical chapters. The book would have benefited from a concluding chapter to draw out the complementary and diverse nature of these theories and to offer a cohesive approach for the study of civil society in Latin America. Yet the book’s chapters do successfully engage the complexities of applying conventional civil society concepts to the realities of contemporary Latin American democracies. Thus, the book will likely serve as a fruitful foundation for future exploration of theory and as a source of several useful frameworks for subsequent empirical analysis.


Review by Evan Smith, M.A. Candidate in Democracy Studies at Georgetown University

While democracy may still be an unattainable luxury for a large portion of the world’s population, over the past three decades it has become a daily reality for millions of people in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. During this same period, the United States and Western Europe have realized a convergence in their ideological and foreign policy goals in assisting the global spread of democracy. As President Bush eloquently stated in his second inaugural address, “the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” The intent is clear, even as the results have been mixed: the advanced democracies of the world have made a lasting commitment to the promotion of individual liberty and democratic self-governance for all citizens of all countries. It is to this commitment that Richard Sondriette and Juliana Geran Pilon have addressed their edited volume, Every Vote Counts: The Role of Elections in Building Democracy.
It is widely acknowledged that elections are necessary for any successful transition to democracy, but it remains largely uncertain what effect the process of successfully (or unsuccessfully) holding elections has on the trajectory of the transitional path and on the ultimate quality of the resulting democracy. *Every Vote Counts* confronts this gap in the literature by providing cursory investigations of the following topics: “(1) the evolution of democracy promotion, (2) when is a country ready for elections? (3) the role of international administration assistance, and (4) conflict and elections” (p.2).

The impressive roster of election assistance experts and political scientists assembled for this project addresses these issues by defining international electoral assistance and investigating its role in promoting democracy, as well as by providing case studies of elections held in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, and Ukraine. Overall, this volume provides an excellent introduction to the study of the interaction between electoral assistance and democratization, as well as a set of case studies that illustrate the often overlooked technical details and difficulties of conducting elections in transitional situations.

A shortcoming of the volume, however, is its lack of an overarching framework within which international electoral assistance can be effectively evaluated. While meaningful evaluation has proven to be a perennial difficulty for democracy promotion programs of all types (civil society organizing, political party building, good governance and rule of law strengthening, etc.), it is nonetheless imperative that such attempts be made if we ever expect to realize the peace and freedom extolled by President Bush. In the title of the chapter on the 2005 Afghan elections by Peter Erben and Ben Goldsmith, the scholars ask, “What constitutes a successful election?” While this is an important question worthy of serious scholarship, it seems that the more immediate question for this volume would be, “What constitutes successful international electoral assistance?” a question left largely unaddressed by the authors. Moreover, without an underlying framework that includes standards for analyzing and evaluating the success of electoral assistance, any answers provided will be contextually tied to the cases from which they are derived.

*Every Vote Counts* also misses an important opportunity to open a dialogue across all four cases, which precludes identifying best practices. While this dialogue could have been achieved through employing a common framework for analysis, it could also have occurred through systematic comparison by individual authors of multiple cases over different dimensions of election administration. Analyses of voter registration efforts and newly established independent election commissions, for example, are thus limited to the context of individual countries, and are unable to provide even tentative conclusions regarding what policies work best and when.

Ultimately, *Every Vote Counts* presents an excellent introduction to the study of international electoral assistance but falls short of providing a systematic method for constructing generalizable lessons from assistance provided in different contexts. Admittedly, this was not Sondriette and Pilon’s explicit goal in producing this volume, but without an analytical approach to the study of electoral assistance in different countries with different logistical and cultural constraints, the wealth of first-hand information provided by the experts and scholars included in this project remains underutilized.
On April 4-5, Center Director Steven Heydemann took part in a conference in Cairo, Egypt on “Labor Market Reform, Trade Unions, and the Future of Social Policy in the Middle East and North Africa.” The conference was jointly organized by CDACS and by the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung Cairo office. It was supported by a grant to the Center from the 21st Century International Ladies Garment Worker’s Union Heritage Fund and by the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung. He also participated in a workshop on “Employment Policies in Arab Mediterranean Countries: How Are They Reacting to Trade Liberalization and Social Change,” organized within the 8th Mediterranean Research Meeting sponsored by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute. He published two op ed articles in a leading Arabic newspaper, al-Hayyat, co-authored with Syrian scholar and human rights activist Dr. Radwan Ziadeh.

Last semester Professor of Government Clyde Wilcox went to Kenya and Turkey for democracy building programs for the State Department. He also gave a paper in Copenhagen on gender and religion and participated in a roundtable in New Hampshire on religion and democracy. Professor Wilcox also served as a visiting scholar at the University of Toronto Center for American Studies and the Center for the Study of Sexual Diversity, giving a series of lectures on religion and sexuality.

Mark Carl Rom, Associate Professor of Government and Public Policy, recently presented the paper “Democracy and Markets or Authority and Tradition? What’s Wrong with Scholarly Conferences, and How We Can Fix Them” to the Department of Government at the College of William & Mary.


CDACS graduate fellow Ariel I. Ahram and Professor of Government Dan Brumberg presented a paper on the National Iranian Oil Company and politics of reform at a conference on national oil companies in the global economy convened by the Baker Energy Forum at Rice University, Houston. The article has been published as a working paper and is in preparation for an edited volume focusing on the unique political and economic roles national oil companies play in the domestic and international markets. Ahram presented a version of this paper at the International Studies Association conference in Chicago and Prof. Brumberg spoke on this subject at a conference in the United Arab Emirates.

CDACS graduate fellow Julie Lantrip presented her paper “Breaking the Habit: The Effect of Human Rights Crises on US Foreign Aid” at the 2007 Midwest Political Science Association conference in Chicago. She also served as chair and discussant for the panel entitled “Foreign Aid: Carrot or Stick.”

CDACS graduate fellow Sarah Cross co-authored an article entitled, “High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development,” with Susan Martin of Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration and Philip Martin of the University of California at Davis. The paper was published in the March 2007 issue of International Migration. She also presented her paper, “Refugees and Legal Rules: Can the International Refugee Regime Provide Adequate Protection?” at the 2007 International Studies Association conference in Chicago in March.

Leah Gilbert, CDACS graduate fellow, attended the Midwest Political Science Association conference this April in Chicago and presented a paper co-authored with Prof. Marc Howard entitled, “Putting Tocqueville to the Test: The Internal Effects of Participation in Voluntary Organizations.”

This semester, Democracy Studies student Miki Wilkins is working as a research assistant with Professor Stephen King of the Government Department at Georgetown University and Sarah Yizraeli of Tel Aviv University on research projects related to the Middle East North Africa region. She also plans to attend the summer Language Institute at the University of Damascus in Syria, where she will study Modern Standard Arabic and Syrian colloquial Arabic.