To understand the condition of democracy in the world today, one must begin by situating it in the context of its global fortunes over the past two centuries. The most illuminating account of democracy’s historical trajectory was put forward by Samuel P. Huntington in his 1991 book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Huntington finds that democracy’s advances have occurred primarily in three waves—periods in which the number of democratic countries in the world has risen substantially, with transitions to democracy considerably outpacing breakdowns of democracy.

Huntington chooses as the starting date of modern democracy the year 1828, when it is estimated that suffrage in the United States was extended to fifty percent of all adult males. Beginning in 1828, the first wave slowly but steadily gathered force and did not come to an end until 1926. This “long wave” really comprises two different subgroups of countries. The first is the dozen or so European and European-settler countries that had, by the nineteenth century, succeeded in establishing a fair degree of freedom and rule of law, and then later moved into democracy. Democratization has been associated with relatively short “transitions” from autocratic regimes. Yet 40 out of 89 currently existing democracies have not been established by means of a direct or short transition from an autocratic regime, but by a process of opening from a long-lasting intermediate or “hybrid” regime, also called “anocracy” or “partly free” regime in the literature. This type of regime typically involves significant freedom together with either limited suffrage rights, restrictions on electoral competition or constrained accountability of elected rulers. An anocracy is not a brief transitional situation, but a type of regime that tends to be as long living as democracies or autocratic dictatorships.

Intrigued by this finding against the odds of conventional wisdom, we revisit the classic topic of regime types and regime changes. Based on well-grounded conceptual discussion, we use a trichotomous classification of regime types, including the intermediate anocratic category between democracy and autocracy, and the subsequent six-fold typology of regime changes. We have...
Welcome to another issue of Democracy & Society, this time led by a new editorial team that includes current students Samuel Maynard, Sundar Ramanujam, and Elizabeth Lievens. This past semester was a busy one for Democracy and Governance, with new students, faculty, and initiatives.

In August we welcomed our 10th incoming class into the Democracy and Governance MA program! Our new students come from diverse and fascinating backgrounds, and are sure to contribute immeasurably to our program. We are happy to continue and expand the international reach of our program, and the current class includes students from China, India, and Japan.

Our one credit-skill courses have been a huge success. These are intensive courses that often meet for just one weekend a semester and tackle specific topics such as policy writing, building a sustainable non-profit, and even storytelling. Our advisory board member Eric Bjornlund of Democracy International leads a fascinating class on consulting and grant writing. This innovative educational platform gives us new flexibility in our course offerings and is very useful for our growing body of working students. This fall, the one-credit skill courses received deserved recognition from Georgetown University’s Provost, Robert Groves.

In August we also welcomed a new faculty member — Dr. Georges Fauriol of the National Endowment for Democracy. Dr. Fauriol brings decades of experience in democracy promotion, and is a tremendous addition to our program. True to his background Dr. Fauriol taught the program’s core course on Democracy Promotion this past fall.

This past semester also saw the DG program partner with some new organizations, which significantly raised the profile of our students, faculty, and alumni. In November we co-hosted along with the International Republican Institute the Transatlantic Youth Summit. This full-day event was held on the Georgetown campus, and brought together 50 European members of parliament and Washington D.C. professionals. Three of our own students were able to participate. Later in December, DG took part in the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management’s annual conference on public sector finance. Our panel included members of the Georgetown faculty and alumni, who tackled the tricky question of the relationship between corruption and governance. The event was held at the International Monterey Fund, with over 150 participants from around the world.

This issue of Democracy & Society is dedicated to the topic of “Democracy in Decline?” Since the end of the Cold War the performance of nascent democracies has been a primary focus of political scientists and practitioners. Today, many scholars contemplate an era of “democratic decline,” with the rise of new global counter-democratic actors in China, Iran, and Russia. Likewise, the rise of “hybrid” regimes that combine elements of democracy and autocracy has forced observers to go back and reevaluate the record of democratization since the Third Wave. We asked authors to consider the ways that autocrats use features of democracy to preserve their own power, the role of citizen activism in hybrid regimes, and the influence of new international actors on the future of democracy.

We are extremely grateful for a key submission from Dr. Marc F. Plattner, the Vice President for Research & Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Co-Editor of the Journal of Democracy. Dr. Plattner places the current state of democracy within its important historical context, and contrasts different perspectives regarding whether there has simply been democratic slowdown or downturn. Ultimately, he concludes that there are reasons to think that democracy will recover some of its lost momentum despite the considerable headwinds. Democracy is still the only system that can appeal to the desires and hopes of ordinary citizens who want to have their voices counted and represented.

Other articles come from Dr. Josep Colomer, an adjunct professor with the Democracy and Governance Program, and two MA students from the Latin American Studies Program at Georgetown University, David Banerjea and Fernando de Mello. Through a cross-national comparison they find that “anocracy” is a useful regime category that is conceptually different from democracy and autocracy. We also received a submission from Jordan Roberts and Juan Tellez, two Ph.D. candidates in political science at Duke University. This fascinating article uses a discontinuity design to test whether Freedom House classifications of freedom in the world produce international stigmas, or what they call a “Scarlet Letter” effect.

A submission from Ugur Altundal, an alumnus of the Democracy and Governance MA program and currently a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Syracuse University, investigates the hybrid regime of Turkey, and the decline in influence of the military vis-à-vis the executive branch. Kwather Alfasi, a Ph.D. candidate in politics at the University of Warwick contributes a piece that looks at one of the most significant transitions of the Arab Spring, and the difficult road that lies ahead in Libya. Finally, Georgetown Ph.D.
candidate in government Diane Zovghian reviews one of the most currently talked about books in academic and policy circles, *Democracy in Decline?* (edited by Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, John Hopkins University Press, 2015).

Please find out more about Democracy & Society and the Democracy and Governance program at https://government.georgetown.edu/democracy-and-society and consider submitting an article for our spring-summer issue.

Yonatan L. Morse (Ph.D., Georgetown University) is the associate director of the Democracy and Governance program.

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Plattner, Continued from Page 1

the democratic column by gradually extending the suffrage to the mass of their male populations. The second subgroup, by contrast, includes countries that became democratic only after World War I, many of them new nations born from the European Empires defeated and destroyed during the war.

After a “reverse wave” in the 1920s and 1930s brought down democracy in most of the countries where it had been established after the First World War, a second, short wave of democratic expansion (1943-1962) began with the triumph of the Allies in the Second World War. Except for some Latin American cases, the second-wave democracies were either countries defeated in World War II, including Germany, Japan, and Italy, or new nations produced by decolonization, such as India, Jamaica, and Israel. There then followed, according to Huntington, a second reverse wave (1958-1975), during which many of the newly decolonized nations and a number of Latin American countries saw their democracies break down.

By the mid-1970s, democracy was at a low point in the developing world. Two of Latin America’s most successful democracies, Uruguay and Chile, fell to military coups in 1973, and in 1975 Indira Gandhi proclaimed a state of emergency in India, suspending elections and civil liberties. Shortly thereafter, Daniel P. Moynihan, who had just finished serving as the U.S. Ambassador to India and was about to become its Ambassador to the United Nations, offered the following assessment of the state of democracy in the world:

“[Set off or put in quotes] Liberal democracy on the American model increasingly tends to the condition of monarchy in the nineteenth century: a holdover form of government, one which persists in isolated or peculiar places here and there, and may even serve well enough in special circumstances, but which has simply no relevance to the future. It is where the world was, not where it is going. Increasingly, democracy is seen as an arrangement peculiar to a handful of North Atlantic countries, plus a few of their colonies, as the Greeks would have understood that term.

Only in retrospect did it become clear that as Moynihan penned this pessimistic appraisal, Huntington’s ‘third wave of democratisation’ was rising in southern Europe as the right-wing dictatorships in Portugal, Greece, and Spain collapsed. In the 1980s the democratic wave inundated Latin America and reached parts of Asia; at the end of that decade it swept through Eastern Europe; and in the early 1990s it hit the former Soviet Union and Africa as well. During the final quarter of the twentieth century, democracy experienced the most massive global expansion in history. Far from being confined to a few North Atlantic countries and their offshoots, democracy had shown that it appealed to peoples in every corner of the globe and that it could be successfully instituted in vastly divergent kinds of societies.

As democracy expanded, its legitimacy grew, and its growing legitimacy fostered its further expansion. There are, of course, inevitable disputes about whether and when particular countries should be counted as democracies, but the general trend was unmistakable. According to Freedom House’s annual survey, the number of free countries in the world soared from 40 in 1975 to 88 in 1998, going from 25 percent of the world’s countries to 46 percent. In 1989 Freedom House also began tracking a less stringent measure that identifies “electoral democracies”—countries that choose their governments in reasonably free and fair elections, including those that may not perform very well in terms of rights and liberties. This category increased from 69 in 1989 (representing 41 percent of the world’s countries) to 120 in 1999 (representing 63 percent of the world’s countries). The greatest gains in this category actually were made in the years from 1990 to 1995, after Huntington’s book on the third wave was already completed.

A kind of perfect bookend to Moynihan’s despairing words in 1975 was provided in 1999 by the Indian Nobel Prize-winning economist and political thinker Amartya Sen. Responding to a journalist’s question as to what was the most important development of the twentieth century, Sen answered that “in the distant future, when people look back at what happened in the twentieth century, they will find it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.” He noted that this was “a historic change from not very long ago,” when democracy advocates from Asia or Africa were very much on the defensive. As the century drew to a close, Sen confidently asserted that “while democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed uniformly accepted, democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right.”

Slowdown or Downturn?

The pace of democratic expansion slowed after 1995, and by the late 1990s some key measures of democratic progress had already reached their peaks. According to Freedom House, the proportion of countries classified as Free in 2014, at 46 percent, was at exactly the same level as in 1998, and the proportion classified as electoral democracies in 2014, at
63 percent, was at exactly the same level as in 1999. Since the end of the 1990s, however, the picture has been murkier, and the trajectory of democracy in the opening decade and a half of the twenty-first century remains a matter of some dispute among political scientists who seek to measure these things. This controversy was aired in January of this year when the Journal of Democracy published its twenty-fifth anniversary issue, which was devoted precisely to the question of whether democracy is in decline.

My coeditor at the Journal, Larry Diamond, has been contending for some time now that the world has entered a “democratic recession,” citing among other evidence the fact that the Freedom House annual survey has now shown a mild decline in its finer-grained measurements for nine straight years, with the number of countries registering improvements outnumbered by those whose raw scores were diminishing. Writing in the Journal’s twenty-fifth anniversary issue, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way attack what they call “The Myth of the Democratic Recession.” They argue that even the decrease in overall Freedom House scores up through 2013 has been very slight, and that the indicators produced by other organizations such as Polity IV, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Bertelsmann index show no decline at all. Levitsky and Way also contend that today’s alleged “democratic recession” is a myth born of a misunderstanding of the unusual developments of the 1990s. In their view, what occurred then was not so much a triumph of democracy as a collapse of authoritarianism, as dictators were hit by a kind of “perfect storm.” The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of economic stringency and geopolitical weakness for authoritarians, and when many of them fell, especially in Africa and the former Soviet Union, the new regimes that replaced them often were misidentified as democracies. But in fact, Levitsky and Way argue, many of these successor regimes were no less authoritarian in their inclinations—they were simply too weak to be able to manage successful repression. So for a limited time they had to tolerate a kind of “pluralism by default” that never really deserved the name of democracy. Therefore, the perception that democracy had first succeeded and then declined in such places was mistaken.

Countering Levitsky and Way’s argument in an article entitled “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” Larry Diamond cites other evidence that the past decade has been “a period of at least incipient decline in democracy.” He points to the increasing frequency of democratic breakdowns, the poor performance of new democracies according to various measures of good governance and the rule of law, and democratic backsliding in the biggest and wealthiest non-Western countries. While each side in this dispute offers strong arguments, the analyses of the Freedom House data or other numbers cannot settle the larger question of whether democracy is in decline.

There is little question that the global expansion of democracy has ceased in the past decade, but there are varying interpretations of how this should be understood. For one thing, there has been nothing like the kind of “reverse wave” that Huntington identified in earlier periods. So what is negatively characterized as stagnation or as an end to democratic progress might more hopefully be regarded as success at conserving the remarkable democratic gains of the third wave. Moreover, the fact that so many countries became democratic during the late twentieth century dramatically reduced the pool of future prospects, and those that remain are generally less promising candidates in that they tend to possess fewer of the economic and cultural characteristics that have been identified as facilitating conditions for democratization. In a sense, the “low-hanging fruit” has already been picked. This indicates that the road ahead will be more difficult. Yet an optimist could still conclude that democracy is, so to speak, pausing to catch its breath to get ready for a new wave of expansion.

Disappointment with democracy’s “failure to deliver” accounts, at least in part, for its vulnerability to breakdown in countries that have adopted it for the first time and its failure to take root in some places until it has been tried several times.

So the numbers are ambiguous, and there are hopeful as well as discouraging ways of interpreting the recent slowdown or slight downturn in democratization. Yet democracy today is widely perceived, both among its friends and among its foes, as being in decline. Why is this the case?

One answer, stressed both by Larry Diamond and by Francis Fukuyama, is “bad governance.” This term refers in the first instance to the failure of many new democracies to build well-functioning and effective states, which often leads to lagging economic growth, poor public services, lack of personal security, and pervasive corruption. The citizens of such countries understandably feel disappointed by democracy. Fukuyama contends that “the legitimacy of many democracies around the world depends less on the deepening of their democratic institutions than on their ability to provide high-quality governance.” Of course, bad governance afflicts most nondemocratic countries as well, but this offers scant consolation to citizens who feel that the government they have democratically elected is failing them.

Fukuyama concludes that those who wish to strengthen democracy need to pay greater attention to state-building, including such prosaic matters as public administration and policy implementation. This is no doubt useful advice. Yet good governance remains stubbornly hard to achieve, especially in new democracies. In such settings, where citizens are not yet habituated to democratic attitudes and
institutions, there is an almost inevitable tendency to blame poor governance on democracy. Disappointment with democracy’s “failure to deliver” accounts, at least in part, for its vulnerability to breakdown in countries that have adopted it for the first time and its failure to take root in some places until it has been tried several times. Yet this checkered pattern need not portend democratic failure in the long term. If this pattern were to persist, many more years might be needed for countries to attain democratic consolidation, but time would still be on the side of democracy.

Three Sources of Doubt about Democracy

This optimistic long-term scenario, however, presupposes that democracy will remain the goal that countries are seeking to attain. And this in turn is likely to depend on its continuing to be viewed both as the global standard of political legitimacy and as the best system for achieving the kind of prosperity and effective governance that virtually all peoples desire. What has changed most dramatically in recent years is that these presuppositions are being called into question. It is rising doubt about the legitimacy and the desirability of democracy that is at the root of the sense of democratic decline.

There are three chief reasons for this shift: (1) the growing sense that the advanced democracies are in trouble in terms of their economic and political performance at home; (2) the new self-confidence and seeming vitality of some authoritarian countries; and (3) the shifting geopolitical balance between the democracies and their rivals.

Admiration for the model offered by the advanced democracies was steeply diminished by the 2008 financial crisis and its lingering economic consequences, including the economic recession and the high unemployment rates that still plague much of Europe. The fact that the advanced democracies suffered these reverses at a time when emerging-market countries were growing at a rapid clip undercut the notion that the institutions and policies of the West were worthy of emulation by “the rest.” The political dysfunction that afflicted the advanced democracies as they sought to respond to the crisis further weakened their appeal.

Thus, Western organizations seeking to encourage and assist developing countries in building and strengthening democratic institutions have increasingly been greeted with skeptical responses. It is much harder, for example, to make the case for adopting Western-style legislative reforms when both elites and publics in Western countries are so critical of the way in which their own legislatures are performing. As Thomas Carothers notes, “Democracy’s travails in both the United States and Europe have greatly damaged the standing of democracy in the eyes of many people around the world.”

As democracy’s prestige has been dwindling, there have emerged signs of growing energy, political influence, and assertiveness on the part of the world’s leading authoritarian regimes—China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia—or the Big Five. Despite the existence of some very real differences and rivalries among them, these regimes are united in their desire to prevent any infringements on their sovereignty in the name of human rights or democracy. In pursuit of this goal, they not only directly work together in many cases in international forums; they also learn from one another, often copying domestic measures tried out by their fellow authoritarians. This has been the case with laws restricting the funding of civil society, pioneered by Russia, and with strategies for controlling content on the Internet, where China has led the way.

Unlike the other countries of the Big Five, China has been able to grow richer and more powerful without depending on oil wealth. Its ability to make enormous economic strides without introducing democratic reforms has cast doubt on the notion that democracy is the only appropriate political system for wealthy countries. Therefore, the so-called China model, combining market-based economic growth with political repression, holds great appeal to authoritarian rulers. China has also provided developing-country governments, especially in Africa, with an alternative source of trade, investment, and military and development assistance, without imposing conditions regarding the recipients’ adherence to standards of human rights or government accountability. Meanwhile, rich petro-state authoritarians have been able to buy a great deal of international political influence—think of what Venezuela has done in Central America and the Caribbean, Russia in Europe and Eurasia, or Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world.

The leading authoritarian states are also directly challenging the democracies in the realm of soft power: They are working to undermine democratic norms in international and regional organizations like the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the OAS, and building new clubs of their own, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Eurasia and UNASUR in South America. It had been widely expected that bringing countries into Western-dominated regional organizations would help to lead them in a democratic direction and turn them into “responsible stakeholders” in the liberal international order. It now appears, however, that instead the authoritarians have been able to use their membership in these clubs to subvert their democratic character from within. Perhaps the clearest case in point is the way that Azerbaijan has been able to use its membership in the Council of Europe to maintain its international standing despite holding rigged elections and severely repressing human rights and civil liberties at home. This small but oil-rich country has proven to be a master at what has been called “caviar diplomacy” which combines lobbying in Western capitals with winning and dining parliamentarians and other influential figures in democratic countries.

Soft power was thought to be the sphere in which the democracies were strongest, but in a whole series of soft-power arenas the authoritarian have been improving their game, while the democracies are inattentive or ineffective. The authoritarians are recruiting so-called zombie international election observers to counteract the findings of more reputable groups—this is another domain in which
Azerbaijan has led the way, searching out observer groups that are willing to give their bogus elections a clean bill of health. Russia and China are massively stepping up their efforts in international broadcasting and propaganda through the Russian RT and Chinese CCTV. These lavishly funded operations, which broadcast in a variety of languages, are gaining greater and greater audiences around the world. The authoritarians are also making worrisome advances in their efforts to turn the Internet from an instrument of liberation into a tool that governments can use for repression. Authoritarianism, today, seems to be have momentum on its side, even if it has not yet spread to other countries. "The Return of Geopolitics"

It is not only in “soft-power” competition that the advanced democracies are falling short. Increasingly, they are looking weaker in terms of hard power as well, shrinking their defense budgets even as authoritarian states rapidly increase their spending on arms. The United States and its allies not only are less loved than they used to be; they are also less feared.

During the height of the third wave, it often seemed that popular struggles to bring down dictatorship and to institute democracy within individual nations (such as the Philippines, Poland, South Africa or even the Soviet Union) were decisive in shaping the course of international relations. While, the international context mattered, the spark for change frequently came from internal grievances, movements, and conflicts, and by focusing on these one often could gain insight into how larger international developments were likely to unfold.

Was the period of the late 1980s and the 1990s atypical in this respect? Perhaps the seeming centrality of these internal struggles for democracy was possible only because they occurred during the so-called “unipolar moment” of dominance by the United States and its democratic allies, which created a favorable international environment without which democracy would not have prospered. This is certainly the interpretation suggested by Robert Kagan, who says, “Geopolitical shifts among the reigning great powers, often but not always the result of wars, can have a significant effect on the domestic politics of the smaller and weaker nations of the world.” Kagan asserts that today the United States is in “a state of retrenchment” in the international arena, and that this is inflicting “collateral damage” on the fortunes of democracy.

In 2014, the return of geopolitics to center stage became manifest. The rise of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, amid the disappointed hopes of the “Arab Spring” (outside Tunisia) and worries about the future of Afghanistan, made it clear that Western efforts to impose some kind of order and to encourage democracy in the broader Middle East were not succeeding. Meanwhile, China’s muscle-flexing in the East and South China Seas seemed to foreshadow a return to the use of force in Asia. And most important of all, Russia’s brazen annexation of Crimea and stealth invasion of eastern Ukraine showed that the rules-based international order built by democratic powers could no longer be taken for granted.

If the liberal world order is indeed coming apart under pressure from the authoritarians, the future of democracy will be deeply affected. In a globe divided into spheres of influence and power blocs, a country’s ability to follow a democratic path will be determined above all by its international alliances and its geography. We see an example of this in the current struggle in Ukraine, where that country’s internal efforts to build a well-functioning and stable democracy are constantly challenged and are at risk of being overwhelmed by military and economic pressure from Russia.

This new salience of geopolitics threatens to change the international rules of the game. It may limit the centrality of the internal balance of forces in shaping a country’s regime choices and increase the chances that the imposition of external force will be decisive. Moreover, if the geopolitical balance appears to be tilting the authoritarians’ way, their regimes will come to seem much more attractive to the many individuals and nations that seek above all to be on the stronger side. Under these conditions, democracy would lose much of its luster. Where it broke down, there would be less demand to restore it. One could no longer be confident that time would still be on democracy’s side.

"Democracy’s Assets"

However, there are strong reasons for thinking that democracy can recover some of the momentum it has lost. After all, it has gone through difficult periods before. Those of us old enough to have lived through the 1970s—the era of Watergate, the Vietnam War, the energy crisis precipitated by the Arab oil embargo, and the seemingly inexorable advance of the Soviet Union’s international reach—will remember how dismally the global situation of democracy seemed back then. Ambassador Moynihan had genuine grounds for believing in 1975 that its best days were in the past rather than in the future. Yet democracy not only recovered from this low point but in a scant two decades expanded beyond the fondest hopes of its well-wishers. Historically democracy, especially in the United States, has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for self-correction. It sometimes takes a crisis to awaken it from its complacency or its slumber, but when the crisis comes, democracy has shown that it can rise to the challenge.

An important source of democracy’s resurgence during the late twentieth century, of course, was the self-destruction of its greatest foe. Although the Soviet Union may have appeared invincible in the 1970s, in fact its strength was being sapped from within. Its regimented and unfree political system was incapable of keeping up with the economic dynamism and technological prowess of the democracies. Soviet communism succumbed, virtually without a shot, because even its own leaders had lost faith in its ideology and despaired about its ability to keep up with the West.
Today as well, there is reason to believe that the leading authoritarian regimes are not nearly as durable as their recent advances and the self-confidence they exude might suggest. Venezuela, following mismanagement and the sinking of oil prices, has already become an economic basket case; if oil prices remain low, Russia too will encounter daunting economic obstacles, and even Iran and Saudi Arabia will be hard-pressed to maintain stability at home and their current level of influence abroad. Even China, the strongest of the Big Five, faces an uncertain future, as its remarkable economic growth of the past three decades inevitably slows, and its political system must cope with a much more educated and demanding citizenry. So even if democracy remains beset by difficulties, it may be bailed out by the weaknesses of its opponents.

But we must not underestimate the enormous latent strengths that democracy possesses. It appeals to the desires of ordinary people to have their views and voices counted and to have their rights and dignity respected. That is why even seemingly stable autocracies remain vulnerable to the kinds of sudden popular protests that haunt the nightmares of rulers in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Riyadh. It is difficult for authoritarians to justify why political leaders should not be chosen by the people in free and fair elections. Thus they either resort to faking free and fair elections or rely on some other ideological argument for restricting the people’s choice. That is why China, despite its embrace of market economics, cannot afford to jettison the Marxist-Leninist ideology that it uses to justify single-party rule.

Public opinion surveys in every region of the world show that people still want democracy, in most places by quite large majorities. This remains the case even in the Arab world, despite the disappointments and crushed hopes of the Arab Spring. Indeed, it is often in places that lack democracy that the fervor in support of it is strongest. People still show themselves willing to take great personal risks on its behalf, as was recently seen in the crowds on the Maidan in Kyiv or in the streets of Hong Kong. And when given a chance to vote in free and fair elections in countries that are tending toward authoritarianism, citizens still are likely to opt for a return to democracy. A heartening recent example was provided in Sri Lanka, where democracy appeared all but lost given the increasingly corrupt and despotic rule of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had gained popularity by defeating the Tamil Tigers in the country’s long-running civil war. But his own party split and he lost the presidential elections to Maithripala Sirisena in January of this year, and in August his attempt at a comeback in parliamentary elections was resoundingly rejected. In Nigeria too, elections earlier this year that many feared would lead to the breakup of the country instead resulted in a peaceful turnover of power to the opposition party. Even more recently, voters in both Burma and Venezuela gave overwhelming electoral victories to democratic opposition parties challenging authoritarian incumbents.

So there are still signs of progress on the democratic side that can be cited to offset the largely gloomy picture presented here. Nevertheless, the trends in the world today are less favorable to democracy than at any time in the last three decades. Democracy’s global decline is at an early stage and far from irreversible, but it presents a serious danger. The situation can still be turned around before it becomes truly dire. But that will require, first of all, a recognition of the depth of the problem, and second, the kind of resolve and democratic conviction that has been sadly lacking in recent years among the leaders of the world’s democracies.

Marc F. Plattner is the founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy and Co-chair of the Research Council of the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies. This essay, an expanded and updated version of “Is Democracy in Decline?” in the January 2015 issue of the Journal of Democracy, was presented as the Joe R. Long Lecture at the University of Texas - Austin on October 1st, 2015.

Freedom House’s Scarlet Letter

Jordan Roberts and Juan Tellez

On December 20th of 2004, Freedom House released its annual Freedom in the World report. In that issue, Freedom House demoted Russia from being a “Partly Free” country to one that was labeled “Not Free”. In the month that followed, the Russian government received a significant amount of criticism from foreign press and heads of state, particularly in the West. The New York Times and BBC both bemoaned growing authoritarianism in Russia, sentiments echoed by the Bush administration in their criticism of Putin’s reform of gubernatorial elections.1

Is this phenomenon unique to Russia, or does the assessment work of non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House (FH) produce stigmas that change how the international community perceives and treats poorly performing countries? While previous research has applied the concept of the Hawthorne effect (when subjects behave differently if they know they are being observed) to the study of indices and rankings assessing states,2 preliminary evidence is presented here to support a second Hawthorne effect, as in Nathaniel Hawthorne — author of The Scarlet Letter.3 When Freedom House brands a country with the scarlet letter of being “Not Free,” countries who value freedom listen, and they punish that country accordingly in what we refer to as the Scarlet Letter effect (SLE).

The primary difficulty in empirically measuring such an effect is that countries which receive negative labels may be qualitatively different from countries that do not receive them, making the comparison of outcomes for non-stigmatized
and stigmatized countries problematic. We overcome this problem by looking at edge cases on both sides of the divide between “Partly Free” (PF) and “Not Free” (NF) in Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World* (*FitW*) report. By showing that the SLE applies to countries that just barely get labeled as not free, but not to the countries that narrowly escaped the label, this study strongly suggests that this effect is due to the label itself, and not due to actual variance in the level of freedom in a given country.

The remainder of this article will be split into three sections. The first discusses the history of and measurement system employed by the *FitW* rankings. The second empirically demonstrates that countries who fall slightly below the PF-NF cutoff are treated systematically worse by democracies than those who fall above the bright-line. It is also shown that a country’s assignment does not affect the behavior of non-democracies towards it, which provides evidence that the SLE only applies to the behavior of countries which value the level of freedom in other states. The final section concludes by discussing what this finding means for the assessment power of non-governmental organizations and the role of norms and labels in international relations more generally.

**Freedom in the World Rankings**

Freedom House was first established in 1941 as a non-governmental organization that advocated for democratization and the protection of human rights around the world. In 1973, FH began publishing reports under the direction of social scientist Raymond Gastil with the intent of creating indicators to measure the state of freedom in the world, including the *FitW* reports which score countries based on their protection of Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL). To create the rankings, experts are asked to score countries on scales ranging from 0 (lowest degree of freedom) to 4 (highest degree of freedom) for 10 PR indicators and 15 CL indicators. Scores are then aggregated and, based on specific cut-off points, countries are rated in their protection of both PR and CL from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), respectively. The average of a country’s score along these two dimensions are then used to produce a Freedom Rating, which is then cut into Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0) and Not Free (5.5 to 7.0).

The *FitW* Freedom Rating is widely used by both policymakers and academics, and there is good reason to believe that they generally capture traits related to freedom and democracy in an individual country, as well as a country’s broad changes along those dimensions from year to year. The ability of Freedom Ratings, however, to capture small changes in a country’s freedom status from year to year or between countries with very similar levels of freedom is less clear. There is enough random noise in the scoring and aggregation process used by Freedom House such that small differences between two countries’ ratings are likely less meaningful.

For example, in 2014 Burundi had an aggregated PR score of 12/40 and an aggregated CL score of 22/40, giving it PR and CL ratings of 5 and 5 and a Freedom Rating of 5.0 (Partly Free). In 2015, however, Burundi received an aggregated PR score of 11/40 and an aggregated CL score of 21/40, giving it a PR and CL rating of 6 and 5 for a combined Freedom Rating of 5.5 (Not Free). With an unsubstantial difference of one point in PR, Burundi went from being a PF state to a NF state in the matter of a year. The near-arbitrary nature of this difference is made clearer when one considers that Burundi could have instead lost up to 4 points in CL and still maintained its status as Partly Free. The concerns with the cutoffs across multiple levels of aggregation are compounded when one considers cross-country comparisons, as countries’ scores are based off of their own scores from the previous year. This makes for more consistent scoring of individual countries across time, but renders cross-country comparison more difficult as each country has a different reference point from which its scores are based.

The noise around the aggregate Freedom Ratings indicates that although the scores are effective at capturing large differences between states, small differences are not substantively meaningful. Despite this fact, small differences can determine if an edge case gets classified as NF or PF, and we exploit this discontinuity to empirically demonstrate a Scarlet Letter effect in which the edge cases labeled as NF are treated systematically worse by democracies than the edge cases labeled as PF.

**Empirical Evidence**

In order to assess the presence of the SLE, two measurements are need: the *FitW* Freedom Rankings, and a measurement that captures the overall level of strife between states. We specifically focus on the count of conflictual verbal events as our measure of the SLE. Such events include condemnations, demands, expressions of disapproval, and threats. We further disaggregate events by the Freedom Rankings of their source, separating conflictual verbal events sent by democracies from those sent by non-democracies. To generate these measures, we utilize the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) event-level data collected by the U.S. government. ICEWS is considered the current gold standard for event data. The events are collected from the machine-coding of millions of articles from over 200 print news sources. For each of the 68 million events recorded in ICEWS, the source (sender of the event), target (receiver of the event), date, and type of event are recorded. For the purpose of measuring the SLE, we use the subset of ICEWS events that correspond to a country (source) sending an event to an edge case country (target) within one month of the release of a *FitW* report for issues 2000-2001 to 2014.

The fact that democracies treat other democracies better than they treat non-democracies has long been recognized in international relations thought and is foundational to the idea of the democratic peace. As Figure 1 shows, free democracies are sensitive to the labels applied to countries by Freedom House, which affects how they perceive that country. The average number of conflictual verbal interactions sent
from democracies to countries who are barely classified as not free is more than five times the number sent to countries who are barely classified as partially free. There is no substantial difference in the number of conflictual verbal events sent from non-democracies.

Conclusion

With this brief article, we have shown some preliminary support for a Scarlet Letter effect associated with the Freedom House classification of Not Free. Countries who receive this classification from FH are treated systematically worse by democracies, receiving five times as many verbal conflictual events on average. This finding has important implications for international politics. First, it adds to what we know about the role of norms and soft power more broadly. Norms are not just present in “soft” ideas, but also in the hard numbers. Rankings and indices are tools that assess norm compliance, and their creation and publication constitute an exercise of soft power than can be undertaken by states and non-state actors alike. Second, the Scarlet Letter effect makes a serious contribution to what is known about global indicators. While prior work has focused on how rankings and indices affect the behavior of the ranked, we take the first steps here towards understanding the other Hawthorne effect: how indicators affect the behavior towards the ranked.

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### Endnotes

Regime Change within Defective Democracies: Turkey in the Early 1990s and 2010s

Ugur Altundal

Introduction

While democratization studies have been revived after the so-called “third wave” of democratization and “the Arab Spring” recently, the failure of some countries to transition to a functioning democracy has raised important questions. Recent scholarship, accordingly, has mainly focused on understanding “hybrid regimes.” Although some autocratic governments undergo important regime changes, empirical studies demonstrate that they are not necessarily replaced by democratic systems. Such cases help proliferate alternative conceptual studies through a balance between analytic differentiation and conceptual validity. Democracy-with-adjecitves, which enables different typologies, is a critical tool to compare and grasp the regime attributes of different cases and/or the regime attributes of the same case across different periods.

By examining the case of Turkey in two periods — 1990s and 2010s — those theoretical distinctions can become meaningful. The tutelary features of the regime in the early years of the republic have almost disappeared in 2010s; however, the “distance to democracy” is still questionable compared to early 1990s. I argue that the decline of the tutelary powers of the military has not led a “more democratic” regime in Turkey. In contrast, it enabled the executive branch to have a privileged position. This unexpected outcome also shows the complexity of political interactions, which requires a more careful political analysis.

In this paper, the regime change in Turkey — from early 1990s to 2010s — will be examined in light of the recent conceptual debates in hybrid regimes literature. Firstly, the recent literature will be briefly introduced. Secondly, the theoretical framework that the study follows will be laid out. Finally, the attributes of Turkish regime in early 1990s and 2010s will be compared.

A Brief Literature

While democracy and autocracy are arguably stable systems, the area in between was thought to be unstable, temporal, and “in transition” to democracy. However, it has been recently apparent that many new regimes contradict with this assumption. These regimes are in the “gray zone” and are not necessarily in transition to democracy. Although the concept of “hybrid democracy” is quite new, the state of hybridity is historically common. Scholars labeled this gray area in different terms such as “facade democracy,” “quasi-democracy,” “dictablandas and democruduras,” “exclusionary democracy,” “semi-democracy,” “electoral democracy,” “illiberal democracy,” “competitive authoritarianism,” “semi-authoritarianism,” “defective democracy,” “partial democracy,” and “anocracy.” The main trend in recent studies of democratization transformed from the “transitologists” of the 1970s to the “consolidologists” of the 1990s, and most recently the conceptual issue of diminished sub-types of democracy.

There is a vast diversity of regime attributes within the gray area. Whether these cases should be conceptualized under democracy or autocracy is questionable. Although the border between democracy-with-adjecitves and autocracy-with-adjecitves seems prima facie unclear, qualitative studies show that they do not need to be overlapping. Even so, these categories are not mutually exclusive. To be clear, “with-adjecitves” particularly refer to the diminished subtypes. In Table 1., I suggest a clear-cut conceptual distinction between the labels of democracy-with-adjecitves and autocracy-with-adjecitves for practical purposes. In this study, we are interested in the diminished subtypes of democracy (left side of the gray area). These diminished subtypes, “do not fit the root definition of democracy” because they miss at least one component of democracy.

<table>
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<th>Table 1. Gray Area</th>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy-with-adjecitves</td>
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<td>Defective Democracies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illiberal Democracies</td>
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<td>Delegative Democracies</td>
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In order to examine the diminished subtypes, we follow the procedural/minimalist definition of democracy. Schumpeter (1947) emphasizes "the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." The procedural definition requires minimum standards such as universal suffrage, contestation, and civil liberties. Robert Dahl (1973) suggested contestation and participation in his seminal work Polyarchy. The literature "presumes fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association." Besides, some scholars suggested "effective-power-to-govern" as an addition to this procedural minimum. The military experiences in different cases ended up with a path dependent domain control over democratically elected representatives. In fact, “effective-power-to-govern,” aiming to help elected
government control the military, is a conceptual innovation that expanded minimal democracy. However, it does not necessarily lead democratization because there is no ceteris paribus in political contexts. Robert Jervis underlines a similar military example referring to Huntington: “[C]ivilian attempts to gain control of the military by means of detailed orders may erode its professionalism and faith in the civilian leadership, thereby making it less responsive to civilian goals and commands than it was before.” On the other hand, this addition –effective-power-to-govern- has led another issue: the lack of horizontal accountability, which will be introduced as a part of delegative democracy in the next section. Our definition of democracy, then, will include horizontal accountability as an attribute.

Theoretical framework

Merkel’s “Embedded and Defective Democracies” provides an instrumental framework to classify diminished subtypes. He states, “An embedded, liberal democracy consists of five partial regimes [properties]: a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives.” There are internal and external components of embedded democracy. These partial properties should be mutually embedded and the external environment should be suitable for a stable democracy regarding the socioeconomic context, civil society, and international integration as Merkel links in Table 2.

Table 2. Embedded Democracy

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Social and economic requisites</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
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- Civil rights C
- Political liberties B
- Electoral regime A
- Horizontal accountability D
- Effective power to govern E

Defective democracy, on the other hand, is a condition in which one of the partial properties is damaged. It is not necessarily a regime that is in transition. The types of defective democracy, which are distinguished with respect to the damaged/missing partial property, are exclusive democracy, domain (tutelary) democracy, illiberal democracy, and delegative democracy. Table 3. shows the attributes, which are damaged or in question.

A regime is exclusive if some citizens are excluded from political participation.

Tutelary democracy, on the other hand, is about the lack of the effective-power-to-govern, which should lie in the hands of the elected representatives in a full-fledged democracy. If there are “veto powers” such as the military constraining the elected government, it undermines the effective-power-to-govern attribute.

Illiberal democracy is another form in which civil and political rights are not guaranteed. Although they exist de jure, constitutional principles do not de facto work properly or have less effect on the government.

The last type is the delegative democracy. Check and balance system does not work over the executive branch. In such cases, charismatic leaders have the power to rule the whole state mechanism without an institutional accountability namely, the division of powers. Subsequently, the executive branch not only influences but also controls both the legislature and the judiciary.

Given the characteristics of the defective democracy types, there are no clear borders between these four types. Some cases may have a mixed structure. In other words, these subtypes are not mutually exclusive so that each may contain some properties of another.

A Case Study: Turkey

Let us now move on to consider Turkish case and where it fits in this typology. The Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, has never been an embedded democracy although there have been multiparty elections since 1946. Breakdowns of democratization occurred with ups and downs as a result of military coups. However, there is a prima facie gradual democratization since the last coup in 1980. Thanks to the European Union (EU) accession negotiations, Turkey has had successful reforms in civil and political rights since 1990s; and the role of the military in politics has decreased after 2000s.

Following Merkel’s framework, the state of democracy in 1990s and 2010s can be demonstrated with the properties of electoral regime, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective-power-to-govern, respectively.

First of all, Freedom House scores of Turkey are convenient and provide a good comparison for electoral regime, political rights, and civil rights. Table 4. shows the average score of political and civil rights in which the electoral regime is endogenous to political rights. While each score is based on the average from 1 to 7, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. Overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free” are determined by the scores such as whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “Free,” 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free,” and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free.”
As seen above, electoral regime, political rights, and civil rights are in a state with ups and downs but still in the “Partly Free” status since 1990s. It is clear that there is a temporal progress after 2002, which is a joint product of the EU accession process and the democratization packages of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Nonetheless, the condition of political and civil rights cannot alone explain the regime change.

Second property is effective-power-to-govern, which should ideally be in the hands of the elected representatives. The main obstacle to effective-power-to-govern been the military tutelage. The role of the military has a path dependent history in which the roots go back to the establishment of the Republic. Military’s rationale “can best be understood by inspecting its past and the historical heritage that forms the backbone of its ideology.”

Although the elections have been held democratically, and generally considered to be free and fair, there was a tutelary regime “in which the power apparatus, typically reduced by this time to the armed forces, retains the capacity to intervene to correct undesirable states of affairs.” After the coup on May 27 (1960), military control over politics has turned into a hegemonic structure and there are systemic military interventions by the “guardians” of the state staged in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The main reason behind army’s inclination to assume the guardian role is always associated with the historical background of state-military relations, but the legal foundation of the military role goes back to the 1961 constitution that established the National Security Council (NSC). The decisions of National Security Council were binding for the government up until the constitutional amendment of 2001. In addition, the establishment of the Ministry of Defense helped the military play a critical political role, too. According to Cizre, the military has an anti-political stance but it is also supra-political as it positions itself above politics and above society.

Starting from the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria of the EU, reforms focused on the autonomy of the elected civilian government over the military and emphasized curbing the legal power of the military. According to Soyler (2013), through the EU process, the autonomy of the Turkish military has decreased from “very high” to “high” in the last decade.

EU membership talks created dynamism in Turkish politics. After the AKP came to power in 2002, the EU accession process has been maintained. One of the main

Table 3. Defective Democracies: (Shows the “Damaged Attributes”)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Electoral Regime</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Rights</th>
<th>Horizontal Accountability</th>
<th>Effective-Power-to-Govern</th>
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<td>Illiberal</td>
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<td>Delegative</td>
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X: Damaged or missing attribute   ~: Attributes that can be damaged or missing

Table 4. Turkey’s Freedom House Scores From 1990 to 2015
points in EU membership talks was to curb the powers of the NSC because it was thought to be a shadow government. Some steps were taken against the NSC. First, it is converted into an advisory body, and then the number of its civilian members was increased. Second, the number of times the council meets has been reduced from monthly to bimonthly and the budget of the council has been reduced by 60 percent. Finally, “greater civilian control of military promotions and appointments” are observed. Overall, the tutelary characteristics have been gradually eliminated through these reforms.

Finally, let us take a closer look at the condition of horizontal accountability. In vertical accountability, voters hold representatives responsible for their actions. Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, is a check and balance mechanism “across a network of relatively autonomous powers.” Horizontal accountability, in Turkish case, has been damaged since 2010s when the AKP concentrated all state powers in its hands and eliminated its adversaries in the bureaucracy.

Although some autocratic governments undergo important regime changes, empirical studies demonstrate that they are not necessarily replaced by democratic systems.

According to Keyman and Gumuscu (2014), its electoral hegemony allowed the AKP to control all the institutions and the monopolization of power led to the erosion of horizontal accountability at the end.

The monopoly of power cripples the division of powers because the executive branch influences all other institutions. In parliamentary systems, the boundaries between legislative and executive is blurred most particularly when there is a majority. The critical balance is between the judiciary and the executive. The check and balance system does not work properly because the executive authority prevalently attempts to transgress the rule of law and court decisions, which in turn causes arbitrariness.

EU Progress Report (2015) on Turkey states that corruption investigations “remained inadequate” and law enforcements were bypassed. Some of AKP members abstained from implementing court orders (i.e. Presidential Palace, Validebag Mosque). In other respects, politicians attempted to influence judges and prosecutors. Accordingly, “The independence of the judiciary and the principle of separation of powers have been undermined and judges and prosecutors have been under strong political pressure.” Thus, horizontal accountability in Turkey is in question.

So far, we have tried to investigate the attributes of democracy in Turkey by demonstrating the contrasts in two periods. Although the military tutelage has been decreased significantly, the regime did not move towards democracy. As horizontal accountability has been damaged, the type of defective democracy has been transformed into a delegative structure.

Conclusion

Even though the power shifted from military to elected politicians, the “distance to democracy” has remained similar. The state underwent a regime change within defective democracy framework. The decrease in tutelary powers did not lead to the consolidation of democracy because horizontal accountability, a defining attribute of democracy, has been damaged to a certain extent. Turkey, with the change in regime attributions from the early 1990s to 2010s, has a distinct experience within hybrid regimes.

The Turkish case has some implications for democratization studies. First, it confirms Carothers’ criticism to transitiology. It can both be stable and to some degree erratic. Second, it implies that democratization is a complex phenomenon because there are unpredicted consequences. The military becomes weak in political arena but this process does not lead to a more democratic regime. It is similar to Jervis’s example quoted above from Huntington, in which the attempt to control military first erodes military’s professionalism and then makes it less responsive to civilian authority. Third, the relationship between effective-power-to-govern and horizontal accountability needs a further study. We suspect that more effective-power-to-govern causes less horizontal accountability in some certain contexts.

Endnotes

4  Carothers, Ibid.
6  Carothers, Ibid.
7  See e.g. Samuel E. Finer, Comparative Government, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970; O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter,

9 Carothers, Ibid., 10.
10 While democracy-with-adjectives can be O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy,” Zakaria’s “illiberal democracy,” and Merkel’s “defective democracy,” autocracy-with adjectives are Levitsky and Way’s “competitive authoritarianism” and Ottaway’s “semi-authoritarianism.”


12 Collier and Levitsky, Ibid., 438.
15 Collier and Levitsky, Ibid., 434.
16 Ibid., 434.
17 Ibid., 442.
19 Merkel, Ibid.
20 Merkel, Ibid., 36.
21 Ibid., 37.
22 Ibid., 48.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
Democrat Backsliding and the Role of the Military in post-Qadhafi Libya

Kawther Alfasi

The prospect of democratization in Libya looks increasingly bleak. In the immediate aftermath of a NATO-backed uprising in 2011 that toppled Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, hopes were high as Libyans went to the polls in July 2012 to elect a General National Congress (GNC) in the country’s first democratic, free and fair elections since 1952. Libya is now fractured across numerous political and ideological divides, but its overwhelming problem is undoubtedly a military one. Pro-Islamist militias in the west of the country have aligned themselves with the defunct GNC, under the banner of ‘Libya Dawn’, and control the capital city of Tripoli, and are opposed by ‘Operation Dignity’, an anti-Islamist campaign initiated by General Khalifa Haftar in May 2014, which has gained the support of the internationally recognized Libyan government, the House of Representatives.

With two governments in power and a disputed transitional roadmap, an analysis of the military in Libya is critical to understanding its democratic backslide. Concomitantly, the country’s distinctive political trajectory can serve as a way of expanding upon established approaches to democratization, authoritarian resurgence, and the role of militaries within those two processes.

It is commonly held that, by definition, democracy cannot be consolidated until the military is firmly subordinated to civilian control. In turn, it has been argued that democratization as a global phenomenon is being undermined by a legacy of military intervention in politics in contexts such as West Africa and Southeast Asia. The establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, as within East Central Europe, is a major component of post-authoritarian reform. Within the Middle Eastern context, militaries are now increasingly acting as arbiters of social unrest, switching between support of ‘the street’ and defense of the regime. The damaging effects of military intervention in politics are exemplified in Egypt, where the military, which possesses strong institutional autonomy, was able to oust an elected President through its proclaimed protection of the popular will.

Libya has not escaped comparison with Egypt. General Khalifa Haftar, who was appointed commander of the Libyan National Army ten months after launching an illegitimate military operation, has been characterized as the country’s ‘new strongman’. Haftar participated in Qadhafi’s 1969 coup against the monarchy, before defecting to the opposition in 1987 and returning to support the Libyan military effort against Qadhafi in 2011. His proclaimed goal is to restore peace and stability to Libya by eliminating rogue Islamist militias such as Ansar al-Sharia, but his detractors have denounced him as a ‘war criminal’ who poses a threat to Libyan democracy, and to the 2011 revolutionary mission as a whole. He has rallied the support of Qadhafi-era military officials, incorporating the symbol of the Qadhafi regime — the ‘eagle’ — into the colors of the revolutionary Libyan flag in a simultaneous appropriation and rejection of its mission.

Haftar is a divisive figure, but his reentrance into Libyan politics does not explain Libya’s military impasse. In reality, the very concept of a cohesive ‘military’ in Libya is nonexistent, despite the presence of the Libyan National Army. With multiple, self-contained military units established during the 2011 uprising, the Libyan state after Qadhafi has never claimed a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The Libyan National Army comprises a mixture of Qadhafi-era soldiers, tribally organized fighters, and federalists whose core mission is to win greater autonomy for Libya’s eastern region, Cyrenaica. Even before the rise of Haftar, there were military institutions such as the Libyan National Shield that existed as armies in waiting, in parallel to the Libyan National Army, and which sought to safeguard the ideals of the revolution from regime loyalists.

The establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, as within East Central Europe, is a major component of post-authoritarian reform.

The fragmented nature of Libya’s military has an important historical basis. Under Qadhafi, there was no overarching military hierarchy to unite the Armed Forces under one corporate banner: an approach that prevented them from developing a distinctive professional ethic and identity. Instead, the military under Qadhafi was diminished and excluded by turns, in a similar fashion to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, where a weak security sector reinforced a rent and patronage-based authoritarianism. As a result, and unlike other ‘Arab Spring’ countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, the military response to the Libyan uprising in 2011 was disjointed. Some of Qadhafi’s brigades defected almost immediately, particularly in the east of the country, while the most loyal security battalions remained at their posts. After the fall of Qadhafi, tens of thousands of fighters were placed on the state payroll, and the number of militias has increased correspondingly: from 100-300 armed groups after the ouster of Qadhafi, to approximately 1,600 three years later. With financial incentives to take up arms,
and the prospect of political marginalization should they be ceded, the Libyan government’s disarmament program was largely unsuccessful.

In order to grasp the relationship between militaries and authoritarian resurgence in Libya, there is a need to reexamine the dynamics of warfare in 2011, and indeed, the very process of democratic transition that was purportedly initiated by the Libyan uprising. Although the narrative of democratization was emphasized in official communiqués of Libya’s National Transitional Council in 2011, and in the broader media discourse, the revolutionaries themselves were of mixed political affiliations. They spanned former Al-Qaeda jihadists, regime defectors, tribes and ethnic groups that were marginalized under Qadhafi, young disenfranchised men, and networks of conservative groups from Misrata.

In order to grasp the relationship between militaries and authoritarian resurgence in Libya, there is a need to reexamine the dynamics of warfare in 2011, and indeed, the very process of democratic transition that was purportedly initiated by the Libyan uprising.

Islamist actors were also a diverse group, with competing understandings of the revolution’s motives and objectives. The 17 February Battalion headed by Fawzi Abu Katif contained numerous figures from the Muslim Brotherhood, and focused on conducting extensive political maneuverings in anticipation of the post-Qadhafi era. Ansar Al-Sharia, which has been held responsible for the attack on the U.S. Consular Compound in September 2012, was also formed during the Libyan uprising. Despite its unified overthrow of an authoritarian regime, the Libyan uprising cannot simply be a labeled democratizing enterprise. Indeed, some of the Islamist youth targeted by Haftar’s ‘Operation Dignity’, such as Wissam Bin Hamed, were fighting on his side during the 2011 uprising.

The dynamics of warfare in 2011 have resulted in blurred lines of distinction between democrats and authoritarianists, Islamists and liberals. Nevertheless, the mere proliferation of militias, irrespective of their affiliation, has been recognized as damaging to the democratization process. Islamist groups have been held responsible for the assassination of hundreds of lawyers, judges, activists and policemen in Benghazi. Popular demonstrations across Libya have called for the disbanding of militias and the establishment of state security institutions — ‘an army and a police’ — and have in turn culminated in violent clashes and the deaths of protesters. These popular calls for state security institutions expose the underlying tensions in the Libyan revolutionary mission. The Libyan National Army, with its promise of bringing stability to Benghazi, has rallied Qadhafi-era elites, and gained backing from communities in western and southern Libya that did even not support the 2011 revolution. Haftar’s project is in itself a re-enactment of Qadhafi’s malign war against Islamist extremists in 1990s.

The case of Libya problematizes our understanding of the relationship between militaries and democratization. It certainly remains the case that control of the military is a key barrier to a successful democratic transition in Libya. Critical legislation such as the Political Isolation Law of 2013 has been passed under the influence of armed militias, and military forces retain high economic and political prerogatives. However, the problem is not simply the inability to subordinate the military to civilian rule. It is the more fundamental failure to create a unified military force and a cohesive ‘Libyan National Army’ in the first place: an issue that has deep, historical roots in the Libyan state. As indicated by Linz and Stepan in their analysis of hybrid regime ‘situations’, this might necessitate a more contingent conception of post-authoritarian struggles over political and military authority, instead of an account of democratic backsliding, from temporary democratization to resurgent authoritarianism.

Kawther Alfasi is a third year PhD student in Politics at the University of Warwick, UK. After obtaining her undergraduate from the University of Oxford, she went on to complete her MA at the University of Birmingham, writing her thesis on the emergence and instrumentalization of religious nationalism in Libya. Her current research examines the interplay of symbolism and strategy in the Libyan uprising of 2011. She has previously worked as a research assistant at CASAW (Centre for Advanced Study of the Arab World), examining divergences and convergences in Islamist discourses within Egypt.

Endnotes
6 Al-Warfalli, A. “Libya’s Haftar appointed army chief for recognized government,” Reuters, 2 March 2015. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/02/uk-libya-security-army-idUKKBN0LY19N20150302
Book Review


Has democracy lost momentum? Twenty five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the “third wave” of global democratization, the optimism and expectations of democracy scholars and promoters have been shattered by a long list of transition failures, democratic recessions, and authoritarian strengthening in places as varied as Russia, Venezuela, Hungary, Turkey, Egypt, or China.

In this collection of essays originally published in the twenty-fifth anniversary issue of the Journal of Democracy (January 2015), the authors take stock of the state of democracy worldwide and reflect on the ways forward for the study of democratic development and its promotion. The six contributions in this book offer contrasted perspectives on the extent of the alleged “decline” of democracy and its potential causes. Rather than being a mere compilation of essays, the book provides a fine example of what edited volumes should be (but rarely are): a space for scholars to vigorously engage with each others’ assumptions, data and theories.

Several chapters, including those authored by Schmitter (Chapter 3), Levitsky and Way (Chapter 4), and Diamond (Chapter 6) take up head-on the question that gives its title to the book: Has democracy been in decline in the past decade? Their diagnoses vary. Diamond argues for an outright “recession” of democracy since the mid-2000s. In contrast, Schmitter posits that democracy is experiencing a crisis, not a decline, as polities move toward a post-liberal form of democracy. Levitsky and Way, in a rebuttal to Diamond’s theory of democratic decline, convincingly argue that the state of democracy has remained stable over the last decade and has improved considerably since the 1990s. Perceptions of a democratic recession, they argue, are the result of the “unrealistic expectations” generated by post-Cold War transitions, “that when not realized gave rise to exaggerated pessimism and gloom”. Overall, much of the debate between these scholars boils down to a quarrel on the rise or fall of the number of democracies since the mid-2000s, itself a subjective measure that depends essentially on how democracy is conceptualized and its attributes measured. The main take-away of these chapters is that whether the number of democracies has remained stable (as argued by Schmitter...
and Levitsky and Way) or slightly declined (as the figures put forward by Diamond suggest), the world has not experienced a reverse wave.

Perhaps a more interesting question, addressed by the three other essays is: why is there such a persistent perception (both among scholars and among the general public) that democracy is in decline? Poor institutions and shifting geopolitics are the main answers provided. In his contribution, Fukuyama argues that a “failure of institutionalization”, characterized among other things by a flawed transition from a neopatrimonial to modern state, has resulted in the poor (economic) performance of democracies and their delegitimation. While Fukuyama brings a much-needed focus on the need for better governance in young democracies, his contribution falls short of exploring the interaction between democratic development and governance reform: should it always be assumed that good governance and democratic development can always go hand in hand? Or are there times when they might impede each other? Moving beyond domestic factors, Kagan offers a reading of the “third wave” not merely as a “victory of ideas”, but as the result of an international climate propitious to democracy: the unipolar, US-dominated 1990s, created favorable conditions for the expansion of liberal democracy. In contrast, the geopolitics of the 21st century, marked by the strengthening of autocratic Russia and China, and the weakening of Western powers’ democracy promotion agenda, have created a much worse environment for the expansion of democracy. A nice complement to Kagan’s argument, Carothers’s essay reflects on the challenges of democracy assistance. He argues that democracy promoters have come to a crossroad and face the tough choice between pulling back from an increasingly challenging environment, and stepping up their efforts, notably by investing more in learning from their failures and pushing for pro-democracy diplomacy.

Overall, the book stands somewhere between a manifesto for democracy and a sobering analysis of its travails. The authors’ normative commitment to democracy is blatant, as evidenced by the foreword Condoleezza Rice, the editor’s reminder that the Journal of Democracy is “unabashedly in favor of democracy”, or Diamond’s conclusion that “it is vital that democrats in the established democracies not lose faith”. This commitment is challenged by the empirical reality of democracy’s failings, which all the contributions grapple with. Democracy may or not be declining, but the illusions and expectations it was associated with in the 1990s surely are.

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analyzed 581 political regimes having lasted for at least five years and 414 political regime changes in 167 countries (all countries of the world with more than half a million inhabitants) from 1800 to 2013. This is the longest time span of a trichotomous measure of political regimes and regime changes currently available, which should be of critical value for further empirical studies.*

From this platform, we confirm, first, that anocracy is a type of regime different from both democracy and autocracy and not only a situation or transitional stage of relatively brief duration between the other two types. More innovatively, we observe that the diffusion of regimes of anocratic type is not only a recent development produced by incomplete democratization attempts in the last few decades, but a category that can enlighten numerous cases of traditionally called “mixed” or “hybrid” regimes in the nineteenth century and until the mid-twentieth century.

Second, we revise the number of regime changes between each pair of the three categories since late eighteenth century, in order to see whether a general tendency towards democratization holds when the intermediate type is included and how the three-fold categorization can affect the magnitude of the tendency. While we confirm a general tendency towards increasing democratization, we also note the high number of countries in which anocratic or intermediate regimes have preceded complete openings to full democracy. This observation holds both for the “third wave” of democratization during the last 40 years and for the previous historical period.

Classifying Regime Types

Typologies of political regimes based on quantitative measurements are typically supported by scales of democracy, autocracy, political freedom or similar variables. However, the concept of political regime requires disjunct categories. When change is measured only by change in scores in continuous scales, the concept of political regime vanishes. If democracy were only a matter of degree, it might be difficult to agree on whether democracy began to exist in any country at any particular moment.

Most of the available regime typologies are either dichotomous or trichotomous. Dichotomous classifications consider only democracy and dictatorship whereas trichotomous classifications include an intermediate type between democracy and dictatorship. The annual reports of Freedom House provide a seven-point measure of political and civil rights, from which three types are distinguished: free, partly free, and not free countries (respectively corresponding to scales 1 to 2.5, 3 to 5, and 5.5 to 7) since 1972. The Polity project provides scales of democracy and of autocracy from +10 to -10, which are the basis for a threefold classification of regimes in democracies, anocracies and autocracies (respectively based on scales +6 to +10, -5 to +5, and -10 to -6), for the period since 1800.

An alternative for a long period also starting in the nineteenth century is the Political Regime Database. However, we have at least two caveats that incline us not to prefer this database: first, it includes a “Transition” category which, paradoxically, in many cases does not lead to a different type of regime, and second, in spite of having the “transitional” category it codes many experiences that have lasted for only one, two or other short periods of a few years as regimes and not as transitions.

While taking into account that the classifications obtained from most of the above-mentioned data-sources are strongly correlated, we base our analyses on the Polity project because it is the most encompassing one, especially for the inclusion of the three types of regime and for the length of the period covered.

Identifying “Hybrid” Regimes

The relevance of changes from autocracies that stopped short of full democratization was observed already by Samuel Huntington with his distinction between democratization and liberalization. He conceived the latter as the “partial opening” of an autocratic system short of choosing government leaders through freely competitive elections. Dealing also with forms of regime change, Josep Colomer characterized “a moderate reform of authoritarian institutions, which generally leads to a limited democracy”, as a stage involving political party elections by broad suffrage, but also “restrictions on the activity of certain parties, an electoral system that deviates representation in their...
which was defined as a combination of democratic and authoritarian elements, while Larry Diamond coined the expression “electoral authoritarianism”. This category includes both regimes with non-competitive elections (due to limited franchise, restricted entrance or skewed incumbent advantage) and regimes with competitive and open elections but no government’s electoral accountability because the effective power of elected officials is heavily limited. Further on, Andreas Schelder and his collaborators have broadly studied electoral authoritarian regimes. Along similar lines, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way characterize such a type of regime as those “that are sufficiently competitive to guarantee real uncertainty (and even turnover) but which fall short of democracy”.

Looking at the beast from the other side, other authors coined the expression “defective democracy” for regimes holding elections with insufficient degrees of franchise and participation rights, political freedom or government accountability. Alternative proposals to deal with the same phenomenon include labels such as “illiberal democracy”, “semi-authoritarianism”, “semi-dictatorship” and others.  

Matthijs Bogaards proposed to combine into a single category “two of the most systematic recent approaches, centered on the concepts of ‘defective democracy’ and ‘electoral authoritarianism’, which was to be operationalized as for those regimes having moderate negative values and moderate positive values in the Polity scale of authoritarianism and democracy. We share the conclusion that “hybrid regimes are neither a subtype of autocracies nor of democracies, but a regime type of their own”, which “are not to be confused with regimes in transition” or with transitional phases.  

In order to distinguish durable anocratic regimes from processes of change, we discard as regimes those situations having lasted for less than five years, as this seems to be a common period for regime change. As change generally develops over several variables (electoral competitiveness, participation, constitutional constraints on rulers, etc.), all changes not always occur in unison and a new full regime may require a few years to be established. In particular, a democracy or an anocracy lasting for at least five years usually includes at least two elections, which may imply a minimum appreciable degree of institutional stability.

Our calculations for regime type duration from 1800 to 2013 are shown in Table 1. In particular, we observe that the average duration of the all the 301 cases coded as anocracy is about 19 years. However, in many cases anocracy lasts for only a few years and is followed by further regime change. By discarding all transitional situations with a short duration of less than five years, we find 185 cases of nontransitional anocratic regimes with an average duration of 30 years. These values made durable anocracies comparable to the values of durable autocracies and democracies (as also counted for those having lasted for at least five years), which are 262 cases with an average duration of 35 years and 134 cases with an average duration of 34 years, respectively. This permits us to confirm that long-lasting anocracy is a distinctive type of regime which deserves to be included as such, together with autocracy and democracy, in analyses of regime duration, change, and relationships with other variables.

In light of the high number of electoral authoritarian regimes during the last few decades, Larry Diamond hypothesized that “this type of regime, which is now so common, is very much a product of the contemporary world”. Similar observations have placed “the emergence” of hybrid regimes at the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the “third wave” of democratization. However, the category of hybrid regime or anocracy turns out to also be very helpful to comprehend many historical experiences of traditionally called “mixed” regimes in the nineteenth century and until the mid-twentieth century in several continents.

Relevant cases of long duration of anocracy in relatively remote past periods include, first of all, a number of constitutional monarchies in Europe holding “elections before democracy”. This was the case of the United Kingdom for most of the time since mid-eighteenth century, after the King ceased using his veto over legislation and the prime minister elected by the parliament began to regularly become the actual chief executive. In spite of significant legal restrictions to enfranchisement, “the electorate was a numerically impressive, and for most of this period [1760-1832], a steadily increasing entity. It comprised a vast, if somewhat nebulous, electoral pool of fairly

### Table 1. Regime type duration (in years), 1800-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For all cases</th>
<th></th>
<th>For cases with duration ≥ 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>Average Duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracy</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>581</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ calculations with data from Polity IV project.*
wealthy, propertied individuals. Its members participated with commendable frequency in elections whenever the possibilities of such participation were open to them; control of elections by local elites became difficult and most elections were open to innovative candidates and uncertain results. Following an ‘anocratic’ experience of about 150 years, the United Kingdom evolved to democracy after a sequence of enlargements of suffrage rights, which included up to a majority of adult men by 1886.

In France, an anocratic constitutional monarchy followed by a brief second republic covered the period 1814-1851 in between the two autocratic empires headed by the two Napoleons. Three constitutional monarchies and a short-lived republic also existed in Spain in 1836-1858 and in 1868-1899. Regular elections were held, although with restrictions to participation and competition, before universal male suffrage and open entry to non-dynastic parties were introduced in 1890. In Germany, universal male suffrage for the Imperial Bundestag was introduced in 1875. In Colombia, restricted suffrage but relatively open elections were regularly held in the period 1832-1866, with “a record of outward stability superior to that of most of Latin America”, which was followed by a period of more conflictive democratization, and again since 1886, in “the longest period of internal political stability of [the country’s] independent history”, so that “by the 1930s Colombia was on the edge of being acclaimed as an exemplary Latin American democracy”, an achievement that was more clearly reached only in 1956. In Brazil, the Republic established in 1889 introduced direct elections with restricted suffrage and competition, which initiated the longest period of political regime stability and absence of major violent conflicts in Latin America until 1931. In Chile an extremely long period of high political stability, which was sustained upon low electoral participation, extended from 1822 to 1963, when a democratic regime was established.

Other major anocratic experiences, according to Polity’s codes, include Japan, where a constitutional monarchy was established during the Meiji period, initiated in the 1860s, by introducing the election of a legislative assembly with limited franchise, while the cabinet was responsible only to the emperor, in a comparable way to late nineteenth century Germany. Democracy was established in Japan after the Second World War. In China, a republic replacing the traditional Empire in 1911 became an anocratic experience that was ended by military invasion by Japan in 1936. The monarchy of Egypt, which declared independence from the British protectorate in 1922, also held constitutional elections until the military coup d’état in 1951. Liberia established an independent republic based on the principles denoted in the United States constitution in 1847, although with political competition constrained within Americo-Liberians, which lasted until the so-called “invisible protectorate” adopted by the U.S. in 1908.

The data show that diversely labeled intermediate “anocracies”, “partly free” or “hybrid” regimes have been a broadly diffused experience at least since traditional absolutist monarchies and colonial empires were shaken up in a few countries during the eighteenth century. Our data confirm the importance of this type of regime during the third wave of democratization started in the 1970s, especially in Asia, Africa and the Arab region. The longest-lasting, currently existing anocratic regimes include Singapore since 1959 and Malaysia since 1969.

### Types of Regime Change

The three-fold classification of regime types permits us to identify six types of regime change: three towards democracy, that is, “partial opening” from autocracy to anocracy, “complete opening” from anocracy to democracy, and “transition” from autocracy to democracy, and three in the reverse direction: “partial closing” from democracy to anocracy, “complete closing” from anocracy to autocracy, and “breakdown” from democracy to autocracy.

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**In light of the high number of electoral authoritarian regimes during the last few decades, Larry Diamond hypothesized that ‘this type of regime, which is now so common, is very much a product of the contemporary world**
We consider only changes between different types of regime, not within each type, thus we do not count as a regime change the replacement of a dictator with another, limited institutional reforms in an anocratic regime, or a constitutional revision in democracy.22 Regarding “transitions”, we include not only relatively peaceful processes mostly led by fractionalized elites by way of negotiations and pacts, as was typical at the beginnings of the “third wave”, but also relatively fast experiences of democratization from autocracy involving stronger mass mobilizations or significant violence, as was more frequent in previous periods, and particularly at the end of the Second World War. The independence of colonies and the creation of new countries are counted as changes from autocracy, even if the metropolis was democratic, as for the autocratic condition of colonial domination, such as, for instance, in the case of the process in India from the United Kingdom in 1947-50. The numbers for each type of regime change are given in Table 2.

We find much higher numbers of changes in the direction towards democratization than in the reverse direction during more than two hundred years (293 vs. 121 changes). In particular, regarding the intermediate category of anocracy, we confirm and expand on the observation for electoral authoritarianism that it “has not spread primarily at the expense of democracy, but of non-electoral autocracies” (Schedler 2013: 3). There are nowadays two and a half times more anocracies which were established from autocracies than from democracies (36 and 14, respectively). Cases include former Soviet republics after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, including Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Georgia which eventually evolved to democracy in 2003. In the Arab region, anocratic regimes with limited albeit positive degrees of political freedom have existed in Tunisia since 1987, Jordan since 1989, Algeria since 1995, as well as, in spite of enormous challenges, in Egypt and Iraq for some short periods since 2005. A most recent case of anocracy by semi-opening is the monarchy of Bhutan, which began to be opened to parties and elections since 2008 when it adopted its first modern constitution.

All this illustrates the liberalizing character of most anocracies, in contrast to those that imply a reversal of a previous democratization. However, the rate of success has been double for those who have attempted to close an existing democratic regime than for those who have attempted to open an autocratic regime. While more than half of the attempts at partially closing a democracy have led to currently existing anocracies (14 of 24 cases), only less than one fourth of the attempts to open an autocracy have led to currently existing anocracies (36 of 159 cases).

Regarding democracy, of the 89 currently existing democratic regimes in countries with more than half a million population, 49 were established from autocracies by means of relatively short processes of transition of less than five years of duration, and 40 were established from previously existing anocracies having lasted in average for about 34 years. Both the way of transition from an autocratic regime and the way of opening from an intermediate anocracy have produced rates of about two-thirds of success. Specifically, 49 of the 75 attempted transitions and 40 of the 59 attempted complete openings have led to currently existing democracies.

Processes of complete opening to democracy from a previously existing anocratic regime have been almost as popular as direct transitions from autocracies in all “waves” of democratization, in particular before and after 1973. Among the 28 currently existing democracies that were established during the period from early nineteenth century to 1973, 13 were established from anocratic regimes while the other 15 were by short transitions. Specifically, democracy was the outcome of processes from previously existing anocratic regimes in cases such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Costa Rica and Canada during the nineteenth century. In contrast, short transitions led to democracy especially in former British colonies such as New Zealand, Australia and India, in Western Europe including France, Germany and Italy, and in Japan at the end of the Second World War.

Likewise, in the most recent period since 1974, in which most current democracies have been established, comparable numbers have been the result of transitions and of openings: 35 and 27, respectively. Short and mostly peaceful transitions developed in Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin America

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Table 2. Regime type change, 1800-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type Change</th>
<th>No. Countries</th>
<th>No. Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partial opening (from autocracy to anocracy)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete opening (from anocracy to democracy)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition (from autocracy to democracy)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial closing (from democracy to anocracy)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete closing (from anocracy to autocracy)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown (from democracy to autocracy)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>414</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As every country has an initial political regime, the total number of regimes (581 as reported in table 1) = number of countries (167) + number of regime changes (414).

Source: Authors’ calculations with data from Polity IV project.
We find much higher numbers of changes in the direction towards democratization than in the reverse direction during more than two hundred years.

Conclusion

By using a trichotomous classification of regime types that includes the intermediate category of anocracy between democracy and autocracy, we have developed a new analysis of political regime types and regime changes in all countries of the world with more than half a million inhabitants from 1800 to 2013. We have been able to present a number of innovative insights:

We have confirmed, quantified and illustrated that anocracy or hybrid regime can be considered not a transitional situation between autocracy and democracy, but a long-living type of political regime. This intermediate category can enlighten the analysis of numerous cases of mixed monarchies and comparable institutional arrangements during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A large majority of the current anocracies were established after processes of liberalization from autocracies, rather than from failed experiences of democratization. Non-transitional anocracies have had a similar duration to that of autocracies and democracies in modern times.

Attempts at democratization have been about equally successful when they have been tried from autocracies by means of a short transition as when they have been the result of a relatively smooth evolution from an intermediate or anocratic regime. During the “third wave” of democratization initiated in 1974, in which most currently existing democracies have been established, comparable numbers of them have resulted from transitions and from opening. These preliminary findings should trigger and help further innovative discussion and research.

Josep M. Colomer is Research Professor of Government and Senior Fellow in Democracy and Governance at Georgetown University, in Washington, DC, author of more than 200 academic articles and book chapters and author or editor of 23 books in six languages, including The Science of Politics (Oxford 2010). David Banerjea holds a Master’s degree in Latin American Studies from Georgetown University. Fernando B. de Mello holds a Master’s degree in Latin American Studies from Georgetown University.

Endnotes


6 More surveys and discussion of different measures and classifications can be found in Zachary Elkins, “Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations,” American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2, April 2000): 293-300; Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative indices,” Comparative Political Studies 35 (February 2002): 5-34; Daniel Pemstein, Stephen A. Meserve and James Melton, “Democratic Compromise: A Latent variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type,” Political Analysis 18 (2010): 426-449, Carles Boix et al. (2012) cit. Polity IV is also used as the basis for a threefold typology by David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Democratic Transitions, ” Comparative Political Science 50 (3, 2006): 551-569, but the authors do not use the categories suggested by the source, but their own which they call autocracy, partial democracy, and full democracy (respectively corresponding to scales -10 to 0, +1 to +7, and +8 to +10). This could be read as implying that the intermediate category must be entirely on the positive (or “democratic”) half of the scale, but the authors emphasize that “leaving autocracy is not the same as entering democracy” and that “partial democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime types”. In comparison with the three categories suggested by Polity IV, which we use in the current article, the classification by Epstein et al. would underestimate the spread and importance of intermediate regimes.


11 The five year period is also discussed and used by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 78.


22 This is in contrast, for instance, with the counting of different autocratic regimes by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Automatic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (June 2014): 313-331.
In August we welcomed our 10th class into the MA program! Joining us this year are Saki Araida, Ryan Bennett, Evan Chichiaro, Brittany Gaddy, Olan Johnson, Elizabeth Lievens, Jessica Mortellaro, Elizabeth O’Hara, Sundar Ramanujam, Hanxianbo Zhao, Yufei Zhang, and Thomas Williams.

This fall the program welcomed Dr. Georges Fauriol to the program. Dr. Fariol is a vice president at the National Endowment for Democracy, and taught the course “Democracy Promotion” in the fall.

On October 15, 2015 the Democracy and Governance Program hosted its annual career panel. This year’s participants were Thomas Garrett (Vice President, IRI), Dr. Patrick Quirk (State Department, CSO), Claire Roberston ’14 (DI), and Shuang Bin ’12 (ISS).

On November 10, 2015, the Democracy and Governance Program co-hosted the Transatlantic Youth Summit along with the International Republican Institute. The event brought together over 50 young members of parliament from Europe, and Washington D.C. area professionals. Our current students Katie LaRoque (’16), Stephanie Roland (’16), and Elizabeth O’Hara (’17) participated.

On November 16th DG co-hosted an event with the MSFS Global Politics and Security Program with Kyrgyz Ambassador Toktogulov titled “Kyrgyzstan’s Democratic Development.”

On December 10, 2015, the Democracy and Governance Program held a panel at the International Monetary Fund on corruption and governance as part of the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management (ICGFM). Participating were Prof. Yonatan Morse, Prof. Jodi Vittori of Georgetown and Global Witness, alumni Andrea Murta (’13) of the Atlantic Council, and our friend Tom Caradmon of Global Financial Integrity.

The program’s one-credit skill courses entered their second year to great success. There are now offerings on grant writing, policy writing, technology for social change, leadership, advocacy skills, and budgeting. The courses were recently highlighted by Georgetown University’s Provost (https://blog.provost.georgetown.edu/supports-for-faculty-to-teach-in-more-expansive-ways/)


On July 15, 2015 Prof. Daniel Brumberg wrote a piece for the Washington Examiner titled “The Iran Nuclear Talks: Failure was not an Option” (http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-iran-nuclear-talks-failure-was-not-an-option/article/2568233#.VaZHBE_O0L8. facebook)


After nearly 5 years at DAI, Elizabeth Cutler left in November 2015 to start a new position with the Office of Foreign Assistance at the State Department. She handles foreign assistance allocations for the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and special representatives. She also continues to serve in a volunteer capacity as the Senior Vice President of the nonprofit Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.

Josh Linden just returned from South Sudan for Democracy International, working for six months on a civil society program to help launch a series of civic engagement centers around the country for CSOs and citizens. Also, he has just accepted a new position at IFES as a Senior Program Officer on their Africa Team.
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